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Foreword
Forecasting is one of the oldest of demographic activities, and yet it
has never been fully integrated with the main body of demographic
theory and data. The fact that the public regards it as our most im-
portant task finds no reflection in our research agenda; the amount
of it done is out of all proportion to the fraction of space devoted to
it in professional journals. The best demographers do it, but none
would stake their reputation on the agreement of their forecasts
with the subsequent realization - in fact some of the most eminent
demographers have been the authors of the widest departures.
Demographers do not use the departures as data for learning
how to improve their skills; in fact they rarely even look back at
forecasts made 10 or 20 years earlier to note what the errors have
been. Anyone who expects that after a census is taken there will be
a flurry of articles recalling previous forecasts and congratulating or
condemning will be disappointed. Writers merely go on to forecast
the next following census, usually without even a glance at their
past errors.
The present volume is designed to correct this unsatisfactory
condition. Its writers include some of the best-known names in the
profession, as well as younger people who in due course will succeed
them as leaders. They systematically go through the components of
future population - births, deaths, migration - that for any individ-
ual include all the possible ways of entering or leaving the world or
any country in it. The chapters explore the possibilities of bringing
the best demographic methods to the improvement of our knowledge
of future population. Few show any defensiveness in regard to their
own earlier forecasts; the approach throughout is fresh and original.
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By bringing to bear the best of demographic knowledge on an
application whose importance has recently been accentuated by con-
cern with environment, this book will provide a valuable contribu-
tion in its own right, and at the same time be a stimulus to further
needed research.
Nathan Keyfitz
International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis
Preface to the 1996 Edition
The 1990s are developing into a period of significant demographic
changes in many parts of the world. The unexpected political
and economic transformations in Eastern Europe brought about
dramatic demographic consequences such as precipitously declining
birth rates and increasing death rates, especially for men. In Russia
male life expectancy has recently declined by an estimated seven
years. However, at the global level, the rapid fertility declines in
Southern Asia and the fact that the fertility transition in Africa fi-
nally seems to have gained momentum have had a greater influence
than the changes in Eastern Europe. Also, fertility in China has
further declined below replacement level. Available data indicate
that fertility declined in every world region between 1990 and 1995.
At the same time, AIDS and other infectious diseases have recently
depressed the prospects for mortality improvements in many devel-
oping countries. The combination of decreasing fertility and higher
than expected mortality means declines in world population growth.
Indeed, most world population projections now call for somewhat
lower growth than the forecasts presented earlier in the decade.
The population projections included in the first edition of The
Future Population of the World were based on 1990 data and did
not reflect these recent changes in the starting population. Hence,
when the publisher asked us whether we wanted to include any re-
visions in a new edition of the book we decided to make the effort
of recalculating the projections with a 1995 starting year. We also
introduced a number of technical improvements, such as additional
age groups at the high end (up to age 120) and adjustments in the
mortality schedules. Also the definition of geographic regions was
modified slightly to conform with that used by other IIASA projects.
Most of the substantive background chapters in the volume were re-
vised and updated. The chapter on AIDS in Africa was replaced by
a recent paper on global AIDS mortality by the same author.
xiv
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What is most important is that this volume reflects a further
evolution of how to deal with uncertainty in population projections.
We decided to go beyond the alternative scenario approach that
was used in the first edition (and is still used in Chapter 15) and to
present a fully probabilistic set of projections with confidence inter-
vals based on expert opinion on probability distributions of fertility,
mortality, and migration in the 13 world regions (as discussed in
Chapters 2 and 16). To my knowledge this is the first published set
of probabilistic world population projections.
Wolfgang Lutz
Leader, Population Project
Spring 1996
Introduction
Public interest in population research seems to follow a cyclical pat-
tern of ups and downs that is not directly related to demographic
trends. Whereas the 1960s and early 1970s was a period of interna-
tional upsurge in public concern about population and demographic
research, during the 1980s population hardly made it into the head-
lines. Currently, we are experiencing a new wave of public interest
in world population growth which is largely fueled by ecological
concerns. Population growth has been mentioned repeatedly in in-
ternational fora and the media as one of the driving forces, if not
the single most important factor, in global environmental change.
But this time it is natural scientists rather than demographers who
point at the importance of the issue.
Demographers remain conspicuously silent in the face of the at-
tention suddenly given to an issue they have carefully studied for
decades, while researchers in other disciplines attempt to occupy
this territory. Demographers, who should have better knowledge
of population dynamics and the determinants of fertility, mortality,
and migration, tend to be embarrassed over frequent oversimplifica-
tions in the present debate, and also tend to be puzzled over how
to approach the highly complex issue of population---environment in-
teraction. Scientists from other disciplines are often less cautious in
making statements about the role of population and do not always
apply the same rules of scientific scrutiny to population studies that
they apply to their own discipline. It is also problematic when sci-
entific paradigms from the natural sciences and animal ecology are
directly applied to complex social systems.
Without a doubt this new interest in population issues presents
new challenges and opportunities for demographers and social sci-
entists in general. Instead of retreating from this territory of
xvi
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increasingly interdisciplinary population analysis, the demographic
community could show flexibility and directly address some of the
well-justified questions asked by the outside world. These questions
are discussed in Chapter 2 of this volume. One central question in
this context regards possible future population trends in the face of
ecological constraints and new threats to human life. An increas-
ing number of people want to know more about possible alternative
population trends than the information provided in standard pop-
ulation projections. Such people include scholars in energy analysis
who want long-range population scenarios as inputs to their mod-
els; regional planners, politicians, and business leaders who want to
develop robust strategies that hold under different possible future
population patterns; and an increasing number of individuals who
are simply interested in the topic. These nondemographers often
want to know more about the assumptions made, their justifica-
tions, and the range of uncertainty than has been given to them up
to now by demographers.
This volume has been produced because of the belief that the
demographic community can do more in terms of summarizing its
knowledge about future population trends than has been done in
the past. In this, the book attempts to serve a dual purpose: to
respond to the challenge of increased outside interest in alternative
future population trends and to advance within the demographic
community the discussion on the approaches and assumptions to be
chosen for population projections. By summarizing essential results
of demographic research and how they relate to a broad range of
relevant issues, the volume may also serve as a textbook.
The volume's approach follows that of an earlier book, Future
Demographic Trends in Europe and North America: What Can We
Assume Today? (Lutz, ed., 1991, Academic Press, London, UK).
The basic idea is to devote the bulk of space to substantive delib-
erations of experts with partly differing views about possible future
trends in the three components of population change (fertility, mor-
tality, and migration), and then translate these opinions into alter-
native projections. In this book the geographic focus is widened
to encompass all world regions, and the treatment of uncertainty is
more elaborate than in the above-mentioned book.
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Part I of the volume addresses the question, Why another set
of global population projections? It starts with a comprehensive
survey of past long-range global population projections in Chap-
ter 1 written by Tomas Frejka, who in the early 1970s produced the
most influential set of long-range projections following Notestein's
work of 1945 and introduced the concept of convergence toward
replacement-level fertility. In his contribution, Frejka emphasizes
the lessons learned from past projections and points at desirable
features of new world population projections. In Chapter 2, Wolf-
gang Lutz, Joshua Goldstein, and Christopher Prinz discuss some
basic questions in population projections which are rarely addressed
in an explicit way. The chapter, entitled "Alternative Approaches to
Population Projection," deals with such issues as who is interested
in projections, what output parameters are desired, what time hori-
zons are appropriate, and how to handle uncertainty. Chapter 2 also
presents and justifies the specific approach chosen for this study.
Part II is dedicated to future fertility in today's developing coun-
tries. It consists of fOUf chapters dealing with different aspects of
this issue which will dominate the extent of future world population
growth. In Chapter 3, John Cleland gives a comprehensive survey
of regional fertility trends between 1960 and 1995 and the factors
behind these changes. This chapter serves as an important basis
for the IIASA fertility assumptions. Chapter 4, by Charles Westoff,
is more explicitly oriented toward the future; it summarizes the ex-
tensive empirical evidence on reproductive preferences and discusses
their implications for the future course of fertility decline. From this
analysis, powerful arguments can be derived for assuming fertility
declines, at least in the near future. In Chapter 5, Mercedes Concep-
cion looks at another important factor in determining future fertility
levels, namely, the role of population policies and family-planning
programs. Based on the experience from Southeast Asia, she shows
that such programs can make a big difference if certain precondi-
tions are met. In Chapter 6, Griffith Feeney gives an account of the
amazing fertility changes in China. Based on the analysis of parity
progression ratios, he also derives some alternative scenarios for fu-
ture fertility in that country, which currently is home to one-fifth of
the world's population.
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Part III of the volume looks at future mortality in developing
countries. It also consists of four chapters. An introductory chapter
by Birgitta Bucht (Chapter 7) provides a comprehensive analysis of
recent mortality trends in the different developing regions. Michel
Garenne in Chapter 8 focuses on mortality in sub-Saharan Africa,
the world region with the greatest uncertainties. One of the un-
certainties, the mortality impact of AIDS, is explicitly addressed in
Chapter 9 by John Bongaarts. Finally, Gerhard Heilig in Chap-
ter 10 addresses a crucial question which is usually excluded from
population projections, namely, Will there be enough food to feed
all the people projected or is famine-related mortality likely to in-
crease at some point? His conclusion is that, at least for the next
decades, global food supplies should be sufficient under favorable
political conditions.
Part IV considers fertility and mortality in today's industrial-
ized countries. It has two chapters but, in the discussion, reference
is also made to the 14 chapters included in an earlier book on that
topic (Lutz, 1991). Lutz in Chapter 11 considers various arguments
that would suggest further fertility declines in today's low-fertility
countries as well as some arguments implying higher fertility. James
Vaupel and Hans Lundstrom in Chapter 12 focus on the contro-
versial issue of future old-age mortality in developed societies. For
making future mortality assumptions over many decades in countries
that already have female life expectancies of around 80 years, the
question of an upper limit to the human life span becomes decisive.
Part V of the volume considers migration between the world
regions. International migration is a weak point in most population
projections because of missing data and the volatility of migration
trends. Fot these reasons it has sometimes been omitted in popu-
lation studies; this omission results in the assumption of zero net-
migration. This volume makes an effort to deal with migration more
explicitly than it has been dealt with in the past. In Chapter 13,
Hania Zlotnik uses the best data available to present a systematic
analysis of past interregional migration flows. This is complemented
by a very broad consideration of possible future migration patterns
by Sture Oberg in Chapter 14. Taken together, these two chap-
ters provide a basis for making alternative assumptions on future
xx
interregional migration flows that have a status that is equal to the
fertility and mortality assumptions used in the scenario calculations
presented in the final section.
Part VI presents the actual population projections for 13 world
regions with assumptions based on the substantive considerations
given in all previous chapters. Lutz, Warren Sanderson, Sergei
Scherbov, and Anne Goujon present two very different sets of pop-
ulation projections to 2100. The first set, described in Chapter 15,
includes 27 scenarios giving all possible combinations of high, cen-
tral, and low values in fertility, mortality, and migration in all world
regions. It also gives a number of special scenarios assuming in-
teractions between the components and feedbacks from the results.
Chapter 16 goes further and provides a fully probabilistic projection
of all world regions. To my knowledge this is the first such attempt;
it is based entirely on expert assumptions about the uncertainty dis-
tributions offuture fertility, mortality, and migration trends. Exten-
sive Appendix Tables at the end of the book document the results.
There is also a section comparing IIASA's projections with those of
other institutions.
An epilogue by Lutz puts the results of the projection exercises
back into the broader perspective of global change and international
controversies surrounding population issues. It considers two neces-
sary trade-offs which are not always recognized in the political de-
bates - namely, that between curbing population growth and rapid
population aging and that between slower growth and lower mor-
tality. The epilogue also distinguishes between future population
trends that are inevitable and those that can be influenced some-
. what by human activities and changes in behavior. There still is
a wide range of uncertainty and room for alternative choices that
may have significant impact. This book attempts to summarize the
demographic knowledge on which these choices can be based.
Wolfgang Lutz
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Part I
Why Another Set of
Global Population
Projections?
The two contributions in Part I provide a framework for the sub-
stantive presentations in Parts II through V and in particular for
the projections discussed in Part VI. The chapters show that the
generation of new world population projections is useful provided
that the approach followed (a) uses the most recent demographic
data; (b) reflects the current scientific knowledge of the relevant
disciplines; (c) considers several possible future trends in all three
demographic components (fertility, mortality, and migration); (d)
leaves room for substantive considerations of justifiable alternative
future trends in the components; and (e) possibly improves the way
projections deal with uncertainty or considers the interactions be-
tween the demographic variables and their socioeconomic and nat-
ural environments. The projections presented in this volume try to
meet these criteria.
Users of population projections generally demand two types of
information from population projections: (a) one most likely pro-
jections that can be used as a guideline and (b) information about
the range of uncertainty for sensitivity analyses and for testing the
robustness of certain strategies (or policies). Several users - espe-
cially environmental modelers - demand projections until the end
of the 21st century.
To meet these demands the alternative assumptions defined
by the group of experts are extended to the end of 21st century
in Chapters 15 and 16. They provide users with one most likely
path, a broad range of alternative scenarios, and a fully probabilis-
tic projection.

Chapter 1
Long-range Global Population
Projections: Lessons Learned
Tomas Frejk:a
Gregory King (1648-1712), the first known creator of long-range
global population projections, wrote that "if the World should con-
tinue to N' Mundi [anno mundi] 20,000 [A.D. 16,052] it might then
have 6,500 million" (King, 1696). In reality, the world's population
will reach the number projected by King early in the next century,
most likely in about 10 years from the writing of this chapter. In
hindsight his projection left much to be desired. But did he pro-
vide knowledge and insights that were interesting and valuable to
his contemporaries?
This chapter provides an overview of the leading long-term pop-
ulation projections that have been developed to date: their basic
characteristics and an examination of this experience to extract the
lessons learned and to attempt to formulate some general princi-
ples on what makes long-range projections interesting and useful
and what kinds of circumstances justify the creation of a new set
of projections. As a rule, to 'which there will be some exceptions,
this chapter deals only with long-range population projections - i.e.,
those that span over a century or more.
Frejka (1981a) introd nces a classification of global population
projections which distinguishes between extrapolations oftotalnum-
bers and global fomponent projections. The latter are component
This chapter uses a significant part of the work done in Frejka (1981a).
~~
4 Tomas Frejka
projections in two senses: demographic components (fertility, mor-
tality, and age structure) and country and region components that
are aggregated into global projections. Progress from the former to
the latter was historically the basic methodological innovation. In
this chapter we briefly review other new ideas and methods as they
are being applied in the preparation of long-range global population
projections.
1.1 Early Global Projections:
Extrapolations
The few global population projections made up to the mid-20th
century tended to be long range and were based on extrapolations
of total numbers (Table 1.1). The authors (King, 1696; Knibbs,
1928; Pearl, 1924; Pearl and Gould, 1936) based these projections
on their respective observations of population growth rates and of
mechanisms of population growth that were believed to regulate
human population change. The reason for concern about future
population growth was anxiety with regard to the world's carrying
capacity. The method used by King and Knibbs was very simple.
They applied the current estimated population growth rates to the
estimated size of the population.
Pearl undertook extensive research which led him to believe that
there is a law according to which growth of populations (not only
human) takes place, that this law is in principle shaped by biolog-
ical and environmental forces, and that the resulting trend can be
expressed mathematically in various forms of the stretched out S-
shaped logistic curve. In 1924 Pearl calculated the curve for the
world population and subsequently, in 1936, together with Gould
he revised the curve for the world population upward arguing that
there is a "necessity for frequent revision of human population lo-
gistics as new data become available."
1.2 Modern Global Component Projections
The evolution of population theory and methods, as well as the
continuously greater availability of demographic data, has provided
the base for developing more sophisticated population projections.
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Table 1.1. Long-term global population projections.
Population (in millions)
Author Year Alternative To 1950 1950 1970 2000 2050 2100
King 1696 630 780
(B=1695) (2052)
Pearl 1924 1649 1832 1901 1963 2007 2020
(B=1914)
Knibbs 1928 1950 3900 15600
(B=1928) (2008) (2169)
Pearl & 1936 2073 2153 2305 2459 2582 2625
Gould (B=1931)
Notestein 1945 3300
Frejka 1973 NRR=l.O
2040 6670 13025 15102
2020 6422 10473 11169
2000 3645(B) 5923 8172 8389
1980 5116 6286 6417
1970 4746 5592 5691
UN 1974 Medium 3621 (B) 6406 11163 12257
Littmau & 1977 3968 5882 8188
Keyfitz (B=1975)
UN 1978 High 6509 12076 14180
Medium 4033 6199 9775 10525
Low (B=1975) 5856 8004 8029
Bogue & 1979 High 5972
Tsui MedilUl1 B=1975 5883 8107
Low 5756 7816
World Bank 1980 4416 6015 9868
(B=1980) (stat. )
Frejka 1980 NRH=1.0
plausible high 6353 11015 12348
2040 6357 11648 13427
2020 4412 6234 9902 10639
2000 (B=1980) 5930 8214 8539
1980 5333 6743 6986
plausible low 6046 8762 9208
UN 1982 Growth 4441 6337 11690 14927
High 4441 6337 11629 14199
Medium 4432 6119 9513 1018.5
Low 4420 5837 7687 7524
Decline 4420 .5837 7667 7247
(B=1980)
World Bank 1985 4442 6147 9496 10681
(B=1980) (stat.)
UN 1992 High 5327 6420 12506 19156
Medium/High 5327 6420 12495 17592
Medium 5292 6261 10019 11186
Medium/Low 5262 6093 7817 6415
Low 5262 6093 7813 6009
(B=1990)
B stands for base year of projection; NRR stands for net reproduction rate.
Sources: See references.
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The leading scholar who transformed the potentiality into reality
was Frank Notestein. The methodology of component population
projections was first applied in a study of Europe and the Soviet
Union commissioned by the League of Nations in the early 1940s
(Notestein et al., 19H). This study was perceived as the first vol-
ume of a series of studies on world population trends and problems.
Soon thereafter, Notestein (1945) presented the first modern global
population projections. He reviewed past population trends of coun-
tries and continents; he discussed his understanding of the mecha-
nisms of population change, distinguishing three main demographic
types of populations corresponding to different stages of the "demo-
graphic evolution" ("incipient decline," "transitional growth," and
"high growth potential"'); and finally, he discussed prospects for
growth and provided projections separately by continent on the ba-
sis of which he concluded that "summing the hypothetical figures
for the year 2000, we have a world total of 3.3 billion people. On the
assumption of general order and the spread of modern techniques
of production the figure is probably conservative." Even though it
spanned only over a period of" half a century, Notestein's projec-
tion of the world populat ion is discussed in this chapter because of
its pioneering nature and because the applied ideas, approach, and
methods provided the base for a generation of world, regional, and
national projections to follow.
Notestein's projections permit the formulation of general char-
acteristics and procedures that constitute the basis of long-range
population projections:
• An explicit or implicit theoretical framework of the mechanisms
of population change. which guides the formulation of assump-
tions about future changes in delllographic trends.
• A wealth of accumulated demographic data which serves as the
empirical base for the framework, provides the input data for the
benchmark year/period of the projections, and makes possible
a disaggregated approach.
• A methodology which usually consists of (a) a separate assess-
ment of an initial age structure and separate projection of the
two motor forces of demographic dynamics in a closed popula-
tion -- mortality and fertility (the combination of these elements
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yields the so-called component projection of a population) - and
(b) a separate assessment and projection of national and/or re-
gional populations, which, when aggregated, yield global projec-
tions or which provide a check on separately computed global
projections.
• Advances in any of these characteristics and procedures depend
on advances of demographic and social science research as well
as on advances in data collection.
Notestein 's contribution was not only important because he ap-
plied and combined all of the above elements but also critical from a
substantive perspective. His theoretical framework is based on the
demographic transition theory labeled the "demographic evolution"
in Notestein 's 1945 piece. It is the demographic transition theory
which - for the most part implicitly - is the theoretical base for
the majority of the global long-range population projections that
followed.
The sets of the United Nations population projections of the
19.50s and 1960s followed Notestein 's model, with refinements being
introduced as methods of demographic analysis developed and new
data became available. The time span of these projections was from
:30 to 45 years. A particularly innovative set was prepared in 1957
(U N, 1958) which made considerable use of sophisticated methods in
estimating demographic parameters and in the projection computa-
tions. For these projections the UN (19.55) prepared a set of model
life tables, as well as models of fertility trends. This was the first
UN projection extended to the yeaT 2000, for which time a global
population ranging between 4.9 and 6.9 billion was projected. As we
approach the year 2000 it now appears that the UN's 19.57 medium
projection will come remarkably close to what the actual figure for
the year 2000 is likely to be, 6.:~ billion. The central objective of the
UN sets was defined as "an attempt to project population changes
into the future as accurately as possible with available information
to provide basic data on population size and characteristics for fu-
hue planning" (UN, 197:3). The focus of population projections up
to this point in time was on providing the best possible, "as accurate
as possible," projection. forecast. or even prediction.
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1.3 Contemporary Long-range Projections
The first set of long-range projections to follow Notestein's work
of 1945 was developed by Frejka (i97:3a) in the early 1970s (the
ideas and methods applied were originally developed in a study of
the US population in Frejka, 19(8). These projections were meant
to demonstrate t he strength of the population growth momentum
inherent in current demographic characteristics - age structure and
levels as well as age-specific st mct mes of fertility and mortality -
and the strength of behavioral continuities. The principal innovation
was to prepare scenario pro,jections in contrast to projections that
were aimed at projecting future demographic trends as accurately
as possible. More specifically, these projections were designed:
• To map alternative scenarios of how the demographic transition
could proceed toward an assumed low mortality-low fertility
equilibrium expressed by a net reproduction rate of unity being
reached at defined alternative future dates.
• To illustrate the long-range implications for population growth
of specific demographic, mainly fertility, trends.
• To demonstrate the more likely alternatives of future popula-
tion growth in the context of unrealistic/unlikely projections
based on implausibly rapid or implausibly slow assumed trends
of fertility decline.
The emphasis was on generating illustrative scenario projec-
tions, not on generating projections that would aim at depicting
future trends as accurately as possible. At the same time, however,
there was a dear intention to supply a good idea of likely future
trends by providing the possibility of comparing more realistic al-
ternatives with what appeared to be clearly unrealistic options. The
projections were computed for a period of almost 200 years rather
than the customary period of between 30 and 50 years (for instance,
the UN projections).
The assumption that a, low fertility-low mortality stationary
population could be achieved and possibly maintained in the long
run appeared quite plausible in light of the trends in the demograph-
ically mature countries through the late 1960s. There seemed to be
a reasonable (tacit) consensus at the time that post-demographic
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transition societies would stabilize, with fertility and mortality be-
ing such that the long- term net reproduction rate average would be
around unity. In hindsight, the experience of Western countries, par-
ticularly since the early 1970s, has not confirmed this assumption.
These projections provided a vivid illustration of the long-term
consequences for population growth of demographic trends, mainly
of fertility, of the foreseeable fllture, say of the 1970s and 1980s,
which presumably could be modified by public policies. While the
calculations of the global population for the year 20.50, for example,
ranged between 5.6 and 1:3.0 billion (see Table 1.1), it was argued
that the alternative results yielding figures below 8 billion could
be dismissed as unrealistic because the calculations were based on
assumptions of unrealistically rapid fertility decline. With consid-
erably less certainty the numbers at the upper limits of the range
were cast in doubt, as historical experience seemed to indicate that
fertility would be likely to decline faster than the defined assump-
tions for the high projection. Consequently, it was argued that the
global population in the middle of the next century would probably
be between 8 and 12 billion and tha.t whether the actual population
would be closer to the upper or lower limit would depend on how
vigorously major factors shaping fertility decline, including public
policies, would exert their impact.
During the 1970s and 1980s various institutions, in particu-
lar the UN (197.5, 1981b, 1982b, 1992c) but also the World Bank
(Zachariah and Vu, 1978, 1980: VlI, 198.5), the US Bureau of the
Census (1979), and individuals (Littman and Keyfitz, 1977; Bogue
and Tsui, 1979) prepared long-range projections. To a large extent,
these projections used a principle analogous to Frejka's projections,
namely, that they were scenario projections aiming, sooner or later,
for an eventual low mortality-low fertility equilibrium. Many did in-
troduce additional ideas/arguments or methodological refinements.
In their projections of the early 1970s, the UN adjusted the
models for the future course of fertility in both the developed
and developing countries, and introduced the reverse logistic curve
(a stretched-out reverse S) with specified time points at which
replacement-level fertility will be reached and, beyond it, sustained.
A notable departure from the principle of aiming at eventual
replacement-level fertility is contained in the UN 1992 projections
10 Tomas Frejka
where the experience of below replacement-level fertility in the West-
ern countries is reflected. The idea of reaching and maintaining
replacement-level fertility is assumed only for the medium variant
and for an instant replacement-level fertility projection. Two vari-
ants assume reaching and maintaining below replacement-level fer-
tility, two other projections assume a fertility decline that is above
replacement-level fertility which when the defined level is reached
it is ma.intained, and a fifth projection assumes constant fertility
and mortality. Among the conclusions of these recent projections,
the UN stresses that according to the medium projection the world
population would be 11.2 billion in the year 2100 which is 1 bil-
lion, or 10 percent, larger than the UN 1982 projections. According
to the UN, "upwardly revised estimated and projected average life
expectancies at birth probably play the key role." Also, there is a
much wider range between the lowest and highest results in the 1992
compared with the 1982 projections for the year 2100, namely, 6.0-
19.2 compared with 7.2-14.9 billion. The authors emphasize "that
there is a wide range of uncertainty regarding the future size of the
world population."
Bogue and Tsui (1979) reached a \'ery different conclusion, al-
beit over a decade earlier: "the magnitude and pace of the (1965-
1975 fertility) decline is greater than many demographers had ex-
pected" and therefore
this development makes it necessary for demographers to review
and re-examine their projections for the future. We predict that
by the year 2025 the world will have nearly achieved zero pop-
ulation growth. It is estimated that this equilibrium will be
achieved with a world population of about 7.4 billion (8.1 in
2050) ... primarily because of the worldwide dri ve by Third World
countries to introduce family planning as part of their national
social-development services.
In the early 1970s studies associated with the Club of Rome
introduced ambitious methodological innovations. An attempt was
made to link population projections more tightly to social, economic,
environmental, resource consumption, and political trends. Mead-
ows et al. (1972) and Mesarovic and Pestel (1974) defined global dy-
namic systems analysis models that contained population as one of
several basic components. Projections of these systems were carried
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into the 21st century to demonstrate possible disastrous or harmo-
nious long-term consequences inherent in global societal trends. Ac-
cording to these projections, the likely trends in population growth
as well as in other societal trends will lead to a collapse of the world
system. This will include an increase in mortality and a consequent
rapid population decline. The studies conclude that if such a col-
lapse is to be avoided, a rapid fertility decline, significantly faster
than that of the low UN projection of that era, would have to be
generated. These projections were indeed innovative in their com-
prehensive approach. but numerous critics doubted the validity of
employed assumptions and relationships (Ridker, 1973).
1.4 A Recent Critical Review of
Long-run Global Projections
A critical review of long-run population projections has recently
been undertaken by Lee (1991). He takes a substantive rather than a
historic approach. Lee comprehensively analyzes important aspects
of population projections: demography's contribution to forecasting,
theories underlying projections, the degree of uncertainty of long-
run population projections, and recent long-run projections of the
global population. Among the numerous insightful observations and
findings, many can be applied to fut me work.
One observation which appears to be a central concern to Lee
and which deserves particnlar attention in the context of this chap-
ter is that in a number of the above-discussed global projections a
sufficiently explicit and systematic theoretical framework is lacking.
Two views expressed in Lee's paper warrant a brief discussion at
this point.
Lee eloquently challenges a central premise applied in the long-
range global projections of the 1970s and the 1980s, namely, that
the end point of most of these projections are stationary populations
with a net reproduction rate of unity. He claims that he could not
fin d any explanation of this in Frejka's 1973 book (see Frejka, 1973a,
which according to Lee provides the origin of this idea; actually the
origin of the idea is in Frejka. 19GR) and criticizes the justification
given in Frejka ( 1981b). Admittedly. the theoretical justification of
using replacement-level fertilit~· as an end point might not have been
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thorough enough, however, it was clear that Frejka's work in the
late 1960s and early 1970s was conducted within the demographic
transition theory framework as it was understood at that time. If
nowhere else this was succinctly expressed in Frejka (1973b): "The
experience of history suggests that the population of the world may
eventually reach a state close to non-growth, that is, all countries
will be in the third stage of the demographic transition."
The second issue relates to the content and purpose of the con-
cept of projections. A basic premise of Lee's, which he states with-
out providing arguments or justification, is that "almost all demo-
graphic projections are in fart forecasts, in that they present the
author's best guess about the future." Therefore he uses forecasts
throughout his piece. As has been discussed at length above, the
distinction between Joncas!s - i.e., projections that attempt to de-
pict future trends as accurately as possible at any given moment
in time - and scelwrio projections - i.e., projections which intro-
duce elements that aim to illustrate certain developments some of
which might actually be intentionally unrealistic in order to demon-
strate a particula.r outcome - is justified. That does not exclude
the purpose of also attempting to provide a reasonable perception
of realistic future population trends through scenario projections.
1.5 Conclusions
Contemporary long-range global population projections of the past
2.5 years are all constructed along the lines of the Notestein model.
They are based on an explicit or implicit theoretical framework,
using the best available data, and they are component projections.
They aTe usually straightforward demographic projections where the
possi ble impacts of changes in behavioral, social, economic, or po-
litical trends are introduced via the theoretical framework. A basic
innovation was added by devising and using scenario projections in
contrast to projections aiming at prediction. However, even when
using scenario-type projections the intention of more or less approx-
imating likely future demographic trends is almost always present.
The various projections briefly discussed a.bove provide exam-
ples of justifications for new projections. At the most general level,
whenever a significant innovation can be introduced in anyone of
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the elements a new projection is justified. Thus, formulating a new
or different theoretical framework, the application of new data, or
t he development of a new or different methodology provides such a
justification.
Each of the subsequent (TN sets of projections used newly
collected or estimated base data. Some of these sets introduced
methodological advances, and in some the formulation of assump-
tions about demographic trends was modified based on the devel-
opments of actual trends. Bogue and Tsui (1979) based their pro-
jections on their interpretation of fertility trends between 1965 and
1975 and on their belief that policy measures in the form of strong
family- planning programs could and would modify fertility trends
more than experience to date indicated. Meadows et al. (1972) at-
tempted to expand the theoretical framework by direct linkage to
social, economic, environmental, resource consumption, and politi-
cal trends and applied a large number of assumptions about trends
and linkages. In addition to using llew fertility and mortality data,
the most recent United Nations long-range global projections (1992)
assumed a variety of fertility trends: reaching and maintaining
replacement-level fertility, reaching and maintaining fertility levels
below and above replacement.
The purpose of long-range globa.! population projections can be
more than attempting to predict tota.! population numbers 50, 100,
or 150 years into the future. In addition, their purpose can be:
• To demonstrate shorter- and long-run implications of alternative
fertility and mortality trends of the foreseeable future.
• To demonstrate what type of trends need to occur to achieve
a population of a desirable size and with specific structural
characteristics.
• To demonstrate various structural implications of certain fertil-
ity and mortality t rends for major regions and functional age
groups, for example.
• To demonstrate the consequences of intended policy interven-
tions if they were to succeed.
Whatever the purpose of a single projection or a set of projec-
tions may be, for them to be meaningful and to provide new insights,
a significant and well-justified new or £nnovat£ve element has to be
embedded in the projections.
Chapter 2
Alternative Approaches to
Population Projection
Wolfgang Lutz, Joshua R. Goldstein, Christopher Prinz
Future demographic trends are inherently uncertain, and the further
one goes into the future, the greater the uncertainty. On the other
hand, few social and economic trends are as stable as population
trends. No social scientist would challenge the statement that the
percentage increase of the world population over the next five years
can be more accurately projected than changes in unemployment
rates, trade balances, or stock markets. Because of the great iner-
tia of population trends, long term and short term mean different
things for demographic and economic forecasts, but in all forecasts
uncertainty is assumed to increase with the time horizon because of
the greater probability of structural changes.
Summarizing the limits of population forecasting, Nathan Key-
fitz (1981:583) states: "The practical conclusion, then, is that rel-
atively short-term forecasts, say up to ten or 20 years, do tell us
something, but that beyond a quarter-century or so we simply do
not know what the population will be." Such a statement still seems
to reflect the thinking of most demographers today, including many
of the experts invited to contribute to this book, who defined as-
sumptions only up to the year 2030. But the question of what we
can know today about the future goes beyond the issue of the time
horizon, which is discussed later in this chapter.
First we need to ask, What kind of knowledge of the future do
we want to have? Do we want to have one single number, a certain
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range, or a probability distribution? Do we want total population
size a.lone or age-structura.l information as well? Who is interested
in these numbers and for what reason? And what is the motivation
of those who prepare population projections? These questions affect
the approach taken to project future population and the methods
and assumptions chosen.
This chapter gives a broad and nontechnica.l exposition of some
fundamental questions involved in choosing an approach to project
future population. These kinds of questions are usually not ad-
dressed in technical scientific papers or in the publication of pro-
jection results because certain choices are taken for granted. A
broader perspective is necessary, however, to answer the question
which forms the title of Part [: Why another set of global popula-
tion projections? Several fundamental issues in population projec-
tion are addressed in the following eight sections in this chapter. The
approach taken in this book is described and justified against the
background of other possible approaches. The concluding section
gives a concise summary of our choice.
2.1 Who Wants Population Projections?
\,yhat motivates demographers to prepare population projections.
and for whom are they preparing them? Three major groups are
interested in population projections and are willing to pay demogra-
phers to do this job: other scientists, governments and international
agencies. and the general public, including private industry.
A large number of natural and social scientists are increasingly
demanding information about future population size and structure.
The recent upsurge of environmental and global change research has
further heightened this demand. A major reason for this demand
lies in the fact that many of the indicators used in such studies are
on a per capita basis. By definition these require a population figure
ill the denominator. In particular, this is the case in studies on CO 2
emissions conducted by Bartiaux and vall Ypersele (199:3), Birdsall
(1992), and Bongaarts (1992). These studies combine future popn-
lation trends with assumed future per capita CO 2 emissions. Lutz
( 1993) has also demonstrated that the level of regional aggregation
significantly influences the results. The time horizon of these studies
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is typically long (at least to 2030-2050, often to 2100 and beyond)
because global-warming is a long-term phenomenon.
Related to global-warming issues is the large group of energy
demand models, which are probably the most numerous scientific
consumers of population projection data. A few forecasters (e.g ..
Odell and Rosing, 1980) omit the explicit consideration of popu-
lation, and instead project total energy demand. Most, however.
combine scenarios of the evolution of energy demand with popula-
tion forecasts (Gouse et at., 1992; Leontief and Sohn, 1984; WECCC,
1983; IIASA and WEe, 1995). The time horizons of these studies
range from 2020 to 2100.
Another field of studies which routinely includes population
projections is the analysis of world food consumption. The Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO, 1988) has produced forecasts
of demand to 2010. The approach taken by Mellor and Paulino
(1986), for example, is to produce two scenarios: the first is hased on
present per capita calorie consumption and the second includes in-
creased calorie consumption arising from assumed economic growth.
Many more fields, such as economic forecasting, epidemiological
studies, and insurance mathematics, demand population projections
as input.
In the past non-demographic scientific studies requiring popula-
tion forecasts tended to consider only one variant of future popula-
tion trends. Recently, however, the scenario approaches in many of
these disciplines have become increasingly sophisticated and allow
for consideration of alternative population scenarios. There cleaTly
is a demand not only for one best guess of the future population but
also for information concerning the degree of uncertainty and more
extreme scenarios for sensitivity analysis. So far demographers have
not done much to satisfy this demand.
Politicians, including public administrators, need population
projections largely for planning purposes. Especially in the health,
education, and social-security sectors, medium- and long-term plan-
ners regard demographic variables as crucial components. Typically,
politicians and administrators would like to receive one likely vari-
ant of future population size and structure that they can use ill
their models to determine, for example, where new hospitals ami
schools should be constructed and how the legal system of pension
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payments should be organized to accommodate changes in the age
composition of the population.
Unlike the scientific community, public administrators and po-
litical planners rarely ask for alternative variants and generally have
little appreciation of the methods dealing with uncertainty in pop-
ulation projections, despite the fact that policies should be robust
and hold under varying conditions. They typically want one. most
likely figure.
Despite the tradition of government planners to use only one
central forecast, the design of policies that hold under uncertain
future conditions should be a main concern of good politics. For
instance. a restructuring of the pension scheme, as currently be-
ing done in many European countries, should by no means consider
only one future mortality trend. Since national population projec-
tions tend to assume very low future mortality improvements, even
a continuation of past increases in life expectancy results in a much
faster increase of the old-age dependency ratio, and might bring
about painful, if not disastrous, surprises in the new system. In
this situation demographers have a responsibility for communicat-
ing their knowledge about uncertainty.
The third group of users of population projections is by far the
largest and most heterogeneous. Many individuals, organizations,
and enterprises in the general public are interested in specific pop-
ulation projections. Aside from individual curiosity, this interest is
used in the planning of future activities and in the estimation of
expected returns from such activities; the activities range from an
individual's decision to buy real estate in an area with potential in-
creases in population density to an enterprise's marketing strategy
for a commercial product, such as baby food or special products for
the elderly.
Generally the expectations of this group tmvard population pro-
jections can be assumed to be similar to that of the group of politi-
cians and administrators. The interest tends to focus on one most
likely variant. Considerations of uncertainty may playa role in cor-
porate planning, but generally the planning horizon of companies is
too short for alternative population trends to make a difference. An
exception may be energy-supply companies that tend to have long
time horizons.
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In addition to these three major groups some specific groups
explicitly use population projections for educational and illustrative
purposes. The most vocal of these are environmental and family-
planning groups that want to draw attention to what would happen
in the distant future if policies aiming at a reduction of popula-
tion growth were not implemented. Such people are not as much
interested in one medium population projection as they are in the
caleulation of extreme alternatives to demonstrate the long-term
impacts of today's choices.
Another special group are students in the social sciences who
should understand the basic functioning of population dynamics.
For this group, phenomena such as the momentum of population
growth could best be illustrated through comparisons of alternative
long- term population projections.
In summary the different groups interested in population pro-
jections are demanding two different types of results from demogra-
phers preparing such projections: one most likely variant that can
be used without further consideration of the problem of uncertainty
aud information about less likely but still possible trends that can be
nsed for sensitivity analysis. i.e., for understanding how the systems
studied or any planned policy or individual action would perform
under different possible demographic futures. Although most users
of projections are satisfied with a 30- to 40-year time horizon, some
clearly want a longer time horizon.
2.2 Time Horizon
Technically, it is a simple matter to continue a population projec-
tion one hundred, or even one million, years into the future. But
the question is, how meaningful is such an exercise. The choice of a
projection horizon, therefore, represents a compromise between the
advantages of providing more information and the dangers of mak-
ing inaccurate assumptions. Beyond a certain point in time, we are
too unsure about the state of the family, health, and the world to
specify rates of fertility, mortality, and migration. In this section we
explore the possible reasons demographers have for regarding :30 to
40 years as a threshold beyond which projections become less reli-
able. We also address the question of whether uncertainty increases
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monotonically with time or whether there are thresholds and dis-
continuities suggesting a certain cutoff point.
The time scale of population projections is of distinctly human
dimensions. This is not only because the human life span and the
gap between generations have important demographic consequences.
but also because forecasters' judgments about the speed of social
change depend on their personal experiences.
From a psychological perspective, there may be reasons for being
suspicious of projections that forecast further than 40 or 50 yea,rs
into the future, a little less than two generations.[l] During our
lifetimes, most of us get to know our grandparents, but not our
great-grandparents. Consequently, we know first-hand the amount
of social change that can occur over two generations. When we
specify demographic rates beyond this, not only must we forecast
the behavior of individuals whom we will probably never meet, but
we must deal with individuals who are more distant, in generational
terms, than anyone we have met in our own lives. In addition to this
subjective reason for setting a threshold of increased uncertainty. \ve
can point to other. less personal, justifications for a particular time
horizon.
In developing countries the average age is roughly between 35
and 40. As such, this average age marks the period of time beyond
which a population will consist of a majority of people not yet born.
The wholly individual psychological perspective just mentioned thus
also corresponds to the experience of the entire population, the tim-
ing of which might mark a rupture in social change.
In addition to uncertainty in the inputs of population projection
(the demographic rates that reflect individual behavior), we must
also consider the size of the population at risk. The number of
births in the future is a function not only of birth rates but also of
the number of potential parents in the population, itself a function of
past demographic rates. This feedback property is well known in the
case of the echoes of a baby boom (or bust). The time it takes for a
boom to echo is approximately the mean age of childbearing, which
ranges between ages 2.5 and 30 in almost all populations. Beyond
this time horizon, therefore, we add to our uncertainty about birth
rates the uncertainty of how many potential mothers will be in the
population.
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The number of deaths in a population is also a function of the
number of past births and deaths, but since in developed countries
the mean age at death (in a stationary population, equal to life
expectancy) is roughly three-quarters of a century, the lagged mor-
tality effect will be of relatively minor importance. In developing
countries where mortality is still high, however, a rapid improvement
in infant mortality might increase the number of potential mothers
in as little as 1.5 to 20 years.
While not subject to uncertainties about cohort size, migration
levels are subject to perhaps a more arbitrary type of change - the
change in government policy. Annual migration trends are largely
determined by government policy. If we were to ask, for instance,
how many immigrants will Western Europe admit, most analysts
would be reluctant to predict more than a few years into the future.
And indeed we have seen tremendous ups and downs in migration
flows in recent years. \iVhen migration plays a major role in deter-
mining the demography of a region, it would seem that 05 to 10 years
might mark the point beyond which any projection would become
quite speculative.
If we ask, on the other hand, why 10,000 years is too long to
perform a projection, we discover a further constraint on forecast
horizons. In addition to the fact that we are in no position to specify
demographic rates for such a long period, the meaningfulness of the
projection models used applies only to certain time scales. Assuming
the case of an ageless population growing at a constant exponential
rate, the only possible average growth rate in the long term that
would avoid extinction or inconceivable explosion is zero.
Figure 2.1 summarizes the possible thresholds of increasing un-
certainty. The times shown are in an extremely stylized form and are
meant to summarize the arguments given earlier. The second wave
of fertility cohort size uncertainty is added to indicate that the haby
boom (hust) resulting from the cohort size uncertainty after about
205 years will have echoes in the following generation also, a1though
of less amplitude than in the past. Cohort size is also determined
by migration, so we might want to add additional uncertainty 205,
SO, and 75 years after the migration uncertainty begins.
Despite its speculative nature, we can draw several lessons from
FiguT'E 2.1. First, no single clear threshold of uncertainty emerges.
Alternative Approaches to Population Projection
Mortality cohort size uncertainty
I ..
21
>-C
"iii
t
Q)
(..l
C
::J
Q)
"~
Cil
:J
E
::J
()
Echo of fertility cohort size uncertainty
I ..
Subjective increase in vital rates uncertainty
I ..
I Fertility cohort size uncertainty ..
Increased migration policy uncertainty
I •
I Steadily growing uncertainty in vital rates ..
o 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 11 0 120
Years into the future
Figure 2.1. Different components of uncertainty entering the pop-
ulation projection over time.
Instead, there are arguments for stopping the forecast at many dif-
ferent times. Second, the commonly accepted threshold of a little
less than half a century emerges not so much as a clear demographic
threshold (which might dictate a choice closer to the mean age of
childbearing), but rather from the timing of the increased subjec-
tive uncertainty in demographic rates. Last, the timing of t.he de-
mographic thresholds, particularly the delayed effect of births on
the future number of deat.hs, may vary according t.o the population
under consideration. The average age at deat.h in a populat.ion with
high infant mortalit.y might be considerably less t.han 75 years.
Equally important is perhaps what this figure leaves out,
namely, the relat.ive size of the different. sources of uncert.ainty. For
some count.ries, like Canada, migrat.ion levels may be the largest
source of uncertaint.y, while for ot.hers, like many African countries,
structural change in birt.h or deat.h rates might play the largest role.
The risk of projecting too far into the future is the loss of legiti-
macy ( believability) either because assumptions seem to lack founda-
tion or because the projected populations violate constraint.s, such
as an assumed carrying capacity of the globe. However, because
several features of population dynamics, such as growth momentum
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and echoes, persist strongly for at least one or two generations pro-
jections of less than 50 years probably do not reveal all the informa-
tion already present in even today's age structure. This explanation
supports the argument for a minimum length of projection.
The reluctance of demographers to go beyond a certain time
horizon is in conflict with some of the expectations of potential
users as described in Section 2.1. Some users clearly want popula-
tion figures for the year 2100 and beyond. Should the demographer
disappoint such expectations and leave it to others with less exper-
tise to produce them'? The answer given in this study is no, But
as discussed below, we make a clear distinction between what we
call projections up to 2030-2050 and everything beyond that time.
which we term extensions for illustrative purposes.
2.3 Spatial Resolution and Heterogeneity
Because of the great heterogeneity of the world population it clearly
does not make sense to treat the whole world as one region in a
population projection. Users of projections want information to be
arranged by countries or at least by major world regions that group
countries by demographic, socioeconomic, and cultural characteris-
tics. If the output parameters are to be regional, clearly the projec-
tion needs to be done on a regional basis. But even if the user is
only interested in aggregate global results, meaningful assumptions
on future fertility and mortality cannot be made for all the different
regions together for two reasons.[2]
First, different parts of the world are at very different stages of
demographic transition; in most projections this factor is the basic
underlying paradigm on which assumptions about future fertility are
based. The aggregation of these different parts obscures the picture
and makes the reasoning behind assumptions more difficult.
Second, because population growth rates are much higher in the
South than in the North, the weights of the two hemispheres will
change significantly in the future; by itself this factor leads to a
change in aggregate rates even if the rates remain constant in each
hemisphere. Lutz and Prinz (1991) have quantitatively illustrated
this by using a simple calculation. In the purely hypothetical case,
Alternative Approaches to Population Projection 23
in which all vital rates are kept at their present levels, the projection
carried out on the basis of six world regions yields a total population
that by the end of the 21st century is 50 percent higher than the
projection treating the world as one region. This amazing difference
is simply due to the fact that the low-fertility regions make up a
larger proportion of the world population today than they will in
the future. Africa, which has by far the highest fertility, increases
from 12 percent of the world population to roughly one-third under
constant fertility. With this change in weights, constant fertility in
the main world regions results in increasing fertility in the world
total and hence in a larger total population than in the case of
constant global fertility.
While the above example clearly shows that heterogeneity ofthe
population can have a strong effect, it is not clear how much OIle
must disaggregate to avoid this problem. Even within nations there
may be subpopulations with very different demographic regimes.
In some Latin American countries, such as Bolivia, national fertil-
ity rates have been stagnant at a rather high level; this may be
explained by the bifurcation of society into one group that is well
advanced in its demographic transition and another group, the In-
dian population, that has not fully entered the fertility decline and
is rapidly increasing. In addition to the observable heterogeneity
in a population, Vaupel and Yashin (1983) have demonstrated thl?
significance of unobserved heterogeneity for population dynamics.
For our global population projections a basic question was, How
far should one go in disaggregating the world population? The-
oretically, disaggregations need not follow territorial or national
boundaries but should follow the most strongly discriminating vari-
ables. In practice, however, data are most readily available by coun-
tries and groups of countries. The United Nations and the World
Bank produce their population projections at the level of individ-
ual countries. In this approach the 1.2 billion Chinese receive as
much attention as the 72,000 inhabitants of the Seychelles. This is
due to the national constituencies of these organizations and conve-
nience of data availability rather than to questions of demographic
heterogeneity.
With more than 150 countries in the world today, however, si-
multaneous projections become awkward especially with respect to
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the migration matrix to be assumed for all these states. This per-
haps explains why migration is not a major emphasis of the UN and
World Bank projections. An alternative, which has been chosen for
the present study, is to limit the number of populations projected
simultaneously to subcontinental regions. The 13 world regions have
been defined according to geographic proximity and socioeconomic
criteria, as well as similar demographic and institutional aspects
such as compatibility with other data sets. These 13 regions are
projected simultaneously by a multistate model assuming region-
specific future paths of age-specific fertility and mortality rates and
full matrices of interregional migratory streams.
These regional assumptions must be considered aggregate fu-
ture paths of fertility, mortality, and migration that reflect not only
changing behavior within the subpopulations of the region but also
the compositional effect of changing weights. This method seems
to be the most pragmatic way to deal with the bothersome issue of
population heterogeneity.
2.4 Expected Output Parameters
The methodology used for population projection crucially depends
on the choice of relevant population characteristics. If the user is
interested only in total population size, methods such as simple
exponential growth models may be used; these methods, however,
are not sufficient if one is also interested in the future age and sex
composition of the population. But many other population charac-
teristics, such as urban/rural residence, marital-status composition.
and educational or labor-force composition, may be of considerable
interest to the user of projections and require specific methodologies.
Questions about desired output parameters. together with the
above-discussed issues of time horizon and of the desirability of a
range of projections, need to be discussed before the question of
appropriate methodologies. Introductions to population forecasting
usually do not address these issues explicitly, but rather group pro-
jection methods by the statistical models on which they are based
(e.g., time-series models, structural equation models) as is done in
the introduction to a recent comprehensive volume on population
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forecasting (Ahlburg and Land, 1992). Because the evaluation of dif-
ferent methods requires the systematic consideration of objectives,
in this section we distinguish between projections of total population
size, projections of the age and sex compositions of the population,
and projections of characteristics other than age and sex.
2.4.1 Projections of total population size
For projections of total population size alone a basic choice is be-
tween methods that consider the age structure of the population and
those that do not. 'When advocates of projections of population to-
tals through various time-series models (e.g., Pflaumer, 1992) stress
that such models may be more reliable than cohort-component mod-
els, which project the population by age groups, it is important to
keep in mind that this argument only concerns the aggregate totals
- figures that, from a substantive point of view, have rather limited
value. Most economic and social issues, for which the population
variable is considered important, heavily depend on the age pro-
file of the population, ranging from social-security considerations to
marketing, from health expenditures to education, from the size of
the labor force to internal migration. Even in the recent discussion
on population-environment and carrying capacity, the population
composition seems to make a big difference because of varying age-
specific impacts (see Lutz, 1994a).
For the time being, let us assume that the number of total pop-
ulation size in a territory, at some point in the future, has meaning
and value in itself. To derive such a figure we must choose be-
tween simple and sophisticated guesses. The most simple would be
a guess of the future population size without any formal model. But
this would be difficult to defend. Probably the simplest meaning-
ful model of population growth over time is an exponential growth
model with a constant rate of growth. In practice, however, growth
rates have never been fonstant over long periods. Through the
millennia of early human history, birth and death rates fluctuated
widely due to weather, war, food shortages, and diseases. Typ-
ically birth rates were high when death rates were low and vice
versa, resulting in even wider fluctuations in the growth rates of the
population. Although during the 20th fentury the curve of world
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population growth has resembled the typical exponential growth
curve, growth rates have been far from constant even if the trend is
smoothed. The growth rate of the world population was about 0.5
percent during the first half of this century, increased to a peak of
2.06 percent between 1965 and 1970, and slowly declined thereafter.
The appealing feature of an exponential growth model, as opposed
to more sophisticated ones, is that one has to make assumptions
only for one parameter - the growth rate.
Several significant deficiencies of the exponential growth model
result from the fact that it does not consider the age structure of
the population. The most important is that it cannot capture the
momentum of population growth. a phenomenon caused by the fact
that only women aged 15--49 have children, and in the case of a very
young age distribution, more and more women enter this age group
and hence the population would grow significantly even with fertil-
ity at replacement level. Another aspect of this deficiency relates
to countries with very irregular age pyramids, such as some Euro-
pean countries where irregularities in births due to world wars, the
baby boom, and the baby bust have resulted in great fluctuations
in cohort size. Here some changes in the population growth rate are
preprogrammed by the population age structures that do not reflect
any change in fertility, mortality, and migration. For instance, a
phenomenon such as the echo of the baby boom - the large num-
ber of babies born by the large baby- boom cohorts- could never be
captured by a model that considers only total population size.
For these reasons it is generally advisable to use projection mod-
els such as the cohort-component method which explicitly considers
age and sex, even if one is only interested in total population size.
However, in these models one has to make assumptions on a larger
number of parameters, which raise the danger of losing sight of the
behavior of the total system while giving increased attention to spe-
cific issues such as period-cohort translation in fertility. In this
respect the suggestion made by Pflaumer (1992), that time-series
methods applied to population totals should be used as a baseline
against which the results of more complex models should be as-
sessed, is worth considering. Ideally the analyst could then identify
the sources of the difference between the two approaches.
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2.4.2 Projecting the age and sex composition
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As mentioned above, people are interested in population projections
because they want to understand population changes that go beyond
projecting total population size. This knowledge is used in a variety
of ways, ranging from aging and social-security considerations to
labor-market questions, educational issues, and even marketing in
private business. For all these considerations one needs to have esti-
mates of the future population structure at least in broad age groups.
Few users would demand projections in single-year age groups, es-
pecially in a long time horizon. Projection of five-year age groups
in five-year steps of historical time has become popular, mostly for
convemence.
A projection of the population by age and sex requires first the
age and sex composition of the population in the starting year. Next
one must assume age-specific fertility, mortality, and migration rates
for each five-year period to be projected. For this age-groupwise pro-
jection of the population, the so-called cohort-component method
has become standard. This method was introduced by Whelpton
in 1936 and formalized by Leslie (1945). Notestein (19c1.5) flrst ap-
plied it to project the world population. The basic method has not
changed since then. In short, cohorts are groups of men and women
born in the same time interval and representing a specific age group
at any later point in time. Their sizes can only change through
mortality and migration. The size of the youngest age group is de-
termined by age-specific fertility levels applied to the corresponding
female age groups. Hence the projected size and age structure of the
population at any point in the future depends exclusively on the size
and age structure in the starting year and on assumed age-specific
fertility, mortality, and migration over the projection period.
The cohort-component method tells us what to do with assump-
tions on future fertility, mortality. and migration, but not how to
derive them. And it is in this all-deciding question of the choice of as-
sumptions and structuring of sets of alternative assumptions where
controversy exists and continuous improvement of population pro-
jection methodologies is possible and indeed necessary. Alternative
approaches to deriving assumptions on future fertility. mortality.
and migration are discussed in the following sections of this chapter.
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In the context of the cohort-component method, one unresolved
qHestion is whether assumptions should be made in terms of pe-
riod or cohort fertility. Technically, the Leslie matrix requires age-
specific period rates. But these period rates could be either assumed
directly or derived from assumptions on future cohort fertility be-
havior. This decision essentially goes back to the rather philosophi-
cal controversy of whether the cohort approach is more appropriate
in fertility analysis. In practical terms the cohort-fertility approach
requires assumptions of both the level of cohort fertility and the
timing of births over the reproductive life Spall. If the age pattern is
assumed to be constant and the level is assumed to approach a cer-
tain constant value, there will be no difference between cohort and
period fertility assumptions. Theoretically similar cohort-period ar-
gnments could be made for mortality and migration, but they are
rarely discussed.
2.4.3 Multistate models for additional characteristics
Usually populations are defined by the a territory in which they
live. But, as mentioned earlier, populations may also be defined
as su bgroups of the population in a given territory, such as ethnic
groups. marital-status groups, or educational gronps. These groups
can be treated as independent populations that may interact with
each other, i.e., people leave one group and join another. The tradi-
tional cohort-component method can only consider one population
and needs to be expanded to simultaneously project several pop-
ulations that are interacting with one another. Such expansions
are called multistate models, and were developed by Rogers (1975)
and others during the 1970s. The original applications of multistate
models were in the field of multiregional demography and migration.
So far no global population projection has gone beyond project-
ing the age and sex distribution by regions or countries.[:3] Highly
relevant and promising from a global development perspective are
multistate projections of urban/rural place of residence and educa-
tional composition. A recent set of multistate educational projec-
tions for North African countries (Yousif dol., 199G) demonstrates
that because of strong educational fertility differentials the changing
educational composition of the population significantly effects total
fertility and therefore population growth. Assumptions on fertility.
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mortality. and transitions between the states must be state spe-
cific in addition to age and sex specific. This lllultistate approach
can be applied to any other breakdown of the population (socioeco-
nomic, ethnic, etc.) providing that the categories are clearly defined
and sufficient empirical information on transition intensities is given.
Population projections that also provide estimates of future distri-
butions of socioeconomic variables other than age and sex may be
useful for many users, and may become increasingly popular as more
methodologies and computer programs become available.
At the global level, however. one difficulty in applying lllulti-
state models that include not strictly demographic variables is the
availability of relevant empirical data. Hence, the projections pre-
sented in this book are based on alternative projections of only the
age and sex distribution for the 1:3 world regions specified.
2.5 Different Uses of Past Experience to
Derive Assumptions for the Future
The real challenge in population projection is not the method itself
but the generation of one set or several sets of assumptions on age-
specific fertility and age- and sex-specific mortality and migration.
In this context there are two basic questions. The first question
relates to the way in which the past is used to derive future as-
sumptions. The second concerns the strategy one takes to deal with
nncertainty, whether to consider a range of possible assumptions
based on some distribution or individual point scenarios. vVe can
distinguish three ways to draw on past experience.
• The Future as (l Continuation of the Past Trend. This is the
strongest possible way in which the past ca.n enter into future
assumptions. A simple trend extra.polation can be performed
without any additional input about likely future conditions. It
can be blind and mechanical after one has chosen the indicator
to be extrapolated, the length of the period to be considered.
and the information to be derived from the time series. It can
take the form of simple linear trend extrapolation, other func-
tional forms of extrapolation, or. if periodicity is assumed. a
combined trend with superimposed cycles.
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The blind continuation of past trends seems appropriate
only when absolutely no information is available about likely
future trends. In the context of fertility assumptions it would
mean completely disregarding considerations derived from de-
mographic transition theories, information about desired family
size, and surveys on family-planning demands. But even this
simple method does not save the forecaster from making choices.
The indicator, the length of the past period. and the structure
of the process must be defined.
• Only Variance from Histo'l'Y. If one is willing to incorporate into
one's assumptions external substantive information about likely
future trends, one possibility of combining this with information
from the past is to determine the average level from external ex-
pert knowledge but still take the variance from past time series.
The idea behind such a procedure is that the level cannot be
derived by extrapolation but that the past can tell us something
about the variability of the process, i.e .. by how much fertility
tends to change (in any direction) over a five-year period. Along
these lines Goldstein et al. (1994) have proposed a probabilistic
model by which the upper and lower bounds of a random walk
of fertility are externally assumed while the stepsize of change
is resampled from the past. Also the work by Keyfitz (1981)
and Stoto (1983) falls into this category; they estimated future
errors in population projections from past errors.
• S't'l'uclll'l'e and Unde'l'standing from History. Uneler this ap-
proach it is not the past time series itself which is used to derive
assumptions on future evolution, but the substantive knowledge
about the process and its structure. Taking mortality as an ex-
ample. this approach goes beyond the analysis of past trends in
integrating knowledge from medicine and biology and address-
ing questions such as that of a genetically determined limit to
human life. Naturally this understanding is also informed by the
analysis of past trends but goes further, by integrating outside
knowledge derived from other sources. In this approach histor-
ical information enters only indirectly into the formulation of
assumptions about the future. This third approach is the one
chosen for our study. For this reason large parts of this volume
consist of substantive papers about our understanding of the
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processes of fertility, mortality, and migration in the different
world regions. Experts were asked to write about alternative
future paths of fertility, mortality, and migration and to pro-
duce assumptions of a most likely centraL vaLue as well as high
and low extreme values for the various indicators by the year
20:30, based on their substantive understanding of the processes.
For the probabilistic world population projections presented in
Chapter 16, these three points were assumed to define a subjec-
tive probability distribution with 90 percent of all cases between
t he high and low values. The approach chosen for this book is
described in more detail in Section 2.9.
The evolution of the future population of the world will almost
surely differ from the central scenario as described in this volume,
This is unavoidable, for there is inherent uncertainty in the future.
Wars will break out; some societies will modernize more quickly tha11
we expect while others will develop more slowly; new diseases may
break out, old ones may be cured; childbearing may become more
fashionable in the developed world, or, quite the contrary, less so;
the industrialized countries may close themselves to immigration, or
might even become more open. All these factors are crucial to the
demographic future, but they are also uncertain.
~What does a forecaster do in the face of such uncertainty'? 1\
first approach is to freeze all demographic rates at their current
level. Rates will almost certainly not remain unchanged as the fu-
ture unfolds, but this approach enables the forecaster to avoid mak-
ing statements about the direction of demographic trends alld. at
the same time, makes absolutely clear the hypothetical nature of
t he projection. This approach was followed by early demographic
forecasters in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s.
A second approach is to create extreme case scenarios in addi-
tion to a most likely scenario. This enables one to make statements
about how far off future population projections could be from the
most likely expected evolution. It is also 1Iseful for sensitivity anal-
ysis. However, there is a danger that the range between the high
and low scenarios might be so large that it is uninformative. On the
other hand, when the alternative scenarios include conditions that
are more probable, one automatically begins to ask about the likeli-
hood of a given scenario. Alternative scenarios or variants without
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any information about their likelihood somehow remain unsatisfac-
tory to the user.
The third approach, explicit quantification of uncertainty, is
therefore designed to explicitly incorporate information about the
degree of uncertainty. It is evident that both forecasters and users
would like to know how much confidence to place in different projec-
tions, but as yet no single technique is available to do this unambigu-
ously. Sanderson (1995) shows that it is impossible to produce "ob-
jective" confidence ranges for future population projections. Sub-
jective confidence intervals are the best we can ever attain because
assumptions are always involved. As a recent US Bureau of the Cen-
sus (1989) forecast notes: "Many problems remain before a method
can be developed for placing reliable confidence intervals around
population projections." This failure to solve the problem is not for
want of trying, but occurs because it is impossible to derive any "ob-
jective" confidence interval. In the following two sections we discuss
in more detail the second approach (i.e., variants and scenarios) and
the third approach (i.e., probabilistic population projections).
2.6 Non-probabilistic Approaches:
Single Projections, Variants, Scenarios
In practice, both national statistics departments and international
agencies have taken non-probabilistic approaches to forecasting. Un-
til recently, some agencies still offered only one set of rate trajecto-
ries. Thus, it was possible to speak of the future population. Today,
however, there is increasing concern about the uncertainties of fu-
ture population growth, and it is rare to find a projection without
at least one alternative set of assumptions.
Both "variants" and "scenarios" offer alternative sets of assump-
tions. The difference between the two is, to some extent, only a
difference in detail, but this difference is also reflected in the in-
tended use. The variant approach usually offers three alternatives:
high, medium, and low. The high and low scenarios are typically
defined by the resulting population size, and not by their compo-
nents. Therefore, the large population in the high alternative can
come from increased migration, low mortality, high fertility, or a
combination of any of these.
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The World Population Prospects produced by the United Na-
tions Population Division (UN, 1995), the most commonly used set
of world projections, currently offers four projections to 20S0: high,
medium, and low variants and a constant fertility projection which
is called scenario. Fertility is allowed to vary, but only one set of
mortality and migration assumptions are used throughout.
In their recently published long-range world population projec-
tions, the UN (1992c) gives projections to 21S0 for nine world re-
gions. Seven different fertility extensions are considered, but again
mortality and migration assumptions remain invariant. The World
Bank (1992b) offers only one central set of projections. Birdsall
(1992), however, offers a set of alternative projections resulting from
faster than expected fertility decline in the developing world.
Sometimes the selection of inputs for high and low variants is
directly influenced by the interests of the agency producing the fore-
casts. For example, the US Social Security Administration, whose
principal interest lies in the age structure of the population, com-
bines high fertility and high mortality for its high variant and low
fertility and low mortality for its low variant, giving the two most
extreme values for the old-age dependency ratio. The US Bureau
of the Census, however, combines low fertility and high mortality
and vice versa to arrive at the most extreme values for the total
population size.
Recently an increasing number of authors (Ahlburg and Vaupel,
1990; Lutz, 1991; Cliquet, 1993) and agencies (EUROSTAT, UN)
have chosen to speak of population scenarios instead of, or in ad-
dition to, the traditional variants. Originally the word "scenario"
comes from the theater. The Oxford English Dictionary (1982 sup-
plement) defines it as, "A sketch, outline, or description of an imag-
ined situation oj' sequence of events." During the 1970s and 1980s
the word "scenario" became popular in the social sciences, especially
in the context of computer models (Lutz, 1995a). In the realm of
population projections the notion is being used in two somewhat
different meanings: 1. in the sense of purely hypothetical assump-
tions, e.g., a "constant fertility scenario"; and 2. in the sense of a
consistent story in which fertility, mortality, and migration assump-
tions are embedded to provide a comprehensive picture of what the
future might be. While the second usage is certainly closer to the
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original meaning in terms of a consistent picture, the first has gained
great popularity; it seems futile to try to change the common llsage,
especially since there is no readily acceptable alternative word for
the first meaning. Hence, it remains with the authors of a projection
to define what they mean by a scenario.
The meaning the user chooses not only influences the conceptual
design of the scenario, but also implies differences in the setting of
parameters. In the first case the three components of change (fertil-
ity, mortality, and migration) may be assumed to be independent,
whereas in the second case they should be dependent. Chapter IS
of this book gives examples of both approaches. In the systematic
permutations of scenario assumptions the components are assumed
to be independent in the first part of the chapter; in the special
long-term scenarios, specific consistent stories are described such
as fertility responses to aging or mortality responses to excessive
growth.
2.7 Different Probabilistic Approaches
to Deal with Uncertainty
How can the fut ure population size differ from that which is pro-
jected'? The compendium of possible mistakes is long (I\eilman,
1990), but we can categorize the sources of error into three types:
1. Measurement and calculation errors. These can take the form
of mistaken input data (for example, starting the projection
\vith a population based on an incorrect census count), imprecise
algorithms, or a simple calculation mistake.
2. Incorrect specification of t'rends in vital rates and migration.
One can predict that life expectancy will continue to rise at
the rate that it has over the past 20 years, but instead it might
well increase at twice that rate. Fertility may reverse its declin-
ing trend, or less spectacularly, the seemingly random "natural"
variation (see Brillinger, 1986) might cause fertility, mortality.
and migration rates to vary from year to year.
3. Unexpected events. The unexpected could cause large structural
changes: the outbreak of war, a sudden cure for AIDS, an eco-
nomic boom in Africa. Any number of ruptures with current
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trends is imaginable, any of which might render extrapolated
visions of the future irrelevant.
We can call these, respectively, measurement error, parameter
specification error, and model specification error. To these model
specification errors we could also add significant errors resulting
from aggregation of heterogeneous groups. The sum of all forms
of error is called total error.
At first glance, only the second source of error - the variation in
vital rates - seems a likely candidate for the application of proba-
bilistic thinking, and most attempts to incorporate randomness into
population forecasting have used this as the focus. Before examining
these techniques, however, one technique for quantifying the total
error deserves mention. The empirical evaluation of the successes
and failures of past forecasts, developed by Keyfitz and Stoto in
the early 1980s, consists simply of gathering a large number of past
forecasts and evaluating the average error. The most noteworthy
conclusion of these studies, both of which focused only on error in
total population size, was that the traditional high and low variants
offered by population projections corresponded to approximately a
two- thirds confidence interval. In other words, the population grew
at rates outside those predicted by the high and low variants about
one-third of the time (Keyfitz, 1981; Stoto, 1983).
This empirical method of estimating uncertainty clearly takes
into account all three types of error. [4] To apply it to current fore-
casts, however, a strong assumption must be made: the errors in
future forecasts are assumed to be of the same magnitude as those
in the past. This assumption is of particular concern since the sam-
ple of past forecasts tends to be biased toward the older ones for
which the accuracy can be checked. This is problematic because
not only do the methods of choosing high, low, and medium vari-
ants change, but the potential variability of vital rates also changes.
Unless both the variability of vital rates and the methodology of
projection, together with the degree of care used in making the as-
sumptions, stay the same, it is unclear how good an indicator past
errors are of future uncertainty.
While an applicaiion of the results from Keyfitz and Stoto to
future population projections is one way of determining uncertainty
estimates, the direct analysis of population trends themselves offers
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a distinct alternative. It is here that time-series analysts have plied
their trade. Work on time-series analysis began with Lee (1974),
which studied US fertility rates, and analyses continue today. Time-
series methods aim to assign structure to the process of changing
rates, for example, a random walk with drift or an Auto-Regressive
Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) model. Time-series methods
produce not only a central forecast, but also the entire probability
distribution, showing where fertility and mortality rates are likely to
be at any future specified date contingent on a normal distribution
of errors.
The principal drawback of time-series methods has been the
dependence of the results all the choice of a model structure - par-
ticularly for fertility, the demographic component that not only has
the largest effect on the evolution of populations but also is the more
variable one (Lee, 1974; Ahlburg and Land, 1992) when migration
is left out, as is often done. Assuming a constant model structure
is particularly problematic in the case of countries that are in the
midst of the process of fertility transition and where we know that
the model is likely to change toward the end of the transition pro-
cess. Mortality appears to hold more promise in forecasting, at
least in the most developed countries. In particular, both the Lee-
Carter (1992) and McNown-Rogers (1989) methods offer means of
producing trends based on large matrices of age-specific mortality
rates. These techniques have large data requirements and have been
criticized for producing overly narrow confidence intervals. Never-
theless, they are clear in their aim, which is to provide estimates of
parameter variation, providing minimum error ranges.
An alternative method for obtaining probability distributions is
to simulate the evolution of demographic rates using Monte Carlo
simulation methods. Random draws of past levels (for example, see
Keyfitz, 1985 and 1989) or of past variations (Goldstein et at., 1994)
are made and applied to the evolving population. A large number,
for instance 10,000, of sample populations are projected forward,
and the resulting empirical distribution of population size and age
structure is used to estimate the theoretical probability range. These
simulations allow users to analyze the combined effect of uncertainty
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in mortality, fertility, and migration; the last component, mortality,
has usually not been included in time-series models.
Both the history- based simulation and the time-series tech-
niques are means to address only the second type of parameter un-
certainty. They do not deal with the possibility of structural change.
Questions, such as will there be another baby boom in Western Eu-
rope, when will sub-Saharan Africa experience a fertility transition,
what are the chances of a new deadly virus or of a war or revolution,
cannot be addressed without probability models of the likelihood for
each unexpected event. The scenario approach, based on assump-
tions of experts, offers the possibility of seeing the hypothesized
impact of unpredictable events, and seems to be the best means for
analyzing structural change in addition to parameter uncertainty.
With this approach experts can step back from recent experience
and consider possible alternative stories that might happen in the
future. These stories may include unlikely and unexpected events
that can then be translated into specific parameter assumptions.
Based on such expert knowledge it is also possible to define
specific scenarios that describe not only one path out of countless
possible paths but also a whole range of possible future paths. View-
ing scenarios as just specific lines in the spectrum of possible future
trends, one can also attempt to define the full predictive probability
distribution (see Lutz et ai., 199.5). Such an approach takes nei-
ther the trend nor the variance directly from past time series. The
predictive probability distribution is entirely based on the subjec-
tive judgment of the expert who is equipped with an analysis of
past trends, knows about fertility, mortality, and migration deter-
minants, and is able to make informed guesses about possible future
changes in those determinants. Such projections based on subjec-
tive probability distributions are not unusual in other disciplines,
but they have not received much attention in demographic research
although the approach was discussed by Muhsam (19.56) and Keyfitz
(1977). In practice the expert can choose one statistical distribu-
tion (e.g., normal or uniform) and then define only certain fractiles
(e.g., median and upper and lower .5 percent). Combining the su b-
jective probability distributions of a number of experts to form one
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joint predictive probability distribution diminishes the danger of in-
dividual bias. However, there can never be a population projection
without personal judgment. Even models largely based on past time
series are subject to a serious judgmental issue of whether to assume
structural continuity or any alternative structure.
This approach to probabilistic projections based on the subjec-
tive distributions of a number of experts is applied in Chapter 16
of this volume. The chapter presents what we call "probabilistic
world population projections based on expert opinion." It signifi-
cantly adds to the scenario projections in Chapter 15 by giving users
a better understanding of the likelihood of certain scenarios. It is
important for users to know the probability of the scenario (or vari-
ant) they are considering. For example, a high-fertility scenario (or
variant) with a 20 percent probability should be taken more serious
in policy considerations than one with only 2 percent probability.
The reason for choosing the probabilistic approach, which is
based on subjective distributions provided by a group of experts,
rather than a time-series approach lies in our belief that in both the
near and distant future structural changes and unexpected events
are likely to happen in many parts of the world which makes alter-
native expert-based assumptions the only meaningful way to cap-
ture future uncertainty. Time-series analysts could be among the
experts giving their subjective views, but at the global level their
models could never be applied simply because the necessary data
are not available.
As to the relationship between fertility, mortality, and migra-
tion, these simulations can assume either independence or certain
correlations. Examples for both are given in Chapter 16. Another
important issue is, whether regional demographic trends should be
considered independent or follow a uniform pattern (such as high
fertility in all regions) as is traditionally assumed in uncertainty
variants of population projection. There is, however, no particular
substantive reason why, for example, unexpectedly high fertility in
China should coincide with unexpectedly high fertility in Africa. If
regions are considered independent at the global level, much of the
variation will be canceled out. Chapter 16 considers both regional
dependence and regional independence.
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2.8 Interactions among Components and
Possible Feedbacks from Results
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It is essential to determine whether the assumptions made for fer-
tility, mortality, and migration are unrelated or have some form of
interaction. Yet this question is rarely discussed explicitly in the
description of existing population projections. The problem lies in
the fact that, even when some dependency is suspected, it is very
difficult to quantitatively capture and specify the nature of such
interactions. One can distinguish at least three different levels of
interaction:
1. Correlation between trends of demographic components.
2. Feedbacks from demographic variables resulting from projec-
tions, in particular population size or age structure.
3. Feedbacks from non-demographic variables, such as economic
development, education, or environmental factors, which in turn
depend on population factors.
Correlation between demographic components is incorporated
relatively easily. For example, one can assume that in countries in
the process of demographic transition the declines in fertility and
mortality are positively correlated.
Feedbacks from other demographic variables, such as popula-
tion size or age structure, are more controversial and hence more
difficult to include. There is full consensus that the world popula-
tion cannot grow indefinitely, but no agreement exists on the levels
at which some sort of collapse might happen. The land-carrying ca-
pacity concept is accepted in the nat ural sciences, but less so among
social scientists. Collapses, if they happen at all, will probably oc-
cur suddenly and with large regional differences. As to possible
reactions of fertility, mortality, or migration to negative effects of
population aging, little agreement has been reached. Rapid aging
will certainly create problems, in particular when countries are not
well prepared, for example, with regard to social security. But, as
is shown by the example of today's industrialized world, popula-
tions can adapt to gradnal changes in the age structure. Because
of the possible discrepancy between individual desired family sizes
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and societal goals, it is unclear whether, for example, extreme aging
\vill result in higher fertility. Examples of possible feedbacks of this
kind are given in Chapter 1.5.
Feedbacks from non-demographic variables work indirectly via
such complex matters as levels of education, status of health care.
economic development, or environmental pollution. Only a compre-
hensive, multisector system would be able to track such feedbacks.
However, the strength - and sometimes even the dire<tion - of such
multifarious feedbacks is largely unknown, or at least highly un-
certain. Conseq uently, multisector-systems models tend to create
dependencies and future paths that are far different frollJ reality, a
world in itself driven by feedback loops based often on shaky empir-
ical or theoretical grounds.
A well-known example of such a multisector system is the
\Vorld;3 model - an economic. demographic. and ellvironmental
model of the world taken as a whole - developed by the Forrester-
Meadows group during the 1970s (Forrester. 1971; Meadows (-t al..
1972. 1974, 1992b; Meadows and Meadows, 1973). The crude death
rate decreases with increasing food intake and improvements in the
material standard of living, and increases with increasing pollution
and (to a much lesser extent) population crowding.
The Bariloche model (Bariloche Grollp, 1976; Herrera rt al..
197G) is also noteworthy since it includes a relativel,v large nUlll-
ber of feedbacks to the population submodel. For example, among
other things, the crude birth rate is influenced by school ellrollment.
calorie intake, housing availability, and the life expectancy at birth
(Herrera et aI., 1976:.51).
A different approach was recently developed for a study on
population-development-environment interactions in a specific set-
ting (Lutz, 1994a).[.5] A main feature of this PDE model is that it is
extraordinarily flexible. Since the nature and the strength of lllOSt
of the feedbacks included in previous models are subject to much de-
bate among scientists, most of those feedbacks are not hard-wired in
the model. These feedbacks must be defined by the scenario maker
using the model software.
Conceptually such multisector models are desirable. but they
are usually not suited for the purpose of population projections.
Inclusion of multiple feedbacks from non-demographic variables in
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such models increases the potential for introducing more errors than
one resolves.
2.9 Summary: The Approach We Chose
In this chapter we have addressed the following questions: Why an-
other set of global population projections? YVho wants projections
and for what reasons? What should the time horizon and spatial
resolution be'? What output parameters are expected? Which al-
ternative approaches address the issue of uncertainty in population
projections? \Ve have contrasted our approach to that of ot hers.
Issues have been identified in which progress is possible and de-
sirable, and where alternative new strategies promise new insights.
The left- hand side of Table 2.1 summarizes some of the key issues
in population projection, and the right-hand side specifies the ap-
proachs we have chosen.
There is little disagreement on the projection methodology to
be used for (global) population projections. Our projections are car-
ried out using a multiregional cohort-component model, with five-
year age groups. In contrast to global projections produced by the
UN and the World Bank, which are based on individual country esti-
mates, we have disaggregated the globe into 1:3 major world regions.
By doing so, much ofthe world's heterogeneity is taken into account.
and we need not bother with national particularities. especially with
respect to migration.
The crucial difference with respect to existing global population
projections lies in the specification, justification, and combination of
alternative scenario assumptions (Chapter 15) and in the definition
of the first probabilistic world population projections (Chapter 16).
The approach chosen involves a number of steps. First, selected
experts with different backgrounds in the fields of fertility, mortal-
ity, and migration analysis are asked to think about the future of
the three demographic components. If necessary, different experts
are invited for different regions. The experts are asked to suggest
possible high and low assumptions for future fertility. mortality, and
migration levels up to the year :2030 and discuss them in a group spt-
ting. The experts must argue their points substantively and justify
their views. These elements are documented in Chapters ;3 to Ii.
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Table 2.1. Major characteristics of our projection approach.
Issue
Projection methodology
Spatial resolution
Time horizon
Variability of
components
Basis of
assumptions
.J ustification of
assumptions
Uncertainty
Interactions between
the components
Feedbacks from
results
Correlations of regional
demographic trends
Our choice
Multiregional cohort-component model with
five-year age-groups and five-year projection
intervals.
13 major world regions.
Experts define assumptions until 2030-20:35;
extensions until 2100.
Fertility, mortality, and migration are given
equal importance; bigb and low values and
the arithmetic mean for each component
specified.
Judgment of an interacting group of experts
based on understanding of the underlying
processes plus outside knowledge.
Scientific chapters by experts in the fields of
fertility, mortality, and migration; for
developed and developing areas.
Cbapter 15: Alternative scenarios combining
extreme fertility, mortality, and migration
assumptions.
Chapter 16: Probabilistic projections by
simulations based on expert-defined
probability distributions for all t.hree
components.
Independence of components in systematic
permutation scenarios and probabilistic
projections.
Correlation bet.ween fertility and mortality in
subset of probabilistic projectiolls.
Specia.l scenarios assuming a food crisis in
certain bigh-fertility regions (feedback from
populat.ion size on mortality) and a social
crisis in certain low-fertility regions (feedback
from population aging on fertility).
No feedbacks of multi-sectora.l context
explicitly assumed.
The consequences of botb regional correlation
and independence are demonstrated.
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Next, those alternative views expressed on future levels of fertility,
mortality, and migration, which are sometimes only of a qualitative
nature, are transformed into alternative quantitative assumptions
on different future paths in each region considered. The high and
low assumptions are assumed to correspond roughly to a 90 percent
confidence interval of a subjective probability distribution. In other
words, on each side only about 5 percent of all possible cases should
lie outside the values considered. Assuming a normal distribution
as representing the intuitive subjective probability distribution, the
assumed central value is both the most likely case and the mean of
the high and low values.
The specific process by which these subjective probability dis-
tributions were defined and combined in practical terms is described
in detail in Lutz et ai. (199.)) and summarized in Chapters 15 and
16 of this book.
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Notes
[1] The word projection, of course, carries psychological connotations.
Webster's defines the word as follows: "projection. 6b: the attri-
bution of one's own ideas, feelings, or attitudes to other people or to
objects ... 8: an estimate of future possibilities based on a current
trend" (Webster's NelL' Collegiate Dictionary, 1974). These two mean-
ings are not wholly separable, for in imagining individual behavior in
the future, we cannot but include our own perspectives.
[2] Birg (1995) presents a large set of simulations to assess the impact
of alternative fertility and mortality trends on world population size.
However, these calculations consider the whole world one region.
[3] The UN Population Division regularly publishes urban/rural projec-
tions for all countries by multiplying the projected population by as-
sumed urban proportions.
[4] The possibility does exist. that mistaken counts of the achieved popu-
lation would give false estimates of empirical error. These could result
in either overestimates or underestimates of error size.
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[5] The past two decades produced a lively and rapidly growing literature
on the interrelationships between economic, demographic, and envi-
ronmental variables, but the development of simulation models that
included these three factors almost came to a complete halt after the
burst of activity in the early 1970s.
Part II
Future Fertility in
Developing Countries
The material presented in Part II shows that fertility has started to
decline in virtually all countries of the world. Even countries that
until recently showed very high fertility levels seem to have entered
the fertility transition toward low average fertility. The majority of
developing countries are in the middle of this transition process, but
some have nearly completed it. The China and Centrally Planned
Asia (CPA) region is the most advanced in the transition process,
followed by the regions of Latin America and Southeast Asia. Africa
is least advanced in this process, but the most recent information
shows that fertility is declining in this region as well. Survey research
on preferred family sizes suggests further fertility declines in devel-
oping regions, and in many countries government family-planning
policies have already had some success in lowering fertility levels.
Fertility is assumed to decline further in the future in all regions
except in China and CPA, where fertility has already reached such
a Low level that one could even infer a slight increase if the one-child
policy is relaxed in the future. In all other developing regions, differ-
ences between high- and low-fertility scenarios mostly reflect differ-
ent assumed speeds of decline. But the question of what the ultimate
fertility level will be at the end of the demographic transition pro-
cess remains unanswered. There seems to be little substantive justi-
fication to assume that eventually fertility will stay at replacement
level, which is defined as two surviving children per woman. Accord-
ingly the low-fertility scenarios assume below-replacement fertility
by 2030-2035 in all regions, while the high-fertility scenarios assume
a retardation of the fertility decline.
A more detailed justification of the numerical assumptions is
given in Chapter 15.

Chapter 3
A Regional Review of Fertility
Trends in Developing
Countries: 1960 to 1995
John Cleland
This chapter contains a review of fertility trends in developing coun-
tries over the period L960 to 199.5. The choice of the starting date is
simple to justify. Before 1960, fertility decline was very rare in devel-
oping countries. Indeed, there is evidence that levels of childbearing
in many countries increased in the 15 years following World War
II. In this period, substantial improvements in life expectancy were
achieved and thus rates of growth of Third World populations accel-
erated. Concerns about the effects of rapid population growth arose,
and the 1960s saw the first examples of a unique and new form of so-
cial engineering: state-sponsored family-planning programs. These
programs originated in Asia before spreading to other regions. As
we shall see, any account of fertility trends has to address the cen-
trally important issue of the contribution made to fertility decline
by government in terventions.
A broad-ranging review such as that contained in this chapter
has to make explicit choices about the framework within which to
present the demographic elata. The goal is to choose a framework
that will clarify the underlying forces of change. In this instance, a
regional grouping of data has been chosen, rather than one based on
development indicators. There are several reasons for this choice.
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First, one clear lesson from the past 30 years is that simple mono-
causal explanations of fertility decline totally fail to capture the
complex interplay offactors that influence the onset and speed of fer-
tility decline. Thus fertility trends cannot be illuminated adequately
by a straightforward ordering of nations in terms of their stage of
socioeconomic development. This is not to deny that development,
particularly in the social sector, has an influence on childbearing.
Rather it is to assert that this influence is strongly conditioned by
cultural factors and government policies.
A second reason for choosing a regional framework is the exis-
tence of a pronounced regional imprint on fertility transition. The
clearest example is the European fertility transition that was dis-
tinct in its timing from that in other regions. As demonstrated in
this chapter, there is also an undeniable element of synchronicity in
the onset of fertility transition in other major regions, such as Latin
America and East Asia.
The importance of a region lies less in the implied geographical
contiguity of constituent states than in the fact that it represents a
surrogate for shared cultural values and features of social organiza-
tion. A major advance in our understanding of fertility transition
has been the realization that cultural factors, as denoted by reli-
gious, ethnic, or linguistic markers, may have a decisive impact on
fertility, independent of economic and other types of influence.
The statistical underpinning for this review is the fertility rates
collated and published by the United Nations Population Division.
Specifically, the 199/~ revision of World Population Prospects is the
source of information on trends since the quinquennium 1960 to
196.5 (UN, 199.5). For some countries, UN fertility estimates are
little more than guesswork; in other cases, they are based on poor
data and may be incorrect and for the most recent period are based
partly on projections. Nevertheless they represent the most care-
fully compiled and adjusted set of figures in existence and carry a
corresponding authority. In the account that follows, major uncer-
tainties about the rates for specific important countries are noted,
but no attempt is made to amend VN estimates.
Throughout the chapter. levels of fertility are represented in the
form of period total fertility rates (TFRs): the single most useful
and widely used indicator. As is well known, period fertility rates
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are sensitive to variations in the tempo of childbearing as well as to
the numbers of births that any cohort will achieve. Thus a period
TFR can provide misleading impressions of the underlying level of
cohort fertility. vVith the main exception of China, however, there is
little evidence that TFRs in developing countries have been heavily
inftuenced by large, reversible changes in the speed of child bearing.
Insofar as this assertion is correct, period TFRs provide a valid
indication of what age-specific fertility rates in a particular calendar
period imply in terms of ultimate family size.
With these introductory remarks, the groundwork has been laid
for the main part of the chapter: an essentially descriptive review
of the course of fertility in the main regions of the developing world.
Following this, an attempt is made to distill the main lessons that
have been learned and what may lie ahead.
3.1 The Course of Fertility in Major
Regions
3.1.1 East and Southeast Asia
East and Southeast Asia, excluding .Japan, accounts for nearly one-
third of the world's population, with China alone comprising about
one-fifth of the total. Global population trends are thus largely
determined by the course of events in this region. In contrast to
South Asia, economic growth has been rapid: China, Indonesia,
Thailand, Malaysia, Republic of I\:orea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and
Singapore have aU achieved annual rates of growth in GDP per
head between 1965 and 1988 of 4 percent or more. (The equivalent
figure for India is 2.5 percent.) As a consequence, an increasing
number of states in the region are now classified as upper-middle or
high income countries; they are included in this review only because
incomes per head were low at the start of the 35-year period.
As shown in Table .1.1, several countries (China, South Korea,
Hong Kong, and Singapore) now have period fertility that is below
replacement level. In all cases, decline started in the late 1950s or
1960s in response to rising age at marriage as well as increasing
use of birth control. Careful ana.lyses of South Korea (Park, 1992)
and of Taiwan (Feeney, 1991) suggest that current period fertility
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Table 3.l. Fertility trends in East and Southeast Asia.
H)60-65 1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 1985-90 1990-95
Laos 6.15 G.15 6.15 6.69 6.69 6.69 6.69
Cambodia 6.29 6.22 5.5:3 4.10 5.06 5.25 5.25
Myanmar 6.00 6.00 5.75 5.30 4.90 4.50 4.16
Philippines 6.61 6.04 5.50 4.96 4.74 4.30 3.93
Vietnam 6.05 5.94 5.85 5.59 4.69 4.22 3.87
Malaysia 6.72 5.94 5.15 4.16 4.24 4.00 3.62
Indonesia 5.42 r:::: r::"" 5.10 4.68 4.06 3.31 2.90.).;) ,
North Korea 5.75 7.00 5.70 :3.46 2.77 2.50 2.37
Thailand 6.42 6.14 5.01 4.27 2.96 2.57 2.10
China 5.61 5.94 4.76 :3.26 2.50 2.41 1.95
South Korea 5.40 4.52 4.11 2.80 2.40 1.73 1.73
Singapore 4.9:3 :3.46 L.62 1.87 1.69 1.71 1.73
Hong Kong 5.31 4.02 L.89 2.32 1.80 1.31 1.21
Source: UN, 1995.
may be depressed by postponement of marriage and births and that
the underlying cohort level may be slightly above two births. This
interpretation is of considerable importance with regard to policy
because there is growing concern among several governments about
the implications of very low fertility. Singapore has already adopted
explicitly pronatalist policies. and it is possible that Taiwan and
South Korea will follow this lead, unless they can be reassured that
period rates are likely to rise.
Two other countries may join the below-replacement group be-
fore the end of the century: Thailand and North Korea. Thailand's
decline started in the late 1960s and has proceeded rapidly ever
since. Fertility is approaching replacement level with little sign thus
far of stabilization. 11,11 Hch less is known about the demography of
North Korea, and the government, unlike that of South Korea, has
been hostile or indifferent to the promotion of family planning. Nev-
ertheless, there is evidence that fertility has fallen steeply: a vivid
demonstration that transition is not necessarily dependent on strong
government support. Another country of the region, Myanmar, ap-
pears also to haw experienced fertility decline, despite government
indifference to family planning and isolation from the rest of the
world.
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Fertility trends in urban China closely parallel those in the city
states of Hong Kong and Singapore. Decline started in the early
1960s from a level of about 5.0 births. By 1980, fertility in all
three settings had fallen below or close to replacement level. A
major mechanism was increased birth control within marriage; age
at marriage for women also rose sharply from about 20 years in 1960
to about 25 years in the early L9kOs.
Of course. fertility in China as a whole is determined by rural
trends. As in India, traditional fertility levels in China appear to
have been modest, within the range of five to six births. Also like In-
dia, there is some evidence t hat natural fertility increased initially
under the impact of modernization. Marital fertility rates in the
mid-1950s appear to have been about 15 percent higher than rates
recorded in the 1930s (Coale and Freedman, 1993). The first ma-
jor destabilization of rural fertility was the disastrous Great Leap
Forward in the late 1950s. Mortality rose sharply and period fer-
tility plummeted to a little above three births before rebounding to
over seven in 19():3. There followed a period of vacillation in fertility
rates during the Cultural Revolution. The dramatic decline in rural
fertility started in about 1970, coinciding with the introduction of
a forceful family-planning program. Between 1970 and 1980, the
TFR for the whole country fell from about 6.0 to 2.4 births. This
decline of nearly 60 percent in 10 years represents the single most
important contribution to the fall in global fertility over the past
30 years. However, the emergence of pronounced regional variations
during this period is often overlooked (Peng, 1981). By the end
of the decade, TFRs in remote provinces of China, such as Tibet,
Guizhou, and Ningxia. were still over 4.0.
In 1979, the Chinese govf'rnment announced the one-child pol-
icy, and in the following year passed a marriage law that was widely
interpreted as a relaxation of the previous strong discouragement
of early marriage. Both measures had profound but partially off-
setting effects on the course of fertility in the 1980s. The one-child
policy was enforced with considerable success in urban areas. By
1985-1987, urban fertility was well below 2.0 in all provinces of
China. Indeed in most of the larger cities, second- and higher-order
births almost disappeared. In the rural areas, however, the policy
encountered strong resistance. The majority was not prepared to
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sign the one-child pledge, and period fertility in nearly all provinces
remained well above 2.0.
For the whole country, the period TFR fluctuated throughout
the 1980s around a level of 2.4 births per woman, with no clear
evidence of a continuation of the decline of the 1970s. Many com-
mentators assumed that the economic reforms of the 1980s made
it increasingly difficult for central and local officials to enforce an
unpopular policy. However. in 1989 population policy was again
strengthened and responsihility for enforcement was transferred to
local civilian authorities. Allalyses of results from a 1992 survey
conducted by the State Family Planning Commission suggest that
fertility fell sharply in the period 1989 to 1992 (Feeney and Yuan,
1994).
Fertility transition in Indonesia shares several characteristics
with that in China. In both countries, levels of socioeconomic devel-
opment were low at the onset of decline and, in both cases, couples
were subjected to strong official pressure to adopt birth control. The
Indonesian government illitiaUy focused its attention on densely set-
tled Java, which comprises just 6 percent of the country's land area
but over 60 percent of the population. Fertility started to decline
there (and in Bali) in the early 1970s. By 1976, fertility in Java
was actually lower among the least-educated rural population than
among the urban, more-educated sectors: a highly unusual situation
that undoubtedly reflected the impact of the government program
(Freedman et al., 1981).
Between the late 1960s and the early 1990s, fertility in the whole
country fell from 5.7 to 2.9 hirths, a decline of over 40 percent. In
.J ava, the current level is well below 3.0 births per woman but in
Sumatra, the second most populous island, fertility remains much
higher.
The neighboring countries of the Philippines and Malaysia con-
trast in numerous and fascinating ways with Indonesia. In the 1960s,
economic and educational standards were higher than in Indonesia
and fertility began to decline earlier. But the pace of decline has
been much more gradual. Total fertility rates in Malaysia and the
Philippines - estimated by the UN to be 3.6 and 3.9 over the period
1990-1995 - are now markedly higher than in Indonesia.
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The stalling of fertility decline in Malaysia dates from the late
1970s and appears to originate with a resurgence in Islamic values
and shifts in government policy. While fertility among the Chinese
and Indian minorities continued to decline, and is now little above
replacement level, that of the majority Malay population actually
rose in the 1980s, in response to a decline in the use of contraception
(Leete and Tan, 199:3). In 1984. the government announced a new
population policy which set a target of 70 million inhabitants by
the year 2100. It was widely perceived to be a pronatalist measure,
and a national survey conducted shortly afterward indicated that
a significant fraction of Malay women had revised their family-size
expectations upward in response (Arshat et al., 1988).
In the Philippines, there was no radical change in population
policy but official Sll pport for family planning has always been rela-
tively weak because of the opposition of the Roman Catholic Church.
Although President Marcos created, in 1969, a Commission on Pop-
ulation to coordinate family-planning activities, it failed to secure
consensus support or widespread coverage of services. Support fur-
ther weakened during the Aquino era. Between 1978 and 1993, the
level of modern contraceptive practice among married women rose
only from 1/ to 25 percent.
In summary, the fertility transition in East and Southeast Asia
is varied and complex. Variability is evident in the starting level
of fertility; the timing of the onset of decline and level of socioeco-
nomic development at the time; the speed of decline; and the role
of government policy. Anyone who still believes that the level of
reproduction is a predictable outcome of education, urbanization,
and living standards should pause to ponder the difference in fer-
tility transition between Indonesia. and Thailand, on the one hand,
and Malaysia and the Philippines. on the other.
3.1.2 South Asia
For present purposes, this region is defined as the Indian subcon-
tinent, extending west to include Iran. It accounts for about 20
percent of the world's population and represents the largest numer-
ical concentration of poverty. Bangladesh and Nepal, with CDPs
per head of US$liO-$180, are among the poorest countries of the
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Table 3.2. Fertility trends in continental South Asia.
1960-65 1965-70 1970-75 1975-S0 19S0~S5 19S5-90 1990-95
Afghanistan 7.01 7.13 7.14 7.21 6.90 6.90 6.90
Pakistan 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 6.75 6.17
Bhutan 5.92 G.92 G.92 G.92 5.8G 5.S6 5.SG
Nepal G.68 5.78 G.2() 6.54 6.35 5.90 5.42
Iran 7.26 (Ull 6.5,1 6.50 6.S0 6.00 5.00
Bangladesh 6.G8 ().~n 7.02 6.6G 6.15 4.S0 4.35
India 5.81 ,1.69 5.4:3 4.S3 4.47 4.07 3.75
Source: UN, 1995.
world, while India and Pakistan, with per caput GDPs of $350, rank
twenty-second and twenty-third in the world of poverty.
In the region as a whole. fertility has declined modestly from a
level of about 6.0 in the early 19GOs to a little over 4.0 births in the
early 1990s, a fall of some :50 percent. However, there is consider-
able uncertainty about South Asian demographic trends. For three
countries - Iran, Afghanistan. and Bhutan - recent fertility trends
are essentially unknown. For three other countries (Bangladesh,
Pakistan, and Nepal) they are a matter of controversy, leaving only
India for which vital rates are clearly established.
United Natiolls estimates for Afghanistan and Bhutan show
high fertility rates in the 1960s of about seven births per woman
and very modest declines in the past :20 years (Table ';.2). For
Afghanistan, a verdict of nnchanging high fertility seems entirely
reasonable, though the military disruptions of recent years may well
have caused a temporar~' drop. The UN scenario for Iran is also
doubtful. Before the revolution, the country had a vigorous family-
planning program that made a considerable impact. After the fall of
the Shah, the program was discredited, but in recent years the gov-
ernment has reaffirmed the need to moderate the population growth
rate and is again promoting family planning. The degree of success
achieved remains uncertain; fertility has declined, although perhaps
not at the rapid pace suggested by the UN.
By contrast, Bangladesh. Pakistan, and Nepal generate a rela-
tive abundallce of demographic data. All three countries have con-
ducted regular censuses: all have conducted a number of detailed
fertility surveys, supplemented by contraceptive prevalence surveys;
and Bangladesh and Pakistan have prospective systems that pu blish
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vital rates. Yet demographic trends remain in dispute. The reason
for this uncertainty lies in thE' poor quality of the data. Surveys, in
particular, tend to suffer from the pernicious problem of backward
displacement of dates of recent births, leading to an underestima-
tion of the current level of fertility. Claims of fertility decline are
often made but these are equally often shown to be false by the next
survey.
Accordingly. the results of the 1991 Demographic and Health
Survey (DHS) in Pakistan, which indicates a big decline in fertil-
ity to about !5.S births. should be regarded with great skepticism.
Reliance on the prospective system, run by the Federal Bureau of
Statistics in Karachi, is more prudent. This system portrays a con-
stant total fertility of about 7.0 births until 1988, when a drop to
6.5 is recorded. The results for the early 1990s show levels of about
6.2. Falls in lower-order birt h rates tend to be more pronounced
t han in higher-order births; thus it remains unclear whether marital
fertility decline (which normally affects higher-order births at the
initial stages) has really started. Certainly the level of contracep-
tive practice reported in the 1991 DHS (12 percent) is too low to
make an appreciable impact on fertility. To conclude, the level of
fertility in Pakistan remained high and constant until the late 1980s
but has probably fallen slightly in the period 1988-1990. The UN
estimates in Table 8.2 are essentially correct.
In Nepal, evidence of decline is more secure than in Pakistan.
The 1991 Fertility. Family Planning, and Health Survey yielded an
unadjusted TFR of 15.1. The level of contraceptive use rose from
S percent in 1976 to 2;3 percent in 1991, and age at marriage for
women also increased over this period. Thus fertility transition in
Nepal has almost certainly started.
In Bangladesh the pace of change is more rapid and pronounced
than in Pakistan and Nepal. It is increasingly apparent that fertil-
ity decline started in the late 19705 and gathered pace in the 1980s.
Between 1975 and 1990, the TFR fell from about 7.0 to about 4.5.
Evidence for these assertions comes largely from 1989 and 1994 fer-
tility surveys and from two contraceptive prevalence surveys in 1989
and 1991, both of which collected truncated birth histories. The
consistency of these data sets is striking, although the unadjusted
estimate from the more recent survey is implausibly low. Detailed
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analysis of the 1989 fertility survey shows that the main change has
taken the form of a reduction in higher-order births; for instance,
the percentage decline in age-order specific rates (cumulated to age
40) between the period L97.f~1978 and 1984-1986 was 10 percent
for second births btl t :38 percent for fifth births. This evidence of
increasing marital fertility control is confirmed by the rising level of
reported contraceptive use, from 7 percent in 197.5 to 4.5 percent in
1994. Age at marriage for women has also increased but the anti-
natal effect is modest and offset by a decline in widowhood and in
the length of the first- birth interval.
In broad terms, the remarkable transition in Bangladesh, the
fifth poorest country in the world, has affected all socioeconomic
strata equally. Thus fertility decline is as pronounced among illiter-
ate, landless laborers as among the slightly more affluent cultivators.
The experience of Bangladesh proves beyond a doubt that extreme
poverty and low literacy do not represent absolute barriers to fertil-
ity decline.
Like Nepal, but in contrast to its Islamic neighbors, the tradi-
tionallevel of fertility in India was low, fluctuating between five and
six births per woman between 1880 and 1960 (Bhat, 1989). One
possible reason for the slow pace of fertility decline in India is that
modernization acted to increase natural fertility through changes
in lactational and sexual behavior. There is evidence that marital
fertility in the rural areas of many states actually increased during
the 1960s, despite the existence of a family-planning program and
a gradual rise in reported contraceptive practice (Srinivasan, 1989).
The onset of decline in total fertility occurred in the late 1960s and
continued for almost a decade; it then stalled before resuming its
downward path in the micl-1980s. The most obvious explanation
for this sequence concerns the politics of population control. In
the 1960s under Indira Ghandi, the family-planning program be-
came increasingly coercive and, when she fell from power in 1977,
its credibility also fell and recovered only gradually. Over the entire
period from the early 19605 to the early 1990s, total fertility in India
fell by 36 percent, from .5.8 to :3.7 births. Various decompositions
(e.g., Chaudhry, 1989; Srikantan and Balasubramanian, 1989) in-
dicate that one-fifth of this decline is attributable to rising age at
marriage and the rest to marital fertility.
Fertility Trends in Developing Countries 57
Some of the reasons for the slow pace of change in India - the
possible relaxation of traditional restraints on fertility and the check-
ered history of the family-planning program - have already been
mentioned. However, no account of Indian transition can fail to note
the immense cultural and economic diversity of the country and its
relevance to demographic trends. Transition is most advanced in the
southern states, notably Kerala and Tamil Nadu with TFRs of 2.0
and 2.5, respectively, according to the recent results of the 1993 Na-
tional Family Health Survey. In most of the northern states such as
Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and Bihar, fertility and childhood mor-
tality remain high with TFRs ranging between 3.6 and 4.8. Many
(e.g., Dyson and Moore, 198:3) attribute this north-south divide to
fundamental cultural differences that affect the status of women. In
Kerala, for instance, 87 percent of women are literate, compared
with 20-30 percent in the high- fertility, northern states.
3.1.3 Latin America
Latin America is defined here to include all states of continental
South America and Central America, except Guyana and Surinam.
In contrast to other major developing regions, Latin America expe-
rienced large-scale and permanent settlement of European popula-
tions, and this legacy is evident in certain features of the economy
and fertility transition. Two countries, Argentina and Uruguay,
were once among the wealthiest in the world and are still ranked
in the upper-middle income category. Both had completed their
fertility transition by 1950, with TFRs of 3.2 and 2.7, respectively,
at that time. In the past 40 years, fertility in both countries has
changed Little, remaining well above replacement level (Table 3.3).
This stabilization at levels ranging between 2.3 and 3.5 births per
woman appears to be characteristic of the region. In Chile, as in
Argentina and Uruguay, the era of rapid decline is over but pe-
riod fertility remains within this range. However, there is no good
reason for believing that Latin American culture possesses features
that will sustain moderate fertility indefinitely. The majorities of
the populations of these three countries are of Spanish and Italian
extraction. Fertility levels in the countries of origin, Spain and Italy,
are now among the lowest in the world. If Latin America experi-
ences the socioeconomic transformation - particularly with regard
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Table 3.3. Fertility trends in Latin America.
1960-65 1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 1985-90 1990-95
Guatemala 6.8.5 6.60 6.45 6.40 6.12 5.77 5.36
Nicaragua 7.37 7.17 6.79 6.40 6.00 5.55 5.04
Honduras 7.42 7.42 7.05 6.60 6.00 5.37 4.92
Bolivia 6.63 6.56 6.50 5.80 5.30 5.00 4.80
Paraguay 6.80 6.40 5.65 4.88 4.79 4.70 4.31
El Salvador 6.85 6.G2 G.I0 5.70 5.00 4.52 4.04
Ecuador G.70 6.50 (UJO 5.'10 4.70 4.00 3.52
Peru 6.8.5 6.5G 6.00 5.:38 4.6.5 3.83 3.40
Venezuela 6.66 5.90 4.94 4.47 3.96 3.65 3.29
Mexico 6.75 6.70 (U7 5.03 4.30 3.70 3.21
Costa Rica 6.95 5.80 4.3:3 3.89 3.50 3.36 3.14
Brazil 6.15 5.31 4.70 4.21 3.65 3.15 2.88
Panama 5.91 5.62 4.9:3 4.05 :3.51 3.20 2.88
Argentina 3.09 3.05 :3.15 :3.,14 3.15 3.00 2.77
Colombia 6.76 G.28 A.66 4.14 3.51 2.90 2.67
Chile 5.28 4.44 ::Ui:3 2.95 2.G6 2.G5 2.54
Uruguay 2.90 2.80 :3.00 2.89 2.57 2.43 2.33
Source: UN, 1995.
to the position of women in society - that has characterized South-
ern Europe, it is probable that Latin American fertility will fall to
replacement level or below.
From speculations about the future, let us return to a consid-
eration of the past. Because the demography of Latin America is
rather well documented, it is possible to extend the historical de-
scription of fertility trends back to the 19.50s. Between the early
19.50s and the eaTly 1960s, there is little evidence of any fertility
decline. Indeed, in some countries such as Costa Rica, El Salvador,
and Panama, a slight increase is registered, perhaps in response to
declines in widowhood (Dyson and Murphy, 1985). In this regard,
Latin America is very different from Asia, where rising age at mar-
riage for women heralded and then accompanied declines in marital
fertility. For most countries. the early 1960s represent the last quin-
quennium prior to the fertility transition. TFRs are typically close
to seven births per woman. though lower in Brazil, Chile, Pa.nama,
and Venezuela.
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Table 3.4. Year of onset of decline and percentage decline in fol-
lowing decade in Latin America.
Brazil
Guatemala
Venezuela
Costa Rica
Colombia
Chile
El Salvador
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Ecuador
Peru
Honduras
Bolivia
Mexico
Source: Guzmau, 1994.
Year
1960
1960
1960
1961
1962
H162
1962
1962
1962
1~)63
1~)65
1~)()5
1966
H)72
H) 72
Percentage decline
8.3
9.6
15.6
37.5
34.3
28.7
10.8
8.5
20.0
19.7
20.0
16.8
U.5
13.8
36.4
The synchronicity of the onset of fertility decline in Latin Amer-
ica is its most remarkable feature. Leaving aside Argentina and
Uruguay, which belong to the earlier European transition, all but
two countries (Mexico and Bolivia) started their declines in the
1960s. However, the speed of change varied widely. Guzman's
(1994) calculations of the year of onset of decline and the percentage
decline in the following decade are shown in Table 3.4. Declines of
over 30 percent are registered on Colombia, Costa Rica, and Mexico.
At the other extreme are Brazil, Guatemala, and Nicaragua which
experienced declines of less than LO percent. Interpretation of these
figures is difficult, because of the somewhat arbitrary definition of
the onset of decline. For instance, it is perfectly correct to charac-
terize the transition in Mexico as both late to start but extremely
rapid once under way; but it would be misleading to claim that fer-
tility decline in Brazil has been slow but steady. Over the whole
period from 1960 to 1990, t.he pace of change in Brazil has been as
great. as in Costa Rica and Colombia.
In terms of t.heir current sit.uation, Latin American states fall
into four groups. The first group consists of Argentina, Chile, and
Uruguay where fertility is low and relatively stable. A large second
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group follows. In this group total fertility is now in the range of 2.7
to 3.3 births, and this group shows some sign of incipient stabiliza-
tion, particularly in Costa Rica. The three most populous countries
of the region - Brazil, },/Iexico, and Colombia - fall into this group.
It should be noted that fertility in Colombia is now slightly lower
than in Argentina. The third group comprises four countries which
are in the midst of transition with recent fertility rates of 3.5 to 4.5
births per woman. Finally, there is a cluster of four high-fertility
countries, three of which are in Central America.
While the simultaneity of the onset of decline is the most re-
markable feature of Latin American transition, a further distin-
guishing feature is the emergence of very pronounced but temporary
urban-rural, socioeconomic, and regional differentials during the pe-
riod of decline. In most countries of the region, decline started
among the better-educated and metropolitan sectors and spread
gradually to poorly educated, rural sectors. The typical process
is well illustrated by Rodriguez and Hobcraft (1984) in an analy-
sis of Colombian data. They were able to identify the beginnings
of decline in the 1960s for women with complete primary or higher
education, in the late 1960s for women with incomplete primary
schooling, and in the late 1970s for those with no formal school-
ing. Furthermore, they demonstrated that, within each educational
stratum, decline was initially restricted to a reduction in higher-
order births and only subsequently affected earlier stages of family
formation.
This sequence suggests strongly that fertility decline in Colom-
bia has taken the form of social diffusion of a new form of behav-
ior, birth control. An analysis by Rodriguez and Aravena (1991)
supports this view. They examined subgroup changes in fertility
behavior, using World Fertility Survey (WFS) and DHS data for 15
surveys including five from Latin America. Remarkable regularities
were observed in the spacing and limitation components of marital
fertility. Specifically, the strata with the least evidence of fertility
control at the start tended to experience the greatest proportional
change. Within strata, transition followed a self-sustaining course
that is consistent with a basic diffusion process. To the extent that
Rodriguez's analysis and interpretation are correct, it is inevitable
that fertility in all strata will converge at a modest level. Thus the
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prospects for a continuation of fertility decline in the region as a
whole appear good.
3.1.4 The Arab states
The Arab states constitute a linguistic and cultural rather than a
compact geographical entity. Ivlost have small populations: Egypt,
with over 50 million inhabitants. followed by Sudan, Morocco, and
Algeria, with about 2.5 million each, are the main exceptions. There
is a very wide spread in living standards. At one extreme are the
United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, classified as high-
income countries. At the other end of the spectrum are Sudan,
Mauritania, and Yemen with per caput GDPs of less than $500.
Information on the demography of the Arab world is patchy.
For Libya, Lebanon, Syria, and some of the Gulf states, there is
little recent evidence concerning fertility levels. In other countries
of the region - for instance, Sudan and Mauritania - recent survey
information is available, but as in South Asia, data quality is poor
and the estimation of trends is correspondingly difficult.
Nevertheless, several features of Arab fertility have clearly been
established. At the start of the period under discussion, the early
1960s, levels of fertility were universally very high, with TFRs rang-
ing between 6.5 and 8.0. This exceptionally high level is the result
of an unusual combination of early marriage ages, relatively short
periods of breast-feeding, and limited practice of birth control. It
is clear from Table 3.5 that fertility remains high in this region.
Only three countries, Lebanon. Kuwait, and Tunesia, record rates
decisively below 4.0.
For the entire region, total fertility has fallen from about 7.0 in
the early 1960s to about 4.5 in the early 1990s, a drop of 35 percent.
This average conceals very large differences in trends and current
levels and an equally large divergence in government policies toward
population and family planning. Apart from Lebanon, whose ethnic
and religious diversity sets it apart from the rest of the Arab world,
the Egyptian and Tunisian governments were the first to provide
public sector family-planning services and associated publicity, and
were among the few Arab states to experience fertility decline in
the 1960s. Tunisian fertility dropped steadily, and this country now
records one of the lowest TFRs in the region with 3.2 births per
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Table 3.5. Fertility trends in the Arab states.
1960-651965-701970-751975-801980-851985-901990-95
Yemen 7.61 7.61 7.61 7.61 7.60 7.60 7.60
Oman 7.20 7.20 7.20 7.20 7.20 7.20 7.20
Libya 7.17 7.48 7.58 7.38 7.17 6.87 6.39
Saudi Arabia 7.26 7.26 7.:30 7.28 7.28 6.80 6.37
Syria 7.46 7.79 7.69 7.44 7.38 6.66 5.90
Sudan 6.67 6.G7 6.67 6.67 6.42 6.10 5.74
Iraq 7.17 7.17 7.11 6..56 6.35 6.15 5.70
Jordan 7.99 7.99 7.79 7.38 6.76 6.00 5.57
Mauritania 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.10 5.70 5.40
Qatar 6.97 6.97 6.76 6.11 5.45 4.70 4.33
UAE 6.87 G.76 (j .:35 5.66 5.23 4.60 4.24
Egypt 7.07 6.56 5.5:3 5.27 5.06 4.58 3.88
Algeria 7.38 7.48 7.38 7.17 G.35 4.97 3.85
Bahrain 7.17 6.97 5.94 5.23 4.63 4.08 3.75
Morocco 7.15 7.09 6.89 5.90 5.10 4.40 3.75
Tunisia 7.17 6.8:) 6.15 5.66 4.88 3.94 3.15
Kuwait 7.31 7.41 6.90 5.89 4.87 3.94 3.10
Lebanon 6.:35 6.05 ·Ul2 4.30 3.79 3.42 3.09
Source: UN, 199.5.
woman. For reasons that are not fully understood, Egyptian fertility
plateaued in the 1970s, before resuming a downward path in the
1980s to reach a TFR of 3.9 in the period from 1990 to 1995.
In the 1970s, declines in fertility became more widespread with
well-documented falls in Jordan, Morocco, and a number of the
small Gulf states. By the late 1980s, fertility decline had started
throughout most of the Arab world, though the change was often
modest. The main exceptions include two of the poorest countries,
Yemen and Mauritania, but may also include some of the richest
states, such as Libya, and Oman. Little is known about fertility in
Libya, but it is thought that a.ny decline is recent and modest. In
Oman, fertility in 1987 was estimated from the Gulf Child Health
Survey to be 7.8 with only 9 percent of currently married women
reporting use of contraception. According to the results of the Gulf
Child Health Survey, fertility in the late 1980s also remained high
in several other Gulf states: 6.05 among the indigenous populations
of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, 05.9 in the United Arab Emirates, and
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.5.:3 in Iraq (Farid, 199:3). However, fertility had fallen more steeply
in Bahrain and Qatar.
Fertility transition in this region shares some features of both
the Asian and the Latin American transitions. As in Asia, rising
age at marriage for women has made an important contribution to
fertility decline, and as in Latin America, huge differences in fertility
have arisen between urban and rural strata and between educational
strata. This differentiation, in both Latin America and the Arab
states, may reflect the rat her weak nature or nonexistence of many
government family-planning services; under such circumstances, the
poor and less-educated have limited access to modern birth control.
In general, levels of Arab fertility remain much higher than
might be expected from consideration of living standards and ur-
banization. This resilience is sometimes attributed to low levels of
female autonomy and education. vVhile it is true that female labor-
force participation remains low, educational standards for women
are rising rapidly in many Arab countries. But even among educated
women, fertility is remarkabl.Y high. For instance, the 1990 Jorda-
nian Demographic and Health Survey records the following TFRs
by educational status of women: no schooling, 6.92; primary, 6.00;
secondary, .5.39; and postsecondary, 4.10. There are few highly ur-
banized countries with reasonable access to family-planning services
where fertility levels, even among educated couples, remain as buoy-
ant as in Jordan. It seems reasonable to conclude that replacement-
level fertility is a more distant prospect for the Arab world than for
some other regions.
3.1.5 Sub-Saharan Africa
S11 b-Saharan Africa comprises only 10 percent of the population of
the Third World but accouuts for a disproportionately large number
of the least developed countries. The economic plight of the region
deteriorated further in the 19;;;005, with declines in income per head in
many countries. Although it possesses more cultural diversity than
most of the other regions considered in this chapter, sub-Saharan
Africa exhibits features of social organization and cultural values
that distinguish it from other major regions: traditions of postnatal
abstinence. polygyny. and the importance of lineage are the best
k1l0w1l of these.
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The first comprehensive account of Africa's demography had
little direct information on fertility at its disposal and had to rely
heavily on stable population analysis (Brass et al., 1968). Since this
report, data availability has improved steadily. Large sums were in-
vested in censuses, and in the L970s an increasing number of coun-
tries undertook more specialized demographic surveys. The World
Fertility Survey represented the next step forward with the partici-
pation of 10 African countries. Under the successor to this program
(the Demographic and Health Survey project) national surveys have
been conducted in a further L:2 countries.
Despite this improvement, knowledge of fertility levels in Africa
remains uneven. Out of :35 continental states with a population of 1
million or more, direct information on fertility in the period 1985 to
1990 is available for only 17. tvioreover, the reliability of estimates
is lower than in South Asia. Hence Table 3.6 is restricted to current
levels and no attempt has been made to depict trends as has been
done for other regions.
However, the evidence strongly suggests that, prior to L980,
fertility in Africa remained constant at a high level and increases
were even recorded in some countries. Between the early 1960s
and the 1980s, UN statistics show increases of 0..5 births or more
for Rwanda, Angola, Zaire, Central African Republic, Gabon, and
Guinea-Bissau. III :-lOme cases, the most plausible explanation is
a decline in pathological sterility. In other cases, it may be at-
tributed to an attenuation of traditional birth-spacing mechanisms.
Indeed it is probable that, prior to L960, fertility increase was more
widespread. Feeney's analysis of Kenyan census data, for instance,
suggests that fertility rose substantially prior to 1960 (for details
see Feeney, 1988b). Unfortunately few countries have a record of
census taking as good as Kenya's to allow a similar historical depth
of analysis.
The persistence of high fertility in Africa gave rise to a prevailing
view that this situation would continue for some time. It was argued
that Africa possessed unique cultural and economic characteristics
that would render reproductive behavior unusually impervious to
the forces of change (e.g .. Caldwell and Caldwell, 1990). The high
desired family sizes reported in surveys further strengthened this
prognosis.
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Table 3.6. Fertility levels in sub-Saharan Africa: 1985-1990 and
1990-1995.
1985-90 1990-95 1985-90 1990-95
East Africa Southern Africa
Uganda 7.30 7.:30 Namibia 5.60 5.25
Malawi 7.40 7.20 Lesotho 5.45 5.20
Ethiopia 7.00 7.00 Swaziland 5.25 4.86
Somalia 7.00 7.00 Botswana 5.24 4.85
Burundi 6.80 6.80 South Africa 4.38 4.09
Rwanda 7.00 6.55
Mozambique 6.50 6.50
Kenya 6.80 6.28
Zambia 6.50 5.98 West Africa
Tanzania (U6 5.90 Cote d 'Ivoire 7.41 7.41
Djibouti 6.24 5.80 Niger 7.71 7.40
Eritrea 6.00 5.80 l'vlali 7.10 7.10
Zimbabwe 5.50 5.01 Benin 7.10 7.10
Guinea 7.00 7.00
Central Africa Liberia 6.80 6.80
Angola 7.20 7.20 Togo 6.58 6.58
Zaire 6.70 6.70 Sierra Leone 6.50 6.50
Congo 6.2~) 6.2D Burkina Faso 6.50 6.50
Chad 5.89 5.89 Nigeria 6.45 6.45
Eq. Guinea 5.89 5.89 Senegal 6.50 6.06
Cameroon G.10 5.70 Ghana 6.39 5.96
Central Africa 5.69 5.69 Guinea-Bissau 5.79 5.79
Gabon 4.99 5.34 Gambia 6.20 5.60
Source: UN, 1995.
Events of the last decade have transformed perceptions about
the stability of African reproductive regimes. First, an appreciable
shift in population policies has occurred, with governments increas-
ingly expressing concern about population growth and support for
family-planning services. According to Mauldin and Ross (1991),
sub-Saharan Africa recorded greater increases in the strength of
family-planning programs than any other region. There are also
signs of change in reproductive behavior. Nearly all Demographic
and Health Surveys ha.ve recorded appreciable increases in median
ages at first birth. For instance, the differences between cohorts
aged 30 to 34 and 20 to 24 amount to 1.0, 0.9, 0.8, and 0.8 years
in Kenya, Zambia, Burundi, and Togo, respectively. Improvements
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in the educational attainment of young African women may be one
reason for t his change. It is also possible that economic stress has
acted to delay the formation of stable partnerships and the onset of
child bearing.
Postponement of childbearing may be a temporary phe-
nomenon. But there is evidence in an increasing number of East
and Southern African states that fertility decline, fueled by contra-
ceptive use, has started. Such a trend is much more likely to mark
the onset of a sustained transition than to represent a transitory
response to economic hardship. At the forefront of this movement
is the Republic of South Africa. By the late 1980s, the level of con-
traceptive practice among the black population was estimated to be
about .50 percent and total fertility at about 4.5 births (Mostert,
1991). Moderate levels of use among married women have also been
recorded in Zimbabwe (4<~ percent). Botswana (33 percent), Kenya
(33 percent), Namihia (2:3 percent). and Swaziland (21 percent). In
all these countries there is parallel evidence of declining fertility. In
South Africa. Zimbabwe. and I\:enya the decline has amounted to
about 2..5 births. in Botswana to abou t 1..5 births, and in Namibia
and Swaziland to less than 1.0 birth per woman.
Successive surveys in l\enya show how rapidly the climate of
reproductive opinion and behavior can change. The Kenya Fertility
Survey of 1977~ 197:'\ portrayed a very pronatalist society. Total
fertility was about :'\.0; desired family size averaged 7.2 children;
only 7 percent of couples reported contra.ceptive use; and only 16
percent of women said that they wanted no more children. There
was little ground for believing tl1at fertility transition was about to
start. Yet a mere decade later. desired family size had dropped to
4.4 children, 49 percent of women expressed a wish to have no more
children, contraceptive Use had risen to 27 percent, and fertility had
fallen to 6..5 births. In the early 1990s, fertility was well below six
births and the mean desired family size was 3.7 births. This radical
change had affected women of all educational backgrounds and ages.
This impression of change in the subregion should be balanced
by data from other countries. Recent Demographic and Health Sur-
veys provide no convincing evidence of appreciable decline in Bu-
rundi, Uganda, Zambia, or Tanzania. Nor is it reasonable to expect
Fertility Trends in De\'eloping COllntries 67
any decline in Angola or :tvIozambique because of prolonged civil
unrest.
In West and Central Africa, fertility shows fewer signs of ac-
tual or incipient decline. though it is probable that fertility decline
has started among young women in Senegal and in Southwest and
Southeast Nigeria (Cleland Ef al.. 1994). Elsewhere, however, there
is no strong evidence of fertility decline. This stability is particu-
larly puzzling in a collntry snch as Ghana. Ghana has long had a
rather well-educated and urbanized population, where women pos-
sess considerable autonomy aud iJl(leed dominate trading. Moreover,
there has been some attempt. since the late 1960s, to promote fam-
ily planning, albeit on a limited scale. Despite the severe economic
recession of the late 1970s and early 1980s which threatened living
standards of the urban middle classes, fertility remained rather con-
stant until the late 1980s (Onuoha and TimGeus, 1995). However, the
1993 Ghana Demographic and Health Survey suggests that fertility
decline has now started. The experience suggests that Ghanaian
society and perhaps other \Vest African societies present obstacles
to fertility decline and mass adoption of contraception that are ab-
sent in East and Southel'1l Africa. '''!hile the prospects are good for
widespread fertility decline in the East and South, the prognosis for
vVest and Central Africa is uncertain.
3.1.6 Island states
To complete this geographic account of fertility trends, Table S.7
provides data for the main islands and island groups. Their contri-
bution to global population trends is minimal; yet the demography
of islands is of special interest. and several have been at the forefront
of fertility transition. In the 1960s, Fiji, Mauritius, and Sri Lanka
were among the few developing countries to have started fertility
transition. This evidence supported speculations that Malthusian
constraints on population growth may take a particularly visible
form in islands where territorial expansion is precluded.
Table S. 7 shows that such simple generalizations are unjustified.
In the period 198,5 to 1990, fertility in island states ranged from
close to replacement level in Mauritius to about to seven births per
woman in Comoros and the :tVIaldives.
68
Table 3.7. Fertility trends in island states.
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1960-65 1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 1985-90 1990-95
Comoros 6.91 7.05 7.05 7.05 7.05 7.05 7.05
Maldives 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 6.80 6.80 6.80
Madagascar 6.60 6.60 6.60 6.60 6.60 6.60 6.10
Melanesia 6.25 6.01 5.78 5.51 5.23 5.04 4.68
Micronesia 6.98 6.47 5.90 5.:33 4.87 4.61 4.36
Cape Verde 7.00 7.00 7.00 6.70 6.29 4.70 4.26
Polynesia 7.64 7.09 6.1i' 5.31 4.69 4.19 3.74
Caribbean 5.46 4.99 ,1.:37 3.49 :3.10 2.88 2.76
Sri Lanka 5.16 4.68 4.00 3.83 3.25 2.67 2.48
Mauritius 5.72 4.24 :3.25 3.06 2.45 2.17 2.35
Reunion 5.65 4.82 :3.9:3 :3.28 2.90 2.54 2.32
Source: UN, 1995.
3.2 Synthesis and Implications
for the Future
Several lessons can be drawn from this regional review of fertility
trends in the period 1960 to 1990. The first provides grounds for op-
timism about the economic and environmental future of the planet.
During the past 30 years, fertility transition has spread throughout
the developing world with a speed that has dazzled demographers
and confounded many experts. It is easy to forget the profound pes-
simism about the prospects for fertility decline that prevailed in the
1960s and much of the 1970s. In particular, it was doubted that the
mere promotion of birth-control services could have an impact on the
birth rate of largely agriculturaL low income, and poorly educated
nations. As a consequence, there was intense interest in so-called
beyond family-planning measures that included, inter alia, the use
of financial payments to induce couples to accept contraception or
to have fewer children.
The turning point in popular perceptions came in the mid-
1970s with convincing signs that fertility decline was under way
in Thailand and Indonesia, both largely agricultural countries with
low incomes at that time. Hitherto, fertility decline had been con-
fined to countries with atypically favorable conditions: rapid eco-
nomic transformation in the case of Taiwan and South Korea; a
metropolitan environment as in Hong Kong and Singapore; and the
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idiosyncrasies of an insular status such as Fiji, Mauritius, and parts
of the Caribbean.
As we have seen, sustained fertility decline in the Third World
is now the norm rather than the exception. In Asia, the main ex-
ceptions are Pakistan, Afghanistan, and some of the small countries
of Indochina. In Central and South America, fertility decline is al-
ready completed or under way in all countries. Among the Arab
states of North Africa and the I\iiddle East, most countries have
experienced falls in fertility though decline is not yet ubiquitous.
Finally in sub-Saharan Africa, fertility transition is clearly start-
ing in East and Southern Africa, leaving Central and West Africa
as the main areas where fertility remains largely unchanged. Such
widespread transformations of reproductive behavior have come as
a surprise and their existence is not yet fully appreciated outside the
specialist domain of demography. The rates of population growth
ill most developing countries remain high because of the continued
decline in mortality and because crude birth rates are buoyed by
increases in the relative and absolute numbers of couples in the re-
productive ages. Thus. the impact of declining fertility is offset by
these other demographic forces and, in many countries, will not be
felt until the next century.
A major generalization of demographic transition theory is that
once fertility decline, fueled by birth control within marriage, is un-
der way, the trend is irreversible and sustained until fertility reaches
replacement level or thereabouts. Like most simple generalizations,
this one must be qualified. Reversals have occurred, most notably
the post-World War II baby boom in Western Europe and North
America. More commonly. fertility may plateau before resuming a
downward path. as has been t he case in Egypt and Malaysia. More-
over, the speed of decline has varied from the near-precipitous drops
in China and Mexico to a slow pace of change, as in the Philippines
or Jordan. A much more profound uncertainty exists about the
proposition that fertility will continue to fall until the replacement
level of a little over two births per woman is reached. In the aggre-
gate, there is a logic in this ultimate destination for levels of human
reproduction because it implies long- term stability of population
sizes and, in the very long term, no animal population can continue
to grow or decline indefinitely. But, at the level of families and
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individuals, such a.g~regate considerations may hold little force. It
has already been noted that family sizes appear to have stabilized in
some Latin American countries at a level that is well above replace-
ment. In other regions, most notably sub-Saharan Africa and the
Arab states, it is difficult to imagine the achievement of replacement-
level fertility under existing socioeconomic and cultural conditions.
Fertility aspirations, as recorded in surveys, remain much higher. In
Zimbabwe, for instance, which is at the forefront of fertility transi-
tion in Africa. the 1988 Demographic and Health Survey indicates
a mean ideal family size of G.-+ children among currently married
women; and nearly half of women who already have 4 or more living
children want additional children.
Of course, societal conditions do not remain stable. Indeed one
of the biggest mistakes of demographers has been to underestimate
the rapidity with which societies change. Nevertheless, the prospects
for the attainment of replacement-level fertility within the next 40
years remain doubtful in some parts of the developing world.
The second major lesson from this review concerns the need for
humility on the part of scientists. ])pspite a huge volume of new em-
pirical evidence concerning fertility transition that has accumulated
in the past :30 years. our nnd('rstanding of the underlying causes
remains rudimentary. Noris t h('re any sign of a growing consensus
among population scientists regarding fertility theories or the rela-
tive importance of specific causes. The gulf remains wide between
the two dominant schools of thought - one emphasizing economic
determinism and the other. culture and the diffusion of ideas.
At the start of this chapter. t he inadequacy of simple mono-
causal explanations of fertility dpcline was noted. This point is
vividly illustrated by recent reviews of the socioeconomic status of
Asian and Latin American countries at the onset of fertility de-
cline (Casterline, 1994; Guzman, 1994). For every indicator (life
expectancy, infant mortality, urbanization, adult literacy, income
per head, percentage engaged in agriculture), there was a very
wide spread among countries. To take but two examples from
Latin America, infant mortality ranged from 62 per 1,000 births
in Paraguay to 151 in Bolivia. and adult literacy from 84 percent in
Costa Rica to 34 percent in Guatemala. This huge disparity in the
stage of socioeconomic development reinforces similar conclusions
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from studies of the European transition, where birth control spread
across a region with little regard for socioeconomic differences be-
tween counties, bringing lower fertility in its wake.
\Vith the steady increase in the number of countries where fertil-
ity transition has already started, research priorities will shift from
the study of the determinants of the onset of decline to the study
of factors that influence speed of decline and point of stabilization.
Here again, though, it is unlikely that very strong links will be found
between speed of transition and socioeconomic indicators. The ear-
lier comparison between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines is
a pertinent example. Even more striking is the rapid fertility decline
that has taken place in Bangladesh, one of the poorest countries in
the world.
The reason for this complexity is that both culture and govern-
ment policies exert strong independent influences on fertility. It is
appropriate to end this chapter with a brief consideration of one of
these factors (government policies) because of its practical relevance.
To the extent that state-sponsored initiatives to promote birth con-
trol and the acceptability of smaller families can be effective, the
future course of human fertility depends, at least in part, on gov-
ernment policies and the availability of funds to implement them.
Conversely, if the influence of such interventions is minor, then fu-
ture fertility trends will be determined by broader forces of cultural
and socioeconomic change that are less amenable to governmental
and international decisions.
The effectiveness of family-planning programs has been high on
the demographic research agenda for the past 20 years. The most
influential body of work comprises statistical estimations of the rela-
tionship between the strength of family-planning programs and the
demographic outcomes such as level of fertility, percentage decline in
fertili ty, and contraceptive use, using countries as units of analysis
(e.g., Mauldin and Berelson. 1978; IvIauldin and Ross, 1991). The
general finding is that strong programs do reduce fertility, though
this effect is conditioned by, and subordinate to, the effect of so-
cioeconomic development. It is also clear from these analyses that
the creation of family-planning programs cannot be divorced eas-
ily from general development. Few of the least developed countries
have birth-control services, education, and publicity that are rated
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as strong. Conversely. fe\v of the more developed countries have
programs that are rated as nonexistent or weak. This correlation
obviously complicates the task of isolating the effect of programs
from effects of broader development.
A major limitation of this type of study is that program strength
is taken as an exogenous factor. The analytic design is vulnerable
to the cri ticism that serious programs are most likely to arise in re-
sponse to spontaneous expressions of need and prior fertility decline,
and only grow in strength (i.e., political commitment and resource
allocation) when success is already visible. Programs can thus be
seen as a consequence as well as a potential cause of demographic
change. This weakness severely limits the validity of results.
A more convincing approach to an assessment of program im-
pact would be to compare fertility trends in countries that are
broadly similar in cultural characteristics and stage of development
but where population policies have diverged, perhaps because of
the convictions of political leadership. Algeria and Tunisia, Pakistan
and Bangladesh, Mexico and Colombia, North Korea and South Ko-
rea, Zambia and Zimbabwe are possible candidates for such a study.
In each pair, the first country was much slower than the second
country to adopt and implement policies and programs to reduce
fertility. And in each case. the timing of the start of fertility decline
appears to reflect the policy divergence. Thus it is hard to resist the
inference that Mexico's very late fertility transition is connected to
the government's hostility to provision of family-planning services
until the dramatic change in 1972. Similarly, the persistence of high
fertility in Algeria until the early 1980s is surely related to the low
priority attached to birth control, which shifted only in the 1980s.
Such a comparative case study approach shows that government
policies can have and have had appreciable demographic impacts by
changing reproductive attitlldes. by legitimizing birth control, and
by enhancing access to family-planning services. To the extent that
this verdict is valid, the future course of fertility in regions where
it is still high depends to some extent on political leadership. As a
consequence, demographic forecasting becomes more uncertain but
the politics of population and birth control become more important
and exciting.
Chapter 4
Reproductive Preferences and
Future Fertility in Developing
Countries
Charles F. WestofJ
The classical paradigm of the demographic transition features a de-
cline in the rate of reproduction from the conditions of natural fertil-
ity at high levels to a regimen in which fertility is highly controlled
and has declined to replacement or lower levels. In many of the
developing countries that have entered this transitional stage, in-
creases in age at marriage have played an important role. But the
principal mechanism driving this transition is birth control, mainly
in the form of contraception, though abortion has made significant
impacts at different times and in different places.
In Asia and in Latin America, the use of contraception has typ-
ically been adopted at higher parities after couples have achieved
the number of children desired; its use at lower parities for the reg-
ulation of spacing has appeared later in the fertility transition. In
contrast, in Africa, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, a demand for
spacing evidently has emerged before a demand for limiting fertility.
Currently, in the nine sub-Saharan African countries included in the
first phase of the Demographic and Health Surveys (1986-1990), the
average percentage of married women using contraception for spac-
ing purposes was 10 percent compared with 8 percent for limiting
fertility. In the 16 other developing countries (including those in
,:3
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North Africa), the corresponding percentages were 12 and 36 per-
cent, respectively, a dramatically different ratio (calculated from
data presented in Westoff and Ochoa, 1991:7).
Whether contraception is employed for purposes of spacing or
for purposes of limiting fertility, it reduces the likelihood of preg-
nancy and thus has an impact on the period rate of fertility. There
is evidence that contraceptive failure rates are greater when meth-
ods are used for spacing rather than for limiting births, but, even
with such higher failure rates, fertility is reduced far below that im-
plied in the natural fertility model (especially considering the higher
fecundability at the younger ages, where spacing behavior is more
common). In any event, a full appraisal of the subject of reproduc-
tive preferences should ideally include both preferences to postpone
the next birth and preferences to terminate fertility. Data on spacing
preferences are not as widely available, however, as data on prefer-
ences to terminate fertility. The World Fertility Survey included no
direct questions on the subject. and the DHS-I questionnaire did not
include the questions necessary to estimate preferred lengths of birth
intervals for all women. Therefore. the emphasis in this chapter is
on the number of children desired and the intention to terminate fer-
tility. These measures are particularly relevant for Asian and Latin
American populations where the contraceptive prevalence level is
determined largely by such limiting practice. As noted above, the
use of contraception for birth spacing dominates in the sub-Saharan
African countries and thus makes more of a contribution to the pre-
diction of fertility in that part of the world.
4.1 Desired Number of Children
The most common measure of reproductive preferences is the num-
ber of children desired. The basic question included in all DRS
interviews was "If you could go back to the time you did not have
any children and could choose exactly the number of children to
have in your whole life, how many would that be?"
The mean number of children desired is shown in the first col-
umn of Table 4. J for currently married women in all of the countries
included in DRS-I. The range ofthese preferences varies widely, from
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Table 4.1. Indices of reproductive preferences of currently married
women.
Mean desired % with more % wanting
number of than desired no more
children number TFR DTFR children
Sub-Saharan Africa
Botswana 5.4 14 5.0 4.1 38
Burundi 5.5 12 6.7 5.7 24
Ghana 5.5 13 6.4 5.3 23
Kenya 4.8 30 6.4 4.5 49
Liberia 6.5 6 6.9 6.3 17
Mali 6.fl 5 7.6 7.1 16
Ondo State 6.1 5 6.1 5.8 23
Senegal 7.2 9 6.6 ,5.6 19
Sudan 5.9 ~ 5.0 4.2 25
Togo 5.6 1~ 6.6 ,5.1 25
Uganda 6.8 9 7.5 6.5 23
Zimbabwe 5.4 15 5.2 4.3 33
North Africa
Egypt 2.9 :n 4.4 2.8 60
Morocco 3.7 27 4.6 3.3 47
Tunisia 3.5 34 4.1 2.9 ,58
Asia
Indonesia 3.2 19 2.9 2.4 51
Sri Lanka 3.1 21 2.6 2.2 64
Thailand 2.8 21 2.2 1.8 66
Latin America
Bolivia 2.8 42 5.1 2.8 68
Brazil 3.0 35 3.3 2.2 64
Colombia 3.0 :31 3.1 2.1 69
Dominican Rep. 3.7 28 3.6 2.6 63
Ecuador 3.4 30 4.3 2.9 65
Guatemala 4.2 18 5.5 4.5 47
Mexico 3.:3 29 4.0 2.9 65
Peru 2.9 44 4.0 2.3 75
Trinidad/Tobago 3.1 24 3.0 2.2 54
as high as seven children in a few countries in sub-Saharan Africa
to under three children in a few countries elsewhere.
One welJ- known difficulty with this measure is that it is influ-
enced by the number of children already born (and surviving), some
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of whom may not have been wanted at the time. The second col-
umn of Table 4.1 shows, for each country, the percent of currently
married women whose number of living children exceeds their de-
sired number. Even considering the likely tendency for women to
rationalize unwanted births as wanted, this statistic indicates sig-
nificant proportions of women who prefer fewer children than they
have. In sub-Saharan Africa, this measure shows the lowest levels of
excess fertility. ranging between!) and 18 percent except in Kenya,
where 30 percent of women are classified as preferring fewer children
than they have. The percentages with unwanted fertility are much
higher elsewhere, involving roughly between one-fifth and two-fifths
of married women. It is clear, even from this simple measure, that
fertility is significantly higher in many countries of the Third World
than it would be if women's preferences prevailed.
What do these levels of unwanted births imply for the rates
of reproduction? In column :3 of Table 4.1, the total fertility rate
(TFR) is shown for each country. These rates have been calculated
from the birth histories of all women based on person-months of ex-
perience up to 2-1 months before the survey. A desired total fertility
rate (DTFR) has been derived by confining the numerator for each
age-specific category to those births classified as desired or, con-
versely, by deleting those births in excess of the number preferred.
The DTFR (in column .:l) is intended as an estimate of what the
TFR would be if only wanted births prevailed.
In sub-Saharan Africa (including Sudan), the DTFR averages
about 15 percent below the TFR. The greatest differences are in
North Africa and in Latin America, where the DTFR averages 31
percent and :32 percent. respectively, below their TFRs. The levels
of fertility implied by women's preferences are quite low. The lowest
level is for Thailand, where the DTFR reaches 1.8, some 18 percent
below the TFR of 2.2. The values of the DTFR in all of the Latin
American countries except Guatemala fall below three births per
woman.
In sum, the evidence implies a potential for further major de-
clines in fertility in North Africa and in most of Latin America; for
moderate further declines approaching replacement levels in Thai-
land, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia: and for smaller declines in sub-
Saharan Africa. Section -1.2 presents some short-term forecasts of
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the TFR and evaluates the extent to which the DTFRs are likely to
be approximated.
4.2 Fertility Forecasts
The TFR can be forecast (with considerable accuracy, judging from
eight DRS-II surveys recently completed) by taking advantage ofthe
strong interrelationships among fertility, reproductive intentions,
and contraceptive prevalence. We know (Westoff, 1990; Mauldin
and Segal, 1988) that there is a very high correlation between the
TFR and the percentage of married women currently practicing con-
traception - an R 2 of 0.91, based on a large number (84) of national
fertility surveys. 'We also now know that contraceptive prevalence
has a strong association with reprodnctive intentions, i.e., the per-
centage of married women who want no more births. In a recent
analysis (Westoff, 1990) of data from these same countries, the R 2
between these two variables was estimated at 0.78. We also know
that the same strong associations exist not only across countries
at a given time but also between successive surveys in the same
countries observed at five-year intervals. In developing forecasts
based on these associations, we relied upon the association between
reproductive intentions and contraceptive prevalence measured in
those countries where surveys have been repeated. The procedure
first estimated the future proportion of women who want no more
births based on the regression equation connecting this variable at
two points in time. The predicted value for each country is then
included in a second equation to forecast the contraceptive preva-
lence. To improve this fit, the regression is expanded to include the
earlier contraceptive prevalence. Finally, the TFR'is forecast from
the predicted prevalellce and, to improve the fit, from the earlier
TFR. In short, the model relies upon estimates of the regressions
between t1 and t2 to predict the values at t3 , incorporating an ad-
ditional predictor at each stage (Westoff, 1991b). The results are
shown in Table "1-2.
Let us examine the end product first - the forecasts of the TFR
- and then return to the foundation of reproductive intentions. The
forecasts of the TFR indicate an average decline over the next five
years or so of close to 10 percent in sub-Saharan African and range
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Table 4.2. Forecasts of reproductive preferences, contraceptive
prevalence, and fertility.
% wanting Contraceptive
no more prevalence TFR
Fore- Fore- Fore-
Current cast Current cast Current cast DTFR
S'ub-S'aharan Africa
Botswana 38 45 33 37 5.0 4.5 4.1
Burundi 24 34 9 14 6.7 6.1 .5.7
Ghana 23 33 13 18 6.4 5.8 5.3
Kenya 49 54 27 34 6.4 5.3 4.5
Liberia 17 28 7 11 6.9 6.3 6.3
Mali 16 27 5 10 7.6 6.8 7.1
Gndo State 23 33 6 12 6.1 .5.7 5.8
Senegal 19 30 11 15 6.6 6.0 .5.6
Sudan 25 35 9 15 5.0 4.8 4.2
Togo 25 34 12 17 6.6 6.0 5.1
Uganda 23 33 5 11 7.5 6.7 6.5
Zimbabwe 33 41 43 4.5 5.2 4.5 4.3
North Africa
Egypt 60 63 38 45 4.4 3.9 2.8
Morocco 47 52 36 41 4.6 4.1 :3.3
Tunisia 58 61 50 55 4.1 3.5 2.9
ASia
Indonesia 51 55 48 52 2.9 2.7 2.4
Sri Lanka 64 66 62 66 2.6 2.3 2.2
Thailand 66 67 66 70 2.2 1.9 1.8
Latin America
Bolivia 68 69 30 39 .5.1 4..5 2.8
Brazil 64 66 66 69 3.3 2.7 2.2
Colombia 69 70 63 68 3.1 2.6 2.1
Dominican Rep. 63 65 50 .55 3.6 3.2 2.6
Ecuador 65 67 44 51 4.3 3.7 2.9
Guatemala 47 52 23 30 5.5 5.0 4.5
Mexico 65 67 53 58 4.0 3.4 2.9
Peru 75 75 46 .54 4.0 3.5 2.3
Trinidad/Tobago 54 58 53 57 3.0 2.7 2.2
to an average of 13 percent in Latin America. How close are these
forecasts to the DTFR? A comparison of the values in the last
two columns of Table 4.2 reveals considerable variation across these
countries. In most of the sub-Saharan African countries, the DTFR
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is modestly lower than the forecasts. Kenya and Togo show the
largest differences, indicating that women's reproductive preferences
are declining more rapidly than the likelihood of such preferences
being realized. In a few countries, there is hardly any difference -
Liberia, Ondo State in Nigeria, and (J ganda. Zimbabwe is also in
this category, with a forecast TFR of 4.5 and a DTFR, for example,
of 4.:3.
The differences between \ lte:se rates are much greater in North
Africa, with the DTFR considerably lower than the expected TFR.
In Egypt, the forecast shows a TFR of 3.9 with the DTFR at 2.8.
The three Asian countries have already gone through most of the
fertility transition; although the forecast TFRs show some contin-
ued decline, they are very close to the DTFRs. In contrast, Latin
America is more like the three cOllntries in North Africa. Wide dif-
ferences remain between the forecast values and the desired levels,
especially in Bolivia ami Peru. where the DTFR is around one-third
lower than the TFR forecast. In tlw other seven Latin American
countries, the DTFR is an average of one-sixth below the average
forecast value.
One of the intrinsically unsatisfactory features of the forecast-
ing procedure described here is its essential bootstrap nature, in
particular, the initial forecast of t he proportion of (married) women
wanting no more children from the regression equation connecting
this variable at two points in time. It is not unlike forecasting to-
morrow's weather from today's weather in an area of the country
that typically sends its weather systems in one direction. The un-
derlying theory in this case is a knowledge of the prevailing wind
direction and the pace of its movement. Our procedure is even
less theoretically grounded. It recognizes that a population's re-
productive preferences at t 1 are highly correlated with those at t2
and that the sign of the regression coefficient indicates a decline.[l]
It then uses this relationship to predict the proportion wanting no
more births at f3 . The next step, which relies upon the regression
of contraceptive prevalence on reproductive intentions, is less Ull-
satisfactory because it identifies a causal antecedent in substantive
terms,[2] whereas the forecast of reproductive intentions relies only
on the association between these intentions over time.
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The actual forecasts of reproductive intentions (columns 1 and
2 of Table 4.2) appear reasonable enough. The forecast for the
sub-Saharan African populations show a rise from an average of 27
percent to an average of 36 percent of women who want no more
children. The projected increases elsewhere in the percentage of
women who want no more are less dramatic: in North Africa from
55 to 59 percent; in Asia from 60 to 63 percent; and in Latin America
from 63 to 65 percent.
4.3 Determinants of Reproductive
Preferences
The main reason that the forecast of reproductive intentions relies
on the same variable at an earlier time is simply that we have little
else to use. In a broad sense, the determinants of reproductive in-
tentions or preferences in developing countries cover the whole range
of social changes included in the concept of modernization. These
determinants are only partially represented in the WFS and DRS;
e.g., economic status is inadequately measured. We do know that
the desired number of children has been declining in many, proba-
bly in most, developing countries. The mechanics of this process are
less well known. The conventional explanations focus on the changes
in the economic value of children; recent speculation minimizes the
importance of structural economic changes and emphasizes the role
of Western or modern ideas about the control of reproduction and
small family norms (Cleland and Wilson, 1987). There is probably
a time lag in the process of change in reproductive norms. The most
likely process is one that first witnesses an increase in the propor-
tion of women who want no more children without a commensurate
decline in ideal or desired family size. In turn, this leads to a de-
mand for and the use of contraception and an ensuing decline in
fertility. Eventually the number of children desired begins its de-
cline as smaller family norms develop. The urban and middle-class
populations typically lead the transition.
In su b-Saharan Africa, the marital fertility transition may fol-
Iowa different path. As noted earlier, the primary stage may be the
adoption of fertility control to increase birth intervals, a motivation
derived from health rather than from socioeconomic considerations.
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Kenya is a major exception to this generalization; over the decade
from 1978 to 1988, the proportion of women wanting no more chil-
dren increased from 17 to 49 percent.
Analysis of the determinants of reproductive preferences can be
approached at two levels: the macro-demographic level, in which
the statistical units of observations are the provinces or regions of
countries, and the micro or individual woman level.
4.4 Regional-level Analysis
Analysis of the determinants of reproductive preferences at the
provincial or regional level focuses on the question of what char-
acteristics of these areas are associated with the mean number of
children desired or the proportion of married women who want no
more children. The areas assembled for this purpose are the 302
provinces or regions of the :s L countries that participated in the
'VFS or in the first stage of the DRS. Although this is a relatively
large number of areas for analysis, it should be kept in mind that it
is not a representative sample of the developing world; China and
India, for example, are not included.
Since the object of interest is the number of children desired
rather than fertility and because there is some tendency to rational-
ize as desired children that may have been unwanted at the time of
conception, we have tried to eliminate the life-cycle effects by sin-
gling out a particular age group. ,,,romen aged 25-29 were selected
because most would be married by that age (removing the censoring
by age at marriage) and the experience of unwanted fertility would
be still largely in the future. thus minimizing the factor of rational-
ization. The mean number of children desired for this age group
across the 302 regions is 4.6. with a range from 2.3 to 8.5. For the
proportion of women who want no more children a similar logic was
followed by confining the analysis to married women with four or
five children. The mean percentage of women at this parity who
want no more children is 58.0, with a range from 0 to 98.1. Because
there is a high correlation between these two measures (-0.92), the
same covariates are observed. Areas with women wanting no more
children or desiring smaller families are those with high proportions
of their population classified as urban, high proportions of husbands
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Figure 4.1. The nuptiality-fertility model for 216 regions.
in professional occupations, low proportions of women with no edu-
cation, lower proportions of women 1.5-19 currently married, lower
proportions having a birth before age 20, and are areas with lower
rates of infant mortality. This constellation of correlates is a fa-
miliar package of variables associated with development. There is
considerable overlap in these predictors that collectively account for
60 to 70 percent of the variance of reproductive preferences across
regions. The unexplained variance is partly error of measurement,
but also reflects the absence of other relevant explanatory variables,
perhaps measures of income or wealth.
The complete picture of the paths through which reproductive
intentions affect fertility and are determined by different variables is
shown in Figure 4.1. In this analysis, which shows imputed causal
directions and the path (standardized) regression coefficients, the
role of reproductive intentions is interconnected in various ways.
(The analysis is confined to a subset of 216 regions for which in-
formation on all variables is available.) The variable WNM is the
proportion of married women with 4-.5 children who report that
they want no more children. This variable is directly influenced by
the percentage of women with no education and is indirectly in-
fluenced by the proportion who have had a birth by exact age 20
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(B 20 ). In turn, the latter variable is determined by the proportions
first married by age 20 (M 20 ), which is seen to be a function of
residence (the rural percentage), the proportion that attended sec-
ondary school, and a measure of educational change that reflects the
generational decline in the proportion of women with no education.
The influence of reproductive intentions on the TFR, in turn, is seen
to operate indirectly through the prevalence of contraception and
directly, presumably through unmeasured non-contraceptive paths
such as abortion.
4.5 Individual-level Analysis
'rVe have also explored the determinants of reproductive preferences
at the level of individual women in several countries, partly to val-
idate the aggregate analysis but also to exploit some economic and
media exposure data that have not been collected by many of the
surveys included in the regional-level analysis. Several countries
were selected from different areas that represent various stages in
the fertility transition: Colombia, Ghana, Kenya, Guatemala, Peru,
Thailand, Tunisia, and Indonesia. The surveys in these countries
were all part of the DHS-I project.
In none of these countries are we able to account for much of the
individual variance ofthe desired number of children. The regression
equations for each country are shown in Table 4.3; the R 2 s range in
value from only 0.065 to 0.314. We have confined the examination to
women 25-29 years of age as a life-cycle control, and our multivariate
exploration has excluded measures of fertility that would add to the
explained variance. We have concentrated instead on social and
economic measures and have added only age at marriage and/or
age at first birth in order to parallel the aggregate analysis.
A similar set of determinants of reproductive norms operates
across these countries. Several variables stand out prominently in
all six countries. One is the importance of region of residence. In all
of these countries, region exerts a strong influence on the number of
children desired. It is a surrogate for many other variables: region
frequently reflects language, ethnic origin, or religion as well as the
stage of economic development. In principle, region could be further
disaggregated to seek explanations at these compositional levels.
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Table 4.3. Linear regression equations for variables related to
number of children desirec!a by women 25-29 years of age.
Regression coefficients/>
Colom- Gna.te- Indo-
bia Ghana mala nesia
Thai- Tuni-
Kenya Peru land sia
:.\. J 76
-1.224
-0.895 -0.431 -0.209 -0.531 -0.124 -0.175
-0.443 -0.476 -0.169 -0.266
-(l.065 -0.052 -0.030 -0.045 -0.053
-0.050
-0.669 -0.340 -0.266 -0.154 -0.473
-0.234 -0.299
-0.607 -0.733 -0.199
4.835 6.655 8.016 6.247 5.317 4.000 3.495 4.970
0.123 (1.:314 0.223 0.108 0.146 0.065 0.085 0.164
566 745 781 2448 1126 546 1252 836
2.74 5.73 5.36 3.61 4.74 2.69 2.54 3.51
1.38 2.66 3.56 2.16 1.99 1.21 1.08 1.52
0.692 0.237 0.462Urban-ruralc
Region d
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Ethnicitye
Education (wife)!
Edncation (husband)!
Age at marriage9
Age at first birth9
Watch TV h
Listen to radio"
Electricity'
Constant
R2
Number of women)
Mean number desired
Standard deviation
-0.:.\65
0.586
-1.170 -1.100
-0.989
-0.5:.\8 -0.890
-0.651 -1.159
-0.457
0.892 -0.240
-0.758
-0.246 -0.604
-0.834
-1.020
0.346
-0.360
aNon-numeric responses of the type Has many as God sends" or "as many as corne'l
were nsually recoded in category 12+ or with t.he highest. numerical response if less t.han
12.
I> All of the regression coefficients shown in t.he table were significant at least at the 0.05
level, mostly l' < 0.001.
cUrban-rural residence scored as 0 and 1.
dRegions were defined as dummy \'ariables. Those wit.h the highest significant. coeffi-
cient.s recorded here are Pacifica in Colombia; Volt.a, Ashanti, and upper and nort.hern
regions in Ghana; Guat.emala City, Central. Nort.e, and Norte Oriental in Guatemala;
Java-Bali in Indonesia; cent.ral, coast. and eastern regions in Kenya; Selva in Peru;
north and south in Thailand; and Tunis, nort.h-east, north-west., and Sallel in Tunisia.
€Ethnicity in Guatemala is coded as Incligina or Ladino.
! Education of wife and husband are coded here in terms of the categories: no educa-
tion, primary, secondary, higher. Single years of schooling were not used because of
significant numbers of missing cases.
9 Age at first marriage and age at first birt.h were coded in units of single years.
h Wat.ching TV and listening t.o the radio coded as 0 for no and 1 for yes.
'Electricit.y coded as 0 for no and I for yes.
)These are the unweight.ed numbers. Missing informat.ion cases are assigned to t.he
modal frequency cat.egory.
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Where such requisite data are available, the variable still retains its
power, although sometimes it obliterates rural-urban differences as
well. Of course, the importance of region in the study of differences
in fertility has been underscored in many other studies, including
the well-known 19th-century European fertility study (Coale and
Watkins, 1986). Urban-rural residence also features in half of the
countries in the multivariate analysis.
One variable that holds up consistently is education of women,
which is inversely related to preferences for fewer children, a pattern
that persists in the presence of all other variables. In a few countries,
the husband's education makes a similar and additive contribution
(in Peru, it overshadows women's education). Education has been
demonstrated to be probably the most dependable and predictable
determinant of fertility and fertility regulation behavior among all
of the socioeconomic measures examined in hundreds of studies.
Several other determinants operate in some countries but not
in others. Age at marriage or age at first birth is a factor in all
of these countries except Ghana and Guatemala: the later the age
of the event, the fewer the number of children desired. How of-
ten the woman reports listening to the radio or watching television
has an effect in all but these two countries as well. In all likelihood,
the mass media transmit outside values and ideas. In other research,
we have demonstrated a powerful association with reproductive atti-
tudes and behavior of media messages on family planning, including
soap operas that extol the advantages of smaller families ('Vestoff
and RodrIguez, forthcoming).
One of the more surprising findings is a negative one, viz.. that
various measures of economic status either singly or in combina-
tion fail to disclose any significant associations with the number
of children desired. Admittedly, the availability of economic data
in these surveys is less than ideal. Nonetheless, there is a variety
of items including ownership of bicycles, cars, radios, televisions.
refrigerators, kinds of toilet facilities, source of drinking water, elec-
tricity, and different country-specific information on ownership of
homes, land. livestock, and so on. In only a few countries do any of
these measures seem to play any direct role in the determination of
reproductive preferences. Only in Colombia, Guatemala, and Thai-
land does one of these economic variables hold up - the presence of
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electricity in the household. The economic variables frequently show
the expected negative associations with reproductive preferences at
the zero-order level, but their influence is absorbed or dominated by
the regional and educational factors. It seems implausible that eco-
nomic status would be totally irrelevant to the number of children
women desire. However, there is simply no empirical support from
the data for the hypothesis that smaller or larger families are viewed
as inconsistent with economic resources, or more precisely, that an~'
such inconsistency persists in the presence of these other variables.
One might of course reason that economic resources play an earlier
role in facilitating education, but this notion is not testable with
these data.
4.6 Conclusions
So what do we know about reproductive preferences and the dy-
namics of fertility change in the developing world? A fair summary
would be as follows:
1. Whether measured by the average desired number of children or
by the proportion of married women who want no more children.
dramatic changes toward the small family norm are under way
in Latin America, much of Asia, and North Africa, but only in
a few sub-Saharan African countries (where spacing rather than
limiting preferences and behavior predominate).
2. Reproductive preferences are highly correlated (in the aggre-
gate) with the fertility rate, operating mainly, though not ex-
clusively, through contraceptive prevalence.
:3. At the regional or provincial level, the main determinants of re-
productive preferences are those typically associated with mod-
ernization: residence in cities or in rural areas, education of
women, occupational status of men, and age at marriage and at
first birth.
cle. Our knowledge of determinants at the level of the individual
woman remains very limited: region, rural-urban residence. ed-
ucation of women, age at marriage, and exposure to mass media
dominate the picture rather than individual economic variables.
However, the amount of variation explained is very small.
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[1] Unlike the direction of the wind ill the weather analogy, the direction
of reproductive preferences cannot remain pointed in the same way
indefinitely. At the end of the fertility transition, reproductive prefer-
ences stabilize and may even change directions for periods of time, as
has been observed in some developed countries.
[2] Operationally, it is also corrupted by this bootstrapping quality in that
the actual forecasting equation adds the earlier prevalence value. The
redeeming feature here is that at least it does not depend exclusively on
the forecast value of intentions that is based on its own earlier values.
Chapter 5
Population Policies and
Family-Planning in Southeast
Asia
1I1ercedes B. Concepcion
Impressive gains in the control of fertility and in the reduction
of population growth rates have been observed in many countries
within the purview of the Economic and Social Commission for
Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP). Family-planning (FP) and mater-
nal and child health (M CR) programs have played an important
role in reducing population growth, improving the quality of life,
and developing human resources in the region. The success of FP
and MCR programs is closely associated with the enhanced role and
status of women, lower infant, child, and maternal mortality rates,
better birth-spacing and breast-feeding practices, and the delivery
of services by trained personnel. Nevertheless, the population as a
whole continues to grow by more than 50 million yearly. Moreover,
progress in lessening population growth rates has been uneven and
has generally widened the gap between countries with continued
high growth rates and those which have succeeded in moderating or
Lowering their growth ra.tes.
In Southeast Asia, three of the region's 10 component countries
are expected to grow at rates of 1.8 percent or less per annum during
the 1990-1995 quinquennium while the rest are expected to increase
annually by at least 2.1 percent. By the beginning of the 21st cen-
tury, all but one of the countries in Southeast Asia are projected to
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grow no faster than 1.7 percent yearly. Total fertility rates (TFRs)
during the early 1990s are also expected to range from Singapore's
reported low 1.7 children to the estimated 6.4 children per woman in
the Lao People's Democratic Republic. These rates are foreseen by
the United Nations to drop to about 3 children or fewer at the start
of the next century (UN, 1991b). The exceptions are Cambodia and
the Lao People's Democratic Republic.
Governments in .s of the 10 Southeast Asian countries perceive
their current fertility levels as unsatisfactory and have ongoing pro-
grams to lower such rates. Three others - Brunei Darussalam, Lao
People's Democratic Republic, and Myanmar - are satisfied with
their present fertility levels. Brunei Darussalam and Myanmar do
not report any direct intervention, while the Lao People's Demo-
cratic Republic is intervening to maintain current rates. Cambodia
and Singapore consider their fertility rates too low. The former re-
stricts access to contraception. while the latter has been offering tax
rebates to couples having a third or fourth child.
This chapter examines the population policies and FP pro-
grams in selected Southeast Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) and attempts
to draw from their experience the critical preconditions for family-
planning program success. Such experiences have been gleaned from
the country statements provided by participants of the 4th Asian
and Pacific Population Conference (APPC) held in Bali, Indonesia,
on 19-27 August 1992.
5.1 Demographic Situation
During the 4th APpe, which was entitled Population and Sustain-
able Development: Goals and Strategies into the 21st Century, the
present population situation and future outlook were reviewed in the
light of the 1982 APPC Asia-Pacific Call for Action on Population
and Development. The participants noted that while substantial
progress had been achieved by the ESCAP region in responding to
the Asia-Pacific Call for Action, population issues continue to pose
a most critical challenge. The conference adopted the Bali Decla-
ration on Population and Sustainable Development, which set goals
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and made recommendations for population and sustainable devel-
opment into the next century.
One of the population goals included in the Bali Declaration
enjoined countries and areas to adopt suitable strategies to attain
replacement-level fertility, equivalent to a TFR of around 2.2 chil-
dren per woman, by the year 2010 or earlier. In addition, member
countries were also urged to reduce the level of infant mortality to
no more than 40 infant deaths per 1,000 live births during the same
period. Countries and areas where maternal mortality remains high
were called upon to effect a 50 percent reduction by the year 2010.
The Bali Declaration recommended that priority be given to
strengthening policy development and related processes in those
countries where the MCR and FP programs have not yet achieved
desired objectives. Furthermore, such countries were urged to
expand and streamline MCR and FP delivery systems within
the primary health-care framework, adopt innovative management
and multi-sectoral approaches, and encourage wider community
and inter-sectoral participation in program implementation efforts.
Countries which have already reduced their fertility to lawaI' ac-
ceptable levels were prompted to devise program strategies aimed
at achieving self-sustainability.
5.2 Family-planning Policies and Programs
The country statements circulated during the 4th APPC contained
a section on the policy and objectives of national FP /family health
and welfare programs.
5.2.1 Indonesia
The state policy guidelines, issued by the 1973 People's Consultative
Assembly, declared that the objective of the national FP program
during the second five-year development plan period (1974-1978)
was to improve maternal and child health in order to create a small,
happy, and prosperous family. The guidelines also stated that eco-
nomic and social welfare development can be implemented rapidly,
together with population growth control, through a properly admin-
istered national FP program. The most recent guidelines, issued in
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1988, added that the Indonesian FP program should also be di-
rected at reducing mortality rates. At the same time, the need for
successful implementation without endangering future generations
was emphasized. In addition, a policy to enhance support to FP
acceptors through improvements in the quality of available contra-
ceptives and services was outlined. As a general course of action,
FP acceptors are encouraged to use more effective contraceptives,
thus ensuring better protection against pregnancy and accelerating
fertility reduction.
The Indonesian FP program has three broad objectives: expan-
sion of contraceptive coverage in accordance with government tar-
gets; promotion of continued contraceptive use; and institutionaliza-
tion of FP and small family norm concepts by shifting responsibility
for FP decisions to the individual, the family, and the community.
Nine important program strategy elements have been taken into
account in the Indonesian FP program: integration of an array
of governmental, nongovernmental, private, and community agen-
cies; decentralization of responsibility and authority; commitment
to meet targets at every program level; provision of FP services
combined with medical advice; National Family Planning Coordi-
nating Board (BKKBN) cooperation with the Ministry of Health in
health services beyond FP in order to improve FP outreach; devel-
opment of a climate of community support for FP through the co-
operation of community and religious leaders; support for activities
which raise women's social and economic status; emphasis on reach-
ing the rapidly increasing numbers of youth; and encouragement
of self-reliance, the newest strategy element involving the private
sector.
The Indonesian Country Report (1992) stated that the TFR
which was .5.6 children between 1965 and 1969 fell to 3.0 by 1992.
The corresponding decrease for the crude birth rate (CBR) was from
42.6 to 25.2 births per 1,000. By 1990, the crude death rate (CDR)
was estimated to be 9.7 deaths, down from 21 deaths per 1,000 over
the period 1961-1971. The CDR is projected to reach 8.5 deaths
per 1,000 at the start of 199:3, declining to around 7 per 1,000 by
the year 2020. The infant mortality rate (IMR), currently estimated
at GS infant deaths per 1,000 live births, is expected to drop to 28
by the year 2020. The life expectancy at birth, now reported to
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be around 60 years for both sexes, is forecast to lengthen by 10
years during the next quarter of a century. Maternal mortality is
predicted to fall from a level of 450 deaths per 100,000 live births in
1986 to 200 by 2020.
The Indonesians foresee a likely deceleration in the future rate
of fertility decline. The reasons given in the Country Report were
that the desired family size of some couples is unlikely to decrease
further; those who most want to avail themselves of family planning
as well as those for whom the services are most accessible have al-
ready been covered by the program; and the couples who still need
to be brought into the program express larger family-size preferences
and are more difficult to reach. Among these are the urban poor,
those living in outlying areas. those with low educational levels as
well as those who find it difficult to use contraceptives correctly.
Therefore, further mortality and fertility reductions will entail con-
siderably greater efforts. For example, the family-planning program
will have to reach unprecedented numbers of contraceptive acceptors
and motivate couples with high fertility preferences, people who are
less likely to know about health and family-planning programs and
are less disposed to seek services.
5.2.2 Malaysia
Given the rapid economic growth and the prospect of a further de-
cline in fertility, the Malaysian government changed its official stance
in 1984 and promulgated a national population policy. As expressed
in the Malaysian Country Report (1992), a long-term target of 70
million people by the year 2100 is to be achieved through deceler-
ating the TFR decline. The plan is to reduce the TFR by 0.1 point
over five-year periods until a level of 2.05 children is reached in the
year 2070. The TFR in peninsular Malaysia had fallen from a high
6.8 children in 1957 to about :l.3 children in 1990. At this pace. a
TFR of 2.1 could be reached by 2010. The average age at marriage
for females had risen from 22.1 in 1970 to 24.6 years in 1990. The
IMR was recorded at n.:l infant deaths per 1,000 live births in 1990.
The life expectancy at birth of rVIalaysian males was lengthened from
55.8 years in 1957 to 69.1 years in 1990. The corresponding rates
for females were 58.2 and i:L3 years, respectively. Given current
trends, the most probable outlook during the next three decades is
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for small nuclear families with the couples participating actively in
the labor force.
Since its inception in 1966, the Malaysian FP program has un-
dergone several phases of development, each involving expansion in
terms of the approach used, the area covered, or the number of agen-
cies involved in the provision of contraceptive services. The spread
of FP services to the rural areas as part of an integrated MCH/FP
program was initiated in the early 1970s and led to FP services be-
ing integrated in the MeH services provided by the Health Ministry.
The blending of FP with health and other social programs not only
aided in overcoming the resource constraints but also contributed
to wider FP acceptance and a heightened contraceptive prevalence
rate.
In line with the national objective of improving the quality of
life, a comprehensivE' family development program has been devel-
oped and is now being implemented. It emphasizes the improvement
of family health and welfare through family-life education, parent-
ing courses, and marriage and family counseling. The stress is now
on improving infrastructure in underserved and remote areas, on
enhancing coverage and quality of care in designated areas of low
coverage, and on program consolidation. The implementation of the
risk approach in MCH/FP care has for its ultimate objective the
availability and accessibility of a range of services, including FP, to
all women and families for their better health and well- being.
5.2.3 The Philippines
Since 1970, the Philippine FP program as described in the Coun-
try Report (1992) has been a social development initiative aimed
at diminishing the country's fertility level for the benefit of family
and national welfare. Over the course of its history, the program
has adopted varying approaches and strategies to suit the changing
needs and conditions of the time. There have been modest increases
in contraceptive prevalence rate coupled with moderate declines in
total fertility. Program efforts have contributed substantially to
this decline. However, t he gains made did not approximate those of
neighboring countries owing to problems besetting policy and pro-
gram implementation.
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In response to the difficulties experienced in relying on static
clinics, the Outreach Project was implemented in 1976 to expand
the availability and accessibility of services. The Outreach Project
viewed FP not only as a means to reduce fertility but, more impor-
tantly, as advancing family welfare. Furthermore, a closer integra-
tion of broader population concerns into the country's development
plans, policies, and programs was sought. The Outreach Project
also paved the way for strengthening and deepening local govern-
ment involvement in, and support for, FP.
In 1987, a new population policy statement was formulated, tak-
ing into account relevant provisions of the 1987 constitution. The
new policy broadened program concern beyond that of fertility re-
duction. Consequently. the 1989-199:3 five-year population program
directional plan was drawn up focusing on two components, namely,
responsible parenthood/FP and population and development. The
program's institutional arrangement was altered along with the pol-
icy and the program. The Department of Health was designated as
the implementing agency for the FP program with jurisdiction over
the activities of aU FP service delivery agencies. The Commission
on Population, on the other hand, remained as the overall planning,
policy-making, coordinating, and monitoring body of the entire pro-
gram with specific responsibilit.v for coordinating the population and
development integration thrust.
The new FP program uses a health-oriented, demand-driven ap-
proach, anchored on safe motherhood and child survival. Its primary
objective is to reduce the level of unmet needs for FP, particularly
among poor families. The population and development thrust is one
of systematically incorporating population matters into the devel-
opment efforts of concerned agencies.
Whether the program will be able to make a more significant
contribution toward development goals depends on its ability to
align policies and operational aspects to individual and societal
needs. Some considerations include expanding and intensifying the
provision of women's health and family-planning services; integrat-
ing FP in other health programs, particularly MCH; strengthen-
ing the capacity of agencies to manage the services; promoting col-
laboration among the governments, nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), and other private organizations and local communities to
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improve access to these services; and shortening the gestation pe-
riod for an effective program implementation by local government
units, including appropriating local funds for the program.
As stated earlier, the slow pace of decline in Philippine pop-
ulation growth is the consequence of a moderately decreasing fer-
tility and a decelerating mortality decline. The CBR fell from a
level of 46 births per 1.000 in 1969 to about 30 in 1990. The CDR
dropped from ;32 deaths pel' LOOO in 1940 to around 7.2 in 1990.
Further pronounced decreases are not expected as the pace of de-
cline has slackened significantly. The [MR has fluctuated around 61
infant deaths per 1,000 live births since the 1960s. The estimate for
1990 was .57. Communicable diseases still account for the majority
of morbidity and mortality cases. Since 1970, the TFR has been
slowly but steadily declining and was estimated to be around 4 chil-
dren per woman in 1990. This gradual descent can be attributed
to four causes: the continued expansion in the number of women of
reproductive age as an outcome of past high fertility; shrinkage in
1, he prevalence and duration of bre<lst-feeding; low-level use of the
more effective contraceptive methods; and the Roman Catholic hier-
archy's open and active opposition to the government's FP program,
thus affecting its political support.
5.2.4 Singapore
The country's FP and population program was initiated in 1966,
soon after independence. Ambitious FP targets were set for each
five-year plan (1966-1970, 1971-1975, and 1976-1980), and social
disincentives were introduced. The government actively promoted
the two-child family norm. Contraceptives were made easily avail-
able, and abortion and sterilization were legalized. With the attain-
ment of replacement-level fertility in 1975, the government started
to emphasize child spacing as the main policy orientation. The pro-
gram impact on population growth was significant. According to
the Country Report, Singapore's fertility fell by almost 70 percent
within a span of two decades (Ministry of Health, 1992). The TFR
dropped from 4.7 children in 196.5 to a historic low of 1.4 in 1986.
With the continued decline in fertility rates in the early 1980s,
population projections indicated that if below-replacement fertility
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were to continue, the country would experience negative popula-
tion growth within the next ;·W years. A new population policy was
promulgated in 1987 in response to the prospect of a decline in num-
bers. The new policy thrust encourages marriage and childbearing.
A new slogan, "Have three or more if you can afford it," was adopted
reflecting the new direction. Generous incentives are being provided
such as income tax rebates, subsidies for child-care centers and for
delivery fees, and special leave schemes. In addition, two programs
- Strengthening the Marriage Program and Family Life Education
Program - have been implemented.
Since the adoption of the new policy, TFRs have inched up-
ward. The rate rose to 1.9 in 19R8, but is now about 1.7 children.
Since the tax incentives were announced, the number of third- and
fourth-order births have gone up. However, marriage trends have
not manifested significant improvements. The critical issue on pop-
ulation and development facing policy makers is one of ensuring
replacement-level fertility to achieve the optimum population size
and a balanced age structure.
5.2.5 Thailand
In 1970, the government officially launched the National Family
Planning Program (NFPP) aimed at further reducing the popu-
lation growth rate. According to targets set by successive five-year
plans in the last two decades, the program succeeded in decreasing
the growth rate through quantitative target-oriented strategies. The
provision of an extensive contraceptive distribution system and the
efforts to legitimize the preference for fewer children and to increase
awareness of the possibility of controlling family size through ef-
fective and acceptable means contributed to the program's success.
Past successes, however, do not imply that there are no longer any
unmet needs or new and more difficult challenges ahead. The sev-
enth plan (1992-1996) has renewed the emphasis on human resource
development. thus posing new challenges to the health sector. The
strategy for MCH /FP over the next fi ve years will be to maintain
the program momentum to raise contraceptive prevalence rates in
the face of a 10 percent rise in the nnmber of women of childbearing
age; provide effective follow-up for conpIes who are already using
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contraceptives; meet more effectively the special needs of adoles-
cents and ethnic minorities; and improve the management, training,
and information systems, particularly at the regional level. Since
health is a national responsibility. the strategy calls for providing
MCH/FP services within a national and inter-sectoral framework.
Thailand's fairly well-developed and extensive health infrastruc-
ture has brought about a significant improvement in the health sta-
tns of mothers and children. The NFPP is well integrated in the
tasks ofthe Ministry of Pnblic Health's Family Health Division. The
NFPP has effectively utilized the wide primary health-care network
to make contraceptive services available throughout the country.
However, equal attention needs be given to both the quality of ser-
vices and the achievement of the plan's targets. This action entails
strong collaboration with other government agencies, with the pri-
vate sector and with NGOs, all of whom have important roles to
play in supplementing government activities.
The population growth rate decreased from 3.0-3.3 percent in
the 196013 to about 1A percent in 1991, as stated in the Thailand
Country Statement (1992). The seventh plan has targeted the re-
duction of the growth rate to 1.2 percent by the end of the plan
period. The TFR has dropped from about 6.1 during the period
1968-1969 to less than V5 children per woman today. In 1990, the
CDR was estimated at about 5 to 6 deaths per 1,000 population,
with the IMR at approximately 34.5 infant deaths per 1,000 live
births a year later. Currently. life expectancy is estimated to be 66
years for males and 71 years for females. Recently, married couples
whether rural- or urban-based, lesser or better educated, have over-
whelmingly expressed a desire for a family size of some two children.
5.2.6 Vietnam
As recorded in the Country Report (1992), decision number 29 of the
Council of Ministers of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, issued on
12 August 1981, contained the following objectives for the national
population and FP program: married women should be prompted to
have their first birth after age 22; each couple should be persuaded
to have only one or two children; and a spacing of five years should
be encouraged between the first and second birth.
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According to the country's 1989 population census, there were
64.4 million people in Vietnam. The intercensal growth rate for
the period 1979-1989 was 2.1 percent. The population in 1991 was
estimated at 67.7 million. The CBR recorded for the 12-month
period preceding the 1989 cenSllS was 31 births per 1,000, with urban
and rural areas reporting 2:3 and :34 births per 1,000, respectively.
The CDR was SA deaths per 1.000, while the IMR was 49 infant
deaths per 1,000 live births. The average life expectancy at birth
was 63 years for men and 67..5 years for women.
On 18 October 1988, the Council of Ministers' Decree on Pop-
ulation and Family Planning Policies was promulgated (Vietnam,
1989). The stated goal is to reinforce and strengthen measures
to lower population growth and to ensure that adequate family-
planning methods are readily available and utilized by the popula-
tion. Norms were set for the minimum age at first birth (at least
22 years for urban women, 19 for rural women), for the number of
children (no more than two for most families), and for birth spacing
(three to five years after the first ).
A national health law passed by the National Assembly on 30
June 1989 legalized some of the above-mentioned measures. In ad-
dition, the law gives legal force to the individual's right to choose to
limit births and provides for recourse to the judicial system should
this right be violated (Allman cl at.. 1991).
The population of Vietnam is projected to reach 87 million by
the period 200.5~2010 with a growth rate of 1.4 percent, a CUR
of 22.2 births per 1,000 population, and a CD R of 7.9 deaths per
1,000. In projecting the future population, the National Committee
for Population and Family Planning (NCPFP) took into account the
over 17 million women currently of reproductive age who comprise
nearly half of the country's total female population. Moreover, past
high fertility rates are obviollsly affecting the replacement capaci-
ties of future generations. Starting in the year 2000, half a million
women, on the average, will be added yearly to the cohort of repro-
ductive age. This poses additional constraints on the achievement
of an annual decrease in the TFR of 0.11 in the 1990s and of 0.6 in
the first decade of the 21st century.
To achieve the immediate as well as long-term objectives set
forth in the national population program, Vietnam will endeavor
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to improve the quality and effectiveness of FP activities by utiliz-
ing a network of intercommunal FP centers and communal health
clinics; make a wider choice of contraceptives available; integrate
FP activities in other MeR, nutrition, rural development, income
generation, and women's status improvement programs; train FP
staff at the grass-roots level; and support studies on impacts of FP
programs and contraceptive methods as a basis for the formulation
of a more effective and practical FP program.
5.3 Family-Planning Program Effectiveness
Family-planning programs have a long tradition in the Asian region,
and are firmly established there. Various countries in the region
have conceived novel approaches and have devised new strategies
to reduce fertility. In this section an attempt is made to extract
the most important factors contributing to family-planning program
effectiveness from the experiences of the countries considered in this
chapter.
In common with other Asian countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand boast of a relatively longer ex-
perience with intervention schemes to modify reproductive behavior.
All these countries directly support family-planning programs and
provide unlimited access to modern contraceptives. As a whole, the
most common approaches in these countries consist of integrating
family-planning services ill the health-care system at the community
level or in rural development schemes. Incentives and disincentives
have been introduced to discourage large families.
Singapore, which achieved replacement fertility in 1975, intro-
duced a comprehensive package of incentives and disincentives in
1969 which was further intensified in 1972 to exert pressure on cou-
ples to limit their family size. In addition, sterilization was promoted
as the best contraceptive method for those who had completed their
families. Abortion hecame available on demand for a small fee in
government facilities. There were graduated charges for delivery in
government hospitals. paid maternity leaves covering the first two
children only, preferential treatment in choice of primary school for
the first three children in a family. and no priority for public hous-
ing for large families. An additional policy which was made known
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to the public in 1976 was designed to encourage later marriage and
wider birth spacing.
The high commitment of President Soeharto, reflected in the
above-mentioned state policy guidelines, represents one of the keys
to the success of the Indonesian family-planning program. This com-
mitment is not merely a personal one bnt is institutionalized in the
existing systems, both in the People's Consultative Assembly and in
Parliament and other executive systems. The program strengthened
its links with rural communities by recruiting acceptors by means of
a village- based delivery system. Acceptors in the program are main-
tained through varions meaS1ll'es extending beyond family planning.
To enhance family planning within the framework of institutionaliz-
ing the small family-size norm, the BKKBN developed a system of
nonmonetary rewards for individual or group acceptors. A system
was introduced in 1989 whereby a community with high contracep-
tive prevalence rates receives a deep well. The reward can also be
in the form of scholarships for children of low income families that
have been resorting to contraception for at least a decade. More-
over, some private Indonesian finns give discount cards to certain
acceptor groups in major cities for the purchase of selected items.
The success of Thailand's family- planning program, as stated
in the preceding section, can be traced to both the provision of
an extensive system of contraceptive distribution and the efforts to
legitimize the preference for fewer children and increase awareness
of the possibility of controlling family size through effective and
acceptable means.
The Philippines has tried a variety of schemes intended to in-
duce couples to have fewer children. Among these are income tax
deductions limited to four dependents, abolition of paid maternity
leaves after the fourth child, and payment of lower interest rates
for rural bank loans by couples using contraceptives. However, the
coverage of these schemes was limited and therefore of little value
in motivating couples to limit their family size. Malaysia also intro-
duced tax deductions and maternity benefits but limited them to
the first three children.
In Vietnam the rewards that had been implemented since 1982
included monetary bonuses and exemption from the required month
per year of corvee labor for sterilization, IUD insertion, or agreeing
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not to have another child (Banister, 1989). Violations of family-
planning policy resulted in loss of bonuses, benefits, and family al-
lowances. The Council of Ministers' Decree in October 1988 limited
couples in cities, deltas. or lowlands to a maximum of two children.
Those couples having more than the allowed number are required
to pay extra for housing or land space, education, and health care.
Such couples are prohibited from moving to urban areas and are
required to perform more corvee work.
There is still considerable uncertainty concerning the processes
and factors that motivate couples to limit the number of the children
and account for the adoption of contraception in various societies
at different periods of time. There is general agreement that so-
cioeconomic development and organized family-planning programs
play prominent roles in altering reproductive behavior. According
to Bongaarts et af. (1990), socioeconomic development and family-
planning programs operate synergistically, with one reinforcing the
other.
The family-planning program experience of the selected South-
east Asian countries demonstrates that by making contraceptives
easily available and by encouraging smaller families through a vari-
ety of measures, public and private sector family-planning programs
have heightened contraceptive use. In turn. fertility and population
growth rates have been reduced. The key to effective programs is to
emphasize integrated high-quality outreach services and to take into
account the traditional social structure and norms where the deliv-
ery system is to be introduced. Moreover, careful trial and phased
development of alternative approaches to service delivery systems
are critical to the success of a program. Finally, political support
for family planning is often essential for the establishment of strong
program effort.
Chapter 6
Fertility in China:
Past, Present, Prospects
Griffith Feeney*
Future population growth in any population is determined by the
current age distribution and by future trends in fertility, mortal-
ity, and migration. The influence of the current age distribution
is governed by purely formal demographic considerations that are
the same for every population. The role of mortality depends cru-
cially on its current level. 11 nder conditions of high mortality, rapid
declines are possible, and the normal interaction of mortality and
age structure may lead to rapid population increase even in the
face of substantial fertility decline. Once mortality has declined to
the levels now observed in much of the world, however, mortality is
relatively stable, largely because the features relevant to future pop-
ulation growth reflect biology more than social circumstance. Under
current world demographic conditions. then, appropriate consider-
ation of mortality and age distribution may be given without close
attention to social structure or to policy issues that vary widely from
one country to another.
The assessment of future levels and trends in fertility and mi-
gration is a different matter altogether. Circumstances influencing
fertility, and even more so circumstances influencing migration, vary
widely from one country to another, and all but the most superficial
consideration of possible future trends requires study of particular
*With the assist.ance of Jianhua \'nan.
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circumstances. International migration may be an important in-
fluence of future population growth for particular countries, large
as well as small. Immigration and emigration cancel out for the
world as a whole, however, whence a global perspective renders the
assessment of migration trends relatively unimportant,
Fertility behavior is heavily conditioned by both biology and so-
ciety. Social influences may be roughly classified into the direct and
intended consequences of national government policy and all other
influences. The distinction is relevant to consideration of future fer-
tility levels because it focuses attention in different directions: to
broad social and economic conditions thought to influence fertility
in the population at large, on the one hand, and to the minds of a
relatively small number of policy makers, on the other. It should
hardly be necessary to point out that the existence of policies to
limit fertility and/or population growth does not imply the effec-
tiveness of such policies. This is an issue to be decided by empirical
analysis in each case.
The argument for country-specific consideration of influences on
future fertility is particularly compelling for China, which is unique
both in the nature and in the impacts of governmental popula-
tion policies. This chapter aims to give a reasonably comprehen-
sive treatment of China's fertility decline at the national level, with
emphasis on those factors relevant to a consideration of the future
trajectory of fertility. The qualifying clause is important, for there
is now such a quantity of demographic data available for China that
it is difficult to conceive, much less write in the space of one book
chapter, anything that might reasonably be called definitive.
6.1 China's Fertility Decline in
International Perspective
That fertility declined rapidly in China is well known, but the speed
of the decline can be appreciated only when China's experience is
systematically compared with that of other countries. This section
compares Chinese experience with that of the rest of the developing
world. The analysis relies primarily on the historical estimates de-
veloped by the United Nations (1991a). These estimates share the
1980
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Figure 6.1. Fertility decline in China compared with fertility de-
cline in other areas in the developing world. Source: Table 6.1.
weakness of all secondary compilations, most importantly the spu-
rious impression of the uniformity of information available for var-
ious countries. An independent familiarity with demographic data
sources in the various countries mitigates serious misunderstand-
ing, however, and the United Nations estimates render a valuable
service in making possible an international comparison that would
otherwise be impossible.
Figure 6.1 compares fertility decline in China with fertility de-
cline in major regions of the developing world. In each case we plot
the total fertility rates for qninquennial periods from 19.50 through
198.5, listed in Table 6.1. During the 19.50s and 1960s, the level
of fertility in China was similar to that of the developing countries
generally. Beginning in the 1970s, however, China's total fertility
rate (TFR) fell from about six children per woman to slightly over
two children per woman in the space of 15 years. Fertility in the
rest of the developing world declined also, but at a much slower
rate. Thus at the end of the period shown, total fertility for other
areas ranged from a. high of over six children per woman in Africa
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Table 6.1. Total fertility rates in China and in other major areas
in the developing world.
1950-54 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84
China 6.24 5.40 0.93 5.99 4.76 2.90 2.36
Africa 6.65 6.74 6.79 6.73 6.62 6.54 6.40
West Asia 6.82 6.68 6.54 6.32 5.97 5.64 5.35
South Asia 6.11 6.09 6.0:3 5.96 5.76 5.27 5.14
Southeast Asia .5.99 6.08 5.89 5.79 5.26 4.79 4.27
Latin America 5.87 .5.90 5.96 5.53 4.99 4.36 3.93
Source: UN, 1991 :354, 232, 262, 260, 258, 244, respectively, for the six regions.
to slightly under four children per woman in Latin America, all far
above the level in China.
There may be considerable variation in fertility trends between
different countries in the same region. This is particularly true
within Asia, which contains many countries that have experienced
rapid fertility decline, as well as a few that have experienced lit-
tle or no decline. To make country comparisons it is desirable to
summarize the information contained in the time series of total fer-
tility rates, and an accepted way to do this is to calculate a rate
of decline. In the case of China, for example, we see from Figure
6.1 that the total fertility rate declined after 1970, with two rapid
drops followed by a more modest fall. Consulting Table 6.1, we find
that the total fertility rate for 1965-1969, before the decline, was
5.99 children per woman, that tlte two sharp drops brought it down
to 2.90 children per woman for 197.5-1979, and that it fell further
to 2.36 children per woman for 1980-198.5. To calculate a rate of
decline we begin with the .5.99 children per woman in 1965-1969,
the last point before the decline begins, but we may end either with
the 2.90 children per women for 1975-1979, which will give a higher
rate, or with the 2.36 children per woman for 1980-1984, which will
give a lower rate. To make a conservative comparison, we take the
latter rate. This gives a decline of 3.63 children per woman over 1.5
years, for a rate of decline of 0.24 children per woman per year.
Similar calculations have heen made for 21 other Asian coun-
tries, yielding the results shown in Table 6.2.[1] The median rate
of decline for the 22 populations given in Table 6.2 is 0.10 child
per woman per year, or one child per woman per decade. At this
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Table 6.2. Comparative data on fertility decline in Asia.
Period TFR
Country Begin End Begin End Yrs. Decl. Rate
1. China 1965-69 1980-84 5.99 2.36 15 3.63 0.24
2. Taiwan 195.5 1986 6.53 1.68 31 4.85 0.16
3. Hong Kong 1960-64 1980-84 ,5.30 1.80 20 3.50 0.18
4. Japan 1933 1953 4.42 2.26 20 2.16 0.11
5. S. Korea 1955-59 1980-84 6.07 2.40 25 3.67 0.15
6. N. Korea 1965-69 1980-84 6.97 2.76 15 4.21 0.29
7. Mongolia 1970-74 1980-84 5.80 5.25 10 0.55 0.06
8. Indonesia 1965-69 1980-84 5.57 4.05 15 1.52 0.10
9. Lao (PDR) 1970-74 1975-79 6.15 6.69 5 -0.54 -0.11
10. Malaysia 1960-64 1975-79 6.72 4.16 15 2.56 0.17
11. Myanmar 1965-69 1980-84 5.74 4.61 15 1.13 008
12. Philippines 1950-54 1~)80-84 7.29 4.74 30 2.55 0.09
13. Singapore 1955-59 1980-84 6.41 1.87 25 4.54 0.18
14. Thailand 1965-69 1980-84 6.14 3.52 15 2.62 0.17
15. Vietnam 1968-72 1983-88 5.90 3.98 15 1.92 0.13
16. Afghanistan 1975-79 1980-84 7.21 6.90 5 0.31 0.06
17. Bangladesh 1970-74 1980-84 7.02 6.15 10 0.87 0.09
18. India 1965-69 1975-79 5.69 4.83 10 0.86 0.09
19. Iran 1960-64 1980-84 7.26 5.64 20 1.62 0.08
20. Nepal 1975-79 1980-84 6.54 6.2,5 5 0.29 0.06
21. Pakistan 1960-65 1980-84 7.00 7.00 20 0.00 0.00
22. Sri Lanka 1950-54 1980-84 5.74 3.25 30 2.49 0.08
Stem and leaf -+ 0 0
(excl. Lao)
*
666888999
1 013
Median=0.10
*
567788
2 4
*
9
Sources: Table 46 of UN. 1991a. for all countries except Japan and Taiwan. Data
for Taiwan from TOlwon Demogmphlc Yearbook, various years. Data for Japan
from Feeney, 1990, time/TFR as follows: 1933.5/4.42 (Table ll), 1938.5/3.84
(Table 12), 1943.5/3.17. 1948.5/2.66, and 1953.5/2.26 (Table 13).
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rate, decline from a roughly typical premodern fertility level of six
children per woman to an equally roughly typical modern level of
two children per woman would take 40 years. China, with a rate of
decline of 0.24 children per woman per year, experienced a decline
nearly this large in only 15 years.
The range of values in TablE 6.2 illustrates the difficulties en-
countered in international comparisons. Neither of the extreme val-
ues, for example, -0.11 for Lao People's Democratic Republic and
0.29 for Democratic People's Republic of Korea, should be given
much weight. The demographic data necessary for calculating total
fertility rates for Lao People's Democratic Republic over this pe-
riod do not exist, and even casual scrutiny of the estimates given
in the United Nations source raises suspicion that the numbers are
little more than rough guesses. Little is known of data sources for
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, for they are almost without
exception not public, and here again scrutiny of the values shown
in the source places their accuracy in doubt. For most of the other
countries, however, sources are plentiful and public, and while ac-
curacy varies from one country to another, the estimates of rate of
decline may be regarded as rea.sonably sound.
China's rapid fertility decline is more surprising and significant
for having occurred in the largest country in the world. It is more
surprising because, insofar as fertility decline reflects government
policy initiatives, it is a reasonable hypothesis that larger countries
pose greater challenges. It is more significant because an interest in
world population growth will weigh larger populations more heavily
than smaller ones. The rates of fertility decline shown in Table
6.2 are therefore displayed together with population size in Figure
6.2, which compares size and rate of fertility decline in China with
that for 20 other Asian populations. Because of the great range in
population sizes, from under 2 million for Mongolia to over 1 billion
for China, we use the logarithm of population size, rather than size
as such, as the indicator. Thus the vertical axis shows the logarithm
of population size, and the horizontal axis the rate of decline in the
total fertility ra.te.
We see at once how far removed China is from the experience of
other countries. Only one other country in the world, Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, has a rate of fertility decline exceeding
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Figure 6.2. Rate of fertility decline and log population size for 21
Asian countries. Source: Table 6.2.
that of China, and we have just noted that these data are suspect.
The highest rate of decline for all other countries is 0.18, shared
by Hong Kong and Singapore. Pakistan shows no decline, though
also no increase. This is the extreme low value for the populations
shown in Figure 6.2, from which Lao People's Democratic Repu blic
has been excluded.
It is interesting to note the level and distribution of rates of
decline among countries. Until rather recently, Japan was generally
considered to have experienced the most rapid fertility decline in
the world. Yet the rate of decline shown here for Japan is only
0.11 children per woman per year, just over the median value for
the 21 populations displayed in Figure 6.2. It is notable, moreover,
that with the exceptiolls of the Philippines and Myanmar, every
country in East and Southeast Asia had a rate of decline higher
tha,n Japan, and every country in South and West Asia a lower
rate of decline than Japan. It is significant that the higher rates of
decline are observed not only in the small city-states of Hong Kong
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and Singapore, but also in the large nations of Malaysia, Vietnam,
and Thailand.
The inverted V pattern in the plot is particularly notable.
Smaller countries tend to have either relatively high or relatively
low rates of fertility decline, with a convergence toward the median
as size increases. Perhaps this reflects the possibility that, in the dif-
fusion of modernization, small countries may be bypassed altogether
for a time, but may also modernize rapidly once the process begins,
whereas larger countries cannot escape modernizing influences, but
tend to react more slowly to them.
6.2 China's Fertility Decline:
A Closer Look
Looking at total fertility rates for quinquennial periods obscures im-
portant details of China's fertility decline. In this section we exam-
ine several single-year time series to provide a more precise picture of
fertility decline, a picture that may then be compared with govern-
ment population policy initiatives. Incidentally, we present evidence
of the accuracy of the data from which these fertility statistics are
calculated. While certainly not perfect, the Chinese data are supe-
rior to those available for most countries in the world, developed as
well as developing.
Figure 6.3 shows conventional total fertility rates for China from
1965 through mid-1987.[2] We are in fact looking at two different
series here, shown in the first two columns in Table 6.3. The first,
plotted wit h solid dots, is calculated from age-specific birth rates
(ASBR) derived from the birth histories collected in the 1982 One-
per-Thousand Fertility Survey conducted by the State Family Plan-
ning Commission (see China Population Information Center, 1984;
Coale, 1984; Coale and Chen, 1987). The values shown are those
given in Coale and Chen (1987), though these hardly differ from
those reported in the first survey (China Population Information
Center, 1984). These values are for calendar years.
The second series in Figun, 6.3, plotted with small circles, is cal-
culated from age-specific birth rates derived from birth histories re-
constructed from a 10 percent sample of the 1987 One-per-Hundred
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Figure 6.3. Conventional total fertility rates in China: 1965-1987.
Source: Table 6.3, columns 1 and "2.
Survey carried out by tILe State Statistical Bureau. The reconstruc-
tion procedure, developed by Lnther, is described in Luther and
Cho (1988). An extension of the own-children method (Cho et al.,
1986), it begins with the "own-children histories" generated by that
method and imputes deceased and non-own children to each woman
based on reported numbers of children ever born and surviving and
on the standard own-children estimates of age-specific birth rates.
The consistency of the two series shown in Figure 6.3 testifies
to the exceptional accura.cy of these Chinese data. These two series
are derived from different sLlrvey operations, conducted by different
organizations, using different methods applied to different question-
naire items. Given these differellces, the consistency displayed in
Figure 6.:J is most unlikely to be the result of common errors, and
of course the likelihood of chance agreement over this long time
series is negligible.
The total fertility rates plotted in Figure 6.3 decline nearly lin-
early from 5.7.5 children per woman in calendar year 1970 to 2.72
children per woman for the year ending .Tune 30, 1978. This rep-
resents a decline of 3.0:3 children per woman over a period of seven
and one-half years for a rate of decline of 0.40 children per woman
per year. This is much higher than the 0.24 children per woman
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Table 6.3. Total fertility rates and mean age at marriage in China,
various sources and calculations: 1965-1987.
ASBR TFR Mea.n a.ge at ma.rriage PPPR TFR
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1987 2.46 21.8 220 2.33 2.26
1986 2.:~3 21.8 21.8 2.17 2.11
1985 2.27 21.7 22.0 2.07 1.97
1984 2.:35 21.7 22.1 2.06 1.99
1983 2.53 21.8 22.1 2.32 2.10
1982 2.83 22.1 21.9 2.63 2.58
1981 2.71 2.41 22.8 22.6 22.0 2.65 2.61 2.56
1980 2.32 2.55 2:3.0 22.8 22.4 2.70 2.90 2.58
1979 2.80 2.77 23.1 23.0 2:3. 0 3.20 3.14 :~.20
1978 2.75 2.72 22.8 22.8 23.2 3.16 3.14 3.16
1977 2.87 3.09 22.5 22.6 23.4 3.23 3.40 3.14
1976 3.25 :UO 22.3 22.:3 n.1 3.47 3.52 3.48
1975 3.58 3.80 21.7 22.0 2:3.2 3.73 3.93 3.75
1974 4.15 4.24 21.4 2Ui 22.8 4.14 4.33 4.33
1973 4.51 4.72 21.0 21.1 22.5 4.37 4.69
1972 4.92 20.6 20.7 22.2 4.73 4.85
1971 5.40 20.3 20.4 21.9 5.08
1970 h -" 20.2 20.:3 21.1 5.4:~;). (.)
1969 567 20.:3 20.4 20.8 .5.41
1968 6.:n 20.1 20.2 20.6 5.68
1967 .5.25 20.0 20.2 21.0 4.98
1966 6.21 19.8 5.75
1965 6.02 19.7 5.96
Values in colnmns 2 and I refer to ~'eaTS ending .J nne 30 of each year. Other
values refer to calendar years.
Sources: colnmn 1. Coale and Chen (19NI:Basic Table 1.A.); column 2. Luther et
al. (1990:Table 4); column :l. Banister (1987:Table 6.1); column 4, unpublished
computer printouts of the 191'8 Two-per-Thousand Survey; column 5, Feeney
and Wa.ng (l993:Ta.ble 2); column G. Feeney and Yu (1987:Table 1); column 7,
Luther et al. (1990:Table 5): column 8. Feeney and Wang (1993:Table 2).
per year based on the last tlm:~e points shown in Figure 6.1. It is
also substantially higher than t he rate of decline indicated in Figure
6.1 if we leave off the last point and calculate the decline between
196Ei-1969 and 1975-1979. which works out to be 0.31 children per
woman per year. In short, the speed and timing of China's fertility
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Figure 6.4. Mean age at first marriage in China: 196.5-1987.
Source: Table 6.3, columns 3 and 4.
decline are such that the use of quinquennial periods substantially
underestimates the speed of the decline.
In reading the record of fertility change shown in Figure 6.3,
however, there is a confounding factor that must be taken into ac-
count. Figure 6.4 shows mean age at marriage in China for the pe-
riod in question (data from columns :3 and 4 of Table 6.3), defined as
the mean of all marriages occurring in each year. As in previous fig-
ures, we have statistics from two data sources, in this case the 1982
One-per-Thousand Survey and the 1988 Two-per-Thousand Survey,
both taken by the State Family Planning Commission. The consis-
tency between the two series gives an indication of their remarkably
high accuracy.
Mean age at marriage rose rapidly during most of the 1970s.
The mean age at first marriage series shown in column 4 of Table
6.3 rose from 20.:3 years in 1970 to a high of 23.1 years in 1979, a
rate of 0.4 years per year.[:3] If this rate of increase translated into
a corresponding rate of increase in mean age at childbearing, and if
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China: 196.5-1987. Source: Appendix Table 6.1.
the increase were observed over a sufficiently long period of time, it
would have increased period total fertility rates by approximately 40
percent over corresponding cohort levels (Ryder, 1983:741). These
conditions do not hold, and the actual effect is less than this, but it
is nonetheless substantial.
Figure 6.5 shows numbers of first marriages in China during
196.5-1987, based on the 1982 and 1988 surveys. Since we are looking
at numbers here, there is a bias due both to mortality and to the
upper age limit in the surveys.[4] The comparison of the series from
the two surveys shows that this bias is not serious during the period
in question.
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The striking feature of Figure 6.5 is the extraordinary rise in
numbers of marriages between the late 1970s and the early 1980s.
During the late 1960s and middle to late 1970s, we observe 5 to
6 million first marriages per year. During the 1980s the numbers
range from slightly under 10 million in 1984 to over 12 million in
1986, fully twice the level of the 1970s.
This jump in marriages exerts a powerful upward influence on
birth rates. Since virtually all Chinese women have a first birth
within a few years of first marriage,[5] the increases in numbers of
first marriages translate almost directly into a slightly lagged in-
crease in numbers of first births. Thus in Appendix Tables 6.1 and
6.2 we see that annual numbers of first births rise from about 5
million during the mid-1970s to about 10 million during the mid-
1980s. This increase is due not to any change in the childbearing
behavior of Chinese women, but to the rapidly increasing numbers
of recently married women. If we choose to interpret the total fer-
tility rates shown in Figure 6.·] merely as indicators of numbers
of births, these observations are irrelevant. If we wish to interpret
them as indicators of childbearing behavior, however, it is necessary
to recognize that they are distorted by the rapid changes in age at
marriage and numbers of marriages during the period in question.
6.3 Period Parity Progression Measures
of Fertility
The simplest approach to dealing with the effects of changing mar-
riage patterns on the conventional fertility measures presented in the
preceding section is to use alternative measures that are less sensi-
tive to changing marriage patterns. Period parity progression ratios
(PPPRs) calculated from birth probabilities specific for parity and
birth interval provide an effective way to do this. In the calculation
of probabilities of progression from marriage to first birth, for exam-
ple, numbers of women marrying each year and the corresponding
numbers of married women remaining in parity zero appear in the
denominator of each birth probability, whence an increase in num-
bers of marriages from one year to the next does not imply any
increase in the proportion of women progressing to first birth.
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The parity progression approach to fertility measurement asks
what proportions of women move from one childbearing event to the
next. Of all women born, wha t proportion have a first birth? Of all
women who have a first birth, what proportion go on (progress) to
have a second, and so on'? The answers may be derived from parity
progression mtio8, and like other demographic measures, they may
be calculated on a period as well as on a cohort basis. (For a general
discussion of period parity progression ratio measures of fertility, see
Feeney and Lutz, 1991. For applications to China, see Feeney and
Wang, 1993; Feeney and Yu, 19:-(7: Feeney et al., 1989; Luther et
al., 1990). For populations in which fertility is restricted to married
couples, as in China, it is useful to break down the proportion of
women ever having a first birth into two multiplicative components:
the proportion of women who ever ma.rry and the proportion of
married women who ever have a first birth.
Total fertility rates may be calculated from period parity pro-
gression ratios as well as from age-specific birth rates, and the logic
of the calculation is para.Jlel. We ask what average number of chil-
dren would be born to a hypothetical cohort of women that expe-
rience the parity progression ratios observed during a given time
period. The formula is easily shown to be (see, for example, Feeney
and Yu, 1987)
TFR = Po +Polh + ]JO]Jl}J2 +...
A convenient approximation for use with incomplete series of
parity progression ratio:-i is given by replacing the last term in the
series by it.self divided b.v 1-p", where p" is the last available ratio.[6]
Period parity progression ratios are unusual fertility measures,
even within the field of demography, and it will be useful to pro-
vide some examples of their values for different countries.[7] Table
6.4 assembles schedules of parity progression ratios for a variety of
high- and low-fertility countries. Progression to marriage and first
and second births is generally high for both high- and low-fertility
countries. Among the high-fertility Hutterites, some 97 percent of
all married women have' at least one child. In China, virtually all
women married and had a first birth, both before fertility began to
decline (1965) and after it had declined nearly to replacement level
(1982).[8] The lowest levels of progression from marriage to first
birth occur in low-fertility countries, to be sure, but even here it is
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Table 6.4. Parity progression ratios for selected populations, per
1,000 women.
Progression
Canada 1985
Netherlands 1985
East Germany 1985-
Hungary 1984
Yugoslavia 1982
Population
Hutterites
China 1965
China 1979
Rural
Urban
Taiwan 1986
Thailand
1960-1964
1975-1979
Japan 1982
USA
1941
1960
1984
France 1976
Italy 1978
England
& Wales 1977
B--+M M--+ 1 0--+1 1--+2 2----+3 3--+4 4--+5 5--+6 6--+7 7--+8
971 - 988 972 968 967 953 929 905
990 982 972 979 964 929 886 845 786 720
994 991 985 959 700 539 431 414 322 309
997 992 989 978 759 572 448 422 328 310
981 979 960 799 259 168 131 185 44 373
992 959 951 782 428 212 170 185 198 216
948 966 951 925 918 890 859 800
813 917 771 681 646 610 580 548
925 916 847 856 320 137 221 a -
779 745 628 639 651 670 666 635a
923 922 746 645 619 650 682 689 a
802 789 488 386 382 419 439 456a
793 423 301 287 370 412 430 a
835 382 298 363 483 555 562 a
688 274 300 366 427 443 422a
750 242 249 377 414 470 458a
815 318 416 518 567 547 464a
891 939 837 645 325 267 277a -
926 861 797 739 345 280 287 a -
829 - 855 347 267 241 a -
aValues are aggregates for progression from i-th or higher order to (i+1)st or
higher-order births.
Sources: Cohort data for Hutterites, Eaton and Mayer (1954:Table 10). All
remaining figures are period data. China, Feeney and Yu (1987:81). Thailand,
Luther and Pejaranondam (1991:Tables Bl and B2). Japan, Feeney (1986:20).
USA, Feeney (1988a:TabIe 1). Former East Germany, Feeney and Lutz (1991).
Values for Canada, the Netherlands, Hungary, and former Yugoslavia estimated
by the indirect procedure described in the text from time series of registered
births by order from United Nations Demographic Yearbooks. Values for France,
Italy, and England and Wales, Penhale (1984:Tables 12-14).
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unusual for less than 80 percent of women who have a first birth to
go on to have a second.
The difference between high- and low-fertility populations is
greatest in the higher-order parity progression ratios, and most im-
portantly in the proportion of women progressing from second to
third birth. In a high-fertility population - the high-fertility Hut-
terites, China in 1965, and Thailand in 1960-1964 - parity progres-
sion ratios decline slowly with increasing parity, remaining in the
70 to 90 percent range even for progression from seventh to eighth
birth. In a low-fertility population, however, progression from sec-
ond to third birth is sharply lower than progression to first or from
first to second. The values shown in Table 6.4 range from a low of
24 percent for Hungary to a high of 75 percent for the United States
near the height of the baby boom, but this last value is atypically
high. The normal range for progression from second to third birth
in low-fertility populations is 25 to 50 percent.
Higher-order parity progression ratios in low-fertility popula-
tions are surprisingly high - the median value for progression from
seventh to ninth birth for the low-fertility countries in Table 6.4 is
44 percent. There can be little doubt that this reflects a selection
effect. In a low-fertility population, the only women who reach high
parities are necessarily highly fecund, regularly exposed to the risk
of conception, and either nonusers or inept users of contraception.
These relatively high parity progression ratios have little effect on
the overall level of fertility, however, since only a small fraction of
women reach high parities.
6.4 Period Parity Progression Measures of
Fertility in China
Total fertility rates calculated from period parity progression ratios
are plotted in Figure 6.6. Here as in Figure 6.3 we have values
both from the 1982 One-per-Thousand Fertility Survey conducted
by the State Family Planning Commission and from the 1987 One-
per-Hundred Survey conducted by the State Statistical Bureau, and
the consistency of the two series attests to their accuracy.
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Figure 6.6. Total fertility rates cakulated from period parity pro-
gression ratios in China: L96.1-198'1. Source: Table 6.;]
The total fertility rates in Figure 6.6 decline irregularly along
a linear trend from .1.4:3 children per woman in calendar year 1970
to 2.06 children per woman in the year ending June 30, 1984. This
is a decline of :3.3'1 children per woman in 13.5 years, for a rate of
0.25 children per woman per year - remarkably close, though only
by coincidence, to the 0.24 children per woman per year indicated
by the quinquennial data shown in Figure 6.1 and Table 6.1.
The contrast between this picture and that shown by the con-
ventional total fertility rates plotted in Figure 6.;] illustrates the
distorting effects of changing marriage patterns. There are two main
differences. First. the rate of decline shown by the conventional to-
tal fertility rates is much more rapid. 0.40 as compared with 0.25
children per woman per year. because rapidly rising age at marriage
during the 1980s caused a decline beyond that due to declining child-
bearing within marriage. Second. and what is more important, the
conventional total fertility rates indicate a decline ending in 1978,
whereas the total fertility rates calculated from period parity pro-
gression ratios continue until 1984, a full six years later.
The parity progression ratio total fertility rates show that the
level of fertility implicit in the childbearing behavior of Chinese
women continued to decline until t he mid-1980s. Because of the
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tremendous surge of marriages beginning in the late 1970s, this
continuing behavioral change is completely obscured by the con-
ventional total fertility rates. The conventional total fertility rates
suggest that fertility clecline in China ended, at least temporarily,
in 1979. This was precisely the year in which a major new policy
initiative, the one-child family program, was taken. The time se-
ries of conventional total fertilit~, rates suggest that the new policy
was unsuccessful. In fact, as we see below, it achieved considerable
success.
One advantage of total fertility rates calculated from period par-
ity progression ratios is superior control over the distorting effects
of changing marriage patterns. A second advantage, and one partic-
ularly important in the Chinese context, is the correspondence es-
tablished with the period paTity progression ratios themselves. The
level of progression from first to second birth, in particular, reflects
the demographic impact of the one-child family policy.
Table 6.5 and Figure 6.7 show period parity progression ra-
tios and the corresponding total fertility rates for the years 1967-
1987 calculated from the 1988 Two-per- Thousand Fertility Survey
conducted by the State Family Planning Commission (Feeney and
Wang, 1993; see also Lavely, 1991). Because progression to first
marriage is virtually const ant at close to one throughout the period
shown, Figure 6.7 shows proportions of women progressing to first
birth (B~l), the product of women progressing to first marriage
(B~M) and women progressing from first marriage to first birth
(M ----+ 1), rather than showing these two series separately.
Figw'e 6.7 shows that proportions of women ever having a first
birth have been high, about 95 percent, throughout the period con-
sidered. Fertility decline has resulted entirely from declines in pro-
gression to higher-order births. Progression from first to second
birth, in particular, shows the impact of the one-child family pro-
gram. In 1979, the year the program was introduced, 95 percent
of all women were progressing from first to second birth. By 1984,
after the policy had been in effect for only five years, progression to
second birth had been reduced to 6:1 percent. That year, however,
marked a relaxation in the policy, and progression to second birth
rose continuously through 1987, the last year of the series, at which
point it stood at 76 percent.
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Table 6.5. Period progression ratios and total fertility rates in
China: 1967-1987.
Progression and progression ratio
Year B--+M M--+1 1--+2 2--+3 3+ --+4+ TFR
1987 995 968 765 466 384 2.26
1986 997 950 734 440 345 2.11
1985 996 944 678 423 312 1.97
1984 999 961 626 465 338 1.99
1983 997 963 695 465 339 2.10
1982 1000 979 821 571 404 2.58
1981 998 963 858 558 388 2.56
1980 999 960 886 562 340 2.58
1979 999 970 951 743 446 3.20
1978 996 96:3 969 710 442 3.16
1977 996 958 958 713 441 3.14
1976 983 970 964 808 508 3.48
1975 992 946 982 848 565 3.75
1974 992 958 985 883 672 4.33
1973 993 952 986
1972 973 941 984
1971 994 944 991
1970 999 952 984
1969 997 948 984
1968 998 961 988
1967 999 930 970
Calculated from the National Fertility and Birth Control Survey of 1988. TFR
values calculated from parity progression ratio schedule extending to progression
from seventh to eighth birth. Progression to fourth and higher is the aggregate
of progression from third to fourth through progression from seventh to eighth.
Few women reach these parities, so the difference is negligible.
Source: Feeney and Wang (1993:Tables 3, 5, 7, 9, and 16) and unpublished
computer printouts for annual values in first column.
Progression to both first and second births was essentially con-
stant through 1979, whence the great fertility decline of the 1970s
was due entirely to declines in third- and higher-order births. Pro-
gression from second to third birth declined by more than half be-
tween 1974 (88 percent) and 1985 (42 percent), and progression from
third- and higher-order births to fourth- and higher-order births de-
clined from 67 to 31 percent over the same period.
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Figure 6.7. Period parity progression ratios in China: 1967-1987.
Source: Table 6.5.
6.5 Scenarios for Future Fertility Change
The foregoing analysis of fertility decline in China indicates that gov-
ernment policy and programs played a major role in these trends.
(For a more detailed assessment see Feeney and Wang, 1993:92-95.
On population policy in China, see Chen and Kols, 1982; Green-
halgh, 1986, 1990, 1993; Hardee-Cleaveland and Banister, 1988;
Kaufman et al., 1989; Tuan, 1982; and Zeng, 1989. See also the
ethnographic accounts of Huang, 1989; Moser, 1983; and Potter and
Potter, 1990.) The rapidity of the fall in age at marriage following
the relaxation of administrative controls circa 1980 strongly suggests
that the earlier rise in age at marriage was in substantial part due to
explicit government policy. specifically to the later (wan) marriage
component of the wan-8hi-shao policy. The sudden decline in pro-
gression from first to second birth following the introduction of the
122 Griffith Feeney
one-child family program in 1979 and the subsequent rise following
the relaxation of 1984 are even stronger evidence that this particular
component of fertility decline was due largely to government policy.
The structure of China's birth-planning efforts and the attention
and resources allocated to them make this remarkable effectiveness
more plausible than it might otherwise be. Government policy was
effective despite imperfect implementation. Substantial proportions
of men and women married beneath the prescribed ages in the 1970s,
for example, but the encouragement to marry later did result in a
very substantial increase in mean age at marriage. Even at the peak
of its effectiveness, the one-child family program saw well over half
of all Chinese women having two or more children, but the program
nonetheless had a substantial and continuing effect on fertility levels.
In considering future fertility trelLds, then, it makes sense to em-
phasize the role of government policy. The centerpiece of China's
current birth-planning efforts is still the one-child family policy in-
troduced in 1979, but this simple statement conceals a more com-
plicated demographic rea1ity. One-child families llave been realized
among most of the urban population, with progression from first to
second birth in recent years between 10 and 20 percent (Feeney and
Wang, 199~~:Table G..5). The one-child family remains the official
population policy in rural areas as well, but numerous adaptations
belie the "one-child" labeL and progression from first to second birth
in recent years has been around 85 percent. At the national level,
progression from first to second birth in rural areas rose from a low
of G3 percent in 1984 to 7G percent in 1987 (Figure 6.7), with a.
continued increase indicated.
This discussion of scenarios is limited to high and low extremes
over the next two decades. A lligh trajectory is obtained by as-
suming a continued relaxation of the one-child family policy, with
progression from first to second birth rising to about 95 percent,
the level observed before the introduction of the policy in 1979; and
with progression from second to third birth rising modestly from
47 to G2 percent, both plausible extrapolations of recent experience.
This yields total fertility rates rising fro111 2.3 in 1987 to 2.5 in 1990,
to 2.7 in 1995 and 2000. and finally to 2.8 in 2005.
A low trajectory is obtained by assuming implementation of
the one-child policy in rural as well as urban areas, but assuming
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both a somewhat higher level of progression from first to second
birth than has been achieved in cities (30 percent as opposed to
about 15 percent recently) and a slower rate of decline (15 years for
rural areas as compared with only four years for cities). Progression
from second to third birth is assumed to decline as well, though the
very low values of progression from first to second birth make this
relatively unimportant. This ~'ields total fertility rates falling from
2.3 in 1987 to 2.2 in L990, to 1. 7 in 1995, to 1.5 in 2000, and finally
to LA in 2005.
Between now and the beginning of the next century, we expect
fertility in China not to exceed 2.7 children per woman or to fall
below 1.5 children per woman.
6.6 The Scenarios Compared with Recent
Evidence
The analysis and scenarios of the preceding sections are based on
annual data on total fertility rates through 1987, the most recent
available at the time the projections were made.[9] Detailed es-
timates of fertility levels from the L990 population census became
available as the chapter went to press, too late to be incorporated
into the scenario analysis. At this writing we have, in addition to the
census results, fertility rates throngh 1991 calculated from a 1992
fertility survey (Feeney and Yuan, 1994) and rates through L995
indirectly estimated from published data on crude birth and death
rates through 199·) (Yuan. 1995). How well do the scenarios of the
preceding section stand up to recent evidence? Does the comparison
indicate that they should t hey be revised'?
The level of fertility rose over the period 1984-1987, and though
the magnitude of the increase was small, there were grounds, at the
time, for thinking that it might continue. In no large country (and
almost no small country) had fertility fallen as rapidly as it did
in China during the L970s. This rapid decline was due in part to
vigorous government policy measures. The one-child family policy
was relaxed in the mid-1980s. partly as a result of peasant resistance,
and it was conceivabl(· that the relaxation wonld continue. The high
scenario for future fertility change anticipated this contingency and
showed fertility rising to 2.8 children per woman in 2005.
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Fertility estimates from the 1990 census show, however, that
1988 was a turning point (Feeney et al., 1993).[10J The total fertil-
ity rate declined between 1988 and 1990 as quickly as it had risen
from 1985 to 1988. This reversal reconfirms the invalidity of simple
extrapolation and makes the low scenario for future fertility change,
in which fertility falls to 1.4 children per woman in 2005, seem more
plausible.
The low-fertility scenario is both supported and confounded by
the results of a 1992 fertility survey taken by the State Family Plan-
ning Commission. This survey shows a total fertility rate calculated
from age-specific birth rates of 1.65 children per woman for 1991.
Few informed observers in or outside China believe that fertility
was really this low. however, and initially the survey served mainly
to cast doubt not only on its O\\ln validity, but on that of previous
efforts to measure fertility levels as well.
A detailed analysis of the 1992 data indicates that the survey
results were not so poor as initially suspected (Feeney and Yuan,
1994). Retrospecti \Ie estimates of total fertility rates for 1986-1989
from the survey agree very well with the estimates from the 1990
census and the 1990 total fertility rate is a plausible continuation of
the trend. The very low value for 1991 was the result of a sharp drop
from 1990, and it is likely that the 1991 figure is too low by about
10 percent, but there is little statistical evidence of more serious
underreporting.
The possibility of consistent errors is discussed in detail in
Feeney and Yuan (1994:391<393). While it is possible that Chi-
nese women have consistently unclerreported numbers of children
in all the national-level data, we conclude that it is unlikely that
such consistent underreporting has biased observed fertility levels
by more than a few tenths of a child per woman.
Figu're 6.8 compares the 1988 TFR series given in Table 6.5
and the high- ancllow-scenario TFR series (plotted with triangles)
with corresponding estimates from the 1990 census (Feeney et al.,
1993) and age-specific total fertility rates from annual surveys con-
ducted by the State Statistical Bureau (Yuan, 1995).[11J The last
mentioned series is not strictly comparable to the others, but dis-
parities are likely to be small, and the extension of the observed
series through 1995 makes it worth including.[12J
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Figure 6.8. Observed and estimated total fertility rates in China:
1975-2005.
That the observed series should have fallen so quickly below
the low scenario is of little consequence. We know that short-term
movements can be volatile, particularly in China, and the objective
of the scenarios is to capture long- term change. The pertinent ques-
tion is whether the recent data change the long-term prospects. On
the statistical evidence only, the answer is clearly no. The observed
data from the late 1980s through 1995 track the low scenario rea-
sonably well. Hindsight in this instance tempts us to revise the low
scenario downward to fit the observed rates more comfortably in-
side the scenario limits. Experience of population forecasting more
generally, however, suggests that the temptation should be resisted,
for unexpectedly strong movements in one direction are likely to be
followed by strong movements in the opposite direction.
6.7 Conclusion
It would be unwise to leave the matter at this point, however, for
non-statistical considerations raise the question of whether Chinese
fertility levels may not continue to defy what experience in other
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countries teaches. Chinese population policy over the past 25 years
has been tenaciously and effectively anti- natalist. The one-child
family policy has been in place for over 15 years, and though it was
effectively loosened in the mid-1980s to allow a second child to many
rural families, there are no serious indications that it will be aban-
doned. Further declines in fertility may not be in China's long-term
interest, but the negative consequences are speculative and appear
mostly in the very long term. It is possible that the Chinese lead-
ership will continue to push the one-child family policy. Perception
of population pressure may override anticipation of future problems
and the sheer momentum of:25 years of incessant and determined
efforts to lower fertility may make it difficult to change course.
Over the past 15 years various social forces have kept the one-
child policy from being fully implemented. It is possible that this
will change in the future. Economic liberalization and opening to
the outside world have led to very rapid economic growth. This has
led to great opportunity for Chinese families able to exploit the new
situation, and to great uncertainty and anxiety for other families
whose livelihoods are threatened. Both groups are likely to respond
by having fewer children in the short run, and perhaps in the not so
short run.
Could this combination of influences result in long-term fertility
levels substantially below the 1.4 children per woman anticipated
by the low scenario for future fertility change? My judgment is
that Chinese fertility is unlikely to fall below an average level of 1.4
children per woman over the next two decades, though temporary
declines below this level are possible.
There is very little basis for speculation about the extended
long-term future of fertility. The only thing that can be said with
any semblance of scientific support is that world demographic trends
to date suggest that a plausible range is between 1.5 and 3 children
per woman. It is a reasonable supposition that levels and trends
of fertility over the past few decades contain information about the
likely trends over the next few decades, and that is the basis of these
conclusions about fertility in China through the early years of the
next century. Recent levels and trends cannot plausibly be expected
to contain any information about detailed levels 50 or 100 years into
the future, however. Assumptions about these more distant levels
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must either be regarded as purely formal or be made on some basis
other than a study of recent levels and trends.
Notes
[1] Since fertility decline occurs during different periods in different coun-
tries, it makes little sense to compute rates of decline for the same
period for all countries. At tlIP same time, choosing a suitable time
period over which to compute a rate of decline involves an element
of judgment, if not of arbitrariness. The periods shown in Table 6.1
have been selected by examining the plot of the TFR trend in each
country. Because we are interested in showing how different China
is from other countries, we have chosen periods to give larger rather
than smaller rates of declines for all other countries.
[2] "Conventionar total fertility rates means rates calculated from age-
specific birth rates. These are to lw distinguished from total fertility
rates calculated from ]wriod parity progression ratios, discussed in
Section 6.:3.
[3] Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6.3 show mean age at first marriage calcu-
lated directly as the mean of all first marriages occurring during the
indicated year. Column 5 shows mean age at first marriage calculated
from first marriage probabilities, i.e., for the period nuptiality table,
for the given year. The former statistic is more readily computed and
more common. The latter has the advantage of being uninfluenced by
changing age distribution. All three series show a sharp rise in mean
age at marriage. Comparing the plot of the nuptiality table values
(not shown) with Figure 6.4 shows sharp divergences between the two
types of means. See Feeney and Wang (1993:70-71) for discussion of
these differences and their significance.
[4] The 1982 survey included women less than exact age 68 years; the
1988 survey, women less than exact age 58 years.
[5] The evidence of this is given below in the form of period parity pro-
gression ratios for progression from marriage to first birth. See Table
6.5 and the corresponding text discussion.
[6] The approximation assumes that parity progression ratios beyond Pn
are identically equal to Pn. Although not in the least realistic, the
approximation is very good as long as Pn is not too large, which
in practice means not much over one-half. The 1-Pn arises from a
geometric series, as a little algebra readily shows.
[7] The reasons for this are beyond the scope of the present discussion:
for more information seC' Feeney and Lutz (1991:186-187).
[8] The value shown for the proportion of married women having a first
birth is probably too high, one of the relatively few imperfections in
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the data from the 1982 One-per-Thousand Survey. See Feeney and
Wang (1993:71) for a discussion of evidence.
[9] The high-fertility scenario for progression from first to second birth
raised the parity progression ratio to the level observed before the
initiation of the one-child family policy and progression from second
to third birth to the level observed circa 1980. The low-fertility sce-
nario lowered the parity progression ratio for progression from first to
second birth to the observed level of higher-order progressions during
the late 1980s and the ratio for progression from second to third birth
to half the level of the high-fertility scenario. The specific values are
as follows:
171 172
Year Low High Low High
1990 0.74 0.85 0.48 0.55
1995 0.48 0.91 0.38 0.60
2000 0.34 0.93 0.32 0.62
2005 0.31 0.94 0.31 0.62
Intermediate values were obtained by cubic spline interpolation. Total
fertility rates were computed as
T F R = Po + 170171 + 170171])2 + 170171172173/(1 - 173) ,
where 173 denotes progression from third and higher-order births to
fourth and higher-order births. The values of Po and 173 were taken
as fixed at their 1987 values.
[10] Total fertility rates calculated from period parity progression ratios,
shown in Feeney et at. (1993:Table 6), are as follows:
1976 3.57 1981 2.60 1986 2.19
1977 3.30 1982 2.65 1987 2.36
1978 3.13 1983 2.36 1988 2.24
1979 3.08 1984 2.12 1989 2.11
1980 2.91 1985 2.12 1990 2.02
The one-year period for these rates begins on 1 July and ends on 30
June; for example, 1976 covers the period from 1 July 1975 to 30 June
1976.
[11] The 1992 survey estimates are based on age-parity-specific birth rates
rather than on parity-duration-specific rates. Partly for this reason,
and partly because including them would render the plot less readable
and duplicate the analysis given in Feeney and Yuan (1993), they are
not shown.
[12] The estimation procedure, described in detail in Yuan (1995:559-
570), gives estimates of conventional total fertility rates calculated
from age-specific fertility rates. It utilizes the single-year female age
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distribution from the 1990 census in combination with vital statistics
for 1990-1994 derived from t.he annual sample survey conducted by
the State Statistical Bureau. The census age distribution is projected
forward to obtain age distributions for subsequent years. A model
schedule of age-specific fertility rates is then applied to the projected
age distributions, multiplying the rates by a constant factor chosen
to match comput.ed and observed crude birth rates. The vital rates,
given in State Statistical Bureau of China (1995:17), are as follows:
Population
Year (at year end) CBR CDR
1990 114,333 21.06 6.67
1991 115,823 19.68 6.70
1992 117,171 18.24 6.64
1993 118,517 18.09 6.64
1994 119,850 17.70 6.49
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Appendix Table 6.1. Annual first marriages and births by order.
Birth order
Yea.r M 1 2. :3 4 5 6 7 8
1987 11,605 11,951 7,28.3 2,619 1,022 321 145 107 55
1986 12,237 10,055 6,624 2,:319 897 418 193 95 59
1985 10,624 8,937 5,416 2,151 754 298 275 143 48
1984 9,851 9,147 5,056 2,.325 975 442 290 89 59
1983 9,044 9,161 5,060 2,148 923 547 348 113 59
1982 10,001 10,459 5,491 2,702 1,:391 663 398 223 53
1981 10,516 9.332 4,097 2.607 1.406 842 357 285 94
1980 9,850 7,289 4,662 2,:395 1.369 674 328 219 61
1979 8,036 6,92:3 5.365 :3,564 1,874 1,080 649 266 183
1978 7,048 6,256 4,935 :3,218 2, III 1.014 580 416 216
1977 ,5,947 5.,596 4.661 .3 .2'/6 1.904 1,252 676 389 234
1976 6,376 5,948 4,719 :3,995 2,122 1,435 894 628 334
1975 5,191 5,117 4,975 3,785 2,594 1.650 1,156 533 365
1974 5,5,59 ,5.64.3 5.459 4.058 2,896 2,140 1,378 909 425
1973 5,430 5,288 5,2],J ,t,161 .3,164 2,.366 1,524 1,004 510
1972 5,193 4,985 4,824 4,046 3,332 2,512 1,699 1,029 560
1971 4,964 5,193 5,38.3 4,151 3,832 2,609 1,616 971 530
1970 5,586 5,680 4,568 3.841 3.882 2,527 1,809 852 479
1969 5,956 5,141 4,1.50 4,384 3.129 2,186 1,548 826 407
1968 6,047 5,298 4,761 5,109 3,645 2,512 1,459 829 382
1967 5,226 3.781 4,020 4,030 2.592 2,077 1,001 547 191
1966 4,047 4,225 5.425 3,869 2.689 1,912 1,107 448 193
1965 3,827 4,241 4.836 3,285 2,650 1,707 821 351 143
Source: 1988 Nat.ional Two-per-Thousand Fertilit.y and Birt.h Cont.rol Survey.
Appendix Table 6.2. Annual first marriages and births by order.
Birth order
Yea.r M I 'J :j 4 5 6 7
1981 10,673 9,912 5,486 2,971 1,498 779 461 233
1980 9,779 7,504 4.858 2,699 1,482 690 389 222
1979 7,993 7,542 5,704 :3,470 2,025 1,061 688 340
1978 7,166 6,713 ,5,178 3.459 1,980 1,220 671 431
1977 6,489 6,178 4,892 :3,575 2,108 1,323 835 527
1976 6,399 6,004 5,224 3,837 2,468 1,565 1,058 709
1975 5,731 5,572 5,132 4.097 2,742 1,924 1,270 835
1974 5,,530 5,8.34 5,579 -1,:J74 3,117 2,271 1,597 1,056
1973 5,213 5,.389 5,628 ·1.'294 3,415 2,606 1,841 1,186
1972 5,350 5,,500 5.488 '1.195 3,702 2,914 2,119 1,356
1971 5,435 5,891 ,5,:343 4,449 4,126 3,245 2,208 1,480
1970 5,942 6,092 5,029 4,,13 4,285 3,187 2,459 1,580
1969 6,583 ,5,643 4,447 4,927 4,130 3,121 2,262 1,493
1968 6,293 5,618 5.319 5,586 4,400 3,276 2,522 1,729
1967 4,929 4,007 4,758 4,571 3,403 2,706 2,028 1,302
1966 4,172 4,689 5,864 4,nO 3,798 3,121 2,445 1,551
1965 3,896 4,687 5,579 4,197 3,601 3,062 2,316 1,494
Source: 1982 Nat.ional One-per-Thousand Populat.ion Fertility Sampling Survey.
Part III
Future Mortality in
Developing Countries
The papers in this section indicate that the impressive mortality
declines experienced recently in developing countries were mostly
due to the decline in infectious diseases. Until recently, there was
widespread optimism that these declines would continue in the fu-
ture and that eventually life expectancy in all developing countries
would approach the level of industrialized countries; some individ-
ual developing countries have already achieved this level. The AIDS
pandemic, the ret urn of other infectious diseases such as malaria,
and increasing uncertainty about future food supply and environ-
mental problems have significantly weakened this optimistic view.
Althougb at the global level there should be enough food for a pos-
sible world population of 15 billion, local political crises and en-
vironmental damage as well as distributional problems may cause
at least temporary famine-related excess mortality. AIDS will def-
initely have an effect on mortality in several regions of Africa and
South Asia, but we are uncertain about how much it will impact
on life expectancy. This uncertainty is reflected in the significantly
diverging alternative mortality scenarios presented in Part VI. In
the pessimistic case life expectancy is assumed to decline in Africa
and stay constant in South Asia, whereas in the optimistic case life
expectancy is assumed to gradually catch up with that in today's
industrialized countries.

Chapter 7
Mortality Trends in
Developing Countries:
A Survey
Bil>gitta Budd
In preparing population projections for low-mortality developed
countries with good statistics, mortality assumptions are considered
the least problematic, at least for short-term projections, because
mortality rates tend to change slowly. In developing countries, as-
sumptions about future mortality trends are much less certain, even
for short-term projections, because of the inadequacy of reliable in-
formation on past levels and trends.
This chapter reviews past levels and trends of mortality in de-
veloping countries. makes assumptions about future trends made by
the United Nations, compares past assumptions with actual perfor-
mance, and concludes with a review of recent and possible future
changes in the pace of mortality decline. Mortality assumptions
made recently by the World Bank are also reviewed.
The survey of past levels and trends is based on mortality es-
timates prepared for the World Population Monitoring, 1993 (UN,
1994b) as well as the latest United Nations population estimates and
projections, Wodd Population Pro.5pects: The 1994 Revision (UN,
199.5).
The views and OpInIOns expressed in this paper a.re those of the author and do
not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations.
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7.1 Levels and '!rends of Mortality
Since 1950
Considerable progress has been made in reducing mortality in less
developed regions in recent decades. Over a period of 40 years, from
the early 1950s to the early 1990s, the average expectation of life
at birth in less developed region s is estimated to have increased 21
years, from about 41 in 1950-19.55 to 62 in 1990-1995 according
to the United Nations latest world population estimates and pro-
jections (Table 7.1). The difference between the more and the less
developed regions narrowed during this period, from 26 years in the
early 1950s to 12 years in 1990-1995. Life expectancy is projected
to further increase to 71 in 2020-2025. and the difference between
the more and the less developed regions is expected to decline to
seven years. There is a considerable degree of heterogeneity, how-
ever, at the regional and subregional levels, and differences among
countries are even larger. Progress has been slowest in Africa, and
life expectancy is still estimated at only about 50 years in East,
Central, and West Africa. Tviortality is somewhat lower in North
and Southern j-\frica where life expectancy is estimated at 62 and
63 years, respectively. in 1990-1995. In Asia, estimates of life ex-
pectancies at birth in 1985-1990 are generally higher than those in
Africa and range from 60 in Sour h-central Asia to 70 in East Asia.
(It should be noted that the latter region includes Japan, which is a
developed country.) There was less regional diversity in Asia in the
early 1950s, when life expectancy ranged from 39 in South-central
Asia to 45 in West Asia. The estimates for the Latin American re-
gions are still higher, on the average, than those for Asia, and fall
within a narrow range: 68 years in South America and 69 years in
the Caribbean and Central America. Among the developing regions
of Oceania, life expectancy ranges from 59 years in Melanesia to 68
years in Micronesia and Pol,vnesia.
It should be noted that the estimates shown in Table 7.1 are a
mixture of estimates and projections and may be revised as new data
become available. The availability of data on mortality in develop-
ing countries has improved considerably over the past two decades.
Vital registration is gradually becoming more complete, particularly
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Table 7.1. Estimated and projected life expectancy at birth, world,
major areas, and regions: 1950-2025.
Life expectancy (years)
Major area 1950- Hl60- HHO- 1980- 1990- 2000- 2010- 2020-
Region 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 2015 2025
World 46.4 52.3 57.9 61.3 64.4 67.1 69.9 72.5
More developed regions Q 66.5 69.8 71.2 73.0 74.4 75.8 77.3 78.6
Less developed regionsb 40.9 47.7 54.6 58.5 62.3 65.3 68.5 71.3
Africa :37.8 42.0 46.0 49.4 53.0 55.8 60.5 65.4
East Africa 36.;~ 40.7 44.8 46.9 49.7 51.3 57.5 64.3
Central Africa :~6.0 :~9.6 43.9 48.1 51.3 53.7 59.0 65.1
North Africa 41.8 4fU 51.3 56.6 62.2 66.2 69.2 71.8
Southern Africa 44.2 49.:~ 53.4 .57.6 62.6 67.1 70.5 72.9
West Africa 35.G :~9.4 42.8 46.1 49.8 53.2 57.5 G2.1
Asia 41.3 48.4 56.3 60.4 64.5 67.9 70.8 73.2
East Asia 42.9 51.'1 G4.2 67.6 69.7 72.1 73.8 75.4
South-central Asia :EJ.3 45.5 50.1 55.1 GO.3 64.7 68.6 71.5
Southeast Asia fIO.S 46.4 51.8 58.1 63.6 67.3 70.5 73.4
West Asia i1S.2 52.1 57.9 (52.5 66.5 69.5 72.0 74.1
Europe (5(U 69.7 70.8 71.9 72.9 74.3 76.1 77.5
Eastern Europe G5.5 69.1 69.4 69.0 68.9 70.2 72.4 74.3
North Europe 69.2 71.2 72.4 74.1 75.7 77.2 78.3 79.3
South Europe 6:3.3 (j8.G 71.5 74.0 76.2 77.7 78.9 79.9
Western Europe 67.6 70.8 71.8 74.3 76.5 77.9 79.0 80.0
Latin America" S1.4 56.9 61.1 65.1 68.5 71.0 73.2 75.1
Caribbean 52.0 58.4 (j:3.1 66.4 69.2 71.4 73.3 74.9
Central America 4~J .:3 56.7 61.5 G5.8 69.9 72.3 74.2 75.7
South America 52.l !)6.8 60.7 64.7 67.9 70.4 72.8 74.8
North America d 6~).0 70.1 71.5 74.7 76.1 77.6 78.8 79.8
Oceania 60.8 (i4.6 66.6 70.1 72.8 74.7 76.5 78.1
Australia-New Zealand 69.5 70.9 71.7 75.0 77.3 78.5 79.6 80.5
Melanesia 37.~) 45.6 50.8 55.4 59.1 62.9 66.6 69.9
Micronesia 49.4 55.3 59.4 6:3.7 67.7 71.0 73.3 75.2
Polynesia 45.7 5:3.5 59.3 64.5 68.1 70.6 73.1 75.5
UMore developed regIOns comprise North America, Japan, Europe, and
Australia- New Zealand.
bLess developed regions comprise all regions of Africa, Latin America, Asia (ex-
cluding Japan), and Melanesia, Micronesia., and Polynesia.
cIncluding Mexico.
dExclnding Mexico.
Source: UN, 1995:Tables A.~(j a.ncl A.n.
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in Latin America and East Asia. Data that permit estimation of in-
fant and child mortality have been widely collected in censuses and
surveys, in particular those conducted by the World Fertility Survey
(WFS) program and more recently by the Demographic and Health
Surveys (DHSs). Despite these improvements, lack of reliable data
continues to be a serious handicap in the analysis of mortality in de-
veloping cOUlitries. Obviously. countries for which data on mortality
are available may not necessarily be representative of other countries
since mortality conditions are likely to be worse in countries lacking
data. For example, there are no recent surveys or registration data
in countries affected by war or civil strife. The countries without
any national-level data, however, form only a small part of the total
population of less developed regions, so that even large errors in the
country estimates will not greatly affect regional totals.
Although the data situation has improved in Africa, it is still
more problematic to estimate levels and trends there than in other
less developed regions. The only countries in sub-Saharan Africa
with reliable vital registration systems from which life tables can
be derived are three small island countries in the Indian Ocean:
Mauritius, Reunion, and the Seychelles. All three have reached
low levels of mortality with life expectancies now above 70 years.
Most information for mainland sub-Saharan Africa refers to child
mortality. Few countries have adequate data on adult mortality.
Mortality is high throughout most of sub-Saharan Africa, but
there is variation among countries in terms of both levels and trends.
Child mortality has generally been most severe in West Africa, a fact
attributed both to the level of socioeconomic development and to
environmental factors (Blacker, 1991). Although differences with
the other regions have narrowed, West Africa as a whole still has
the highest child mortality on the continent. Sierra Leone, a West
African country, exhibits the highest mortality ever measured in
a contemporary country: a probability of dying by age 5 of 364
per 1,000 in 1971, declining to 334 per 1,000 in 1981 according to
the 1974 and 1985 censuses. Gambia and Mali in West Africa and
Malawi in East Africa, which had similarly high levels of child mor-
tality in the 1970s, have experienced large improvements, but the
latest estimates of mortality under the age of 5 for these countries
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are still above 240 per LOOO. The lowest mortality in mainland sub-
Saharan Africa has been achieved by Kenya and Zimbabwe in East
Africa and Botswana in Southern Africa. The low child mortality
in Botswana (65 per 1,000.in 1984) may be explained, in addition
to its impressive economic growth during the 1970s and 1980s, by
the high proportion of women receiving prenatal care and vacci-
nated with tetanus toxoid, the high proportion of births delivered
by trained health personnel, and the high immunization coverage of
children (Lesetedi et al., 1989; World Bank, 1992a). Immunization
coverage and the proportions of women receiving prenatal care are
also high in Kenya and Zimbabwe (Kenya, 1989; Zimbabwe, 1989).
The countries of North Africa have experienced more rapid mor-
tality declines with an acceleration in the decline since the mid-1970s
and late 1970s. In Algeria, the only country in the region with a
series of life tables derived from vital registration, life expectancy
increased slowly from 05:3 in 1970 to 057 in 1978 and then to 64 in
1985, an annual increase of one year. Life tables after 1985 are not
yet available, but recent data on infants show that mortality has
continued to decline. In Egypt. infant and child mortality fell by
more than half between 1976 and 1986. In Tunisia, which currently
has the lowest infant and child mortality rates in North Africa, the
decline has been equally impressive, from an under-five mortality of
204 per 1,000 in 1968-1969 to 605 per 1,000 in 1983-1987 according
to a 1968-1969 demographic survey, the 19705 census, and the 1988
DHS.
Asia presents the most varied picture among the developing re-
gions, both in terms of levels and trends in mortality and in terms of
availability and quality of elata, reflecting very diverse histories and
levels of development. East Asia has achieved the lowest mortality
levels in the region. The main reason is obviously the remarkable
progress achieved by China. Life expectancy in China was estimated
at 41 in 1950-19.505 and reached 67 in 1980-1985, an annual increase
of almost one year. The other countries of the region with available
data, Hong Kong and the Republic of Korea, have also successfully
reduced their mortality levels. According to its civil registration
data, Hong Kong now has the lowest mortality among all develop-
ing countries with a life expectancy in 1987-1989 of 77 years (80 for
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females and 74 for males) and all infant and under-five mortality of
7 and 9 per 1,000, respectively.
Southeast Asia is characterized by a wide disparity of mortality
levels and trends. Brunei Darussalam, peninsular Malaysia, and Sin-
gapore have achieved mortality levels comparable with those of de-
veloped countries with life-expectancy estimates above 70. Progress
has also been made in other countries in the region, particularly in
Thailand where expectation of life at birth reached 66 in 1985-1986
and in the Philippines where it reached 64 in 1987-1989. However,
the region also includes areas such as East Timor, Cambodia, and
Lao People's Democratic Republic where mortality is believed to be
high and life expectancy estimated to be below 50 years.
Sou th Asia exhibits the highest mortality levels and has experi-
enced the slowest decline in Asia, although Sri Lanka has attained
relatively low mortality: life expectancy was 69 in 1980-1981, and is
now estimated to exceed 70. Afghallistan has the highest mortality
in the region, which is not surprising given its social and political
circumstances. Although mortality is still high in the three largest
countries of the Indian subcontinent - Bangladesh, India, and Pak-
istan - the levels have been declining. In Bangladesh, life expecta.ncy
increased from 48 in the late 1970s to 56 in 1987. In India, life ex-
pectancy was estimated at 5:3 in 1981-198:3. More recent data from
the Sample Registration System show that infant mortality has con-
tinued to decline, from 107 per 1,000 in 1981-1983 to 94 per 1,000
in 1988. The latest data for Pakistan give a life expectancy of 60 in
1984-1988, an increase from 5:3 in 1972-1981.
In West Asia, several countries have experienced very rapid de-
clines, not only the small oil-producing countries of the region, but
also countries such as Jordan, the Syrian Arab Republic, and Turkey.
Cyprus and Israel have the lowest mortality in the region with life
expectancies above 75, followed by Kuwait where life expectancy was
estimated at 72 in 1984-1986. The only country with high mortality
in the region is Yemen, where infant and under-five mortality were
162 and 237 per 1,000, respectively, according to the 1979 WFS.
As mentioned earlier. Latin America has achieved lower mor-
tality levels than Africa and Asia. The mortality decline in the
Caribbean is particularly impressive with levels of life expectancy
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reaching those of developed countries despite lower levels of eco-
nomic development. Life expectancy at birth is estimated to be
above 70 years on all islands except the Dominican Republic and
Haiti. In Cuba and Puerto Rico life expectancy was 75 in 1985-
1986 and 1986-1988, respectively, the highest in Latin America. To
give an example of the mortality decline tha.t has occurred in some
of those countries, life expectancy a.t birth in Barbados increased
from 57 in 19.50-19.55 to 72 in 1980. Infant mortality declined from
1:32 per 1,000 in the early 19.50s to 13 per 1,000 in the late 1980s,
over 90 percent. Decline has been slow in the Dominican Republic
and Haiti. Under-five mortality in Haiti was still estimated at 193
per 1,000 in 1983, higher than in many African countries.
Two countries in Central America - Costa Rica and Panama -
have also achieved very low levels of mortality with life expectan-
cies above 70. In Mexico, the largest country in the region, life
expectancy at birth increased from 61 in 1970 to 66 in 1980 and is
now believed to be close to 70.
In South America, the lowest mortality levels are observed in
Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela.. In Chile, life expectancy
at birth increased from 62 to 71 during the 12-year period between
1970 and 1982, and infant and child mortality declined by almost
70 percent during the same period. Recent data show a continuing
but slower decline during the 1980s. Bolivia and Peru, however,
have the highest mortality in the region but, like all South Ameri-
can countries, have experienced substantial mortality reductions. In
Bolivia, for example, the probability of dying by age 5 declined by
almost half between 1972 and 1988, from 254 to 130 per 1,000. In
Brazil, the largest country in the region, with half its population,
the mortality decline has been moderate. Life expectancy at birth
increased from .58 in 1970 to 62 in 1976-1980 and may be above 65
at present.
Mortality has also declined steadily in the developing countries
of Oceania, and some countries have achieved low levels of mortality.
In Guam, life expectancy was estimated at 73 in 1979-1981 and
infant mortality at 11 per 1,000 in 1985-1987. The only areas where
mortality is still high is Kiribati, a small island in Micronesia, where
under-five mortality was estimated at 123 in 1981 according to the
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1985 census and Papua New Guinea, Melanesia, where under-five
mortality was estimated at 96 in 1976.
The United Nations has recently completed a review of child
mortality since the 1960s in developing countries with an estimated
1990 population of 1 million or more (UN, 1992b). Among the coun-
tries with adequate estimates of the probability of dying by age 5 for
two points in time between 1960 and 1985, altogether 79 observa-
tions, child mortality declined by about 3 percent per annum. Asia
and Latin America both experienced rates slightly above this aver-
age, whereas the rate of decline in Africa was only about 2 percent
per annum. These figures may be somewhat different, however, if
data for all countries were available. In sub-Saharan Africa, there
are a few countries where available data show that child-mortality
declines may have stalled, although the observed trend could be due
to poor data quality. Data are so defective in some countries, not
only in Africa, that it is not really possible to tell how mortality has
evolved. In many countries outside sub-Saharan Africa with suffi-
cient data to indicate a change in trends, child-mortality declines
appear to have accelerated in the late 1970s and in the 1980s.
7.2 Assumptions about Future Trends
in Mortality
The United Nations has prepared global population projections
since the 1950s. The details of the projections have expanded over
time with improvements in data and methods of analysis and with
the utilization of computer technology. Detailed mortality assump-
tions by country were first made in 1968. The assumptions are
formulated in terms of life expectancy at birth and age and sex pat-
terns of probabilities of surviving, corresponding to different levels
of life expectancy at birth. The age-specific survival ratios needed
for the projections are derived from appropriate model life tables.
For countries with reliable data on mortality by age and sex, that
information is used to complement the derivation of the required
survival ratios. A national life table for a given date is used as a
base for the projections, and as mortality is projected to decline,
it is assumed that the mortality rates of the national life table will
gradually approach those of a model life table. This procedure has
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been referred to as the "modified method" of mortality projection
(UN, 1977a). For countries without reliable mortality data by age
and sex, the mortality rates are taken directly from the model life
tables selected for the projections. The Coale and Demeny regional
model life tables (Coale and Demeny, 1966, 1983) and, since the
1988 assessment, the United Nations model life tables for develop-
ing countries (UN, 1982a) are used in preparing the United Nations
projections.
One of the roles of the United Nations projections is to pro-
duce comparable global and interregional prospects of population.
To maintain comparability in the assumptions of mortality between
regions and among countries within regions, a uniform procedure
is llsed for all countries. The assumptions about life expectancy at
birth are made to follow models of mortality improvement. These
models have been developecl using data from countries with reliable
death statistics and have been revised and modified as new data have
become available, reflecting the most recent observations about mor-
tality decline. It has generally been assumed that life expectancy at
birth would increase by half a year annually until life expectancy for
females reaches SS, 62,S, or 65 years, followed by a slowdown in the
gain thereafter. In countries where evidence suggests that the mor-
tality decline has been faster or slower than the model implies, the
assumptions have been adjusted. The most recent working model,
which was developed for the 1988 assessment and is summarized in
Table 7.2, introduces three variations in the speed of improvement
and labels them fast, middle, and slow models.
In the model developed for the 1973 assessment, it was assumed
that the highest female life expectancy that could be attained would
be 77.5 years, the value given as maximum in the Coale-Demeny re-
gional model life tables, and the highest male life expectancy would
be 72.6 years, the value given as maximum in the first United Na-
tions model life tables (Table 7.3). In the 1978 assessment, the
maximum life expectancies were raised to 80 for females and 73.5
for males. In the 1982 assessment, the maxima were further raised
to 82.5 years for females and 7,5 for males. The Coale-Demeny re-
gional model life tables were extrapolated to incorporate survival
ratios corresponding to these higher levels of life expectancies. The
most recent model, developed for the 1988 assessment, represents a
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Table 7.2. \Vorking model for mortality improvement, quinquen-
nia.! gains (in years) in life expectancy at birth (Oe o ) according to
initial level of mortality.
Initial Fast Middle Slow
--
mortality level Male Female Male Female Male Female
55.0-57.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.0 2.0
57.5-60.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.0 2.0
60.0-62.5 2.5 2.5 2.:3 2.5 2.0 2.0
62.5-65.0 2.:3 2.5 2.0 2.5 2.0 2.0
65.0-67.5 2.0 2.5 1.5 2.3 1.5 2.0
67.5-70.0 1.5 2:3 1.2 2.0 1.0 1.5
70.0-72.5 1.2 2.0 1.0 1.5 0.8 1.2
72.5-75.0 1.0 1.5 0.8 1.2 0.5 1.0
75.0-77.5 0.8 1.2 0.5 1.0 0.3 0.8
77.5-80.0 0.5 1.0 0.4 0.8 0.3 0.5
80.0-82.5 0.5 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3
82.5-85.0 0.5 0.4 0.3
85.0-87.5 0.5 0.4 0.3
Source: UN, 1989b:Table 1.4.
Table 7.3. Maximum life expectancies in United Nations working
models of mortality decline.
Assessment year
1973
1978
1982
1988
Male
72.6
73.5
75.0
82.5
Female
77.5
80.0
82.5
87.5
Sources: UN, 1977b:ll; 1981a:3; 198.5b:l0; and 1989b:15.
major revision in terms of long-range mortality assumptions. The
highest life expectancies at birth were extended to 87.5 for females
and 82.5 for males. In order to extend the model life tables to
the new maximum life expectancies, working life tables with life ex-
pectancies of 87.5 for females and 82.5 for males were constructed by
using the reduced values of age-specific probabilities of dying (qx)
available from countries that now have the lowest mortality rates.
The highest levels of survival of each of the nine model life tables
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(West, North, South, and East model of the Coale and Demeny re-
gional model life tables and General, Latin American, Chilean, Far
Eastern, and South Asian model life tables of the United Nations)
were linked individually with the age-specific survival ratios derived
from the working life table so that survival ratios of other interme-
diate mortality levels could be obtained through interpolation (UN,
1989b). These survival ratios have been used in the 1988-1994 re-
visions of the population projections.
Several developing countries have now surpassed the maximum
life expectancy for females of 77.5 assumed in 1973. Only one coun-
try, Hong Kong, is currently estimated to have a life expectancy
above 80 for females, the maximum assumed in 1978, although sev-
eral other countries, mainly small island countries, have reached life
expectancies close to that level. Only one developed country, Japan,
has reached the limit for females set in 1982, 82.5 years, but several
countries have surpassed the limit assumed for males, 75 years.
The most recent United Nations projections have taken into
account the effects of the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
(AIDS) pandemic in 15 high prevalence countries in sub-Saharan
Africa and one country in Asia, Thailand (UN, 1995). The num-
ber of deaths related to AIDS is estimated and projected using an
epidemiological model developed by the World Health Organization
(Chin and Lwanga, 1991b). In applying the model, it is assumed
that there are no new adult human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)
infections after 2010; mother-to-child infections continue to occur
after this date and AIDS deaths follow for many years thereafter
due to the long latency period between HIV and AIDS. The as-
sumption of no new adult infections after 2010 has little effect on
projected AIDS mortality until after 2025. The estimates of deaths
from AIDS by age and sex, for each five-year period, are then in-
tegrated into the existing (non-AIDS) model life tables, producing
a set of life tables which incorporates the risk of dying from AIDS
and which is used for the projections.
Recently, the World Bank has published mortality projections;
the first results were published in World Development Report 1978
(World Bank, 1978). Detailed projections have been published only
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since 1984 in World Population Projections (various years). The
base-year mortality estimates used in the World Bank projections
were mainly obtained from the United Nations, but methods used
to prepare assumptions about future trends are different. In the
1984 to 1987-1988 assessments, life expectancy at birth was pro-
jected with a model using past patterns of relationships between
the change in life expectancy, the level of life expectancy, and the
female primary school enrollment ratio. Two different schedules of
annual increments in female life expectancy were developed: one
for countries with female primary school enrollment less than 70
percent and another for those where the enrollment is 70 percent
or more. For a given expectation of life at birth, survival ratios
for males and females were derived from the Coale and Demeny re-
gional model life tables. In recent projections, a different procedure
has been used to project mortality (Bulatao and Bos, 1989). Life
expectancy and infant mortality are projected separately using lo-
gistic functions, taking into account past trends and socioeconomic
factors. The logistic function is determined so that life expectancy
rises most rapidly from a level of .50 years and increasingly slowly
at higher levels. Rates of change are estimated from past rates of
change and from the female secondary school enrollment ratio or,
in a few cases where data on school enrollment are not available,
from the percent urban. Maximum life expectancies were assumed
to be 90 years for females and 83.3 for males. Life tables are se-
lected from the Coale-Demeny regional model life tables combining
different levels to give exactly the desired infant mortality rate and
life expectancy. Coale and Guo's (1989) extended model life tables
are used at low levels of mortality. The most recent World Bank
projections have also taken into account the effects of AIDS, apply-
ing an epidemiological model developed by Bulatao (1991) and Bos
et al. (1992).
The World Bank assumptions show more variation among indi-
vidual countries than do those assumed by the United Nations, and
indicate, on average, slightly faster decline at lower levels of life ex-
pectancy and slower decline at higher levels. Mortality assumptions
for less developed regions according to different United Nations and
World Bank assessments are shown in Tables 7.4 and 7.5.
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Table .7.4. Estimated and projected life expectancy at birth for less
developed regions, both sexes, according to different United Nations
assessments.
Year
estimated
1968
1973
1978
1980
1982
1984
1988
1990
1992
1994
Projection period
1980-1985 1985-1990
58.0 60.6
.56.7 58.7
57.1 59.2
57.0 58.9
56.6 58.2
57.3 59.1
57.6 .59.7
59,4 61.4
58.6 60.7
58.5 60.5
1990-1995
63.0
60.7
61.1
60.7
60.0
60.8
61.5
63.3
62,4
62.3
2020-2025
69.6
68.9
69.5
70,4
71.6
71.2
71.3
Sources: UN, 1973:Table A.2.1; 1977b:Table 41; 1979; 1981a:Table A-15;
I985b:Table A-15; 1986:Table A-15; 1989b:Table 15; 1991a:Table 44; 1993a:
Table A-15; and 1995:Tables A26 and A27.
Table 7.5. Estimated and projected life expectancy at birth for
less developed regions, both sexes, according to different World Bank
assessments.
Year
estimated
1984
1985
1987-1988
1989-1990
1992-1993
Projection period
1980-1985 1985-1990
59.5 ()1.2
59,4 ()1.1
61.4
():U
()1.9
1990-1995
62.8
62.8
62.9
63.6
63.2
2020-2025
70.7
70.8
70.3
69.3
71.1
Sources: Vu, 1984, 1985; Zachariah and Vu, 1988; Bulatao et al., 1990; and Bos
et al., 1992.
7.3 Comparison of Past Assumptions with
Actual Performance
Since the United Nations has a long series of population estimates
and projections, assumptions made in past projections can be com-
pared with more recent assumptions and with actual levels. Table
7.4 shows estimated and projected life expectancies at birth for less
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developed regions at different periods available from the different
United Nations projections prepared between 1968 and 1994. The
projected life expectancy at birth for less developed regions as a
whole has turned out to be reasonably accurate in each revision
carried out over a quarter of a century. In 1968, when detailed
projections were first performed for each country, life expectancy
at birth was projected to be 60.6 in 198.5-1990 for less developed
regions. In 1994, it was estimated at 60..5 for the same period. The
long-range projections show a small and gradual improvement in as-
sumed mortality levels over time. In 1980, life expectancy at birth
was projected to be 69.6 in 2020-202.5. In 1994, it was projected to
be 71.3 in the same period.
It is remarkable that the projected life expectancy for less de-
veloped regions has changed so little despite large revisions for indi-
vidual countries. Country estimates have been raised or lowered as
new data have become available and with new and better methods
of estimating mortality. Several countries have experienced unfore-
seen and almost spectacular gains in the life expectancy at birth,
most notably China, the most populous country in the world. The
1968 mortality assumption for China, a life expectancy of 62 years
in 198.5-1990, was surpassed by five years. The mortality decline has
been slower than projected in a sufficient number of countries, how-
ever, to offset the more rapid decline in others so that the regional
averages have not changed much. For more developed regions, in
contrast, the projected life expectancies have gradually been revised
upward.
It should be noted that the sudden increase in life expectancy at
birth between the 1988 and the 1990 revisions is partly the result of a
new method of calculating life expectancy at the regional and global
levels from country-specific figures. In the earlier revisions, regional
and global life expectancies were estimated by weighing the country-
specific life expectancy figures by the number of births. This method
provided unbiased estimates only when countries within the region
had similar age structures and similar levels of fertility. Beginning
with the 1990 revision, the method was changed to exactly calculate
survival ratios (and hence life expectancies) at regional and country
levels by aggregating deaths and population by age and sex at the
country level (UN, 199130:91).
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There has been some concern that the deteriorating economic con-
ditions since the mid-1970s in many developing countries would lead
to a slowdown or stagnation in the mortality decline because of a re-
duction in expenditures on social services implemented to cope with
the economic crisis. There is no evidence yet of such a change except
possibly in a few countries in sub-Saharan Africa where mortality
trends are difficult to interpret. In countries with negative growth of
GDP per capita from 1965-1980 or 1980-1990 (World Bank, 1992a)
and with sufficient data to estimate mortality trends - for exam-
ple, Senegal in sub-Saharan Africa and several countries in Latin
America - mortality has continued to decline without change. How-
ever, one cannot rule out the possibility that the deterioration in
economic conditions and reduced spending on health could have a
delayed effect on mortality in some countries.
An important measure that is likely to have a substantial effect
on mortality trends in the near future is the child survival programs
that began in the 1980s b.v governments and international organiza-
tions. These programs have consisted mainly in making a few simple
and low-cost technologies widely available. in particular immuniza-
tion and oral rehydration therapy (ORT). When the World Health
Organization launched its Expanded Programme on Immunization
in 1974, it was estimated that less than 5 percent of children in the
developing world were immunized (UNICEF, 1989). By 1985, the
coverage had increased to about 30 percent for measles and 40 per-
cent for the other diseases. Since then, many countries have sharply
increased their coverage, and it is estimated that by 1990 between 79
and 90 percent of infants were vaccinated against certain diseases.
Immunization of women against tetanus still lags behind, at about
56 percent (UNICEF. 1992). Awareness and use of oral rehydration
therapy have also increased substantially. These efforts should have
an important impact on child mortality, and favorable results have
already been reported in a number of countries. However, since the
programs have only recently gained momentum in many countries
and since data for the late 1980s are still not available in many coun-
tries, the full impact of these programs cannot yet be measured.
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Other factors that will affect child survival in the future are
increasing education of women and declines in fertility, with a re-
duction in high-risk births. Reduced fertility is also likely to have
indirect positive effects on a child's survival chances because a family
with fewer children can allocate more resources per child, including
parental care and attention, food, schooling, and access to health
services. There is also a reduced risk of infection of children in small
households. Maternal mortality, which is high in many developing
countries, is also lowered with fertility declines.
In the near future, the outlook in general indicates a contin-
uation of the mortality decline. In addition to those mentioned
above, other helpful factors include further improvements in educa-
tion, medical research, training of health personnel, and the spread
of democracy which will enable people to put pressure on govern-
ments to improve health services.
Several developing countries have reached mortality levels com-
parable to those in developed countries, even in countries where the
levels of economic development are far behind those of developed
countries. There is no reason that the mortality declines will not
continue and that other countries will not follow, barring of course
wars, famines, and other catastrophes.
This does not mean that it is going to be easy to achieve contin-
ued impressive improvements. The progress in sub-Saharan Africa is
likely to continue to lag behind that of the other developing regions.
Apart from the droughts and famines that are plaguing substantial
parts of Africa at the present time and the civil strife that exists
not only in Africa but also in Asia, there are two important con-
cerns: the AIDS epidemic and the spread of chloroquine-resistant
malaria. Both are likely to have a particularly devastating effect in
sub-Saharan Africa. Environmental problems of various kinds ag-
gravated by population growth, such as water scarcity and loss of
agricultural land, and cut backs in food production could also lead
to increased risks to health.
Chapter 8
Mortality in Sub-Saharan
Africa: Trends and Prospects
Michel Garenne
Interest in the population growth of the Third World began after
World War II, owing mostly to the growing concern for population
pressure and its possible effects upon the economy, ecology, and
political balance of the world. The sources of the high rate of pop-
ulation growth were the rapid decline of mortality and, to a lesser
extent, the increase of natality. The primary concern was with Asia,
in particular, China and the Indian subcontinent, and with Latin
America, in particular Central America. Somewhat later, the de-
mography of sub-Saharan Africa became a subject for research.
The first systematic studies of African populations took place
in the early 1960s. A team of researchers working at Princeton
University published the first comprehensive account of African de-
mography (Brass et aI., 1968). At about the same time, a group of
French demographers published a summary of their experiences and
findings on tropical Africa, with emphasis on the sample surveys
conducted by the French National Statistical Office (INSEE) since
1954 (GDA, 1967). Since this pioneer period, only a few synthe-
ses on the population dynamics of the region have been published.
Mandjale (1985) analyzed infant and child mortality. Van de Walle
et al. (1988) reviewed the state of African demography. The col-
lection of work edited by Feachem and Jamison (1991) focused on
morbidity and mortality.
149
150 Michel Garenne
Over the past 50 years, Africa experienced minimal fluctuations
in fertility, whereas its mortality rate underwent a major decline;
this situation created a considerable potential for population growth.
The decline in mortality has been documented only recently in a
systematic way (Hill and Hill, 1988; Hill, 1991; Timc£us, 1991).
However, there is a growing concern that the mortality decline will
not continue, and may even be reversed under new conditions such
as economic crises, political turmoils, and emerging diseases such as
AIDS.
This paper reviews the available evidence of mortality decline,
before and since independence, and discusses the future of mortality.
It focuses on the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. The small islands
off the African coast, such as Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe,
Mauritius, and the Seychelles, have been ignored in this analysis
because they have very different population dynamics. Three broad
periods are distinguished: prior to 1960 - that is, the colonial period
for most countries; 1960-1990, the first three decades after the region
achieved independence; and recent trends (when available), 1985-
1994.
8.1 The Colonial Period: 1920-1959
8.1.1 Mortality trends
Data from the end of the colonial period (1920-1959) are very scarce,
and there is virtually no data on tropical Africa prior to 1915. Two
long- term series are available from Dakar and Saint- Louis, two cities
in Senegal, where an extensive vital registration system has been
maintained. The vital registration data from Saint-Louis were re-
cently analyzed in a Ph.D. dissertation (Diop, 1990) and the data
from Dakar were discussed in a recent paper (Garenne et at., 199:3).
For Dakar, there is clear evidence that mortality has been declin-
ing since at least 1920; the 191.5-1919 period was seriously disturbed
by the 1918 influenza world epidemic as well as by a local plague
epidemic. For Saint- Louis, mortality has been declining steadily
since 1930, the earliest date for which data were analyzed (Figure
8.1). In both cases. the crude death rates at the beginning of the
series were among the highest recorded, and were only slightly lower
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Figure 8.1. Crude death rates in Dakar and Saint-Louis (Senegal),
from vital registration data. Source: Garenne et al., 1993.
than the crude birth rate: CDR was 35 per 1,000 in Dakar during
the 1920-1924 period, and it was 36 per 1,000 in Saint-Louis in
1930-1934.
It is reasonable to conclude that mortality began to decline dra-
matically during the period just following World War 1. This finding
is confirmed by the fact that the population increased significantly
between 1920 and 1960, as shown by the series of administrative
censuses in Senegal (Becker and Martin, 1983).
Other evidence is available from early censuses and from retro-
spective questioning of mothers (Table 8.1). For Ghana, the prob-
ability of dying before the fifth birthday, q(5), was estimated at
380 per 1,000 in 1933, and has been declining since then with mi-
nor fluctuations. In the former Portuguese colonies, q( 5) was esti-
mated at 472 per 1,000 in Angola (1935-1939), at 367 in Mozam-
bique (1945-1949). and at 3,53 in Guinea Bissau (1945-1949) (Heisel,
1968). These values are very high, and they are no longer prevalent,
except in special cases of severe political crisis such as the Mozam-
bican civil war (see Section 8.3.1).
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Table 8.1. Estimates of child mortality in sub-Saharan Africa prior
to 1960, probability of dying before age .5, q(5), per 1,000.
Country
1930- 1935- 1940- 1945- 1950- 1955-
1934 1939 1944 1949 1954 1959
375
424 408
345
255 225
291
383
365
353 327
345
353
367
420
300:370
472 438
:380
Angola
Benin
Burkina Faso
Centr.Afr.Rep.
Ghana
Congo
Guinea (Conakry)
Guinea- Bissau
Mozambique
Niger
Senegal 385
Source: Adapted from Hill, 1992, and from Brass et al., 1968.
By 1960, when most countries obtained independence, major
differences in infant and child mortality already existed among coun-
tries. The quotient q( 5) ranged from 160 per 1,000 in Zimbabwe to
400 per 1,000 in Sierra Leone ( Table 8.2). These large differences
among countries were attributed primarily to the level of develop-
ment (for instance, Zimbabwe and Botswana were much wealthier
than other countries in the region) and, to a certain extent, to the
environment (the highland countries of East Africa were reputed
to have less malaria and therefore a lower mortality rate) (Blacker,
1991). The exception to this pattern is Malawi, a country known
to have a high prevalence of malnutrition and vitamin A deficiency
(Feachem and Jamison, 1991).
8.1.2 Socioeconomic change
There are several reasons for the mortality decline during the 40
years following World War 1. Colonial powers opened roads in most
of Africa, sometimes railways, which drew most of the villages out
of their isolation. One noticeable consequence of improving commu-
nications, well documented in the past in Europe and also in the
20th century in India (Davis, 19.51), is the drastic reduction in the
number of famines. In northern Senegal there were famines every
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Table 8.2. Estimates of child mortality in sub-Saharan Africa,
probability of dying before age 5, q(5), per 1,000: 1960-1990.
Country 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Benin 255 240 200
Botswana 175 160 140 120 90 53
Burkina Faso 315 295 275 255 220 215 187
Burundi 270 240 220 220 210 152
Cameroon 235 220 185 126
Centr.Afr.Rep. 325 295 245 245 157
Chad 310
Congo 200 165 140
Cote d'Ivoire 265 245 210 165 150 150
Ethiopia 235 230 225 220
Gabon 250
Gambia 350 345 310 275 240
Ghana 228 208 190 173 156 155 119
Guinea (Conakry) 310 275 229
Kenya 216 186 161 139 120 89 96
Lesotho 200 195 185 175
Liberia 280 270 255 245 235 275
Madagascar 170 169 181 195 163
Malawi 360 345 335 320 285 246
Mali 360 310 249 234
Mozambique 280 280 280
Namibia 110 102 83
Niger 308 334 318
Nigeria 195 192
Rwanda 240 220 220 245 225 176 150
Senegal 300 295 285 265 220 191 131
Sierra Leone 400 385 365
Somalia 240 225 210
Sudan 220 205 170 150 145 135
Swaziland 230 220 215
Tanzania 240 235 225 215
Togo 300 245 220 200 180 158
Uganda 229 201 191 178 185 180
Zaire 235 210 200
Zambia 220 190 180 165 152 162 190
Zimbabwe 160 155 145 140 135 75 77
Average 258 244 227 216 201 180 161
Source: Adapted from Rill, 1992, and from DRS.
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three to four years in the 19th century (Chastanet, 1982). Severe
famines virtually disappeared after World War I, with a few ex-
ceptions such as in 1942 in Senegal, and although food shortages
continued to occur with the same frequency, they became far less
acute. Colonization also brought to Africa the monetary economy,
in particular cash crops (peanuts, coffee, cocoa, rubber, and so on),
which gave farmers the power to purchase what they needed.
Cities were rare and small in Africa prior to 1900. How-
ever, they developed rapidly thereafter; these cities subsequently
opened schools and provided a modern education to an elite group
of Africans. The level of modern education has been shown to
be closely associated with mortality decline throughout the world
(Caldwell, 1986).
8.1.3 Public health
In addition to improving socioeconomic conditions, considerable ef-
forts were made to improve public health. Health programs focused
on diseases affecting the expatriate community, especially adults,
but were also directed to the whole population. Modern hospitals
were built at the turn of the century. Local dispensaries soon fol-
lowed in secondary towns. Treatment of the water supply began in
cities during the same period (1928 in Dakar).
Newly developed vaccines against tuberculosis (BCG), yellow
fever, smallpox, and plague became available and widely used, even
in the remotest villages. As a consequence of vaccination and vector
control, the last three of these deadly diseases were under control
by 1960. Tuberculosis has been more difficult to control, mostly
because BCG has a low efficacy but also because the disease has a
more complex epidemiology. Major efforts were also made to con-
trol syphilis and yaws, as well as trypanosomiasis. The control of
syphilis and other infectious diseases reached a new dimension with
the marketing of antibiotics just after World War II. Synthetic anti-
malarial drugs became available in 194.5 in most of tropical Africa.
Malaria control programs also started after World War II, and al-
though they failed to achieve their goals, they certainly contributed
to mortality decline and perhaps to an increase in fertility.
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8.2 Evolution Since Independence:
1960-1990
After 1960, a relatively large amount of data concerning mortal-
ity became available: censuses with retrospective questions, sam-
ple surveys (prospective or retrospective), maternity histories in the
World Fertility Survey (WFS), and Demographic and Health Sur-
veys (D HSs). These surveys provide levels and trends in child mor-
tality at various points in time from which a history of mortality
decline can be reconstructed (Hill, 1991). Results of this recon-
struction are shown in Table 8.2.
Among the countries listed in Table 8.2, data are satisfactory in
more than half the cases and roughly indicate a 40 percent decline
in q( 5) between 1960 and 1990, from an average of 258 in 1960 to
an average of 161 ill 1990. This is a rapid decline in mortality.
In England and vVales, it took about 80 years to achieve the same
decline. A typical example of a steady mortality decline can be
found in the case of SenegaL where the estimates of q(5) follow
quite accurately the fitted trend up to the early 1990s, which is the
most recent point (Figu.re 8.2).
The speed ofthe mortality decline varied widely from country to
country. For instance, the evolution in Ghana differed greatly from
that in Kenya. Mortality levels were virtually the same in 1960 (228
and 216 per 1,000). Mortality decline was steady in Kenya from 1960
to 1985, whereas in Ghana mortality decline was slower between
1960 and 1975 and almost stopped in 1975 for about 10 years, so
that by 1985 mortality \vas 7-J. percent higher than in Kenya. How-
ever, recent data show that Ghana had a rapid mortality decline
between 1985 and 1993, while mortality was reversing in Kenya (see
Section 8.3.1). III 1993, mortality levels in the two countries were
again quite close (1n and 122), with a small excess in Kenya.
During t his period, some countries failed to achieve the large
mortality decline that most countries experienced. In Niger mortal-
ity was above 300 per 1,000 in the 1980-1992 period. Burkina Faso,
a neighboring country, experienced this level in the 1960s; today its
level is below 200 per 1,000. Another striking case is Madagascar,
which experienced little change ill 25 years (Table 8.2).
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Figure 8.2. Estimated mortality trends in Senegal, from DRS-II,
q(5) per 1,000 live births.
8.2.1 Adult mortality
Adult mortality has also been studied, from retrospective question-
naires and from direct estimates from sample surveys (TimCEus,
1991). Adult mortality data are available for 21 countries, but only
a few provide trends over time. Convincing evidence exists of an in-
crease in adult survival in Benin (1967-1978), Congo (1962-1971),
Cameroon (1945-1976), Sudan (1960-1974), Kenya (1955-1975),
Uganda (1955-1965), Tanzania (1958-1968), Zimbabwe (1973-
1979), and Swaziland (1960-1974). In these countries, life ex-
pectancy at age 15 increased by about 10 years, on average, between
1960 and 1980, from around 45 years to approximately 55 years. The
only two exceptions in this study were Lesotho and Botswana, for
which surprisingly no change was visible during the period studied.
8.2.2 Socioeconomic correlates
Despite the poor quality of both demographic and socioeconomic
data and the numerous missing values, various socioeconomic vari-
ables appear to be significant correlates of child survival. Feachem
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and Jamison (1991) found a significant correlation between the level
of infant and child mortality and income, measured by the GNP per
capita in 1987, as well as by secondary school enrollment.
A systematic review of these correlations was undertaken by
Trani (1992), using all the available evidence from socioeconomic
data published by the World Bank (Tables 8.3, 8.4, and 8.5). In
the linear simple regressions, seven variables appear significant: two
measures of income (index of CDP/ capita and GNP/capita), three
measures of education (literacy and enrollment in primary and sec-
ondary schools), one measure of public health (number of physi-
cians) , and one measure of nutrition (caloric consumption). Owing
to the poor quality of the data, no further analysis could be done.
However, these correlations indicate that the mortality decline is
part of the whole development process, and that countries doing
well economically and socially are also showing improvements in
mortality levels. There are, however, a number of outliers in the
regression analysis. Countries such as Sierra Leone, Gambia, and
Malawi have higher than expected mortality, and this was also the
case in 1960. Countries such as Kenya, Botswana, and Zimbabwe
have lower than expected mortality; they were also among the coun-
tries with the lowest mortality in 1960 (Table 8.2).
8.2.3 Public health and primary health care
Modern health infrastructures developed significantly after 1960,
and the number of health personnel per capita also increased. In
particular, the number of physicians per capita increased by about
100 percent during the 1960-1985 period and the number of nurses
per capita, by 373 percent. In Botswana, the number of physi-
cians per capita has increased 6.2 times and the number of nurses,
70 times. Botswana has 38 times more physicians per capita than
Burkina Faso. Hence, there is little wonder why Botswana has the
lowest mortality levels.
Major health programs were also implemented in Africa after
1960. The interest of the health authorities and of donor agencies
shifted from tropical diseases affecting adult mortality toward ma-
ternal and child health care. Efforts were made to provide new vac-
cines, in particular vaccines against measles and poliomyelitis. Af-
ter 1978, selective primary health-care strategies were implemented
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Table 8.3. Values of socioeconomic indicators: 1984-1990.
Country Pop Urb GNP FLFP Lit Phys Nurse Cal Prim Sec IGDP q(.5)
Benin 4.741 37.7 390 47.4 74 1.5940 17.50 2145 63 16 5.0 187
Botswana 1.254 27.5 2040 34.9 29 6900 700 2269 116 33 19.3 53
Burkina Faso 9.016 9.0 330 ·16.2 87 265250 1680 2061 32 6 199
Burundi 5.470 5.5 210 47.3 66 21030 4380 2253 70 4 151
Cameroon 11.941 41.2 940 33.3 44 2161 111 27 10.0 123
Centr.Afr.R. 3.03646.7 390 4.5.7 60 1980 67 11 156
Chad 5.679 29.5 190 21.1 75 38360 3390 1852 51 6 223
Congo, PR 2.277 40.5 1010 38.8 37 2512 12.8
Cote d'Ivoire 12.223 40.4 730 34.2 57 2365 19 8.2 150
Eq. Guinea 0.417 28.7 330 39.9
Ethiopia 51.183 12.9 120 :37.4 38 78770 5390 1658 36 15 1.6 216
Gabon 1.13545.7 3220 37.3 38 2790 270 2396
Gambia 0.875 23.2 260 40.3 206
Ghana 14.870 33.0 390 39.7 40 20460 1670 2209 73 39 153
Guinea- Bissau 0.981 19.9 180 40.8
Kenya 24.368 23.6 370 39.9 41 100.50 1973 93 23 5.2 87
Lesotho 1.171 20.3 470 43.4 26 18610 2307 112 25 165
Liberia 2.560 45.9 4.50 30.2 65 9350 1380 2270 35 275
Madagascar 11.620 25.0 230 39.3 33 9780 2101 97 19 3.4 195
Malawi 8.50411.8 200 41.2 59 11340 2009 72 4 3.2 246
Mali 8.461 19.2 270 16.2 83 25390 1350 2181 23 6 2.5 248
Mauritania 1.969 46.8 500 22.2 11900 1180 2528 52 16
Mozambique 15.784 26.8 80 47.4 62 1632 68 5 291
Namibia 1.780 27.8 2:3.8 1889 102
Niger 7.666 19.5 310 46.7 86 39670 460 2340 30 7 334
Nigeria 90.000 35.2 270 34.8 58 6440 900 2039 62 16 6.2 193
Rwanda 7.113 7.7 310 47.7 53 35090 36901786 64 6 3.0 176
Senegal 7.428 38.4 710 39.3 72 2030 1989 59 16 6.5 186
Sierra Leone 4.137 32.2 240 32.7 71 13620 1090 1806 53 18 2.6
Somalia 6.284 36.4 150 38.7 88 16080 1530 1736 169
Sudan 25.191 22.0 .520 2UI 10190 1260 1996 49 20 130
Swaziland 0.78933.1 840 38.8 199
Tanzania 24.518 32.8 120 47.9 24980 5490 2151 66 4 2.3 199
Togo 3.638 25.7 410 36.4 59 8700 1240 2133 101 24 164
Uganda 17.358 10.4 220 41.1 43 2013 17 8 183
Zaire 3.5.564 39.5 230 35 ..5 39 12940 1800 2034 76 22 200
Zambia 8.122 49.9 480 29.0 24 7150 740 2026 97 4.3 162
Zimbabwe 9.80927.6 640 34.6 26 6700 1000 2232 128 51 8.8 79
Pop = population (millions), Urb = percent urban, GNP = GNP/capita (US$), FLFP
= female labor-force participation, Lit = percent of adults illiterate, Phys = number of
people/physician, Nurse = number of people/nurse, Cal = caloric consumption/capita
(cal), Prim = primary school enrollment, Sec = secondary school enrollment, IGDP =
index of GDP/capita (USA=100). q(.5} = mortality age 0-4 per 1,000 live births.
Source: Hill, 1992, and \Vorld Development Indicators.
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Table 8.4. Estimates of the mean annual rates of change III so-
cioeconomic indicators, per 1,000: 1970-1990.
Country Pop Urb GNP Phys Nurse Cal Prim Sec q(5)
Benin 29 36 63 37 20 03 26 72 40.6
Botswana 35 59 1:37 73 170 06 25 104 65.7
Burkina Faso 24 23 70 -67 48 05 42 77 46.9
Burundi 25 41 54 5] 27 -02 43 60 41.2
Cameroon :30 35 k'~ 03 7 73 53.9
Centr.Afr.R. 24 21 63 -01 7 74 47.7
Chad 22 48 32 33 73 -10 17 77 27.8
Congo 32 11 7] 05
Cote d'Ivoire 40 19 49 01 50 55.1
Eq. Guinea 19 4
Ethiopia 29 20 34 -6 5 -03 51 87 8.]
Gabon 4] 29 79 54 12
Gambia 32 2'2 47 41.6
Ghana .)- (j :t2 -21 42 06 2 47 33.8_I
Guinea- Bissau 31 14 (j
I\enya 38 41 52 ]5 -04 23 76 58.8
Lesotho ') r:: 13 II 4 05 7 79 18.3... ,)
Liberia 30 28 n ](j 28 03 -6 30.9
Madagascar 27 29 15 4 -05 17 37
MaIawi 32 34 60 75 -04 21 30 40.7
Mali 23 ]5 fi7 37 48 07 -1 17 29.3
Mauritania 24 (j] 51 59 14 60 120
Namibia 28 20 00
Mozambique 26 77 -02 26 22 -5.1
Niger :31 42 :B 26 137 08 43 84
Nigeria 29 28 29 80 101 -03 28 50 2.0
Rwanda :33 44 1'\'1 38 37 03 8 47 21.5
'- -
Senega.! 29 0, 58 10 -09 16 35 38.6
Sierra Leone 22 29 211 11 74 -04 26 55
Somalia 28 24 2.5 44 50 09 :38.3
Sudan 28 15 II 44 52 03 22 69 35.0
Swaziland 32 61 56 11.6
Tanzania 30 79 09 -7 -51 07 31 30 17.1
Togo 29 34 53 52 73 -04 26 68 47.4
Uganda 29 13 , -06 6 30 22.]
Zaire 29 ]3 -4 5') -02 3 64
Zambia 33 25 4 24 109 -00 26 43.8
Zimbabwe 31 25 36 9 - 1 04 6 93 48.7
Pop = population (millions), Urb = percent urban, GNP = GNP /capita (US$), Phys =
nunlher of people/physician. Nurse = nnmber of people/nurse, Cal = caloric consump-
tion/capi ta (cal). Prim = primary school enrollment., Sec = secondary school enrollment,
q(5) = mort.ality age 0-4 per 1.000 live births.
Source: Trani, 1992, and 'Norld D"velopmenl. Indicators.
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Table 8.5. Elasticities of q(S) with respect to various socioeconomic
indicators, in 36 countries of continental tropical Africa: 1980-1990.
Standardized
coefficient
Index of GDP/capita (US=100)
Secondary school enrollment
Primary school enrollment
% Adult illiterate
GNP/Capita
Population/ Physician
Mean caloric consumption
Population/Nurse
Export of agricultural products
% Urban population
Exports of fuel, minerals, and metals
% Female in labor force
-0.745
-0.734
-0.711
0.590
-0.517
0.499
-0.460
0.524
0.287
-0.201
-0.138
0.091
0.002 a
O.oooa
O.oooa
0.002a
0.006 a
0.030a
0.018a
0.080
0.155
0.306
0.586
0.645
0.556
0.539
0.506
0.348
0.267
0.249
0.211
0.179
0.082
0.040
0.019
0.008
a p < 0.05.
SQurce: Trani, 1992.
throughout the continent. Emphasis was on the treatment of diar-
rhea, using oral rehydration therapy, and to a certain extent mon-
itoring the growth of children. Recent efforts have focused on in-
creasing vaccination coverage. on the treatment of acute respiratory
infections (ARI), on the use of antibiotics and essential drugs, and
on the financing and management of primary health-care systems.
Thus far, little is known about the exact impact of these strategies.
However, it is certain that. when well implemented, they can have
a dramatic effect on a child's survival, as shown in a number of
small-scale case studies (Lamb et 01., 1984; Garenne et 01., 1991).
8.3 Recent Evolution and Prospects
The global picture of general mortality decline in sub-Saharan Africa
does not accurately reflect reality. even if the different levels in 1960
and the different speeds of mortality decline since 1960 are taken
into account. Especially with the second and third DHSs (1990-
1994), it became clear that mortality started to increase in a number
of situations and for a variety of reasons. Section 8.3.1 presents
examples of reversed mortality trends.
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Figure 8.3. Estimated mortality trends in Zambia, from DHS-II,
q( 5) per 1,000 live births.
8.3.1 Examples of recent reversal of mortality trends
Economic Crisis: Zambia, 1981-1992
The DRS-II conducted in Zambia in 1992 revealed an lllcrease III
mortality of children under age 5. Mortality estimates were com-
puted by year from the original data file to reconstruct the turning
points not visible in the five-year estimates published in the DHS
report. In Zambia, mortality declined steadily from 1961 to 1981,
with minor ups and downs which can be attributed to random fluc-
tuations in the sample (Figure 8.3). Although somewhat faster
than the average, the mortality decline was parallel to that of other
countries, from an estimated q(5) of 232 in 1961 to 141 in 1981.
However, the mortality trend reversed suddenly after 1981, and by
1991 it reached 197 per 1,000, a level equivalent to that of 1968.
Within only 10 years, 23 years of progress were whipped out.
During this period, Zambia went through a major economic cri-
sis caused primarily by plummeting prices of copper, the number
one export of the country (Kelly, 1991). Zambia had one of the
lowest economic growth ra.tes of all sub-Saha.ran African countries
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Figure 8.4. Estimated mortality trends in Uganda, from DHS-I,
q(.5) per 1,000 live births.
from 1970 to 1990 (Table 8..{). The mortality crisis happened de-
spite the fact that the country was politically stable and had made
significant progresses in health services and education. Zambia is
currently severely affected by AIDS, and in the future it is expected
that AIDS will have a strong impact on mortality levels in Zam-
bia. However, it is unlikely that the mortality crisis that occurred
between 1981 and 1992 is due to AIDS.
Political Crisis: Uganda, 1971-1988
Uganda went through a period of political turmoil after Idi Amin
seized power in 1971. The country stabilized in the mid-1980s when
a new president was installed. Mortality seems to have reacted
very strongly to these events (Figure 8.4). Under-five mortality
declined from an estimated level of 227 in 1960 to 1.54 in 1970,
on a path very similar to its neighbor, Kenya. Beginning in 1971,
however, mortality increased and reached a peak in 1981-1983 (206
per 1,000). After 198;3 it started to decline again. In 1988, the
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Figure 8.5. Estimated mortality trends in Central Mozambique,
q(5) per 1,000 live births. Source Garenne et al., 1996.
last point available, mortality was 161 per 1,000, twice the level
predicted, and about twice that of Kenya at that time.
Civil War: Central Mozambique, 1976-1991
A striking case of reversal of mortality trends can be found in Central
Mozambique, an area severely hit by the civil war which devastated
the country from 1976 to 1991. The mortality of children declined
between 1945-1949, the earliest point at which data are available,
and 1975, the date of independence. After this date, mortality in-
creased dramatically and reached a peak of 475 per 1,000 in 1986, a
level even higher than the earliest level, which means that 30 years
of progress were whipped out within a few years (Figure 8.5). These
data include only natural mortality and not deaths from direct war
actions. Most of the deaths were due to common childhood infec-
tions, and only a few were due directly to starvation (Garenne et
al., 1996). One strategy of the guerrilla movement in Mozambique
was, in fact, to destroy the health infrastructures and the schools.
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This study clearly shows that the destruction of the health system
can have a devastating impact on child mortality.
Possible Impact of AIDS on Child Mortality: Kenya, 1989-1993
After a long history of steady mortality decline, Kenya recently ex-
perienced a mortality increase. This increase is evident in the most
recent DHS (Figure 8.6). The adjusted trend fits the mortality de-
cline in Kenya from 1961 to 1989, when mortality reached its lowest
value, 76 per 1,000. But from 1990 to 1993 mortality increased sig-
nificantly above the value predicted from the previous trend. By
1993 it reached 122 per 1,000, the mortality level of 1976. This very
marked mortality increase after :30 yea,rs of rapid improvements was
surprising. No obvious explanation comes to mind: Kenya had po-
litical stability (despite significant domestic problems), steady eco-
nomic growth, major improvements in health and education, and a
remarkable decline in fertility. The recent mortality increase could
be attributed to the onset ofthe AIDS epidemic raging in Kenya, but
this interpretation would require confirmation from cause of death
information.
Impact of A IDS on Adult Mortality: Abidjan, 1986-1992
AIDS is already having a strong impact on mortality of young adults
in sub-Saharan Africa. A recent study in Abidjan, the capital city
of Cote d'Ivoire, shows a doubling of mortality within the first seven
years of the AIDS epidemics (1986-1992), after 13 years of small but
regular improvements (1973-1985) (Figure 8.7). The demographic
data are from the city's vital registration statistics, which have a
high degree of reliability. From scarce cause of death information,
this changing pattern has been attributed almost entirely to AIDS
(Garenne et al., 1995). A similar increase in adult mortality has
been found in the rural areas of southwestern Uganda.
8.3.2 Socio-political factors
The complete picture of the recent evolution of mortality in sub-
Saharan Africa may be optimistically biased, since the demographic
situations of the most critical cases are not documented. For in-
stance, recent reports state that famine is threatening one-third
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of the population in Somalia. The demographic effect of the re-
current famines in Ethiopia has been poorly documented, and the
little we know leads to serious worries (Seaman, 1987). Relatively
little is known about the situation in southern Sudan, which has
been engaged in a civil wa,r for more than three decades. The re-
cent Sudanese data cover only the north of the country. Angola,
Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and Burundi are also
involved in civil wars. Griffiths (1988) provides a striking map of
Africa: most countries experiencing political unrest and civil wars
are also experiencing famines (see Figure 8.8).
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The future of African mortality may be divided into two cate-
gories: countries continuing their rapid trend toward low-mortality
situations, and countries so politically and economically disturbed
that any improvements in the mortality situation must be postponed
to the unforeseeable future. International aid seems to reinforce this
dichotomy rather than to diminish it. For instance, USAID, the
most active agency for child-survival programs, has a list of coun-
tries for which it will not intervene. These countries are often the
poorest and the most desperate. Countries that are democratic and
developing rapidly receive more international support than those
that are undemocratic and not developing or slowly developing.
8.3.3 Epidemiological factors
Tropical Africa is also experiencing a profound sociological and epi-
demiological transition. The emergence of the modern economy de-
stroyed most of the traditional agricultural and economic system
and perturbed the ecological balance between populations and re-
sources. This change led to massive migration flows and to very
rapid urbanization. In Senegal, about half of the population now
lives in cities or large towns, whereas at the turn of the century
99 percent of the population was rural and no city accounted for
more than 5,000 inhabitants. In Mauritania, more than half of the
population became urban in less than one generation.
This pattern of migration has been favorable to the rapid spread
of communicable diseases, in particular sexually transmitted dis-
eases - as happened with syphilis at the onset of economic de-
velopment in Europe, and basically for the same reasons (Shorter,
1990). The AIDS epidemic is the leading source of concern in this
respect. The dynamics of the AIDS epidemic has been affected by
the existence of the network of international truck drivers (along
the Tanzania-Kenya-Ugancla highway), by the emergence of large
numbers of urban commercial sex workers, and by the appearance
of large communities of single male migrants in cities, like Abidjan
and Johannesburg. The spread of AIDS is probably the single most
important factor propelling the mortality increase in sub-Saharan
Africa. Projections made of the mortality of future generations are
alarming: up to half of the population of some countries or regions
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may have AIDS as a cause of death. The death rates may even
exceed the birth rates in extreme situations, reversing the pattern
of population growth (Anderson, 1991). The AIDS epidemic has
another major consequence: the disruption of families, by the death
of one parent or both, exposing new orphans to risks of infection,
malnutrition, and accidents. There are also increases in mortality
from tuberculosis, as already shown in developed countries (Murray
et at., 1990), and possibly of viral hepatitis B.
The massive implementation of modern medicine has also af-
fected the ecology of certain diseases. This is the case for malaria,
as more and more cases of strains resistant to chloroquine are doc-
umented (Bradley, 1991). Malaria has always been a leading cause
of death in Africa. Resistant malaria strains may lead toward an
increase in deaths attributed to this disease. There is now some
limited evidence suggesting increasing malaria mortality, such as
the case of Abidjan and Ouagadougou, two cities in West Africa
(Garenne et at., 1995). Furthermore, the wide-scale use of anti-
malarial drugs may have led to a decline in natural immunity. This,
in turn, may make certain populations vulnerable to major out-
breaks of malaria, such as what happened in Madagascar in 1988.
Cholera came back to Africa in 1971 after an 80-year absence.
The index case was brought by plane to Conakry, Guinea, an exam-
ple of a new way of spreading communicable diseases. Since then,
cholera has become endemic in most of tropical Africa, and seems
also to have become a leading cause of death, at least in rural areas.
The vaccination coverage against yellow fever has dropped
markedly in many countries. Recent outbreaks have taken place
in Nigeria and will occur again in the future unless vaccination cov-
erage increases dramatically. Although rare, plague still exists in
Madagascar and occurs occasionally on the east coast of Africa.
With changing lifestyles and growing urbanization, new diseases
will also emerge or reappear as a result of increasing risk factors or
changing ecological conditions. Smoking has increased in Africa,
with the help of massive commercial campaigns by tobacco compa-
nies. Obesity, rare in villages, has become prevalent in cities and
may be linked with a probable increase in the prevalence of diabetes.
Car accidents are also becoming a significant cause of death; African
roads are among the most dangerous in the world. Political violence
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has been taking a heavy toll in the recent years; for instance, the
population of Rwanda was devastated during the 1994-1995 civil
war.
8.4 Discussion
The past trends of mortality in Africa have been induced by trans-
fers of technology from the 'Vest, which have affected virtually all
countries on the continent in a short period of time. Public health,
nutrition, economic development, and modern education seem to
have been the key determinants ill mortality change. However, the
future of mortality in Africa is hard to determine and even harder
to quantify. There are reasons to believe that the major and quite
uniform mortality decline experienced over the first 25 years of inde-
pendence (1960-1985) will not be followed by a com parable decline
in the next 25 years in all the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Most
likely, the principal differences that already exist between countries
will prevail and may even increase. Some nations will continue along
their successful routes to low mortality, and others will see their
health transition stop or even reverse for some period of time. Be-
sides the socio-political conditions, a critical factor will be the spread
of the HIV virus, resistant malaria, tuberculosis, and other diseases
infecting the general population.
The control that the countries have over the health of their
population is also a function of their research capacity to identify
new problems and to choose the most appropriate solutions in time.
Essential National Health Research has recently been seen as one
of the top priorities for developing countries (ENHR Report, 1990).
Data information systems to identify and tackle new diseases and
new health problems may be an important component of the success
of health policies in the future. The AIDS epidemics could have been
smaller in size if appropriate steps had been taken at its onset.
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Chapter 9
Global Trends in AIDS
Mortality
John Bongaarts
The AIDS epidemic began spreading around 1980 in North Amer-
ica, Western Europe, and sub-Saharan Africa; since then HIV, the
virus that causes AIDS, has quickly reached all corners of the globe
(WHO, 1994).[1] Despite significant efforts to contain the epidemic,
HIV is now spreading more rapidly than ever, resulting in an esti-
mated 2.4 million new infections each year among adults (WHO,
1995b). Expansion is most rapid in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia,
with approximately 1 million new infections annually in each con-
tinent. In addition, a growing number of infections occur through
"vertical transmission" from mother to child during pregnancy, de-
livery, or breastfeeding. In the early 1980s AIDS was thought to
be primarily a disease of homosexuals and injecting drug users, but
heterosexual transmission was soon found to be common in Africa
and elsewhere (Piot et al., 1988). Today the large majority of infec-
tions worldwide are the result of sexual intercourse between men and
women, even though this is a relatively inefficient mode of transmis-
sion (the probability of infection per heterosexual contact between
an uninfected individual and an asymptomatic carrier averages less
than 1 percent if the uninfected person is healthy). Transmission
through transfusion with contaminated blood and blood products
Reprinted with the permission of the Population Council, from Population and
Development Review 22(1), March 1996.
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has been reduced to very low levels in countries with extensive test-
ing, but where screening is incomplete transfusion can be a signifi-
cant source of HIV infection.
The HIV/ AIDS epidemic has become a serious public health
problem because no cure or vaccine exists and infection almost
invariably leads to death. Infection is followed by years of slow
destruction of the immune system, rendering carriers increasingly
vulnerable to fatal opportunistic infections such as pneumocystic
pneumonia and cancers such as Kaposi's sarcoma. The median in-
cubation period between initial infection and onset of AIDS is about
a decade (Chin and Lwanga, 1991a). Carriers are typically asymp-
tomatic for most of the incubation period and they therefore can
unwittingly infect others, thus contributing to the rapid dissemina-
tion of HIV.
The World Health Organization (WHO) monitors the epidemic
closely and estimates that by mid-1995 a cumulative total of about
18.5 million adults had been infected with HIV worldwide since the
1970s (WHO, 1995a). Despite the many uncertainties and limi-
tations regarding available statistics, this global estimate and the
geographic distribution of infections published by WHO are widely
accepted.[2] However, the future course of the epidemic remains
controversial.
During the remainder of the 1990s WHO expects 10-15 million
new HIV infections among adults and 5-10 million among children
(through vertical transmission), bringing the cumulative total by
the year 2000 to 30-40 million HIV infections (WHO, 1994). Oth-
ers expect more severe epidemics. For example Mann et al. (1992)
project that the cumulative total of infections by 2000 could exceed
100 million. Model simulations of African epidemics by Anderson
et at. (1991) and by Gregson et al. (1994) indicate that a majority
of adults could become infected, leading to massive AIDS mortality
and possibly even to declines in population size.
This article presents a set of projections of the epidemic from
1995 to 2005 for major world regions and assesses the correspond-
ing effects on death rates and population growth. Estimates of the
future demographic impact of AIDS for world regions have not yet
been made. The United Nations (UN, 1995) and the US Bureau
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of the Census (Way and Stanecki, 1994) have prepared such assess-
ments for a number of African countries especially affected by AIDS,
but their findings differ substantially from each other.
9.1 Global Patterns
In the 1980s the number of AIDS cases reported to WHO was
the most widely used statistic to monitor the epidemic's expansion
worldwide. The exponential growth in AIDS cases then observed -
a doubling annually for much of the 1980s - reflected the exception-
ally rapid spread of this new disease. Unfortunately, underreporting
due to limited access to health care, lack of diagnostic facilities, and
reluctance of individuals, medical personnel, or governments to re-
port the disease and/or the full extent of the epidemic has been a
serious problem, especially in Africa. The cumulative number of
AIDS cases reported by the beginning of 1994 is estimated to be
less than a quarter of the actual number (WHO, 1994). Moreover,
the number of AIDS cases, even if accurately known, does not give
a complete picture of the epidemic because there are several times
more individuals infected with HIV than there are AIDS cases. As a
consequence, WHO now relies on the estimated cumulative number
of HIV infections in major world regions as the principal statistic
with which to monitor the global epidemic.
By the end of 1994 an estimated cumulative total of 17.2 mil-
lion adults had been infected worldwide. Nearly 3 million of these
infections have resulted in deaths from AIDS before 1995, leaving
approximately 14.3 million HIV-infected individuals alive at the end
of 1994 (WHO, 1995b).[3] Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for over
half of this total (see Table 9.1). Asia and Latin America have
the next largest numbers with, respectively, 3.4 and 1.7 million in-
fected adults, and North America and Western Europe each have
less than 1 million. The estimated proportion of adults infected
averages 0.4 percent worldwide, ranging from a high of 2.5 percent
in sub-Saharan Africa to a low of 0.2 percent in Asia and Western
Europe.
These regional averages, in turn, conceal large differences in the
size of the epidemic between countries. This is the case in every con-
tinent, but especially in Africa. Figure 9.1 presents the geographic
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World
total a
North Latin Western
America America Europe
Table 9.1. Cumulative number of adults infected with HIV, cu-
mulative AIDS deaths, and number of infected adults (in millions),
and percentage of adults infected by region at the end of 1994.
Sub-
Saharan
Africa Asia
HIV infections
AIDS deaths
Infected adults
Adults infected
9.7
1.9
7.8
2.5%
3.5
0.1
3.4
0.2%
1.2 2.0 0.7
0.4 0.3 0.2
0.8 1.7 0.5
0.4%. 0.6% 0.2%
17.2
2.9
14.3
0.4%
aTotal includes a small number of infections in the former Soviet Union, Eastern
Europe, West Asia, and North Africa.
Source: WHO, 1995b.
distribution of HIV prevalence (i.e., the percent of adults infected)
among low-risk urban populations in Africa circa 1993 (comparable
data for rural areas are not available). Prevalence varies from more
than 10 percent in parts of East and Central Africa to a fraction
of 1 percent in many other countries, particularly in North Africa.
Within countries, infection levels are highest in cities, in the sexu-
ally active age groups, and in groups with high-risk behaviors (e.g.,
prostitutes, injecting drug users, and homosexuals).
Why has the HIV/ AIDS epidemic affected some regions and
countries much more than others? Although there is no commonly
agreed upon explanation, a number of hypotheses have been ad-
vanced. Two factors are widely accepted as at least partially re-
sponsible. First, the timing of the onset of the spread of HIV dif-
fers considerably among regions, from the late 1970s in sub-Saharan
Africa, Nor.th America, and Western Europe, to the mid-1980s in
Asia (Mann et ai., 1992). This difference no doubt contributed to
large variations in the size of the epidemic in the mid-1980s because
in some countries the epidemics were by then already a decade old,
while in others they had just begun. Today, a majority of coun-
tries have had epidemics of at least a decade's duration, and the
timing effect is therefore significantly smaller now. A second cause
of differen'ces is the nature and size of a population's "high-risk"
groups. In Europe and North America homosexuals/bisexuals and
injecting drug users have been the principal population groups af-
fected by AIDS, while in sub-Saharan Africa the large majority of
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Figure 9.1. Estimated levels of HIV seroprevalence (percentage of
adults infected) for urban populations in Africa: circa 1993. Esti-
mates are based on surveys of "low-risk" groups, primarily pregnant
women and blood donors. Source: US Bureau of the Census, 1994a.
HIV infections are the result of heterosexual contacts (Piot et al.,
1988).
But neither of these two factors explains one of the epidemic's
most puzzling features: the huge differences - more than an order
of magnitude - in infection levels of heterosexuals among countries
where the virus has been present for some time. For example, in a
few heavily affected African countries prevalence in the adult pop-
ulation exceeds 10 percent, while in others prevalence is below 1
percent (Berkley, 1994; Lamptey and Coates, 1994; Plummer et al.,
1994; Serwadda et al., 1994; Way and Stanecki, 1994). Equally
large differences have been observed within countries. For example,
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according to a 1991 survey in Rwanda, prevalence was above 25 per-
cent in urban areas, but only 2.2 percent in rural areas (Serwadda et
a1., 1994). In one rural area of Zaire prevalence was low and stable
at 0.8 percent for a decade (Nzilambi et aZ., 1988), while urban infec-
tion levels were about 5 percent. Low infection levels (0.17 percent)
are also found among childbearing women nationwide in the United
States (Centers for Disease Control and Pr.evention, 1994). These
findings may be explained by variations in the following factors that
facilitate or inhibit spread of the virus among heterosexuals:
• SexuaZ behavior. Frequent sexual contacts with individuals other
than a permanent partner and frequent changes in partners are
key determinants of the speed of diffusion of HIV. There is little
comparative evidence on sexual behavior, but differences among
countries can be substantial. According to WHO-sponsored sur-
veys in five sub-Saharan countries, the proportion of men report-
ing sex with someone other than their regular partner in the past
year ranged from 14 to 53 percent (Carael et a1., 1992). Cald-
well et aZ. (1989), Piot and Carael (1988), and Larson (1989)
discuss the social-institutional context that supports the high
degree of sexual networking in sub-Saharan Africa.
• Condom use. African men report infrequent reliance on con-
doms when engaging in commercial sex (Carael et a1., 1992).
Condoms are more widely used in developed countries, espe-
cially in sexual contacts with one-time partners (UN, 1989a;
Laumann et aZ., 1994).
• Sexually transmitted diseases (STDs). The infectiousness of
HIV carriers and the susceptibility of uninfected partners are ap-
parently increased in the presence of STDs, particularly those
that cause genital ulcers (e.g., chancroid, genital herpes, and
syphilis) (Piot et aZ., 1994; Cameron et aZ., 1989; Plummer et
aZ., 1991, 1994). The prevalence of STDs is relatively high in
some parts of sub-Saharan Africa (Caldwell and Caldwell, 1983).
• Absence of maZe circumcision. There is a highly significant
correlation between the proportion of uncircumcised males in
African ethnic groups and countries and the prevalence of HIV
(Bongaarts et a1., 1989; Moses et a1., 1990; Caldwell and Cald-
well, 1993). Although this association may in part be due to
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confounding factors (De Vincenzi and Mertens, 1994), it is con-
sistent with clinic-based case-control studies in which circum-
cised males were significantly less likely to be infected with HIV
than uncircumcised controls (Cameron et at., 1989; Seed et at.,
1995). Several biological mechanisms, including enhanced sus-
ceptibility to genital ulcer disease, may be responsible for the
increased risk of HIV infection among uncircumcised males (De
Vincenzi and Mertens, 1994; Over and Piot, 1993; Caldwell and
Caldwell, 1994).
Lack of reliable measures prevents a quantitative assessment of
the relative roles played by these factors, but it is likely that they
are responsible for much of the differences in heterosexual epidemics
between countries, as well as for the equally large differences between
regions and demographic groups within countries.
9.2 Past Trends
9.2.1 Prevalence
HIV prevalence trends from 1980 to 1995 for five major world re-
gions are plotted in Figure 9.2. Epidemics in Africa, Asia, and
Latin America, although differing widely in size, continued to ex-
pand through the first half of the 1990s. Prevalence rates in North
America and Western Europe also grew rapidly during the 1980s,
but they apparently have leveled off in the 1990s at less than one-
half percent of the adult population. These trends represent aver-
ages for regions; epidemics in countries within regions can deviate
significantly from these averages not only in size but also in trend.
For example, in Africa the epidemic is generally expanding rapidly,
but in a few instances (e.g., in the capital cities of Bangui, Bujum-
bura, Kampala, and Kinshasa) the epidemic appears to be leveling
off (US Bureau of the Census, 1993a, 1993b, 1994b).
The appearance of a plateau in HIV prevalence while a large pro-
portion of a population remains uninfected is one of the epidemic's
most crucIal features. Although still rare in the developing world,
this plateau is likely to be found eventually in all geographic ar-
eas. A stable prevalence level implies that the virus is disseminated
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Figure 9.2. Estimated trends in HIV prevalence among adults, by
region: 1980-1995. Source: WHO, 1995b.
in the population but that there is nevertheless no further expan-
sion. An explanation for this phenomenon is that every population
is a mixture of more or less frequently interacting subgroups with
widely varying infection risks. In North America, for example, sub-
stantial parts of the homosexual/bisexual and injecting drug user
groups are at high risk, whereas infection risks are very low for the
vast majority of heterosexuals. In fact, the heterosexual epidemic in
the United States is apparently not self-sustaining, and prevalence
is therefore low (less than 0.2 percent) and virtually stable, despite
some interaction with high-risk groups (Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, 1994).
A self-sustaining epidemic can occur in a subpopulation with a
given level of infectivity per contact only if a threshold rate of sexual
contact with different partners has been exceeded. This threshold is
reached when the so-called basic reproductive rate of the epidemic,
R, equals 1 (Anderson and May, 1988, 1992). R is the average num-
ber of new infections caused by one infected individual over his or
her lifetime. The reproductive rate for a particular population is
determined by its sexual behavior, the duration of infectivity, and
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the infectivity per contact (which in turn is affected by the presence
of such cofactors as condom use, the prevalence of other sexually
transmitted diseases, and the absence of male circumcision). In a
population with homogeneous behavioral and biological character-
istics, an epidemic will spread until nearly everyone is infected if
R exceeds 1. On the other hand, if in such a population R is less
than 1, a self-sustaining epidemic cannot o.ccur. This is true even
if the virus is introduced repeatedly through contacts with infected
individuals outside the group.
For the sake of simplicity, this explanation for the leveling off
in prevalence rates has ignored some key aspects of the epidemic,
such as changes in behavior over time, the movement of individuals
between risk groups, and membership in more than one group, but
the main points remain valid. The virus first invades the subgroups
with the highest reproductive rates, and HIV prevalence rates in
these core groups rise rapidly to high levels. In contrast, the plateau
in prevalence for the lowest-risk groups of heterosexuals can be at
a fraction of 1 percent, as in North America and Western Europe,
because the large majority of these populations do not engage in
risky behavior or engage in it so infrequently that their reproduc-
tive rate is well below 1, and because their interaction with high-risk
groups is limited. In sub-Saharan Africa, on the other hand, the core
group comprises prostitutes and their male partners; the virus can
spread efficiently from these male partners to their wives and chil-
dren, thus putting a large proportion of the general population at
risk. An epidemic reaches a plateau when the virus has achieved
maximum penetration in the vulnerable subpopulations. Because
the size of the subgroups with high reproductive rates and their in-
teractions with the general population vary widely among countries,
the plateau levels of HIV prevalence also differ greatly, ranging from
no more than a few tenths of a percent in most developed countries
to more than 10 percent in a few countries in sub-Saharan Africa.
9.2.2 Incidence
The prevaience of infection at a point in time is the net result of
past additions to the infected population through new infections
and subtractions through deaths. Further insight into the dynam-
ics of the epidemic can therefore be gained by examining trends in
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the annual incidence rates at which the key events - HIV infection,
onset of AIDS, and death - occur. Figure 9.3 presents WHO esti-
mates of these incidence rates for each region up to 1995. Because
the epidemics in North America and Western Europe have evolved
furthest, they give the most complete picture of the phases through
which other epidemics are likely to progress. In these two regions,
a key turning point in the epidemic was reached in the mid-1980s
when the annual rate of new infections reached a maximum, esti-
mated, respectively, at about 0.7 and 0.3 per thousand adults per
year.
The peaks in new HIV infections in sub-Saharan Africa and
Latin America are estimated by WH0 to have occurred in the early
1990s at, respectively, 3.6 and 0.9 infections per thousand adults
per year. The incidence of infections in Asia has not yet reached
its maximum, although one Asian country, Thailand, may already
have passed it. In Thailand, HIV spread very rapidly in the late
1980s, and prevalence in the adult population had reached 1.5 per-
cent in urban areas at the end of 1993. Recent analyses suggest
that the incidence of HIV has been declining since 1991, in part due
to vigorous public health measures implemented by the government
(Hanenberg et al., 1994; Tim Brown as cited in Cohen, 1994b).
Past trends in AIDS incidence are also plotted in Figure 9.3.
Since the incubation period averages about a decade, there is a
substantial delay between the rise in new infections and the corre-
sponding increase in new AIDS cases. In all regions, the estimated
AIDS incidence rose through 1994. However, in North America and
Western Europe the rate of increase in AIDS incidence has slowed in
the early 1990s, suggesting that a plateau is approaching. Patterns
of incidence of AIDS deaths are very similar to those of AIDS; the
only difference is a delay of about one year.
A comparison of Figures 9.2 and 9.3 shows that the prevalence
of HIV can continue rising for a number of years after the incidence
rate has begun its decline. This is possible because individuals who
are HIV-positive in a given year have become infected over a num-
ber of years in the past. For example, in the hypothetical case in
which an infected individual survives exactly 10 years before dying,
the number of infected individuals at any given time would equal
the sum of all infections in the past 10 years regardless of whether
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Figure 9.3. Estimates (1980-1995) and medium projections (1995-
2005) for incidence rates of HIV infections, AIDS cases, and AIDS
deaths amo.ng adults, by region. Sources: UN, 1995, and WHO,
1995b, for estimates; see text for projections.
the rate of new infections in those years was rising or falling. The
number of infected individuals alive reaches its maximum in the
year in which the (declining) number of new infections equals the
(rising) number of annual deaths from AIDS. This typically occurs
several years after the HIV incidence rate has peaked. As a conse-
quence, HIV incidence rates, when available, are generally preferable
to prevalence rates, because the former is a "leading indicator" of
what lies ahead in the epidemic.
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9.3 The Coming Decade
The first step in projecting the course of regional epidemics un-
til 2005 is to estimate plausible future trends in the variable that
drives the epidemic, that is, the rate of new HIV infections among
adults. Based on trends for the early 1990s, one would not expect
infection rates to rise in the near future in Africa, Latin Amer-
ica, North America, or Europe, and they could well decline further.
With little guidance from theory, it is assumed in my "medium"
projection that infection rates will remain constant at 1995 levels
until 2005 in each of these four regions. This may err on the high
side, but, as will be shown below, trends in AIDS mortality over
the next decade are rather insensitive to variations in future trends
in infections. The situation in Asia is clearly different - with the
infection rate still rising - and for present purposes I extrapolate
the current upward trend to 2000 and assume it constant thereafter
(see Figure 9.3). Since there is considerable uncertainty about fu-
ture trends, I also present two other scenarios - a high and a low
variant. These variants for each region are obtained by assuming
the number of HIV infections in the year 2005 to be, respectively,
50 percent higher and 50 percent lower than the medium projection
(with linear interpolation between 1995 and 2005).
Next, the projected annual number of new AIDS cases, A(t),
for t = 1995 to t = 2005 is calculated from the time series of annual
HIV infections, H(t) , using a simple convolution equation:
A(t) =L D(n)H(t - n) ,
where D(n) represents the distribution of the incubation period (n
in years) between HIV infection and the onset of AIDS. This distri-
bution is assumed to have a median of 9.5 years, with 90 percent of
new infections progressing to AIDS after 20 years.[4] (This median
is a crucial parameter in the projection. In any population where it
is smaller than assumed here, the number of AIDS cases will be un-
derestimated when the annual number of HIV infections is rising.)
Once the number of AIDS cases is projected, a similar convolution
procedure 'yields the annual number of deaths from AIDS. Median
survival time from onset of AIDS to death is assumed to be 0.5 years
in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and one year in North America
and Western Europe.
------,.~-
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Figure 9.4. Estimates (1980-1995) and projections (1995-2005)
of annual number of HIV infections and AIDS cases among adults,
world total. Source: WHO, 1995b, for estimates; see text for
projections.
The resulting medium projections to 2005 of annual rates of
new AIDS cases and AIDS deaths among adults are shown in Figure
9.3, giving a broad picture of the evolution of the epidemic from its
start to 2005. In North America the incidence of AIDS is expected to
peak in the mid-1990s, and in Western Europe a plateau is projected
starting in the late 1990s. In Asia, Latin America, and Africa the
annual number of AIDS cases is projected to rise at least until 2005.
By far the largest increase in AIDS cases is expected in Asia: from
an annual rate of 0.06 per thousand adults in 1995 to an annual rate
of 0.39 per thousand adults in 2005. In absolute terms this amounts
to a change from 124,000 new AIDS cases in 1995 to 965,000 new
cases in 2005.
Projections to 2005 of the absolute annual number of HIV in-
fections and new AIDS cases among adults for the high, medium,
and low variants for the world as a whole are plotted in Figure 9.4.
For the medium variant, these totals rise between 1995 and 2005
from 2.4 to 3.6 million HIV infections and from 0.8 to 2.2 million
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Table 9.2. Projected high, medium, and low variants of cumula-
tive HIV infections, AIDS cases, and AIDS deaths (millions) among
adults in 2005, by region.
Sub-
Saharan
Africa Asia
North Latin Western World
America America Europe totala
Cumulative HIV infection
High variant 23.3
Medium variant 20.7
Low variant 18.1
23.0
19.1
15.3
1.6
1.5
1.4
5.2
4.6
4.0
1.0
0.9
0.9
54.7
47.4
40.1
Cumulative AIDS cases
High variant 9.4 5.3 1.0 2.0 0.6 18.5
Medium variant 9.1 4.9 1.0 1.9 0.6 17.8
Low variant 8.9 4.6 1.0 1.9 0.6 17.2
Cumulative AIDS deaths
High variant 8.9 4.8 1.0 1.9 0.5 17.2
Medium variant 8.7 4.5 1.0 1.8 0.5 16.8
Low variant 8.5 4.2 1.0 1.8 0.5 16.2
GTotai includes a small number of infections in the former Soviet Union, Eastern
Europe, West Asia, and North Africa.
new AIDS cases per year. Interestingly, the difference between the
high and low variants is larger for the projected number of new HIV
infections than for new AIDS cases. The same is true for the cu-
mulative number of HIV infections and AIDS cases for each region
(see Table 9.2). The reason for this is the long incubation period.
Projected AIDS cases in 2005 are the result of HIV infections that
occurred on average in the mid-1990s, when the uncertainty about
the number .of infections is much smaller. As a consequence, projec-
tions of AIDS cases and AIDS mortality until 2005 are subject to
smaller errors than the corresponding projections of HIV incidence.
Of course, future trends in AIDS mortality are highly sensitive to
any errors in the WHO estimates of HIV incidence up to 1995, which
provide the basis for these projections. Estimates of past levels and
trends in infections are perhaps most uncertain for Africa, and the
projections for this continent are therefore the least reliable.
The discussion to this point has dealt only with the epidemic
among adults. A complete assessment of AIDS mortality must also
include the effects of vertical transmission from mother to child. The
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Table 9.3. Projected annual number of child deaths due to AIDS,
percentage of births ending in AIDS deaths, and deaths among chil-
dren as a percentage of all AIDS deaths, 1995, 2000, and 2005, by
region, medium variant.
Sub-
Saharan North Latin Western World
Africa Asia America America Europe totala
Child deaths due to AIDS (thousands)
1995 145.5 9.4 0.9
2000 191.2 33.4 0.7
2005 218.7 56.0 0.5
Percentage of births ending in AIDS deathsb
1995 0.56 0.01 0.02
2000 0.68 0.04 0.02
2005 0.72 0.07 0.01
5.7
7.7
8.5
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.4
0.3
0.3
0.01
0.01
0.01
162.5
234.2
285.0
0.12
0.17
0.20
Deaths among children as a percentage of all AIDS deaths
1995 23.5 8.7 1.3 5.4 1.0 17.2
2000 21.4 6.7 1.1 4.6 0.9 14.0
2005 19.4 5.7 0.9 3.9 0.7 11.7
QTotal includes a small number of infections in the former Soviet Union, Eastern
Europe, West Asia, and North Africa.
bThe estimates of the total number of births are ta.ken from UN, 1995 (medium
projections) .
probability that a newborn dies due to HIV infection is estimated as
the product of the probability that the mother is HIV-positive, the
probability of vertical transmission from an infected mother to her
infant, and the probability of dying from AIDS. Prospective studies
have reported vertical transmission rates from 15 to 20 percent in
Europe and from 25 to 35 percent in sub-Saharan Africa (Gibb and
Wara, 1994). Approximately four out of five infected newborns die
by age five (Chin, 1990). Table 9.3 presents regional projections of
the annual number of AIDS deaths among children for 1995, 2000,
and 2005.[5] Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for the large majority of
HIV-related child deaths in the world over the next decade. This
finding is attributable to Africa's relatively high birth rates, high
HIV prevalence rates among pregnant women, and high risk of ver-
tical transmission. In 2005 the fraction of all births dying from HIV
infection ranges from a high of 0.72 percent in Africa to a low of
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Table 9.4. Projected annual number of AIDS deaths, percentage
of all deaths due to AIDS, and AIDS death rate, 1995, 2000, and
2005, medium variant.
Sub-
Saharan
Africa Asia
North Latin Western World
America America Europe totala
AIDS deaths (thousands)
1995 619 109 64 105
2000 895 499 61 165
2005 1,129 976 52 217
AIDS deaths as a percentage of deaths from all causei
1995 7.6 0.4 2.5 3.3
2000 10.5 1.8 2.3 5.0
2005 12.9 3.5 1.9 6.2
36
38
40
0.9
1.0
1.0
943
1,678
2,438
1.8
3.2
4.5
AIDS death rate (per thousand population)
1995 1.04 0.03 0.22 0.22 0.09 0.17
2000 1.31 0.14 0.20 0.32 0.10 0.27
2005 1.44 0.26 0.16 0.39 0.10 0.37
Low variant 1.27 0.22 0.15 0.34 0.10 0.32
High variant 1.61 0.31 0.17 0.43 0.11 0.42
aTotal includes a small number of infections in the former Soviet Union, Eastern
Europe, West Asia, and North Africa.
bThe estimates of the total number of non-AIDS deaths and of total population
size are taken from UN, 1995 (medium projections).
0.01 percent in North America and Western Europe. In sub-Saharan
Africa the estimated number of AIDS deaths among children is 23.5
percent of all AIDS deaths in 1995 and 19.4 percent in 2005. These
percentages in 2005 are expected to be 3.9 in Latin America, 5.7 in
Asia, 0.9 in North America, and 0.7 in Western Europe.
Adding adult and child deaths yields the total annual number
of AIDS deaths by region, presented in Table 9.4. The global total,
estimated at 943,000 in 1995, is projected to more than double to 2.4
million by 2005. These numbers represent 1.8 percent of deaths from
all causes in 1995 and 4.5 percent in 2005. As shown in Figure 9.5,
regional differences are large: in 2005 AIDS deaths are expected to
account for 13 percent of all deaths in Africa, compared to 1 percent
in Western Europe. Differences in the AIDS death rate per thou-
sand population projected for 2005 are similarly large (Table 9.4),
ranging from 1.4 in sub-Saharan Africa to 0.1 in Western Europe.
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Figure 9.5. Projection of deaths due to AIDS as a percentage of
deaths from all causes, by region, 1995-2005.
The high and low variants deviate from these medium projections
by about 14 percent in each direction.[6]
The regional averages of AIDS mortality in Table 9.4 conceal
much variation among countries, among regions within countries,
and among groups with different demographic characteristics. For
example, several countries in Central and East Africa (e.g., Rwanda,
Uganda, and Zambia) have much more severe epidemics and hence
higher AIDS mortality than average for the continent. Within coun-
tries, above~averageAIDS mortality rates are found among children
under age 5 and young adults, as well as among urban residents.
The death toll is highest between ages 20 and 50, when mortality is
normally relatively low.
9.3.1 Comparison with other projections
Regional projections of AIDS mortality comparable to those pre-
sented in Table 9.4 are not available from other published studies.
However, the United Nations Population Division and the United
States Bureau of the Census have recently updated their population
projections, and these revisions include adjustments for the impact
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United Nations
US Bureau of the Census
Present study
of the AIDS epidemic in sub-Saharan African countries with HIV
prevalence above 1 percent in 1990 (UN, 1995; Way and Stanecki,
1994). These projections made no revisions for AIDS mortality in
other African countries, even though it is recognized that these coun-
tries are not entirely free of HIV infection (accounting for perhaps
10 percent of Africa's total). Results from these studies, compared
with those of the present study, are as follows:
Average annual AIDS deaths in
sub-Saharan Africa, 2000-2005
1.07 million
2.16 million
1.01 million
Even though these findings are not entirely comparable, it is
clear that the mortality projection from the present study is similar
to the UN's but much lower than that of the US Bureau of the
Census.[7] There are three potential causes for this discrepancy:
differences in the HIV prevalence levels estimated at the starting
point of the projections, different rates of growth in HIV infections
over time, and differences in the key parameters (e.g., the duration
of the incubation period and vertical transmission rates) used for
calculating the AIDS mortality associated with a given level of HIV
infection. Detailed further analyses will be required to quantify the
role of each of these three factors in causing the differences in results.
Another comparison can be made for the global cumulative
number of adult HIV infections by the year 2000. The low, medium,
and high variants project, respectively, 28.1, 29.3, and 30.5 million
cumulative infections. Forecasts of this same variable by Mann et
al. (1992) have a much wider range - from 38 to 109 million by 2000.
To achieve an increase from 18.5 million in 1995 to 109 million in
2000 requires more new infections each year between 1995 and 2000
than have occurred in the entire history of the epidemic until 1995.
This is implausible, and the high projection of Mann et al. (1992)
must therefore be considered unrealistic.
9.3.2 Impact of the epidemic on population growth
Table 9.5 presents estimates of the effect of AIDS mortality on an-
nual rates of population growth by world regions in 1995 and 2005.
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Birth, death, and growth rates are listed for both years with and
without the epidemic. Estimates in the absence of AIDS are based
on UN medium population projections,[8] which assume negligible
regional migration so that the growth rate equals the difference be-
tween the birth and death rates. The estimates with AIDS are
obtained by adding the AIDS death rate (from Table 9.4) to the
death rate from other causes and by making the simplifying as-
sumption that the birth and the non-AIDS death rates as well as
the population age structure remain unaffected by the epidemic.
In sub-Saharan Africa the growth rate in 2005 is projected to
be 27.7 per thousand per year in the absence of the epidemic (Le.,
38.9-11.2). AIDS mortality raises the death rate from 11.2 to 12.7
per thousand, resulting in an equivalent decline in the growth rate
from 27.7 to 26.3 per thousand. If maintained over 25 years, such
levels of growth would yield increases in population size of 93.4
percent with AIDS and 99.9 percent without. The epidemic has a
significant moderating effect on population growth in sub-Saharan
Africa, but even under the high variant AIDS projection the growth
rate remains at a substantial 26.1 per thousand. In all other world
regions the epidemic's impact on population growth is substantially
smaller. Due to AIDS mortality, the growth rate in 2005 is expected
to be 12.6 (per thousand population) instead of 12.9 in Asia, -0.5
instead of -0.4 in Western Europe, 14.4 instead of 14.8 in Latin
America, and 5.1 instead of 5.2 in North America. Results for the
high and low variant AIDS projections are remarkably similar.
These estimates of the effect of AIDS on population growth are
approximate. The assumption that migration at the regional level
is negligibl~ is reasonable for present purposes and is also made in
the standard population projections of the UN. However, the as-
sumption that fertility and non-AIDS mortality remain invariant in
the presence of the epidemic is only a first approximation. Fertil-
ity could be reduced if HIV-infected adults engage less frequently
in sexual intercourse due to poor health, rely more on condoms or
other contraception, or have a higher prevalence of other sexually
transmitted diseases, in particular those that can cause infertility.
Among uninfected adults fear of infection might also lead to lower
frequency of intercourse and more condom use. Alternatively, in-
creased fertility might result from a desire to replace dead children
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Table 9.5. Projected birth, death, and growth rates a (per thou-
sand population) with and without AIDS, 1995 and 2005, medium
variant, by region, and projected growth rate with AIDS in 2005 for
low and high variants.
Sub-
Saharan North Latin Western World
Africa Asia America .America Europe total b
1995
Without AIDS
Birth rate 43.5 23.9 15.2 24.9 11.2 24.3
Death rate 13.8 8.2 8.6 6.6 10.3 9.1
Growth rate 29.7 15.7 6.6 18.3 0.9 15.3
With AIDS
Birth rate 43.5 23.9 15.2 24.9 11.2 24.3
Death rate 14.8 8.2 8.9 6.8 10.4 9.2
Growth rate 28.7 15.7 6.3 18.1 0.9 15.1
Difference in growth
rates due to AIDS -1.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2
2005
Without AIDS
Birth rate 38.9 20.3 13.8 21.1 10.2 21.6
Death rate 11.2 7.4 8.6 6.3 10.6 8.3
Growth rate 27.7 12.9 5.2 14.8 -0.4 13.3
With AIDS
Birth rate 38.9 20.3 13.8 21.1 10.2 21.6
Death rate 12.7 7.7 8.8 6.7 10.7 8.7
Growth rate 26.3 12.6 5.1 14.4 -0.5 12.9
Difference in growth
rates due to AIDS -1.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.4 -0.1 -0.4
Growth rate
Low variant 26.5 12.6 5.1 14.5 -0.5 12.9
High variant 26.1 12.6 5.1 14.4 -0.5 12.8
aDiscrepancies in growth rates are due to rounding.
bTotal with AIDS includes a small number of infections in the former Soviet
Union, Eastern Europe, West Asia, and North Africa.
or from a s.hortening of birth intervals when infant deaths interrupt
postpartum amenorrhea. The epidemic's effect on non-AIDS mor-
tality is likely to be significant in part because a large epidemic will
tax already overburdened health-care systems in many countries and
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may draw resources from programs addressing other diseases. In ad-
dition, other diseases (e.g., tuberculosis) can become more prevalent
because HIV-infected individuals are more susceptible to them. The
rise in the non-AIDS death rate from these effects is counteracted by
a small change in the age composition of the population caused by
elevated AIDS mortality.[9] The net effect of these secondary effects
on fertility and mortality cannot be assessed, with available evidence,
and the overall impact of an AIDS epidemic on population growth
could therefore be somewhat different from the estimates presented
in Table 9.5.
Further insight into these issues can be gained from a unique
prospective study in the Rakai District of Uganda (Sewankambo et
al., 1994). An initial 1990 survey of 1,945 households with 5,795
adults and children collected demographic and socioeconomic infor-
mation as well as blood samples. A follow-up survey of the same
households in 1991 provided estimates of changes in households and
of the number of births and deaths in the time between surveys.
From this information, estimates were obtained of the demographic
impact of the AIDS epidemic in the district. In 1990 13 percent
of adults were found to be seropositive, a very high level (more
than eight times the 1990 average for Africa) matched by very few
other largely rural districts in Africa. The proportion of deaths at-
tributable to HIV infection was estimated to be 28 percent among
the population as a whole, 52 percent among all adults, and 87
percent among adults aged 20-39. Infant mortality among the off-
spring of infected mothers was nearly double that oftheir uninfected
counterparts (210 vs. 111 per thousand births).
Despite this very high AIDS mortality, population growth de-
clined only 'modestly. The main reason is that the birth rate was
much higher than the death rate, and the rise in the death rate
caused by the epidemic only partly reduced this difference (see Fig-
ure 9.6). Observed annual vital rates per thousand population were
as follows: birth rate, 45.7; death rate, 28.1; and growth rate (nat-
ural), 17.6.
The authors estimated that in the absence of the epidemic the
death rate would have been 20.4 per thousand. AIDS mortality
therefore elevated the death rate by 7.7 per thousand. If one as-
sumes that the birth rate remains unaltered by the epidemic, then
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Figure 9.6. Impact of the AIDS epidemic on the death rate and
population growth rate in Rakai District, Uganda. Source: Se-
wankambo et al., 1994.
the natural growth rate is reduced by the same 7.7 per thousand
(Le., from 25.3 to 17.6 per thousand). However, the fertility of
HIV-infected women was found to be slightly lower than that of
uninfected women. This difference is probably due in part to the
higher prevalence of other STDs among women infected with HIV;
the role of HIV in reducing the birth rate therefore cannot be deter-
mined. In the absence of this difference, the birth rate would have
been higher by about 1.2 per thousand (i.e., 46.9 instead of 45.7).
Finally, no direct evidence for the epidemic's effect on non-AIDS
mortality is available. The fact that the district's death rate with-
out AIDS (20.4) is slightly above the average of 16.8 estimated for
Uganda as a whole without AIDS (UN, 1995) is suggestive but not
conclusive because Rakai is not representative of Uganda. These re-
sults indicate a need for studies that examine not only the epidemic's
direct effe~t on mortality, but also its indirect role in affecting birth
rates and non-AIDS mortality.
According to estimates of HIV prevalence in 1990 and 1992, the
epidemic is no longer growing in Rakai (Wawer et al., 1994). The
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epidemic has apparently reached an equilibrium at which HIV inci-
dence has to remain high to offset AIDS deaths and to maintain the
plateau level of prevalence in a growing population. These findings
suggest that population growth will remain substantially positive
in Rakai. Since Rakai is one of the districts in sub-Saharan Africa
most severely affected by AIDS, it is also unlikely that population
growth will drop precipitously elsewhere in ,the continent.[10]
9.4 Outlook
Regional trends in HIV infections over the coming decade are uncer-
tain. The course of the epidemic depends chiefly on the behavioral
responses of the affected populations, on the wider application of
existing public health approaches to reduce transmissions, and on
the successful development of new medical technology. A worst-
case scenario would be sluggish spontaneous behavioral responses,
the lack of new medical solutions for several more years, and a con-
tinuation of current, mostly weak, and uneven public-health efforts
to change high-risk behaviors. In that case, the epidemic will con-
tinue largely along its natural course until all vulnerable groups (i.e.,
those in which R exceeds 1) are heavily infected, and HIV prevalence
in the developing world will reach levels much higher than today's
before eventually leveling off. This gloomiest of possible outcomes
can be improved upon considerably by vigorous implementation of
such public health measures as control of sexually transmitted dis-
eases and screening of donated blood as well as behavioral interven-
tions such as information campaigns and the distribution of condoms
(Berkley, 1994; Lamptey and Coates, 1994; Philipson and Posner,
1995; Potts et ai., 1991). Such efforts have demonstrated their ef-
fectiveness in the past, for example, in Thailand (Hanenberg et ai.,
1994) and among homosexuals in the United States (Centers for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention, 1991; Morris and Dean, 1994). Lack of
political commitment and resources unfortunately hinders the wider
application of these measures.
A larg'e effort is now under way to develop effective HIV ther-
apies, microbicides, and vaccines, but obstacles are many and suc-
cess is probably years away (Haynes, 1993; Cohen, 1994a; Elias and
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Heise, 1994; Johnston and Hoth, 1993). If and when this effort suc-
ceeds, it could end the epidemic. However, the cost of prevention
or treatment may be so high as to be out of reach for the poorest
segments of the population in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. The
epidemic would then become even more a Third World disease than
it is now.
Regardless of the long-range trends in HIV infections, the overall
course of AIDS mortality during the next decade is relatively clear.
The toll in deaths will continue to rise in much of Asia, Africa, and
Latin America, while population growth will remain high in some
regions and positive in all.
Notes
[1] This article focuses on HIV-l, which is the cause of virtually all AIDS
deaths. HIV-2, primarily found in West Africa, is less pathogenic.
[2] Estimates by Mann et al. (1992) put the cumulative global total of
HIV-infected adults at 17.5 million at the beginning of 1995.
[3] WHO assumes that all deaths among HIV-infected individuals are
caused by AIDS.
[4] Following WHO practice, HIV-infected individuals are assumed to be
at risk of dying from AIDS alone (see note 3). The distribution of
the incubation period is taken from Chin and Lwanga (1991a). The
projection results presented in this article are not very sensitive to
the precise shape of the distribution of the incubation period with a
given median duration.
[5] Projections assume perinatal transmission rates of 30 percent in devel-
oping regions and 17.5 percent in the developed world. The distribu-
tions of the incubation period and the survival interval after perinatal
infection are the same as those used by WHO (Chin, 1990).
[6] All variants of HIV/ AIDS projections rely on the medium projections
of the UN (1995) for population estimates (including births and non-
AIDS deaths).
[7] The similarity of the results of the UN and the present study is in part
because both rely on past estimates of HIV incidence from WHO, and
their projection methodologies are similar (US Bureau of the Census
estimate: Peter Way, personal communication).
[8] Medium projections are taken from UN (1995). The projections with-
out AIDS are obtained by subtracting estimates of AIDS deaths de-
tailed in the same publication.
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[9] Projections by the UN (1995) for African countries provide estimates
of the effect of a changing age structure. In the 15 sub-Saharan coun-
tries with the most severe epidemics, the total number of deaths be-
tween 2000 and 2005 in the presence and absence of the AIDS epi-
demic is estimated at 19.504 and 15.169 million, respectively, giving a
difference of 4.335 million. The actual number of AIDS deaths for this
five-year period is projected to be 5.362 million. Non-AIDS deaths
therefore decline from 15.169 to 14.142 million due to the epidemic's
effect on the age structure alone.
[10] The level of HIV prevalence at which population growth becomes zero
is highest in countries with the highest birth rates. Once birth rates
decline, lower prevalence levels suffice to stop population growth.
Chapter 10
How Many People Can Be Fed
on Earth?
GeThard K Heilig
Many distinguished writers have studied the question whether food
is a limiting factor for population growth. Since the time when
Malthus started the debate some 200 years ago (see Malthus, 1967;
Ricardo, 1964) thousands of books, research papers, and study re-
ports have been published on the subject (Boserup, 1965, 1981;
Clark, 1967; Clark and Haswell, 1964; Livi Bacci, 1991).[1] Despite
these intense efforts, we are still far from consensus. A screening
of available literature on estimating the earth's population carrying
capacity reveals surprising diversity of results (see Table 10.1).
In 1945 Pearson and Harper calculated that between 902 million
and 2.8 billion people could be supported by the earth's agriculture.
Some 20 years later Clark (1967) estimated the sustainable popu-
lation maximum of the earth to range between 40 and 157 billion!
However, in the 1970s Buringh et al. (1975) considered the world
food production potential equivalent to just 5.3 billion people. In
the late 1970s and early 1980s a large FAO study (Higgins et al.,
1983) concluded that - only on Third World soils - between 3.9 and
32.4 billion people could be fed, depending on the level of agricul-
tural inputs. Only a decade ago, Simon's (1981) Ultimate Resource
became a popular book. It resolutely denied any limits to (pop-
ulation) growth; people were considered the "ultimate resource."
Today Beyond the Limits by Meadows et al. (1992a) is a best-seller.
19G
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Table 10.1. Estimates of the earth's population carrying capacity
during the past 100 years.
Source
Ravenstein (1S91)
Penck (1925)
Pearson and Harper (1945)
Baade (1960)a
Clark (1967)b
Revelle (1967)a
Miickenhausen (1973)C
Buringh et ai. (1977, 1975)
Westing (19S]), Mann (19S1)
Simon (19S1), Kahn (19S2)
FAOjUNFPAjIIASA d
(Higgins et ai., 19S2)
Gilland (19S3)a
Resources for the Future (19S4)
Marchetti (1 97S)
World Hunger Program e
(Cohen, 1992)
Ehrlich et ai. (1993)
Earth's maximum population
carrying capacity
6 billion
7.7-9.5 billion
0.9-2.S billion
30 billion
47-157 billion
41 billion
35-40 billion
2.7-6.7 billion
about 2 billion
no meaningful limitation
for 1975: 1.957-32.407 billion
for 2000: 3.590-33.195 billion
7.5 million
6.1 billion
1 trillion
2.S-5.5 billion
< 5.5 billion
Date
IS91
1925
1945
1960
1967
1967
1973
1975
19S1
19S2
19S2
19S3
1984
1978
1992
1993
a Estimates are based on very low estimates of average food caloric consumption.
According to Norse (1992) the three estimates of the global population carrying
capacity would be much lower, if an average grain consumption of 800 kilograms
per year were applied. Baade's estimate would be more than 18 billion; Revelle's
would be 14 billion; and Gilland's would be 8.8 billion.
b"]f we take world resources of agricultural land at 10.7 billion hectares of stan-
dard land equivalent, this could feed, at maximum standards, 47 billion people .
. .. For people living at Japanese standards of food consumption and Asian stan-
dards of timber requirements only 680 sq.m.jperson is required, and the world's
potential agricultural and forest land could supply the needs of 157 billion peo-
ple." See Clark (1967).
eM iickenhausen 's estimate was based on a report of the US President's Science
Advisory Commitee in 1967 which analyzed the world's production capacity of
soils (US, 1967).
dThe FAO/UNFPA/liASA study estimated the global population carrying ca-
pacity for 1975 and 2000 at three agricultural input levels (low, medium, high).
for details see Appendix Tables 1 and 2 in Higgins et al. (1982).
e ''The World Hunger Program at Brown University estimated that, with present
levels of food production and an equal distribution of food, the world could sus-
tain either 5.5 billion vegetarians, 3.7 billion people who get 15 percent of their
calories from animal products, ... or 2.8 billion people who derive 25 percent of
their calories from animal products" (Cohen, 1992).
Among other sources the author uses a compilation on "Estimates of Arable
Land: Past Studies" in Shah et al. (1985).
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They argue that we have already passed the limits of sustainabil-
ity and are on the way to ecological disaster. In 1992 the World
Resources Institute published a wealth of data and analyses which
imply that we are already approaching ecological limits in many
sectors of our economies, including agriculture.
Most recently Ehrlich fl al. (199:3) analyzed the subject. Ac-
cording to their estimate it is "doubtful ... whether food security
could be achieved indefinitely for a global population of 10 or 12
billion people." They thought it "'rather likely that a sustainable
population, one comfortable below Earth's nutritional capacity, will
number far fewer than today's 5..5 billion people." There are many
other studies, but probably the highest estimate of the globe's pop-
ulation carrying capacity was published by Marchetti (1978), who
argued that a world population of 1 trillion people would not be
impossi ble.
Obviously, these numbers are not much help to the student of
future population trends. One reason for the large discrepancies is
methodological divergences of the various approaches. Some authors
deal with global averages of carrying capacity; others study small
agro-ecological areas and only later aggregate the results. Some au-
thors base their estimates on the most advanced agricultural tech-
nology or assume future innovation; others define the carrying ca-
pacity in terms of current. and in some regions rather low, levels of
agricultural output.
Biologists llsually explain carrying capacity as the balance be-
tween natural resources and the number of people; social scientists
consider human resources the critical factor and accentuate social
limits to growth. More systematically, we can identify four reasons
for the conceptual confusion: dissent about the reference area, dis-
agreement about the means of sustenance, controversy on the mode
of reaction to limitations, and confusion about the time frame. We
discuss some of these problems in detail in later sections of this chap-
ter. For now we can only conclude that there are more dimensions
to the problem than one would expect at first sight. It seems to
be necessary to combine the various aspects of the earth's carrying
capacity into a consistent theoretical framework.
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10.1 Dimensions of the Earth's
Carrying Capacity
To visualize the major dimensions of the problem, imagine a pipe
through which the earth's food resources have to pass before they
can be used for feeding people (see Figure 10.1). The diameter of
the pipe, however, is 1l0t constant. \i\Thile it is quite large on the
"input" side, it is significantly smaller on the "output" end. The
pipe's stepwise decreasing diameter symbolizes different kinds of re-
strictions to the earth's carrying capacity - technological, economic,
ecological, and sociocultural.
10.1.1 The hypothetical maxirnum carrying capacity
On the input side of our conceptual pipe we have the theoretical
maximum of the earth's food production capacity. This purely hy-
pothetical measure is roughly equivalent to what biologists have
termed the net primary production (NPP) of the earth. The mea-
sure is based on the assumption that the ultimate limitation of food
production is given by the energy conversion ratio of photosynthe-
sis. This is the basic biochemical process by which green plants
transform solar radiation into biomass. Since we (roughly) know
the total solar radiatioll illput of the earth, we can calculate the
globe's maximum biomass production, which quantifies the initial
product of aU animal and human food chains.
The NPP is only restricted by physical constants, such as the
total solar radiation energy input of earth, and by natural laws that
govern the biochemical processes of plant growth.[2] In its most
extreme version the measure ignores not only economic, social, cul-
tural, and political restrictions of food production, but also technical
constraints and ecological feedback mechanisms. It assumes homo-
geneous implementation of most advanced agricultural technologies
throughout the world. Authors who have adopted this rather nar-
row definition of carrying capacity estimate the maximum world
population that can be sustained indefinitely into the future in the
range of 16 to 147 billion people. depending on the specific method
applied.[3] Marchetti's (197~) monstrous estimate of 1 trillion is
based on a similar approach.
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10.1.2 Technical and logistic restrictions and chances
The previous definition of ca.rryin~ capacity assumes homogeneous
distribution and instantaneous implementation of (advanced) food
production technology. But this is impossible in reality. Even with
existing agricultural technologies we would need years before we
could use them throughout the world. They have to be adapted to
local conditions; they must be integrated with existing food distri-
bution channels; and they often require previous implementation of
service and support schemes. The production and distribution of
regionally adapted high-yield seeds, for instance, can take years or
decades. Also the breeding cycles in husbandry must be considered.
In addition to the usual delays in technology transfer, we must
realize that advanced agricultural methods are primarily available
for good-quality soils in temperate climates and for subtropical and
tropical irrigation cultures (such as Asian paddy rice crops). In
the arid and semiarid zones of Africa, however, we still have tra-
ditional pastoral systems which survive quite well provided animal
and human population density remains low. But since the popula-
tion has doubled or tripled, the socioecological system is out of bal-
ance. The situation obviously requires new technology to increase
productivity of food production. However, we cannot be sure that
high- tech alternatives of animal husbandry, which could potentially
boost productivity by orders of magnitude, are adaptable to the hot
and dry climate. Current experiments are not too promising. It
is not impossible that there simply is no high-tech alternative to
traditional cattle ranging and primitive agriculture in certain parts
of the world. We are just beginning to apply scientific methods to
the management of arid and tropical soils, and it will probably take
years or decades before we have drought-resistant, high-yield crops
and livestock.
This indicates that the global carrying capacity is certainly
diminished by agro-technical and logistic restrictions and delays.
Some studies have tried to take this into account by defining dif-
ferent input levels for various agro-climatic regions. The FAO/
UND P /IIASA (1982) study, for instance, assumed three levels of
agricultural input which largely correspond to levels of technology.
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10.1.3 Economic barriers
Nothing in the world is free. Also the implementation of advanced
agricultural technology and the expansion of agricultural areas into
previously unused land is costly. One needs investment capital, func-
tioning price mechanisms. adequate incentives for farmers, and a
whole set of other economic conditions and mechanisms to boost
food production for a world population of several billion. Current
estimates of a global carrying capacity usually ignore these economic
dimensions. However, in reality we find numerous economic diffi-
culties and limitations which could further restrict global carrying
capacity. On the other hand, few spheres in human life are capable
of generating more powerful incentives and driving forces than the
economy. Recent histor,v has shown (for instance, in China) that
agriculture can modernize within a few years and double or triple
its productivity when the economic framework is right. Only few
studies have developed agricultural models that take into account
economic mechanisms. such as prices and (international) trade. Un-
fortunately these models are extremely complex and their method-
ology and assumptions are highly debatable (Pa.rikh et ai., 1988).
It is an illusion to belie\'e that economic development is pre-
dictable for more than a few years. The fundamental changes in
global economic patterns, from the rise of the Asian Tigers (Tai-
wan, South Korea, Singapore. Thailand, Malaysia) and the eco-
nomic boom in China to the total breakdown of former Soviet and
East European economies, should have taught us a lesson. The eco-
nomic framework of agriculture is man-made and can be changed
for the better or the worse.
The earth's carrying capacity in the 21st century will be a mat-
ter of economic decisions at least to the same extent as it will be
a matter of sufficient natural reSOl1rces. Three aspects are most
important: the conditions of international agricultural trade, the
dissemination of agricultural technology, and the implementation
of functioning incentive structures. \,ve can strengthen or weaken
worldwide agricultural productivity. depending on what we do with
trade restrictions and food subsidies. We can speed up or slow down
agricultural modernization. depending on what we do with the re-
sults of agricultural research and development. We can block farm-
ers' initiative or encourage their entrepreneurial spirit, depending on
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how we arrange property rights, taxation, price mechanisms, access
to modern agricultural inputs, and education. The earth's carrying
capacity not only depends on natural conditions and technology; it
is also a function of specific economic arrangements.
10.1.4 Ecological constraints and feedback
mechanisnls
Since agriculture and livestock production - as everything else -
is embedded into a natura! environment, we also have to take into
account ecological constraints and feedback mechanisms, such as
acidification, soil loss, groundwater pollution, or desertification.
These consequences of intense agriculture and animal production
can gradually diminish returns. Some ecologists have argued that
the overutilization of arable land and forest areas in Europe and
North America has already degraded the soils to such an extent
that artificial fertilization and soil management techniques cannot
repair the damage.
However, there is more to the ecological perspective than the
necessary modification of production systems in order to minimize
harmful impact on the environment. For instance, we need to re-
serve space for the (still rema.ining) fauna and flora, if we want to
avoid additional termination of whole strains of evolution. Keep-
ing biodiversity at a high level is not (only) a matter of aesthetics
and respect -- a large pool of plant and animal genes could be a
primary resource for future bio-sciences. We must also reserve nat-
ural space for human recreation. The 10 billion world population
of the 21st century, cramped into multi-million urban agglomerates,
will certainly need some of the potential crop area for leisure activ-
ities, such as playing golf or riding a horse. Finally, a significant
proportion of our environment cannot be utilized for agriculture or
cattle ranging because it has vital functions in stabilizing the cli-
mate. Cutting down tropical rain forests for agricultural expansion
would probably backfire. It would trigger or speed up climate change
which could worsen agricultural conditions elsewhere and diminish
overall food prod uction. These examples show that the ecologically
sustainable population maximum is certainly below a level that is
determined by physical laws, technological possibilities, or optimal
economic structures.
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10.1.5 Social, cultural, and political conditions
Some people believe that we just have to provide land, tractors,
high-yield seeds, fertilizers and pesticides, agricultural training, and
free markets to make a farmer highly efficient. This technocratic ap-
proach, however, ignores the social nature of man. We must realize
that probably the most serious restrictions for maximal utilization of
the earth's population carrying capacity arise from social, political,
and cultural conditions.
Social and cultural constraints which prevent optimal land uti-
lization can be found not only among traditional food collectors,
hunters, and cattle rangers of Africa and Asia. In many societies we
have political and social conditions which hinder farmers from fully
exploiting the carrying capacity of their land. In some cases these re-
strictions are voluntary and based on ecological considerations. For
instance, a growing number of European farmers and agricultural
politicians have realized that maximizing food production by means
of agrochemistry and mechanization cannot be the ultimate goal of
agriculture. They begin to exclude land from cultivation to make it
available for natural reservations or recreational purposes. In Ger-
many, for instance, 911.576 hectares (or 7.8 percent) of arable land
was taken out of production between 1988-1989 and 1990-1991. In
eastern Germany even 12.8 percent of the arable land was excluded
from cultivation in 1990-1991. There are similar trends in all Eu-
ropean countries, especially in Italy and France, where 357,922 and
113,922 hectares of land were taken out of agricultural production
(Bundesministerium fiir Raumordnung, Bauwesen und Stadtebau,
1991:62-64).
However, this noble self-restriction of agriculture (which is fa-
cilitated by substantial government subsidies) is rather untypical.
Usually, there are other, more nnpleasant sociocultural and political
constraints. Many fanners throughout the world are working their
fields amid (civil) wars, suffer from lack of technology and modern
inputs, or are restricted by ridiculously low producer prices or mar-
ket regulations. They are forced into collectivization by fanatical
bureaucrats, and their children are deprived of adequate education
and training. These kinds of sociocultural and political constraints
probably restrict the carrying capacity of the earth much more than
anything else.
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To my knowledge there is no estimate of carrying capacity which
takes into account all five kinds of restrictions. Scientists partic-
ularly shy away from addressing sociocultural and political con-
straints. Usually, the concept is defined in terms of natural resources
available for food production at a given level of agricultural technol-
ogy. This reflects widespread ignorance of key factors - economic,
social, cultural, and political - that limit food production. In Sec-
tion 10.2 we examine the multiple dimensions of the earth's carrying
capacity in greater detail.
10.2 Natural Resources
According to our pipe concept of carrying capacity, natural con-
ditions (such as the globe's solar radiation input) and basic bio-
chemical processes (such as photosynthesis) ultimately determine
the earth's food production potential. If we could transform the
total solar energy input of the earth into biomass - and if we could
eat this biomass - we could probably feed 1 trillion people. But this
is just a theoretical exercise (which we discuss later). For all prac-
tical purposes we must consider real agro-climatic conditions. Four
natural resources and conditions directly limit the globe's carrying
capacity: land, water, climate, and fossil energy.
10.2.1 Land
Since the beginning of the debate on the globe's carrying capacity,
the land factor has usually been considered a limitation for increas-
ing food production. The world's land area is, undoubtedly, limited,
and only a small proportion is suitable for agriculture (Table 10.2).
Many physical and chemical constraints restrict the arable area -
some land is too steep or too shallow, other areas have drainage
or tillage problems. There are serious constraints of soil fertility,
such as low nutrient retention capacity, aluminum toxicity, phos-
phorus fixations hazards, low potassium reserves, or excess of salts
or sodium.
Both in its 1990-1991 and 1992-1993 reports on world resources,
the World Resources Institute (WRI) published detailed estimates
of these physical and chemical soil constraints by climatic class for
major regions and on a country- by-country basis. The estimates in
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Table 10.2. Cropland in percent of land without soil constraints,
23 highest and lowest: 1989.
Country
Lesotho
Malaysia
Lao PDR
Thailand
Burundi
Mauritius
Rwanda
Sierra Leone
Syrian Arab Rep.
Vietnam
Uganda
Bangladesh
Benin
Lebanon
India
Cote d'Ivoire
Brazil
Togo
Cambodia
Nigeria
Pakistan
Cuba
Cameroon
Ethiopia
Mexico
Kenya
Argentina
Botswana
Sudan
Peru
Somalia
Bolivia
Uruguay
Kuwait
Egypt
Chad
Niger
Namibia
Mali
Libya
Saudi Arabia
Yemen, PDR
Oman
United Arab Emirates
Albania
Mauritania
Land
Popu- Land Crop- without soil Cropland in %
lation area land Constraints of land without
(1000) (1000 hal (1000 hal (1000 hal soil constraints
1724 3035 320 1 32000.0
8451 32855 4880 196 2489.8
4024 23080 901 37 2435.1
54857 51089 22126 983 2250.9
5315 2565 1336 66 2024.2
1069 185 106 7 1514.3
6994 2467 1153 91 1267.0
4049 7162 1801 187 963.1
12085 18406 5503 643 855.8
65276 32549 6600 989 667.3
18118 19955 6705 1210 554.1
112548 13017 9292 1719 540.5
4493 11062 1860 360 516.7
2694 1023 301 59 510.2
835610 297319 168990 33232 508.5
11552 31800 3660 730 501.4
147283 845651 78650 17081 460.5
3424 5439 1444 319 452.7
8044 17652 3056 695 439.7
105015 91077 31335 7797 401.9
118476 77088 20730 5250 394.9
10500 10982 3329 888 374.9
11453 46540 7008 1949 359.6
47942 110100 13930 30079 46.3
86672 190869 24710 55930 44.2
23187 56969 2428 7342 33.1
31914 273669 35750 111781 32.0
1256 56673 1380 4792 28.8
24487 237600 12510 50390 24.8
21105 128000 3730 15264 24.4
7257 62734 1039 4519 23.0
7115 108439 3460 15415 22.4
3077 17481 1304 6100 21.4
1971 1782 4 31 12.9
51186 99545 2585 24633 10.5
5539 125920 3205 34160 9.4
7492 126670 3605 41388 8.7
1725 82329 662 9308 7.1
8938 122019 2093 40865 5.1
4382 175954 2150 54004 4.0
13585 214969 1185 30579 3.9
2416 33297 119 3870 3.1
1446 21246 48 3897 1.2
1538 8360 39 3707 1.1
3186 2740 707 96958 0.7
1970 102522 199 58867 0.3
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this discussion are from the 1992-1993 WRI report and are based
on a complex methodology, which combines the Fertility Capabil-
ity Classification (FCC) system developed at North Carolina State
University (Sanches et 01., 1982), agro-climatic data from FAO's
Agro-Ecological Zones project (FAO, 1978a, 1978b, 1981a, 1981b),
and the FAO /UNESCO soil map of the world.
The estimates are shocking. The most seriously handicapped
region is Southeast Asia: more than 93 percent of the soils have
physical or chemical constraints. The situation is not much better
in Southwest Asia: only 12 percent of the soils are free of inherent
fertility constraints. In South America 80 percent and in Africa 82
percent of the soils have constraints. Central America is a little bet-
ter: "only" 73 percent of the soils are hampered by physical or chem-
ical restrictions (\iVorld Resources Institute/United Nations En-
vironment Programme/United Nations Development Programme,
1990:286-287).[4] On a country-by-country basis the estimates are
even more dramatic. For India. the WRI reports just 33.2 mil-
lion hectares of unconstrained soils; this is equivalent to just 0.04
hectares (or 400 square meters) per person. Bangladesh's uncon-
strained soil resources are even less: only 0.02 hectares per person.
Pakistan, the Philippines, and Indonesia would have from 0.4 to 0.6
hectares of soil without inherent physical or chemical constraints for
each person.
What do these statistics indicate? The WRI reports that "the
extent of land with soil constraints is an important indicator of
agricultural costs, the potential and success of future expansion [em-
phasis added], and the comparative advantage of a nation's agricul-
tural production" (World Resources Institute/United Nations En-
vironment Programme/United Nations Development Programme,
1990:289).
The WRI further explains that "in the past 10 years, the FCC
system has proven a meaningful tool for describing fertility limita-
tions on crop yields" (ibid:2:oI,9). Do the estimates - in other words -
indicate that we are already short of fertile soils for future expansion
of food production?
Not at all! First, one has to read the footnotes attached to
the WRI tables. Here we find a few hints that explain what is
meant by the various soil constraints. It turns out that most of
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the so-called constraints are just specific natural conditions that
can be somewhat easily overcome with modern agricultural technol-
ogy. Consider the case of soils with "low potassium reserves" which
constrain crops because of potassium deficiency. There is a simple
solution: throw potassium fertilizer on them! Other examples of
soil constraints are "steep slopes" or "drainage problems": would
one think that many of these soils can be found in the extremely
productive paddy rice and wheat areas of Asia, where agriculture
in some places has been practiced for more than 8000 years (as in
China)? "Aluminum toxicity" is also called a constraint, but its
impact turns out to be less dramatic than its name: it limits the
growth of common crops, "unless lime is applied" (World Resources
Institute/United Nations Environment Programme/United Nations
Development Programme, 1992:284) - a practice that should not be
completely impossible.
There are, of course, serious soil constraints that cannot be over-
come by technology, but the WRI data do not distinguish between
these and simple problems of soil ma.nagement. For thousands of
years farmers had to cope with soils that were less than perfect.
They had to build terraces, add (natural) fertilizers, irrigate or drain
the soil. But this did not hinder them from supplying some of the
most prominent empires of history, such as the dynasties of China
or the kingdoms of ancient Egypt.
There is a second reason why the WRI data on soil constraints
are worthless as indicators of the earth's carrying capacity: they
do not match with current trends in food production - to be more
precise, in some cases the indicators are just absurd when compared
with agricultural performance. For instance, according to the WRI
the continent-size nation of India has only 33.2 million hectares of
internally unconstrained soils, but FAa reports that India's farmers
are cultivating some 169 million hectares of cropland - which is five
times the area of "unconstrained soils" (cropland equals arable land
plus land under permanent crops). In other words, according to the
WRI most of India's farmers are producing on marginal land, which
should limit crop yields. But just the opposite has happened during
the past 30 years. Between 1961 and 1989 India's farmers increased
cereal production by a spectacular 129 percent (from 87,376,000 to
199,816,000 metric tons). They also increased the cereal yields from
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947 to 1,921 kg per hectare area harvested. In Thailand just 983,000
hectares are free of soil constraints, according to WRI data. Is it not
strange that the country's farmers actually cultivated 22.1 million
hectares of cropland - nearly 23 times the area of the unconstrained
soils? Only the rice area harvested was 10 times the size of the un-
constrained soils area. Thailand's farmers also managed to increase
cereal production by 1:31 percent between 1961 and 1989. Most ab-
surd are the estimates of soil constraints for Malaysia. According
to WRI data only 0.6 percent (or 196,000 hectares) of the country's
land area is covered by unconstrained soils. Obviously this did not
have a great effect on the country's farmers, who cultivated 4.9 mil-
lion hectares of cropland in 1989 - 25 times the area of unconstrained
soils. It also did not affect their productivity, since they managed
to increase cereal production by 62 percent between 1961 and 1989.
These are only a few examples. We can find a large number of
countries where the farmers expa,nded cultivation far into the area
of so-called constrained soils, while at the same time substantially
increasing crop yields.
There is a third reason why WRI's soil data have limited rele-
vance: a high percentage of unconstrained soils in a country does
not correlate with good agricultural performance. For example, ac-
cording to the WRI, Chad has one of the largest areas of excellent
soils - 34.2 million hectares have no inherent physical or chemical
constraints, an opulent 6.2 hectares per person. Is it not strange
that the farmers use less than 10 percent of this area for cultivation
and that famines are notorious in a place with one of the largest per
capita resources of first-rate soils? This is not just an isolated case.
According to WRI data, nearly all typical famine countries of Africa
(Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Mali) have huge areas of top-rated soils
which are many times the size of their actual cropland.
Given these examples it is obvious that factors other than soil
quality by itself are responsible for agricultural performance. There
is simply no correlation between food production and soil constraints
as reported by the WRI.
On the other hand, we have a large number of agricultural tech-
niques available that could help to either expand the arable land and
increase yields on marginal soils or improve the overall efficiency of
crop production.
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First, we could expand the area of multiple harvests. In many
places farmers could use their land several times during a grow-
ing season instead of only once or twice. Modern seeds, advanced
agricultural technology, artificial fertilizers, and other agricultural
inputs have made these techniques of multi-cropping possible. It is
a myth that we are already overutilizing the world's arable land.
This is only true in some European and Asian regions. Large parts
of Latin America and Africa have excellent soils which are still cul-
tivated with most primitive agricultural technology. Crop yields are
often 60 to 90 percent below the average European level. Better in-
puts and modern agricultural methods could substantially expand
the area of multiple harvests.
Second, we could expand cultivation to marginal land. There is
still plenty of dry land that could be irrigated, swamps that could
be drained, steep hills which could be terraced. We could cover
land with greenhouses in cold regions or use forests for multilay-
ered cultivation. It is also possible to convert shallow seas into
agricultural land. The Netherlands have demonstrated that even
in an adverse dimate one can produce more than enough (tropical)
fruits and vegetables on artificially climatized and drained land. In
most countries it was not necessary to increase arable land dur-
ing the past decades, but some agricultures have demonstrated that
a spectacular expansion of culti vat ion is still possible. Libya, for
instance, has converted desert into cirdes of irrigated cropland; be-
tween 1961 and 1989 its area of irrigated agriculture doubled from
121,000 to 242,000 hectares (Allan, 1976). Burundi, which is al-
ready densely populated, managed to increase its arable land from
765,000 to 1,120,000 hectares and the area of irrigated agriculture
from 3,000 to 72,000 hectares. Tanzania nearly doubled its arable
land and increased the irrigated agriculture more than seven times.
There are still spectacular land reserves in parts of Africa and Latin
America. Of course, some of these expansions are rather absurd in
terms of energy efficiency or economic costs; one might even con-
sider the idea of growing wheat in the desert a form of hypocrisy.
But these cases show what could be done in agriculture if money
and technology were accessible and environmental concerns could
be ignored.
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Third, we can expand food production areas to the water bod-
ies of our globe -lakes, rivers, and seas (Sindermann, 1982). While
there is certainly a danger of exploiting the natural fish population
of the sea, efforts are being made to begin exploring the potential
of fish farming. There is already some fish farming on the northern
coast of England, in Norwegian fjords, along the coast of Sweden,
and in Chinese paddy rice fields. A significant proportion of Eu-
rope's salmon supply is produced in fish farms near the Shetland
Islands. But these are still small production sites compared with
the huge coastal zones of our continents. It has been argued that
large-scale fish-farming schemes might disturb the natural balance
of the maritime ecosystem, which, in turn, could limit its produc-
tion potential (Uthoff, 1978; UNO /FAO, 1976). However, recent
research has found only a minimal risk of local sea pollution caused
by a discharge of nutrients in intense fish farming (Ackefors and
Enell, 1990).
Fourth, we can switch from nonfood to food crops. Currently, a
significant proportion of fertile land is used not for food production
in a narrow sense, but to grow lifestyle-related cash crops, such as
tobacco, tea, cocoa, or coffee. It is hard to estimate the areas wasted
for the illegal cultivation of drugs (marijuana, coca, etc.), but it
must be substantial Farmers also spend arable land for producing
natural fibers, such as jute, flax, or sisal - nonfood products for
which synthetic substitutes are available. In some countries, such
as Brazil, there is substantial energy-cropping (sugar cane), and
some European governments encourage farmers to grow rape seed
and produce bio-fuel. In some countries (Italy, Spain) large areas are
used to grow wine. And - last hut not least - we spend considerable
amounts of land to produce hops, which is mainly used for brewing
beer. According to FAO statistics, it is quite likely that some 20
percent of all arable land worldwide is used to produce nonfood or
lifestyle-related products, including drugs (see Table 10.3).
Previously it was thought that a given plot of land can only
feed a fixed number of people. Later, scientists realized that it is
not only the size and natural quality of the land, but mainly the level
of agricultural technology which determines the land's food produc-
tion capacity. This basic understanding is still rare among today's
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Table 10.3. Lifestyle-related and nonfood agricultural production.
Area harvested In % of total
(1,000 ha) Growth (%) arable land
1961 1990 1961-1990 1961 1990
Drugs (marijuana, coca) ? ? ? ? ?
Wine ? ? ? ? ?
Tobacco leaves 3,:397 4,629 36.6 0.3 0.3
Hopsa 55 79 43.6 0.0 0.0
Tea 1,318 2,442 85.3 0.1 0.2
Coffee 9,706 11,241 15.8 0.8 0.8
Cocoa beans 4,100 5,312 29.6 0.3 0.4
Sugar beets 6,917 8,656 25.1 0.6 0.6
Sugar cane 8,914 17,120 92.1 0.7 1.3
Flax fiber 2,041 1,113 -45.5 0.2 0.1
Hemp fiber 685 233 -66.0 0.1 0.0
Jute, jutelike fibers 2,629 2,218 -15.6 0.2 0.2
Linseed 7,615 4,078 -46.4 0.6 0.3
Rape seeda 6,277 17,588 180.2 0.5 1.3
Sunflower seed 6,667 16,913 153.7 0.5 1.3
Seed cottona 31,897 32,984 3.4 2.5 2.4
Sesame seeda 5,051 6,336 25.4 0.4 0.5
Soybeans 23,806 56,351 136.7 1.9 4.2
Castor beans 1,233 1,657 34.4 0.1 0.1
Groundnuts 16,641 20,135 21.0 1.3 1.5
Total 138,949 209,085 50.5 11.1 15.5
a1961-1991.
Source: FAO, 1994.
environmental doomsayers, such as the World Resources Institute.
They continue to focus their attention on the physical conditions of
soils, collecting ever-more detailed inventories of soil characteristics.
But they are obviously blind to the fact that these characteristics
are becoming relevant. The size and quality of soils are just two vari-
ables in a multiterm equation of agricultural productivity, which is
mainly determined by technological, economic, sociocultural, and
political factors.
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Some experts have argued that it is not land, but water which is the
critical resource for the global carrying capacity (Riviere, 1989). The
most prominent Cassandra of a world water crisis is Malin Falken-
mark. She has argued that "water scarcity [is] now threatening
two-thirds of the African population" (Falkenmark, 1989:118). Her
pessimism, however, is not shared by prominent hydrologists who
have collected detailed water resource inventories for Africa. Al-
most three dozen water experts, assisted by five major hydrological
institutes, contributed to a UN publication which concluded:
There is almost nowhere in Africa where groundwater is not found
at one depth or another .... Mineral-water and thermo-mineral
springs abound in the African continent in the fracture zones.
They constitute a major potential resource which has been ex-
plored and exploited in only a few places. [UN, 1988:13-14]
Other water experts have raised the argument that we should
not confuse man-induced regional or local water shortages with
climate-related resource scarcity (Bandyopadhyay, 1989).
Globally about 70 percent of all water withdrawal is used in
agriculture (Table 10.4). This explains why the water situation
is, in fact, important to the food production capacity o'f the earth.
There are also some reasons for concern. Available statistics confirm
that in some river basins, freshwater is being extracted for human
use (including agriculture) at rates approaching those at which the
supply is renewed. In particular, Egypt is probably on the brink of
a water crisis. The country's renewable freshwater resources include
some 58.3 km3 , of which 56 ..5 km3 are from the Nile's annual flow and
1.8 km3 from other internal renewable resources. Some 97 percent of
these resources (or 56.4 km 3 ) are already being withdrawn. Egypt's
agriculture needs 49.6 km3 of water. Only 2.8 km3 are used in
industry, and the withdrawal for domestic purposes is about 3.9 km3 .
Libya's agriculture might also be limited by extreme water
shortages. According to recent estimates the country has a re-
newable freshwater resource of some 0.7 km3 per year - mostly
from underground aquifers. Libya's annual withdrawal, however,
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is estimated at 2.83 km3 - which is four times the rate of natu-
ral replacement. Some 7.5 percent of this unsustainable withdrawal
is used in agriculture. The country's spectacular increase of grain
production is obviously borrowed from future generations.
Another interesting case is Saudi Arabia. Since 1961 the desert
country has increased its wheat production by a spectacular 4,706
percent, from merely 8.5,000 to 4,000,000 metric tons. Today, the
country's farmers are not only able to provide more than 3.5 percent
of the domestic food supply - which is a spectacular achievement
in itself - but they actually produce more grain than the country
needs. In 1991 Saudi Arabia's net export of wheat was 1,80.5,000
metric tons, as compared with a net import of 67,600 metric tons
in 1974. Ecologists have argued that the bumper harvests were
mainly achieved by exploiting fossil - that is, nonrenewable - water
resources below the desert. They estimate that in 1988 the country
withdrew some 20..5 km 3 of water, 90 percent from nonrenewable
fossil groundwater aquifers. They also estimate that Saudi Arabia's
agriculture needs 90 percent of the water available, with 3.5 percent
of the agricultural water consumption being used in wheat produc-
tion. According to the Middle East Economic Digest (Hopes dry
up ... , 1989:1.5), which cites a confidential US government agency
report, at the current rate of depletion Saudi Arabia's fossil ground-
water would be exhausted by 2007.
Many authors have argued that Africa is a parched continent
(Pearce, 1991). The most pessimistic position maintains that by
the year 2000, Tunisia, Kenya, Malawi, Burundi, and Rwanda will
suffer a permanent water crisis (Falkenmark, 1989:116).
There is also much concern about the arid regions of the north
China plain. According to recent calculations by the World Re-
sources Institute, the 200 million population is already exploiting
the freshwater resources to a large extent. The WRI concludes that
"if present trends continue, the region will have 6 percent less water
than needed by the end of the century" (World Resources Insti-
tute/United Nations Environment Programme/United Nations De-
velopment Programme, 1992:16:3). These examples certainly seem
to confirm the conclusion that water is a critical factor for limiting
global carrying capacity, but there is also empirical evidence that
does not fit into the pessimistic outlook.
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According to the most recent estimate the earth's total an-
nual freshwater resource is some 40,673 km3 . The annual agricul-
tural withdrawal is about 2,236 km3 , which is less than 6 percent
of the globe's renewable water. Worldwide industrial and domes-
tic water consumption together account for another 995 km3 , or
just 2.5 percent of the total water resource (\iVorld Resources Insti-
tute/V nited Nations Environment Programme/Vnited Nations De-
velopment Programme, 1992:328). It is hard to imagine that we are
approaching global limits of freshwater withdrawal when more than
92 percent of the known reserves are still untouched.
If there is no scarcity at the global level, the uneven regional
distribution of resources might be the problem. Africa is frequently
considered an example of continentwide agricultural stagnation -
triggered, or at least intensified, by water scarcity (Falkenmark,
1991). Available statistics, however, do not confirm this theory.
Africa has 4,184 km3 of annual internal renewable water resources,
which was nearly 6,500 m3 per person per year in 1990. This is
almost five times the per capita freshwater availability of western
Germany, which is only 1,:300 m3 . Moreover, Africa's freshwater is
not only located in the tropicaJ areas, as one might suspect. There
are large reserves all over the continent: famine ridden Somalia has
more than twice the per capita internal freshwater resource of the
Netherlands (1,520 versus 680 m3 ).[5] The "arid" Chad has internal
freshwater sources of 6,760 m3 per person - more than three times
the rainy VK's per capita water resource (which is only 2,110 m3 ).
In Angola there are 15,770 m3 of freshwater for each person - nearly
28 times more than, for instance, ill Hungary, which has just 570
m3 available.
There is also more than enough freshwater in South America.
The total resource is estimated at 10,377 km3 which is equivalent
to the combined renewable water resources of Europe, the former
Soviet Vnion, and Africa. On average, each inhabitant of South
America has potential access to 34,960 m3 of freshwater, which is
7.5 times more than in Europe. All large South American nations
have abundant per capita freshwater resources, ranging from 18,860
m3 in V ruguay to 43,370 m3 in Venezuela (which is many times
the typical ratio for Europe, Asia. or the USA). Only Peru is some-
what "shorter" in freshwater: 1,790 m3 per person are available -
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a still abundant amount, however, if compared with the 850 m3 of
Belgium's internal renewable water resource.
The situation in North America and Central America is mixed:
very large resources ill Canada, more limited resources on the
Caribbean Islands. HO\vever, there is no indication that freshwa-
ter resources are running out in the region. Mexico, for instance,
has larger internal freshwater resources than Italy: 4,030 compared
with 3,130 m3 per person per year.
The freshwater resources of Asian countries are very different.
At the national level, China has enough water - 2,470 m3 per person
per year.[6] India, Pakistan, and Thailand have a little less (2,170,
2,430, and 1,970 m3 per person per year, respectively), but are far
from critical. There is abundant freshwater in Indonesia (14,020
m3 ), Bangladesh (11,'140 m3 ), and I\1alaysia (2,630 m3 ).
An interesting indicator of water stress is the proportion of an-
nual withdrawals from available resources. In 51 countries the an-
nual withdrawals are equal to or less than 1 percent of the renewable
freshwater resources - including populous nations such as Indonesia,
Brazil, and Nigeria. China uses 16 percent of its annual freshwater
resource; India, 18 percent; Kenya, just 7 percent. In all of Africa,
including the drought-affected Sahel, only three countries extract
more than 50 percent of their annual freshwater resource, namely,
Egypt (90 percent), Libya (404 percent), and Tunisia (53 percent).
Most African countries are extracting less than 3 percent of their
resources. In South America the highest extraction is reported from
Peru: a mere 15 percent. All other South American nations have
not even touched their renewable water reserves - they use typi-
cally less than 2 percent. Even in Asia, where the situation is a
little tighter, extraction rates typically range between 1 and :30 per-
cent. Only Afghanistan, Israel, and Cyprus have extraction rates of
more than 50 percent. For these countries the situation is certainly
serious. Jordan, Algeria, and Tunisia are also critical. The real
"dramatic" cases, however, are only a small number of states of the
Arabian peninsula: Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates,
and Yemen. They are all withdrawing water at much higher rates
than those at which their resource is renewed.
These statistics indicate that at the national level only a very
small number of countries are facing water resources shortages. On
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the other hand, local or regional water shortages are well known, as
well as strong seasonal variation of availability. It is also obvious
that groundwater pollution is a major problem in some places, such
as in very intensely used agricultural or industrial areas. Can we
solve these water problems, or will they impose serious restrictions
on the world's agricultural production? To answer these questions
three aspects have to be taken into account.
First, with a 10 to 15 billion world population there is no al-
ternative to the implementation of (advanced) water management
and exploitation technologies. It will also be necessary to find po-
litical solutions to water conflicts. But this is nothing new. Water
- as well as air -- has always been a natural resource that must be
managed. Noone knew this better than the ancient civilizations
along the Nile or in the desert. They developed highly sophisticated
methods of water exploitation. storage, distribution, and conserva-
tion. We tend to forget that large irrigation systems were built in
the Middle East some 4,000 to 5,000 years ago and that during the
Roman Empire the capital city could flourish only because it was
supplied with water through aqueducts across hundreds of miles.
We have to advance these methods (Meybeck et al., 1990). Most
likely it will be necessary to pump freshwater to agricultural areas
over long distances (such as from northern United States to south-
ern California); we certainly will have to settle conflicts over limited
water resources between neighboring countries (such as between Is-
rael and Lebanon); some islands (such as Malta) and some densely
populated agricultural regions (such as northern China) will require
the implementation of advanced water conservation and recycling
schemes. These methods are not impossible, and they have proved
to be successful in the past.
Second, we have to understand that water use is essentially a
recycling process: frequently water is just moved through biological
and technical systems for cleaning or as some kind of biological cat-
alyst. Much of the freshwater withdrawal (especially in agriculture)
is not consumed, but directly returned to a river or underground
aquifer. From there it can be used several times before it finally
reaches the sea. ~!e usually do not consume water in the same way
we exploit fossil fuels or scarce minerals. These natural resources
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have a much lower recycling rate than water - they are actually de-
stroyed or at least removed from natural cycles for a very long time
through human consumption. Consumptive uses of water, such as
the evaporation from industrial cooling towers and irrigation sys-
tems, make up only a, small proportion of water withdrawal. The
real water problem is not its natural scarcity, but the pollution we
add to the returning flows and the carelessness with which we use
freshwater in households, industries, and agriculture.
Finally, both industries and private households have already
caused serious local or regional water contamination. Unfortunately,
high-tech agriculture itself is a major polluter of groundwater and
river flows (Biswas, 1993). In some intensively cultivated agricul-
tural areas of Europe the excessive use of fertilizers has raised the
nitrate concentration in groundwater to dangerously high levels. We
can also observe pesticide contamination of freshwater resources in
some areas of North America and Europe (Hallberg, 1989; Leistra
and Boesten, 1989). An increase in food production could easily
lead to further deterioration of water resources. On the other hand,
this trend is not inevitable. All experts agree that there is still a
huge potential for improving the efficiency of fertilizer use, irriga-
tion, water treatment, and recycling (Biswas and Arar, 1988). Much
has already been done to clean lakes and rivers in Europe. Twenty-
five years ago the lakes in southern Germany frequently had to be
closed to swimmers because of pollution with coli bacteria; today
one could drink the water. European farmers have also realized the
danger of overfertilization. Contrary to popular belief they have not
increased nitrogen fertilizer application per hectare of arable land
during the past 10 years.
On the basis of these considerations we cannot see water as a
serious limitation for the globe's carrying capacity. No doubt, there
are nations with rather limited resources. As well, local or regional
shortages will require expensive water infrastructures. However, the
only dramatic shortages can be found in a small number of desert
states of North Africa and West Asia. Most of these countries are
enormously wealthy oil exporters that could artificially "produce"
water for their unconventional high-tech agriculture - in fact, this is
what they are doing with the highest density of desalination plants
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in the world. But is the natural water scarcity of some oil billionaires
really worth the concern?
10.2.3 Climate
The globe's food production potential certainly depends on the cli-
mate. The annual fluxes of precipitation and evapotranspiration
which determine the potential water supply available for human ex-
ploitation (runoff) vary greatly by region. They are much higher at
the equator than in the arid or semiarid regions around the latitudes
of 40° north or 30° south (Baumgartner and Reichel, 197.5). The
vast deserts and arid lands of Asia and Africa that have emerged
from these climatic conditions are certainly among the most hos-
tile environments for agriculture on earth. The lowest precipitation
and evapotranspiration, and consequently the lowest potential water
supply for human exploitation, can be found at the poles.
The spatial pattern of the global water cycle not only influ-
ences the water supply for rainfed agriculture, but also determines
variations in the flux of solar radiation energy, which is the fuel of
photosynthesis - the basic process of plant growth. In the arid or
semiarid mid-latitudes of low precipitation, cloud cover is rare or
absent so that less solar radiation is absorbed or reflected. Conse-
quently, insolation in these regions is some 20 percent higher than
at the equator, where one would expect the highest solar energy flux
(Stanhill, 1983). Since there is also a low level of actual evapora-
tion in these arid zones, the solar energy input mainly heats up the
ground and the air, which further increases the region's water deficit
and worsens environmental conditions for agriculture.
It is not only the (absolute) shortage of water and the high
temperatures in arid and semiarid regions that make agriculture
difficult or impossible. There is also the interannual variation in
precipitation, which is typically three or four times greater in these
regions than in temperate regions. This high climatic variability
explains why the desert can widen and narrow in an unpredictable
temporal pattern. During the early 1970s we experienced a global
redistribution of rainfall which led to the 1970-1972 Sahel drought
and contributed to widespread famines in the Sahel and Ethiopia.
The bioclimatic zones of the Sahel moved to the south and expanded
the area of high desertification risk.
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During the 1970s and 1980s many authors considered desertifi-
cation ~ triggered by climate variation - a major cause of declining
food production potential in large parts of Africa and Asia. But
there is no general consensus. Other scientists reported evidence
for a major anthropogenic component in the desertification process
(Garcia, 1981; Rubenson. 1991: Kiros, 1991). We also have to take
into account that the transformation from arid and semiarid lands
to desert during the Sahel drought was (at least partially) compen-
sated by higher precipitation north of the Sahara (Stanhill, 1989).
There is still a debate over whether the total desert area really ex-
panded or just shifted southward into densely populated and more
intensely cultivated areas. causing serious famines.
There is also evidence that the climatic risk of desertification in
the arid and semiarid regions of Africa is amplified by unsustainable
practices of agriculture, deforestation, and cattle ranging in this re-
gion. According to some authors, human mismanagement of land
resources are major factors of desertification in the African Sahel
(Stanhill, 1989). Finally, climate data show that the drought was
not restricted to the famine areas of the Sahel. Much higher pre-
cipitation anomalies were observed during the same period in Asia
and south of the equator. The absence of serious famines in these
regions indicates that factors other than climatic conditions must
have caused the great African famines (Lamb, 1982).
Climate conditions are certainly important factors restricting
the area of profitable agriculture. but this does not mean that we
a.re totally dependent on t hem. We can grow tropical fruits in cold
climates or wheat ill t he desert. "Ve can heat or cool, irrigate or
drain cultures. These are matters of technology, food prices, and
investment capital. Of course, farmers are still restricted by natural
conditions, such as soils or climates, but they have also made great
steps toward reducing t heir dependence. Between 1961 and 1990
Finland, which certainly does not have the most favorable climate
for agriculture, increased its total production of cereals from 1.94
to 4.30 million metric tons (by almost doubling average yields from
1.88 to 3.54 metric tons per hectare).
Farmers in Sweden and Norway could also achieve spectacular
increases of cereal production. By comparison, climatically privi-
leged Argentina only increased its cereal yields from 1.41 to 2.22
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metric tons per hectare, and Brazil's farmers could only improve
yields from 1.35 to 1.76 metric tons per hectare. Obviously, there
must be important conditions other than climate (and soils) which
determine agricultural output. As we discuss in Section 10.3, agri-
cultural technology plays a major role in agricultural output.
10.2.4 Fossil energy input
Most experts agree that we could boost food production in many de-
veloping regions if we modernize agriculture. Crop yields in Africa
and Latin America are frequently 70 to 80 percent below the Eu-
ropean average. Modern agricultural inputs, such as nitrogenous
fertilizers, irrigation, pesticides, and agricultural machinery, could
easily double or triple the output. There is no doubt that nitrogen
fertilizer production must increase substantially to meet the food
demand of the rapidly growing Third World population. Recently
it was estimated that, until the year 2000, world nitrogen production
must increase by 15 million metric tons, which is equivalent to the
output of 10 large new plants each year (Constant and Sheldrick,
1992:115). With modern technology after-harvest losses could also
be reduced. These losses are substantial in many developing coun-
tries. This modernization, however, is linked to one basic factor:
commercial energy. Therefore, some authors have argued that (fos-
sil) energy is the limiting factor for the global carrying capacity.[7]
However, available statistics and research on energy consump-
tion in agriculture give no indication that fossil energy will be a
limiting factor for agricultural modernization. Modern agriculture
does not consume large amounts of commercial energy. On aver-
age, just 3 percent of worldwide fossil energy consumption is used
in agriculture, and less than 1 percent is needed for the production
of (nitrogenous) fertilizers (Smil, 1987). Most likely it takes more
fossil energy to fly the doomsayers of the global food problem to
their many international conferences than it would cost to produce
adequate amounts of crop nutrients, pesticides, and fungicides for
the stagnating agricultures in Africa and Latin America.
Some critics have rejected agricultural modernization as an op-
tion for increasing global food production on the basis of its suppos-
edly high consumption of fossil energy. They obviously misunder-
stand energy statistics which indicate that some 70 to 80 percent
How Many People Call Be Fed on Earth? 225
of all commercial energy is used in the food sector. While these
numbers might certainly be correct, they only indicate the overall
fossil energy consumption in human food chains. Most of this en-
ergy, however, is not spent in agriculture, but used for packaging,
cleaning, transport, conservation, bottling, canning, refrigeration,
and preparation of food. vVe spend enormous amounts of fossil en-
ergy for post-harvest processing of food and .or running a most
energy-consuming international food distribution network (Heilig,
1993). We have accepted the preposterous situation that, for in-
stance, French or Austrian mineral water is bottled and shipped to
the USA or Australia - completely unaware of the fact that a huge
amount of fossil energy is needed to produce the bottles and ship
the water halfway around the globe. Most of the energy consump-
tion in the food sector has nothing to do with agriculture, but with
lifestyles, trade regulations, state subsidies, or marketing strategies.
If we would discontinue only the most absurd practices in the food
processing and distri bution sector, we could save much more fossil
energy than is needed for modernization of agricultures in develop-
ing countries.
10.2.5 Conclusion: Are the natural resources limited?
If we take into account the creative potential of man, there is no
foreseeable limitation to the basic natural resources of food produc-
tion, which are space, water, climate conditions, solar energy, and
man-made inputs. All these resources are either unlimited or can be
expanded, better utilized, or redesigned to a very large extent. This
might be the reason why several experts have denied any upper limit
to population growth. The notion of "physical limits to growth" is
a faulty concept. It makes it easy for agricultural technocrats to
deny any basic problems in boosting the world food supply. Bet-
ter arguments must be fonnd to convince people that global food
production may be limited.
10.3 Technical Limitations and Chances
Technology is certainly one of the most important determinants of
the earth's carrying capacity. If the human race would have failed to
invent agriculture some 10,000 years ago, only a few million people
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could have survived on this planet as hunters and gatherers. Cut
and burn agriculture, which was the next step in the evolution of
human sustenance, lifted the carrying capacity to at least twice or
three times the level of primitive food collectors (Pimentel, 1984:4).
The invention of soil cultivation and animal husbandry in stable
settlements, which was the first agricultural revolution, prepared
the way for the empires at the Nile, Euphrates, and Tigris and
along the great Asian rivers.
Since World War II, the second - chemo-technological - revolu-
tion of agriculture has established a new level of sustenance. We are
certainly capable of producing enough food for a world population
of 5 to 6 billion; in fact we are facing severe problems of overproduc-
tion. Now, the important question is \vhether technologies will be
available that could further increase the earth's carrying capacity?
And what are the restrictions on and risks for their implementation?
10.3.1 Chances
Despite nearly hysterical criticism by some scholars, only the appli-
cation of modern technology to agriculture will provide the necessary
tools for increasing the earth's carrying capacity. Of course, we are
not talking about simple-minded high-input agriculture which - for
the sake of short-term increase of yields - would degrade soils, pol-
lute groundwater. or harm the environment in some other way. We
are talking about the numerous technical options that could improve
yields, while at the same time reduce the environmental impact of
agriculture. In general these technical options would be targeted
to improve energy and water efficiency, refertilize exhausted soils,
or minimize pesticide application. They would optimize crop rota-
tion, adapt cultivation methods to local soil conditions, or prevent
adverse effects of large-sca.le irrigation.
10.3.2 Fertilizer application
Many people are not aware t hat in some developing countries there
is a threat to the environment, not because of too much use of mod-
ern technology, but because of too little. A case in point is fertilizer
application. Especially in less developed Africa there is the prob-
lem of excessive nutrient removal or "nutrient mining" from soils.
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While farmers try to respond to the growing food demand by us-
ing better crop seeds, reducing fallow periods, and so on, they have
frequently failed to prevent the constant nutrient removal which
is typical for modern crops. These require an essential supply of
plant nutrients (such as nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium), be-
cause with each harvest the farmer permanently removes some 100
to 150 kg per hectare of these major plant nutrients from the field.
Therefore it is imperative that (artificial) fertilizers are applied to
ensure sustained productivity of the soil. However, according to re-
cent estimates, African farmers replace only some 50 percent of the
harvest- related crop nutrien t loss in their soil by applying (artificial)
fertilizers. They permanently degrade their soils because of a less
than optimal in put of fertilizers (Constant and Sheldrick, 1992: 114).
10.3.3 Irrigation
One possibility for increasing the earth's food production capacity
is the expansion of irrigation. However, since two-thirds of global
freshwater withdrawal is already used in agriculture it would be es-
sential to implement only those technologies that improve irrigation
efficiency, reduce water loss, and prevent environmental damage in
irrigation schemes. Fortunately. techniques are available that could
achieve these objectives. In a study on agricultural water efficiency
Xie et at. (1983) conclude:
Technologically, there is great potential to improve water use effi-
ciency in both the agriculture and urban sectors. Despite demon-
strated success in water saving and favorable experience in many
developing countries, advanced technologies, such as sprinkler and
drip systems, are applied to less than 3 percent of the world's ir-
rigated lands.
We cannot go into detail, but list a few options that are con-
sidered rather promising by agricultural experts (most examples are
from Stanhill, 1989).
An obvious technical option is the conservation of existing wa-
ter resources (rather than the exploitation of new ones). In most
irrigation schemes efficiency is incredibly low - usually less than 25
percent of the applied water is consumed by plants. In the USA it
was possible to double water-use efficiency by simple means, such
as laser land leveling and automatic pulsed water application.
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Runoff control, cleaning, and recycling of agricultural waste-
water could also contribute to the conservation of existing water
resources.
A modification of cropping practices could save water or increase
yields with available resources. For instance, farmers could switch
to crops that can be grown during seasons of lower climatic water
demand - which are the cooler and more humid seasons of the year.
This simple measure could increase yields per unit of water by up to
50 percent. Only by carefully timing planting dates are substantial
yield increases possible.
Insufficient leaching is one of the most serious dangers in ir-
rigation agriculture. [8] To avoid problems farmers tend to apply
more water to their irrigated fields than would be necessary. This
frequently results in serious soil damage and has already destroyed
large irrigation areas. Agricultural science and technology could
prevent this irrigation mismanagement. There are methods for cal-
culating and applying the amount of water needed for leaching re-
quirements, which take into account soil salinity and evaporation.
Desertification and soil loss is frequently triggered by removal of
significant areas of the vegetation cover - through overgrazing, cat-
tle trampling, or deforestation. Intelligent land-use practices which
avoid phases of total vegetation removal could substantially increase
the local water availability. Afforestation on water catchment areas
would also help to conserve water resources.
Modern technology could reduce water evaporation losses. The
three major sources of water evaporation in agriculture are water
storage and conveyances, irrigation systems, and plant evapotran-
spiration. All three can be reduced by technical means. There are
several methods for reducing plant transpiration (Stanhill, 1986),
but the gains are probably not very big and negative side effects
are likely. Much, however, could be done to reduce evaporation
in irrigation, such as better timing of water application and trickle
irrigation. The evaporation from lakes and conveyances could be
reduced by removing water plants and by building deep, instead of
shallow, reservoirs. It was estimated that Lake Nasser, dammed by
the Aswan Dam, is losing more water by evaporation than it makes
available for irrigation (Stanhill, 1989:268).
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Water harvesting is also a very attractive technical option for
increasing local water resources for agriculture (Reij et aZ., 1988).
For example, special kinds of fences can be used at high altitude to
"milk" water out of clouds, as is being done in some places in the
Andes Mountains. A very cost-efficient method is cloud seeding.
Certain chemicals are used to increase the number of condensation
nuclei in the atmosphere which can trigger precipitation. Recently
detailed studies were undertaken to assess the possibility of water
harvesting in Burkina Faso, Kenya, Niger, Somalia, Sudan, and Zim-
babwe (Critchley et aZ., 1992). Rapid development of desalination
technologies has also been observed. Prices for the desalination of
water are declining rapidly as larger plants with better technology
are set up (Wangnick, 1990).
Finally we can exploit previously neglected sources of water.
Also several great rivers are practically unused for irrigation, such
as the Shari and Logone rivers in Chad (Melamed, 1989). Their
combined water flow is comparable to Egypt's withdrawal from the
Nile. Well-designed irrigation schemes could make the desert bloom.
Many arid and semiarid countries in Africa have vast resources of
fertile soils. If these countries were able to apply proper irrigation
technology to their lands (such as Israel did under similar climatic
conditions), they could significa.ntly increase food production.
10.3.4 Breeding, bioengineering
Apart from irrigation there are many technological options to boost
rainfed agriculture. We have just started to explore the potential of
bioengineering for increasing crop yields (Gasser and Fraley, 1989)
and livestock efficiency (Pursel et az', 1989). In a few years or
decades the creation of new plants by techniques of bioengineer-
ing could replace traditional breeding methods. This would speed
up the process of adapting animal and plant species to marginal
environments, such as arid regions or wetlands. The new techniques
could also lead to high-yield food and feed crops which bind nitro-
gen from the air and thus require less fertilizer inputs. There is also
speculation about bioengineering plants and animals that have a
natural resistance against many kinds of diseases; this would reduce
the consumption of pesticides and animal medicines. Most experts
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agree that these techniques could possibly boost food production by
orders of magnitude (Hollo, 1986).
Photosynthesis is the complex and still poorly understood bio-
chemical process by which plants build up biomass. It is fueled
by solar radiation energy, and needs - among other things - atmo-
spheric carbon, plant nutrients, and water as inputs. Until today
not much could be done to increase the overall efficiency of the pro-
cess - other than creating artificially CO 2-enriched atmospheres in
greenhouses. However, there is a chance that recent advances in
biochemistry and plant genetics can somewhat improve the net ef-
ficiency of photosynthesis by reducing the respiratory losses of CO 2
(Smil, 1987: 165-1(6). The gains will probably not be spectacular
in food grain, but it is possible that animal food with very high
photosynthetic efficiency can be bioengineered.
10.3.5 Food processing
Much can be done to optimize post-harvest crop processing, drying,
transport, and storage. In some parts of the Third World (such as
India) enormous amounts of food and feed crops are lost to mice,
rats, and fungi. Improper storage and transport frequently causes
after-harvest losses of up to between 40 and 50 percent.
Much can also be done to improve the processing, transport, and
preparation of food. Most people are not aware that some 90 percent
of fossil energy use in the food chain is linked to nonagricultural
activities - only 5 to 10 percent is consumed on the farm.
Also, if we were to reduce meat consumption in Europe and
North America by a few percent we could save enormous amounts
of grain. Finally, we could boost the productivity of agriculture
by optimizing system integration of farms, such as linking energy
generation (biogas) and lives toek production.
10.3.6 "Frankenfood"
Finally, there is the option of synthetic food production. Those who
shiver from abhorrence about this possibility have coined the term
"frankenfood"; but they should think twice about this option. We
are already using considerable amounts of artificial ingredients in
our food. The yeast in our beer and bread is industrially produced
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in bioconverters, and citric acid and hundreds of food preservatives
are manufactured by the biochemical industry.[9] The taste of fruit
yogurt is usually a synthetically redesigned and enforced "natural"
flavor. The colors of meat sausages or fruit juices often come straight
from the chemical laboratory. In the not-too-distant future it is
very possible that we will produce "synthetic" meat or vegetable
protein in cell cultures. If this perspective affects your appetite, it
is just because you are not familiar with what is currently done in
slaughterhouses or chicken farms all over the world. Actually, it
might be more humane to feed a 10 or 12 billion world population
on bioengineered protein than to breed and kill billions of animals
or convert the last natural ecosystems into paddy rice fields.
A big step toward synthetic food production was recently made
in Japan, where 12 lettuce factories began production. They look
like high-tech electronic laboratories; the lettuce farmers wear white
gloves and breathing masks. The production sites are so-called clean
rooms - hermetically isolated and sterilized chambers which pre-
vent introduction of fungi. insects, and crop diseases. There is no
soil, rainfall, or sun. The lettuce is grown on a synthetic fiber, the
roots are automatically sprayed with fertilizer-enriched water, and
radiation energy (for photosynt hesis) is applied by special electric
lights. Lettuce output is 10 times that of natural cultivation and
highly profitable. The taste of this high-tech lettuce cannot be dis-
tinguished from the naturally grown plant. Rash critics might jump
to the conclusion that this high-tech production is rather energy-
inefficient as compared with conventional cultivation, but this is
most likely not the case. More fossil energy is used to control the
production environment (heating, lighting, irrigation), but much less
is needed for production of pesticides, fungicides, weed killers, and
insecticides because of the sterile growing conditions.
Moreover, high-tech cultivation needs much less space and can
be located close to the consumers, such as in the middle of a city.
Thus, enormous amounts of fossil energy for transportation, con-
servation, and storage can be saved. (Usually, the fossil energy
consumption needed for the production of lettuce and other veg-
etables is a small fraction of the energy that is spent in packaging,
transportation, and storage of the product.) In some Japanese su-
permarkets lettuce is a.lready produced directly on the spot and
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harvested by the sales personuel according to demand. It is very
likely that the urban agglomerates of the 21st century will be sup-
plied locally with vegetables and fruits. This is not science fiction.
Large proportions of the tomatoes, cucumbers, zucchini, and egg-
plants consumed in Europe are already produced in a similar way
in the high-tech greenhouses of the Netherlands.
10.3.7 Limitations
After reading the previous section one might have the impression
that technology is the "golden key" to open the earth's unlimited
resources of food, but this is not t he case. Agro-science and agro-
technology have limitations and dangers.
First, there are unintended side effects of agricultural technol-
ogy. Especially the input-oriented large-scale technology of the
197013 and early 198013 has caused many problems, such as soil degra-
dation, over-fertilization, salination or water logging in irrigated
soils, groundwater pollution, and toxification of agricultural work-
ers. These problems are usually caused by lack of know-how, poor
management techniques, faulty maintenance of irrigation systems
and agricultural machinery, or corruption and ignorance.
Second, we have consequences of agricultural modernization and
expansion that were well predicted but seem to be inevitable. When
farmers transform natural ecosystems into cropland or meadows,
they inevitably disturb their biological balance. Anew, artificial
balance has to be re-established. This action requires careful plan-
ning and proper long- term management of soils, water sources, and
infrastructure. One of the greatest threats to natural ecosystems -
such as the tropical rain forests - is the "unconfined cut-down, plant,
and move" exploitation by poorly trained, inexperienced farmers (or
ignorant and cynical agribusinesses).
Third, there is the problem of education and sociocultural adap-
tation. Not every culture and ethnic group is flexible enough to
learn new ways of food prod uctiOll. Chinese farmers, for instance,
quickly adapted to using modern technology when the government
abandoned many restrictions of the communist economy during the
1970s. Within a few years China experienced one of the most spec-
tacular increases in nitrogenous fertilizer consumption and tractor
use - and a tripling of cereal production. Compare this to Nigeria,
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the oil-wealthy African nation. The country has all the resources
(including capital, land, water, and fossil energy for fertilizers) to
make it the breadbasket of Africa, but agriculture has stagnated for
the last three decades.
Finally, there are enormous costs for implementing a more effi-
cient agricultural technology. We are not only referring to farmers
who need investment capital. There is also the need for upgrading
the general infrastructure. Agricultural modernization requires a
steady supply of inputs (fertilizers, water for irrigation, crop san-
itation products) for which working transportation and distribu-
tion systems have to be implemented. There are also significant
social costs. Agricultural modernization inevitably increases the
pressures on the rural labor force. Both farmers and landless agricul-
tural workers have to adapt to new methods and conditions. They
must accept retraining and technical education, and there are al-
ways groups of the population that lack the necessary flexibility
for change. It is also very likely that agricultural modernization
will produce rural unemployment. even if labor-intensive produc-
tion methods are applied.
lOA Ecological Limits
Ecological constraints and feedback mechanisms are frequently con-
sidered limiting factors of growing food production (Chen, 1990).
Currently scientists are discussing four types of problems. First,
the expansion of agricultural areas and increases in the catch of fish
could destroy large ecological systems. This would lead to a reduc-
tion of biodiversity in the fauna and flora and diminish the global
gene pool. Second, the increase of agricultural inputs, such as fertil-
izers, pesticides, fungicides. weed killers, a.nd other chemicals, could
pollute groundwater bodies. lakes, and the sea. It could change the
chemistry of the soils and speed up soil erosion. Third, genetica.lly
modified pla.nts (and animals) could be a danger to the natural en-
vironment. Finally, a significant increase in food production could
even change the global climate; emissions of greenhouse gases, such
as methane, could dramatically increase clue to the expansion of
livestock and paddy rice production. What evidence do we have
that these ecological consequences are in fact unavoidable'?
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10.4.1 Shrinking of natural ecological systems
There is little doubt that feeding an ever-growing number of people
will further diminish the living space of other species. For many
kinds of wild animals we leave only small niches of natural ecosys-
tems. This competitive race between man and other living creatures
(including plants) is probably unavoidable. It seems to be an evolu-
tionary constant. The best we can hope for is that we will be able to
preserve key natural habitats in order to stop further extinction of
species. The only realistic protection of the planet's natural "gene
pools" and "green lungs," such as the Amazonas, is a combination
of strictly managed natural parks and careful economic utilization
with a minimum of environmental damage. If we want to reserve the
tropical rain forests exclusively for butterfly catchers, anthropolo-
gists, and botanists in the face of millions of landless hungry farmers,
we have to answer some tough questions on our moral standards.
Food production. however, is not the only activity that tends to
diminish the natural ecosystem. The spread of human settlements,
infrastructures, a.nd industries lllust be added to a possible expan-
sion of agricultural land. Undoubtedly, the human race is changing
the surface of the earth with unprecedented speed.
10.4.2 Soil degradation (acidification, soil loss)
and water pollution
Many agricultural practices can have a destructive impact on the en-
vironment. Excessive use of fertilizers can contaminate the ground-
water; crop monocultures and unsuitable tillage practices can ag-
gravate soil erosion; the use of pesticides poses health risks on farm
workers; and the runoff of pesticides can pollute groundwater. There
are concerns that "artificiar pest and weed control can trigger the
emergence of resistant animal and plant species, which in turn would
require the further increase of pesticides. In some parts of Europe
we have industrial-size livestock production systems which produce
enormous amounts of manure. If the manure is not properly pro-
cessed and is only spread in large quantities on crop fields and mead-
ows, it can run off into rivers and lakes, seep into the groundwater,
or increase the already existing nitrogen overload of the soil. In
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Africa's pastoral societies over/!;razing and trampling by cattle is an
enormous problem.
These environmental risks of agriculture are well known and
certainly diminish the actual carrying capacity of many regions. A
recent study conducted by the International Soil Reference and In-
formation Centre in Wageningen has estimated that agricultural ac-
tivities have caused moderate to extreme soil degradation of 1.2 bil-
lion hectares worldwide - which is about the size of China and India
(Oldemann et aL 1990). This does not mean that the soils are com-
pletely unproductive, butt hat their natural fertility is diminished.
The impact of agriculture on the water is also well documented:
some 25 percent of the population in the European Union is already
drinking water with a nitrate level greater than the recommended
maximum of 25 milligrams per liter (Gardner, 1990:5). Pesticides
can be found in the groundwater of ;~4 states in the USA.
These problems of intensive crop and livestock production are
serious, but there is no reason why we should not be able to solve
them. With modern technology, agricultural know-how, and better
agricultural policy it would be possible to expand food production,
while reducing its environmental impact. A good example is Eu-
rope's agriculture. Contrary to widespread belief, the farmers did
not just proceed with their practices of overfertilization and mind-
less use of pesticides (which they in fact had adopted during most
of the 1970s and 1980s).
If the FAa statistics are correct the consumption of nitrogenous
fertilizers significantly declined during the past six or seven years
in most European countries, while production increased. In all of
Europe the consumption of nitrogenous fertilizers fell from some
1.5.1 in 1983-1984 to about LtG million metric tons in 1990-1991-
a decline of more than 10 percent (FAa. 1992:56). In West Germany
farmers consumed 1..52 million metric tons in 198.5; four years later
consumption was down to 1.48 million metric tons (FAa, 1994).
The fertilizer input in kilograms per hectare of cropland fell from
464 to 404 between 1971-1979 and 1987-1989 (World Resources
Institute/United Nations Environment Programme/United Nations
Development Programme, 1992:27.5).
Modern methods of crop management have tried to optimize,
rather than maximize. the input of crop nutrients and pesticides.
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We also have to take into account that in large parts of the Third
World, especially in Africa, fertilizer consumption is a small fraction
of what is typical in Europe or some Asian countries. Even if these
farmers doubled or tripled fertilizer consumption they would be far
from the levels that are typical for high-input agriculture.
10.4.3 Risks of genetic engineering and advanced
breeding practices
Previously we mentioned that genetic engineering could be a great
opportunity for increasing food production, especially if we could
breed drought- and pest-resistant crops, but it could also be a dan-
gel'. There was much concern that genetically manipulated plants
and animals could escape and drive out other natural species from
their habitat. Also several other unintended side effects have been
under discussion. However, governments in Europe and North
America have recently loosened restrictions for field experiments
with genetically modified plants. They obviously consider the risks
rather low as compared with possible benefits.
10.4.4 Climate change
In theory, there are two links between climate change and global food
production. First, the expansion and intensification of agriculture,
which is necessary for sustenance of the growing world population,
could be a driving force for global warming. Emissions of methane
(CH4 ), which is the third most important greenhouse gas, could
increase when livestock and paddy rice areas are expanded. Live-
stock and paddy rice areas are important sources of anthropogenic
methane emission to the atmosphere (Heilig, 1994b). Agricultural
mechanization could boost CO 2 emissions. The second link between
climate change and agriculture works the other way: global warm-
ing could reduce (or increase) agricultural output. One of the most
detailed approaches to the problem was IIASA's integrated climate
impact assessment which - for the first time - analyzed not only
first-order consequences of global warming to agriculture, but also
second-order impacts (Parry et aL, 1988). This is not the place
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to analyze this major scientific study, but it should be pointed out
that Parry and Carter (1988) are very cautious about the predictive
validity of their research. In a summary of results they write:
The estimates reported in this volume are not predictions of fu-
ture effects. Present-day uncertainties and inaccuracies in simu-
lating the behavior of the world's climate and in evaluating the
agricultural implications of climatic change do not permit real-
istic predictions to be made. Furthermore, we cannot forecast
what technological, economic and social developments in agricul-
ture will occur over the next half century. The estimates should
therefore be considered as measures of the present-day sensitivity
of agriculture to climate change. [Parry and Carter, 1988:69]
No doubt, there are links between climate and agriculture, but
it is also obvious that these links are not just simple one-way cau-
sations. They work through a complex system of intermediate vari-
ables, which not only can modify their strengths, but also can turn
them around from positive to negative (and vice versa). The most
important intermediate variables are the availability of advanced
technology, the existing economic arrangements, the political situ-
ation, and the level of education and training among farmers. If
farmers have no access to advanced technology, are hampered by
poor education and training, or are restricted by stupid economic
arrangements, a worsening of climate conditions (such as the in-
crease of drought or unstable precipitation) can seriously diminish
agricultural output. However, the climate change could also have
the opposite effect: it could trigger the development of advanced
agricultural methods, which in the end are even more productive.
Israel's and Finland's farmers have demonstrated that high produc-
tive agriculture is possible under harsh, and diverse, agro-climatic
conditions.
Our knowledge is too limited to decide whether the projected
climate change would reduce global carrying capacity. However, we
believe that a possible (but by no means certain) global warming
would be a gradual process, which would give us enough time to
adapt the socioeconomic framework of agriculture and implement
new technologies in order to counterbalance its negative effects.
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Social, Economic, and Political
Dimensions of Carrying Capacity
For decades the scientific discussion on the food-population nexus
has avoided a key issue. While scientists spent their time elaborat-
ing hypotheses with rather weak empirical evidence (such as the law
of diminishing returns) or engaged in intellectual self-gratification
by building all kinds of complex models of global carrying capacity,
they mostly ignored the political. social, and economic dimension
of food production. The news media, however, reported the facts
on a day- by-day basis: in most cases it was colossal policy fail-
ure which caused widespread undernutrition and famine during the
past four decades. Agricultural stagnation and food deficits were
usually unrelated to a shortage of soil, water, rainfall, fossil energy,
or investment capital. They were also unrelated to high population
growth. Typically, food crises could be found where social, cultural,
and economic conditions have prevented agricultural modernization,
as in large parts of Africa.
There are so many sociocultural constraints to agricultural mod-
ernization that we could dedicate an entire chapter to this problem.
Due to space limitation we mention only a few of the most important
factors.
Policy failu.re. The most serious famines in recent times had noth-
ing to do with population pressure, crop failure, or natural disas-
ters. They were directly and intentionally triggered by unscrupu-
lous regimes as a means for executing their political strategies as
the Khmer Rouge did in Cambodia (Becker, 1986; Barnett et al.,
1980), accepted as necessary side effects of coercive development
measures as in China's Great Leap Forward during the Mao Tse-
Tung era (Bernstein, 1984), or simply emerged from cynical igno-
rance because the regimes were more interested in other political
and military issues as in most civil wars of Africa from Ethiopia to
Somalia (Griffith, 1988).
False economic policy and cornlption. The stagnation of agricul-
tural production in some parts of the Third 'World - especially in
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sub-Saharan Africa and in parts of Latin America - was closely re-
lated to the notorious inefficiency, massive corruption, unbelievable
incompetence, and ideological blindness of political leaders and their
administration. Many of these incompetent regimes in Africa sim-
ply transplanted the Soviet model of a centrally planned command
economy to their preindustrial society. They eliminated traditional
market mechanisms by fixing food prices at ridiculously low levels to
appease urban masses (Bale, 1981). They collectivized most of the
fertile land (as in Ethiopia) and forced farmers to sell their produc-
tion to state-owned trade agencies for prices that were close to pro-
duction costs (as in Tanzania). The ideologically legitimized lack of
incentives discouraged farmers and prevented agricultural modern-
ization (Bates, 1981). In Latin America military regimes stabilized
feudalistic rural societies and prevented agricultural modernization.
Very often these disasters of agricultural policy were joined by a gen-
eral failure of development policy. The political and administrative
elites in many developing countries of Africa and Latin America did
not do much to modernize infrastructure; they neglected technical
education and training and blocked industrial modernization. Huge
amounts of development aid were wasted on expensive but useless
prestige projects or simply vanished into bank accounts of the small
ruling class. Even rich countries, such as exporters of oil and other
natural resources (Nigeria). neglected the agricultural sector.
Social inequality. There is still chronic undernutrition and hunger
among certain groups of the population in food surplus countries, as
in India or Indonesia. However, this kind of food problem can also
be found in highly developed. affluent countries, such as the USA.
It is a problem of income distribution and has nothing to do with
the availability of food. Lack of entitlements to acquire adequate
food in the lowest classes of society is the cause of the problem. The
class and cast structure of some societies also prevents adequate
distribution of agricultural land.
Development of human resources (health, education). Much land
in the Third World cannot be cultivated in the most efficient way
because farmers are suffering from chronic diseases (malaria, river
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blindness) or are hampered by a lack of education and agricultural
know-how. Several studies, for instance, have shown the impact
of malaria among rural populations on food production (Bradley,
1991). A dramatic situation is evolving in parts of Africa and Asia
(Thailand) because of AIDS. The spread of this disease among rural
populations in East Africa has already made a measurable impact
on food production (Norse, 1991). Is it not rather absurd that we
spend considerable efforts on the collection of soil inventories to
determine Africa's carrying capacity, while whole villages in Africa
are wiped out by a virus infection?
Traditions. Many traditions help people improve their suste-
nance. Agricultural societies have developed numerous rules, habits,
taboos, and traditions to prevent food crises, maintain soil fertil-
ity, or improve the environment for the next generation. Consider
the traditional rules of crop rotation or the tradition to plant a
tree on certain occasions. Unfortunately some cultural values also
prevent agricultural modernization and full utilization of resources.
For instance, in most of Africa agriculture is considered low- prestige
women's work. It is part of their household duties - in addition to
cooking and caring for children. Whenever a man can afford to avoid
working on a field, he will do so. This traditional disregard of food
production, deeply embedded in African men, can also be found in
development plans and investment decisions of African governments.
Culture and food are closely related. A society can only develop
sciences, technology, and arts when it has a highly productive sys-
tem of food supply. As long as everyone is busy collecting or hunting
food, no real modern development is possible. We can study this
link between cultural development and food in early agricultural so-
cieties that originated in the alluvial lowlands and river floodplains
of Africa and Asia. These ancient people developed complex social
and economic systems, which included bureaucratic hierarchies and
specialized professions. The social differentiation was necessary to
solve typical problems of agriculture, such as water management or
storage administration. The societies also institutionalized mecha-
nisms of conflict resolution - for instance, to settle conflicts of water
distribution and land ownership. They developed cognitive systems
which helped them to understand and predict the natural cycles of
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floods and rainfalls. They also managed to establish a stable (if not
always peaceful) relationship with their neighbors. This social and
cultural framework was essential for making their agriculture pros-
per - and in turn, the highly productive agriculture also propelled
social and cultural development. In his many books on Indonesia,
Clifford Geertz (1963) has studied these dialectics of food and so-
ciocultural development.
10.6 Discussion
From a system-analytic point of view, most studies on carrying ca-
pacity are surprisingly unrealistic in their economic and social as-
sumptions. They usually define carrying capacity in terms of direct
agricultural self-supply - as a population supporting capacity of
land, given a certain level of agricultural technology. This concept
might be sufficient to describe traditional rural societies, which lack
a clear division of labor, international trade, political organization,
science, and industry. But this concept is inadequate for today's
functionally differentiated societies and economies. Here the divi-
sion of labor expands from the household to the national economy
and the international market. In the past, Arab nomads in the
deserts of Saudi Arabia could feed their families quite well from
the scarce land by selling their oil resources on the world market -
for instance, to French farmers, who in turn produced a significant
proportion of their meat supply.
Today, the supply of food, which once was a simple process
of collecting, hunting, or self-sufficient local agriculture, has evolved
into a complex international network of production activities, indus-
trial processes, market and price mechanisms, trade arrangements,
food policies, and distribution channels. At each stage of this widely
expanding food chain we might find conditions that could limit the
food supply of a population. It might be a shortage of fertile soils or
water; it might be adverse climate conditions; or it could be a lack
of fossil energy for fertilizer production. But the limitation might
also arise from widespread analphabetism and a lack of agricultural
know-how in a population; it could be caused by the persistence of
inefficient market structures and production regulations; or it might
be the consequence of international trade restrictions.
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The carrying capacity of the earth depends on its natural re-
sources or the level of technology and on the quality of our world-
wide economic, social, and political arrangements. Land, water,
climate, and energy are just four parameters in a more complex set
of equations for calculating a measure of carrying capacity. These
equations must describe the world as a system of interdependencies
- a system of exchange mechanisms (food trade) and complementary
production activities, which can counterbalance regional variations
in the density of natural and human resources. Today, carrying ca-
pacity cannot be defined at a purely local or regional level. It cannot
be calculated from the availability of natural resources. We know
that the natural supporting potential of land can only be realized if
there are educated and trained people who can live in peace, who
have access to (world) markets, who can use modern agricultural
and industrial techniques and inputs, who are not punished and
unmotivated by a centrally planned command economy.
10.7 Conclusion
How many people can be fed on earth if we take into account techni-
cal, ecological, political, and social constraints? Most experts would
probably agree that we could sustainably supply the current 5.5 bil-
lion world population. At t.he moment European governments are
pressing their farmers to reduce food production; grain is cheap on
international markets; and Asian countries are harvesting bumper
crops year after year. The scandal of famines in Africa is not a
result of agriculture approaching carrying capacity; it is mostly a
consequence of massive policy failures, corruption, ethnic conflicts,
ignorance, and incompetence of ruling elites. There are different
and more complex reasons for widespread undernutrition in some
parts of Asia. but they have nothing to do with natural limitations.
Certain groups of the population lack the means to acquire food,
which would be available in principle. Here we obviously have the
socioeconomic and cultural problems of uneven distribution of enti-
tlements. Latin America has vast resources of land, freshwater, and
- at least in some cases - oil money. The real problem is the feudal-
istic distribution of land which prevents a more efficient agriculture.
But could we also feed 10 or 15 billion people? Most likely,
if we can prevent (civil) wars with soldiers plundering harvests or
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devastating crop fields with land mines; if we can stop the stupid-
ity of collectivization and central planning in agriculture; if we can
agree on free (international) trade for agricultural products; if we
redistribute agricultural land to those that actually use it for pro-
duction; if we provide credits. training, and high-yield seeds to poor
farmers; if we can adapt the modern high-yield agriculture to the
agro-climatic and sociocultural conditions of arid regions and use it
carefully to avoid environmental destruction; if we implement opti-
mal water management and conservation practices. If we do all this
during the next few decades, we would certainly be able to feed a
doubled or tripled world population.
There are many "ifs" in our conclusion. Almost certainly, busi-
ness as usual will not provide the conditions which are necessary for
feeding the world population of the 21st century. We need funda-
mental political, social, and economic changes, especially in Africa,
Latin America, and parts of Asia. Only a democratization in these
regions will open the gates for the development of human resources,
for better education and training, for private economic initiatives,
and for functioning markets.
There are positive and negative signs that this change will be
possible: the governments of China, India, and some other Asian
countries have removed economic controls which prevented agricul-
tural productivity; they have provided a relatively stable political
environment; and they have actively supported agricultural mod-
ernization (the green revolution). Consequently, they doubled or
tripled domestic food production within two or three decades. Many
African governments, on the other hand, neglected the agricultural
sector. They introduced rigid methods of central planning, sup-
pressed free markets, and collectivized or coercively resettled farm-
ers. They did not stop the devastation of agricultural areas due to
civil wars, and they mostly failed in introducing modern techniques
of crop production and livestock management. It is no wonder that
per capita food production stagnated or declined in most parts of
Africa during the past three decades.
Let us do a simple exercise: How many people can be fed in
Sudan? The FAG estimated that at a low input level the coun-
try's arable land could sustain nea.rly 60 million people - 3.7 times
the actual population of 197.5 (which was 16 million); a high-input
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agriculture could feed 1.036 billion Sudanese, which would be twice
the actual population of Africa. All we hear from Sudan, how-
ever, are reports of persistent famines and slow degeneration of the
agricultural system. Theoretically, Sudan could be the breadbas-
ket of Africa; in practical terms it is one of the continent's famine
areas. On the other hand, the FAa has estimated that Algeria's
agro-climatic conditions could support only 7 million people at low
inputs and 24.6 million at medium inputs. Currently Algeria has
a population of 25 million and not much can be heard about food
shortages in this country. Given the substantial restraints and diffi-
culties that can slow down or even prevent the theoretically almost
unlimited increase of global food production, we have to lower our
expectations. It is unlikely that the world food problem will be
solved within the next decades, despite the fact that it would be
possible in theory. There are serious social, economic, and political
limits to growth.
We should come back to the initial concept that visualizes the
problem of carrying capacity in a pipe with a declining diameter.
Using this image, we can conclude that the key for balancing people
and food is the speed with which the social, economic, cultural, and
political constraints are pushed bad; that hinder people to utilize
the full potential of the earth's food resources in a sustainable way.
If we can open the pipe quickly enough, if we can stop some of our
collective stupidities, we could produce more than enough food for
the people of the 21st century. The carrying capacity of the earth
is not a natural constant - it is a dynamic equilibrium, essentially
determined by human action.
10.8 The Discussion Continues
Two major books have recently been published on the issue of the
carrying capacity of the earth. These books differ from each other
in intention, methodology, empirical data base, and analytical ap-
proach, but both are important contributions to the ongoing de-
bate on the world's carrying capacity. Do they provide any new
arguments or data which would make it necessary to revise the con-
clusions in this chapter? The authors of these books might see it
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differently, but I consider their analyses quite similar to my con-
clusions. Of course, both books had access to new data, and the
authors have applied analytical techniques and models which are
far more advanced and rigorous than those I used. One can learn
a great deal from the authors' analytical insights and the wealth of
new empirical evidence and agro-economical considerations. But, in
the end, both books answer the question, How many people can be
fed on earth?, in a way which confirms my arguments.
The first book is an updated edition of the well-known FAO
study, World Agriculture: Towa'rds 2000 (Alexandratos, 1995). It
assesses world agricultural prospects to the year 2010; in some cases
even to 2025. An international team of highly acclaimed (mostly
agricultural and economic) experts selected, evaluated, and ana-
lyzed empirical data, mostly from the FAO's statistical system, in
order to model the world's agricultural potential and project future
trends in food supply. The book is packed with facts on (changing)
biophysical conditions of agricultural production (such as land and
water resources, crop yields, livestock productivity). Fortunately, it
is not restricted to this technical analysis of the world's agricultural
potential. There are also detailed studies of agro-economical and
socia-political factors, such as "international trade issues and poli-
cies" and "rural poverty." One of the most important sections of the
book, however, is the discussion of agricultural pressures on the en-
vironment. One chapter explicitly deals with the trade-off between
necessary agricultural development and environmental degradation.
The book carefully investigates prospects and technological require-
ments for putting worlel agriculture on a sustainable path.
It is risky to try to summarize the results of a 488-page book,
but I consider the main messa.ge of this FAO study to be that we
will be - despite numerous pressures, constraints, and risks - able
to feed the growing world population in the foreseeable future. We
have not reached, and will not reach during the next two or three
decades, insurmountable biophysical limits. The only sector where
global natural resource constraints are imminent is the sector of
fisheries (but even here we can anticipate alternatives, such as fish
farming). This optimistic outlook, however, is only possible under
certain conditions. We ca.n improve future food security only if we
bring modern agricultural technology and management techniques
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to underdeveloped agricultures and if - and only if - we eliminate
social and economic conditions (at both the national and interna-
tional levels) that constrain farmers from fully utilizing their soils
and livestock. Food security also requires socioeconomic develop-
ment to give the poor better access to available food supplies. In
concluding remarks the FAG team writes:
There appear to be no insurmountable resource and technology
constraints at the global level that would stand in the way of
increasing world food supplies by as much as required by the
growth of effective demand. And, on balance, there is scope for
such growth in production to be achieved while taking measures
to shift agriculture on to a more sustainable production path.
The second book, How Many People Can the Earth Support, is a
landmark study by Joel E. Cohen (1995). As a theoretical biologist,
mathematician, and demographer (to list just a few of his talents),
Cohen applies his analytical rigor to more dimensions of the problem
than most other authors. He first analyzes past long-term trends
in world population growth. This analysis is essential, because it
reminds us to consider the uniqueness of the present demographic
situation and the exceptiona1 challenges we face. He then reviews
the methods of projecting future population change - a sobering
exercise that highlights fundamental uncertainties in demographic
projections and a few, rather irrelevant, facts we know for sure. The
main part of the book begins with a review of eight major studies
that have attempted to estimate the human carrying capacity of the
earth. It is followed by a survey that compiles estimates of carrying
capacity from 1679 to the early 1990s. Cohen reports a most striking
finding:
There is no clear increasing or decreasing trend in the estimated
upper bounds [of carrying capacity]. '" [In fact,] the scatter
among the estimates seems to increase with the passage of time,
as more and more extreme (both high and low) estimates are
proposed, challenged and defended. [Cohen, 1995:214]
Cohen's interpretation of this growing diversity is carefully phrased:
The increasing scatter, or at least absence of convergence, is the
opposite of the progressive refinement and convergence that would
ideally occur as time passes when a constant of nature like the
speed of light or Avogadro's number is measured.
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I arrive at a more drastic conclusion: This lack of scientific
progress indicates that we have probably used the wrong approach
to deal with the earth's carrying capacity.
My last sentence in Section 10.7 of this chapter also points to
this problem: The carrying capacity of the earth is not a natural
constant - it is a dynamic equilibrium, essentially determined by
human action, The reason for highly diverse estimates of carrying
capacity is that human choices determine, to a great extent, how
many people can be fed on earth. The estimated number will vary
depending on the type of food people will choose to eat and which
(international) system of food distribution and trade they will imple-
ment. There will be great differences in carrying capacity depending
on the technology and management farmers will apply; but carry-
ing capacity will also vary with the level of environmental change
or degradation people will tolerate. Because of these future human
choices we cannot base our estimates of carrying capacity on demo-
graphic arithmetic and quantification of natural constraints alone.
We must develop conditional models and projections that take into
account the element of human action. All we can say at this time
is that "if future choices are thus-and-so, then the human carrying
capacity is likely to be so-and-so" (Cohen, 1995).
Is this the end of the story? I don't think so. This is just the
end of the agro-ecological approach to the problem of determining
carrying capacity. Cohen's book is a brilliant dissection of all the
failed efforts to quantify the earth's carrying capacity by estimat-
ing natural constraints. It is packed with critical (and sometimes
sarcastic) comments on all those gross abstractions, (unspoken) as-
sumptions, and far-reaching ceter'is par'ibus clauses which are neces-
sary to calculate carrying capacity but ignore important economic,
social, cultural, and political factors of the problem. Conditional
models of carrying capacity are a last attempt to save the failing
natural science approach to solving an essentially social, economic,
and political problem. These models just "download" the complex-
ity of our socioeconomic world into long arrays of rather arbitrary
conditions. In the end, we are as clever as before. We have to de-
cide which future human choices (defined as model conditions) we
consider most likely. Cohen draws a similar conclusion. In his last
chapter, in which he is "looking beyond the next hill," he deals with
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social and economic arrangements that would enable us to actually
increase the earth's real carrying capacity by improving our societies
and economies:
I aim in this book not to sell any particular approaches, but to
promote a view of the Earth's human carrying capacity that is
more modest, more in touch with a complex reality and more
likely to enable you to think through your own choices of action
than many of the simpler alternative views. [Cohen, 1995:380]
The carrying capacity of our earth is a problem of political plan-
ning, education, social balance, economic restructuring, and insti-
tutional efficiency. We are far from physical or biological limits
if - but only if - we use creativity, social responsibility, economic
initiative, and political vision to restructure still highly inefficient
agricultural and international food trade systems. Where we do not
have enough fertile soils we can educate young people to design and
produce computer chips (as in Malaysia) which will provide them
with the means to buy food on international markets. Where we
have economic arrangements that discourage farmers (as in former
centrally planned command agriculture) we can introduce incentives
and more efficient, decentralized planning. Where we have environ-
mental degradation from high-input agricultural practices we can
introduce legislation to ensure that pesticide or fertilizer use; we
can reduce the environmental impact of industrial-type pig farming
by limiting livestock per hectare of land. No natural law prevents
us from changing absurd agricultural subsidies in Europe's Com-
mon Agricultural Policy; no physical constant stands in the way of
social and economic reforms in India that would reduce poverty (a
major factor of food insecurity today and in the future). We can
establish or improve institutions, such as early warning systems and
international emergency food reserves, to deal with sudden food
deficits that are due to war, droughts, cyclones, and other unex-
pected events. And, above all, we can plan and reduce the size of
families in countries where rapid population growth prevents eco-
nomic and social reforms.
How Many People Can Be Fed on Earth?
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[1] Malthus was not the first scholar dealing with the problem, but prob-
ably the most influential.
[2] Usually the total solar radiation input of earth is seen as a (near) con-
stant. However, at the soil level, it can certainly vary considerably with
specific atmospheric conditions, such as water vapor and dust concen-
tration in the higher atmosphere, as well as cloud cover conditions in
the lower atmosphere.
[3] Clark (1967) estimated that the earth could support between 47 billion
people on an American-type diet and 147 billion on a cereal-subsistence
diet.
[4] These data are from the 1992-1993 WRI report. The estimates of
soil constraints in the 1990-1991 report were even higher for most
countries.
[5] River flows from other countries are an unreliable source of water sup-
ply, since they can be influenced by neighboring countries. Therefore
we compare only "annual internal renewable water resources," such as
underground aquifers.
[6] The situation within this continentlike country is, however, different.
There is water scarcity in the northeastern agricultural areas.
[7] In 1974 The Futurist wrote that Lester Brown "refuses to own an au-
tomobile and uses public transportation, so that more energy can go
into food production" (cited in Smil, 1987:100).
[8] In irrigation systems a certain proportion of the water applied is not
intended for plants, but for washing out (leaching) soluble salts which
are concentrated in the topsoil by evapotranspiration. Especially in
arid and semiarid areas this practice is absolutely essential. Otherwise
soil salinity would build up to toxic levels. Frequently farmers apply
too much water for leaching, which not only is a waste of the resource,
but also results in serious soil damage.
[9] This industry is highly profitable; Austria's richest man made his for-
tune by producing citric acid for the European food industry.

Part IV
Future Fertility and
Mortality in
Industrialized Countries
The nature of uncertainties in fertility and mortality in today's in-
dustrialized countries is very different from that in developing re-
gions. For mortality the relevant questions are: What will happen
to old-age mortality? Is life expectancy already approaching an up-
per limit? These are highly controversial issues. Medical science
does not provide a convincing reason to assume that a limit will
soon be reached. In our scenarios this optimistic view is translated
into an assumed three-year increase in life expectancy per decade.
The alternative view of stagnating improvements, due to a possible
increase in adverse conditions (stress, toxification, risky behavior,
etc.) is reflected in the low assumption of a general one-year im-
provement per decade.
The future direction of fertility change is unclear in industrial-
ized countries. On the one hand, fertility could further decline if cer-
tain social trends such as increasing individualism and consumerism
continue. On the other hand, fertility may increase to replacement
level or above if certain counterforces, such as community orien-
tation, become stronger than they are now and social services are
improved to make it easier for women to combine motherhood and
work. However, more factors seem to point toward lower fertility
than toward higher fertility, but the issue remains unsettled. This
uncertainty can be translated into possible low values of 1.3-1.4 chil-
(lren and high values of 2.1-2.3 children per woman depending on
the specific region.

Chapter 11
Future Reproductive Behavior
in Industrialized Countries
Wolfgang Lutz
For countries that have fully passed through the fertility transition
from high fertility to modern family limitation, there is no convinc-
ing theory on what should happen to fertility trends in the future.
This is not for lack of trying. Approaching the issue from several
different disciplines, scientists have made innumerable efforts to ana-
lyze and understand past trends and to derive from these hypotheses
about the future.
Economists tend to look at fertility fluctuations, trying to dis-
cover regularities in the sequence of ups and downs and associations
with economic cycles. Demographers have given much attention to
the comparison of period and cohort fertility rates. Sociologists and
psychologists have studied myriads of survey data and developed
theories of increasing individualization and changing gender roles.
Family historians have pointed at the changing structure and func-
tion of the family. And the medical profession has contributed to the
issue by looking at sub-fecundity and effectiveness of contraceptives.
In sum, there are many interesting ideas and hypotheses that tend
to refer to specific aspects of reproductive behavior, but they are of
limited value for predicting the final outcome, namely, age-specific
fertility rates in the years to come.
The remarks made in this chapter are based on the huge lit-
erature available on the determinants of fertility in modern indus-
trialized countries which cannot be exhaustively summarized here
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(see Kiernan, 1993, for a more detailed discussion). The chapter
is guided by the goal of determining reasonable and defendable as-
sumptions about alternative high and low paths of future fertility
trends in modern industrialized countries. In doing this, we first
look at unambiguous empirical evidence from past years, and then
list possible arguments that could be used to support alternative
assumptions of either further declining fertility rates or increasing
fertility levels. The final section focuses on how these alternative
forces could work in a heterogeneous society and result in specific
assumed fertility levels.
11.1 Recent Trends in Partnership
Formation and Dissolution
Human procreation is intimately linked to the institution of mar-
riage in virtually all historical and contemporary societies. In some
populations this link has been stronger than in others, and recently,
in highly industrialized countries, new forms of partnership have
been spreading that directly compete with traditional marriage.
With respect to fertility, this situation raises the obvious ques-
tion whether such changes in living arrangements and partnership
have affected and will affect the average number of children born to
women and men. For this reason we must first look at changes in
the marital-status composition of industrialized populations.
Over recent decades the proportion ofthe married adult popula-
tion has declined markedly in many industrialized countries. Table
11.1 gives these proportions for 1960 and 1985 in selected Euro-
pean countries. This decline was most significant in Sweden, where
the proportion of married adult women declined from more than 60
percent in 1960 to only 48 percent in 1985. The decline for men
was of similar magnitude. The decline is mostly attributable to in-
creases in the never-married and divorced proportions. A similar
pattern can be found in the other Scandinavian countries and in the
UK. In former West Germany (FRG) the decline in the proportion
married was much steeper for men than for women, which is largely
explained by a significant increase in the never-married male popu-
lation. Of the countries listed, Italy shows a slight increase between
1960 and 1985 which is due to the fact that the decline in marriage
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Table 11.1. Marital-status distribution of the population above
age 15 in selected European countries: 1960 and 1985.
'Nomen Men
Country
Never Mar- Di- Wid- Never Mar- Di- Wid-
married riecl von'ed owed married ried vorced owed
France
1960 20.7
1985 24.5
F'RG
1960 22.7
1985 24.4
Hungary
1960 17.3
1985 14.2
Italy
1960 29.1
1985 24.5
Netherlands
1960 26.9
1985 26.4
Sweden
1960 26.2
1985 :30.0
UK
1960 2Ul
1985 24.0
Source: Prinz, 1995.
60.3 2.5
56.6 4.6
57.7 2.6
54.:3 4.4
64.4 2.6
61.5 6.9
58.0 0.0
61.1 0.4
63.0 1.:3
51.G 4.8
60.7 3.0
48.4 8.7
6:Hj 09
56.4 5.7
lG.G 27.3
14.3 31.5
17.0 26.8
16.9 33.5
15.7 23.7
17.4 23.1
12.9 34.4
14.0 30.8
8.8 30.7
11.2 33.5
10.1 31.6
12.9 38.7
13.6 2.5.6
13.9 :31.4
66.4 1.9
61.9 3.6
67.9 1..5
.59.8 3..5
71.5 1.4
68.0 .5.0
62.1 0.0
6.5.8 0.3
64.9 0.8
60.0 3.9
61.9 2.3
.50.4 7.3
70.0 0.6
60.2 4.8
4.3
3.1
3.9
3.2
3.4
3.8
3..5
3.1
3.6
2.6
4.3
3..5
3.9
3.5
rates started later in Italy than in the other countries. This table
clearly shows that the proportion married is a cumulative indicator
which is largely determined by past trends; therefore, it is hardly
appropriate to study recent behavioral changes.
Trends in contemporary marriage behavior can be derived from
age-specific marriage rates. An analysis of such rates in industri-
alized countries since the 1960s makes it apparent that men and
women are marrying later and that the probabilities of marriage
have decreased. To illustrate this pattern, Figu.re 11.1 plots age-
specific marriage rates of women in the USA and Sweden in 1967
and 1990/1993. In 1967, marriage rates peaked in both countries
in the 20-24 age group with about 20 percent of all women in this
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Figure 11.1. Age-specific marriage rates for women in Sweden
and the USA: 1967 and 1990/1993. Source: National Statistical
Yearbooks, various years.
group marrying. Some 20 years later the peak moved to the 25-29
age group with marriage intensities slightly above half of the 1967
level in the USA and only at less than one-third of the 1967 level in
Sweden. The figures include remarriages which explains why rates
especially in the USA are still rather high; many individuals in their
late 30s and 40s are remarrying. Marriage rates among American
women aged 45-49 are even higher than those for Swedish women in
the traditional prime age group for marriage, 20-24. While the pat-
tern of marriage and especially remarriage after divorce still seems
to be popular in the USA, the new Swedish pattern can only be ex-
plained by a significant societal change in the role of marriage and
an increase in other living arrangements.
Table 11.2 gives data on the evolution of nonmarital unions
in Europe between 1960 and 1985. It shows that in Sweden, de-
spite a 20 percent decline in proportions married, the proportion of
women living in unions (marriages and consensual unions) remained
virtually unchanged. Not surprisingly this trend toward nonmari-
tal unions is strongest among younger couples. Of all women aged
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Table 11.2.
Country
Austria
Finland
France
Germany
Hungary
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Sweden
UK
Evolution of nonmarital unions in Europe.
Changes 1960 to 1985 Proportion of consensual
in percentage points of unions among all unions by
women living in age of woman (in %) ca. 1985
Marriage All unions 20-24 25-29 30-34
-3.0 1.6 25.8 8.2 3.5
-7.0 5.0 49.7 23.9 11.6
-4.6 4.6 35.8 14.0 10.1
-6.1 -1.5 30.0 a 6.2a 6.2 a
-2.8 0.1 3.3 2.4 2.7
4.4 5.9 2.1 1.8 1.6
-9.1 -1.7 36.3 15.9 6.7
-9.8 1.1 47.0 23.0 12.0
-20.3 -0.4 77.1 48.1 29.6
-11.3 -5.4 29.0 12.8 6.8
aData only given for 15-24 and 25-34 age groups.
Source: Prinz, 1995.
20-24 living with a man, only 23 percent were married. This trend
toward nonmarital unions was less extreme in other European coun-
tries but still went in the same direction. In all countries a decline in
proportions married was associated with an increase in nonmarital
unions. Only Hungary and Italy stand out with very low proportions
of women living in nonmarital unions in 1985.
The other significant trend over recent decades was the increase
in divorce rates that could be observed in all industrialized countries.
Crude divorce rates (the number of divorces per 1,000 inhabitants)
showed an increasing trend between the 1950s and the 1990s in most
industrialized countries. At every point in time between 1950 and
1990, divorce rates were the highest in the USA. Between 1965 and
1980 the rate more than doubled. Currently about every second
marriage ends in divorce in the USA. In Europe this proportion
ranges from about lout of 10 marriages in Southern Europe to 3
out of 10 in Central Europe and to about 4 out of 10 in Scandinavia
and the UK (as indicated by the total divorce rates in Figure 11.2).
In the present context the crucial question with regard to future
fertility levels is to what extent changes in the patterns of union for-
mation and dissolution affect the number of children. The empirical
evidence so far is very mixed. In Sweden the fertility of nonmarital
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Figure 11.2. Total divorce rates in selected European countries:
1970-1994. Source: Council of Europe, 1995.
unions is not considerably different from that of married couples,
although dissolution rates of the former unions are still significantly
higher. In Southern and Eastern Europe fertility is still closely tied
to marriage. In western Germany, despite rapidly declining pro-
portions married, only 10 percent of all children are born out of
wedlock. In the USA, this proportion recently increased to about
25 percent (Pagnini and Rindfuss, 1993). For most industrialized
countries it seems likely that a possible future decline in the preva-
lence of marriage and marital stability will tend to decrease fertility,
but the extent of this decline will largely depend on whether other
countries follow the Swedish or the German pattern. This issue is
discussed in Sections 11.4 and 11 ..5.
11.2 Recent Trends in Period and
Cohort Fertility
Fertility can be measured and described with respect to different
demographic dimensions, such as age, duration of marriage, birth
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order, period between births, and calendar year. One principal con-
ceptual distinction is whether to consider the reproductive experi-
ence of birth cohorts of women over their life span (cohort approach)
or to study the fertility of different age groups in a specific calendar
year (period approach). For the purpose of population projections
the number of children born in a particular year is needed as an in-
put parameter, which is derived from the application of age-specific
period fertility rates to the age structure of the female population.
Hence, assumptions must be defined in terms of period fertility. If
one believes, however, that cohort fertility - because it has greater
stability - is the more appropriate indicator for making assump-
tions, assumed cohort fertility can be translated into period rates if
additional assumptions about the timing of births over the course
of a life are made.
Table 11.3 gives period total fertility rates, i.e., the mean num-
ber of children per woman implied by age-specific fertility rates of a
year, for 30 industrialized countries over the period 1950-199,5. In
all countries except Malta, Japan, and countries in Eastern Europe,
fertility increased during the late 1950s. This indicates the start of
the postwar baby boom, which peaked in the early 1960s in most
countries. Of the 30 countries listed, in 1960-1965 only Estonia
and Hungary had fertility rates below two children per woman, but
several countries had rates above :3.0. The 1970s were a period of
fertility decline in practically every industrialized country. By 1980-
1985 only Iceland, Ireland, Poland, and Slovakia had a fertility level
above 2.1. For all industrialized countries together- which com-
prised 0.8 billion people in 1950 and 1.2 billion in 1995 (UN, 1995)
- fertility declined from 2.77 in 1955-1960 to 1.91 in 1975-1980 and
to 1. 70 in 1990-1995.
As to regional differences in fertility trends (see Figure 11.3 for
five selected countries), there seems to be a West European pattern
with a moderate baby boom and a steep decline during the 1970s.
Southern Europe follows the pattern with some delay. The United
States clearly falls out of the general pattern: because of an excep-
tionally pronounced baby boom, it reached fertility levels of 3.7 in
195.5, which is above any level registered in Europe since early in this
century. Japan shows a completely different pattern with a steep
fertility decline during the 1950s which brought down total period
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Table 11.3. Total fertility rates in 30 industrialized countries:
1950-1995.
1950- 1955- 1960- 1965- 1970- 1975- 1980- 1985- 1990-
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Australia 3.18 3.41 3.27 2.87 2.53 2.09 1.93 1.87 1.87
Austria 2.10 2.53 2.79 2.54 2.02 1.65 1.62 1.45 1.53
Belarus 2.60 2.72 2.68 2.37 2.24 2.09 2.06 2.03 1.65
Belgium 2.33 2.50 2.66 2.34 1.94 1.70 1.59 1.56 1.64
Bulgaria 2.48 2.27 2.18 2.15 2.17 2.18 2.01 1.92 1.50
Czech Rep. 2.69 2.35 2.21 1.94 2.21 2.32 1.99 1.92 1.83
Denmark 2.54 2..54 2..59 2.25 1.97 1.68 1.43 1.54 1.70
Estonia 2.06 1.99 1.94 2.01 2.15 2.06 2.08 2.18 1.61
Finland 2.97 2.78 2.58 2.06 1.62 1.64 1.69 1.66 1.85
France 2.73 2.71 2.85 2.61 2.31 1.86 1.87 1.80 1.74
Greece 2.29 2.27 2.20 2.38 2.32 2.32 1.96 1.53 1.40
Hungary 2.73 2.21 1.82 1.97 2.09 2.11 1.81 1.82 1.71
Iceland 3.70 4.02 3.94 3.15 2.84 2.29 2.25 2.12 2.23
Ireland 3.37 3.67 3.96 3.86 3.80 3.46 2.87 2.28 2.10
Italy 2.32 2.35 2.55 2.49 2.28 1.92 1.55 1.35 1.27
Japan 2.75 2.08 2.01 2.00 2.07 1.81 1.76 1.66 1.50
Luxembourg 1.97 2.22 2.36 2.22 1.96 1.50 1.47 1.47 1.65
Malta 4.14 3.73 :3.10 2.17 2.07 2.02 1.96 2.02 2.05
Netherlands 3.06 3.09 3.12 2.73 1.97 1.58 1.51 1.56 1.61
Norway 2.60 2.84 2.90 2.72 2.25 1.81 1.69 1.80 1.93
Poland 3.62 3.29 2.65 2.27 2.25 2.26 2.33 2.15 1.88
Portugal 3.05 3.04 3.09 2.86 2.76 2.42 1.99 1.60 1.55
Russian Fed. 2.51 2.62 2.48 2.02 1.98 1.92 1.99 2.10 1.53
Slovakia 3.52 3.27 2.89 2.49 2.51 2.47 2.28 2.15 1.92
Spain 2.57 2.75 2.89 2.93 2.89 2.63 1.86 1.46 1.23
Sweden 2.21 2.23 2.33 2.12 1.89 1.65 1.64 1.91 2.10
Switzerland 2.28 2.33 2.50 2.27 1.81 1.53 1.53 1.53 1.60
Ukraine 2.51 2.30 2.08 1.9.5 2.04 1.98 2.00 2.01 1.64
UK 2.18 2.49 2.81 2.52 2.04 1.72 1.80 1.81 1.81
USA 3.45 3.71 3.31 2.55 2.02 1.79 1.82 1.92 2.08
Source: UN, 1995.
fertility from 3.6 in 1950 to 2.0 in 1960. An East Asian particularity
is the low fertility in 1966 which is attributable to the Hinoeuma
("fire horse") year during which it was considered unpropitious to
have a daughter (Atoh, 1989).
In many of the East European transition countries fertility rates
have recently declined sharply. The most extreme case is eastern
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Figure 11.3. Total fertility rates in five selected industrialized
countries: 1950-1995.
Germany with a TFR of 0.77 in 1994. But a number of other coun-
tries have also reached very low levels: Bulgaria, 1.46; Czech Repub-
lic, 1.44; Latvia, 1.40; Romania, 1.41; Ukraine, 1.40; Croatia, 1.52;
as well as others. It is still too early to assess whether the sharp
fertility declines in these countries mostly reflect a postponement
of births that will be followed by a recovery of fertility rates or a
transition to a different reproductive pattern.
As can be expected the completed fertility of generations (co-
horts) shows a much smoother trend as plotted in Figure 11.4. The
figure gives the average number of children born between 1940 and
1960 to women by age 45. For cohorts born after 1950, the data are
partly based on estimations because the women have not yet reached
age 45. There seem to be two types of countries, those that show a
steadily declining trend, such as West Germany, Switzerland, Italy,
and the UK, and those that do not show a steady decline, such as
Sweden and Poland. The French data are particularly interesting
because several years ago France saw a heated public debate over
whether cohort fertility was actually still above replacement level
despite of a period TFR of 1.8 (Le Bras, 1991). The most recent
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Figure 11.4. Completed fertility rate for birth cohorts born be-
tween 1940 and 1963. Source: Council of Europe, 1995.
cohort data resolve this debate by clearly showing that the fertility
of French couples is below replacement level.
Under the cohort perspective, fertility declines over recent
decades look less dramatic than under the period perspective. The
baby boom and the following baby bust are not clearly visible be-
cause these events were largely phenomena of birth timing. However,
there is little doubt that in most countries cohort fertility has also
been declining significantly below replacement level.
11.3 Desired Family Size and Childlessness
Since the information derived from the analysis of past fertility
trends in industrialized countries that have already completed the
demographic transition does not suggest any obvious future trend,
one must look at other sources of information, such as reproductive
intentions as stated in interview surveys. For short-term studies,
such expressed intentions are clearly a relevant piece of informa-
tion although they cannot be readily translated into fertility rates
because of various biases.
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Table 11.4. Responses to question: "[In your country] today what
do you think is the ideal number of children for a family like yours
or the one you might have?" Poll taken in 1989.
Number of children (in %)
Country
Belgium
Denmark
Germany, West
Greece
France
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
UK
EC12
012
5 18 52
3 9 65
7 14 58
2 13 42
3 19 47
2 9 33
2 9 61
3 21 56
3 5 65
3 21 55
4 22 55
2 10 67
4 14 57
3
21
20
18
33
28
30
24
19
22
16
15
15
21
4 or more
3
4
3
11
4
27
4
3
5
4
3
6
4
Mean
2.01
2.13
1.97
2.42
2.13
2.79
2.20
1.99
2.23
2.01
1.94
2.14
2.10
Source: Eurobarometer, 1991.
A recent survey with comparable data for a large number of in-
dustrialized countries was given in an annex to the Eurobarometer
1991 which asked identical questions in 12 countries of the European
Community. Table 11.4 lists the responses to the question on the
ideal number of children in a family. Despite some variation across
countries, the general pattern is similar: very few European men
and women find a childless family ideal; the proportion is highest in
West Germany with 7 percent and Belgium has the second highest
proportion with .s percent. In all countries there is a clear majority
for the two-child family. In the UK, the Netherlands, and Denmark,
up to two- thirds of the population thinks that two children are de-
sirable. About one-fifth thinks that three children are ideal. The
proportion preferring three children is 30 percent in Ireland and 33
percent in Greece. In the UK and Spain this proportion is as low
as 15 percent. The proportion indicating four or more children as
ideal is extremely small in all countries except Ireland and Greece.
The ideal mean family size is lowest in Spain, West Germany, Lux-
embourg, Portugal, and Belgium. While these results are expected
for Germany, they are surprising for Spain and Portugal because not
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Table 11.5. Responses to questions on family size in Austria from
women married five to eight years: 1981~1982.
Desired Expected Children already
Number of Societal Personal number of number of born (incl.
children ideal ideal children children pregnancies)
Zero 0.1 2.4 2.2 2.2 10.1
One 1.4 7.3 13.8 14.1 30.7
Two 72.3 53.4 51.6 50.0 46.0
Three 24.5 28.1 24.6 25.3 10.8
Four 1.4 6.6 5.9 6.5 1.8
Five or more 0.3 2.2 1.9 1.9 0.6
Mean 2.27 2.37 2.25 2.26 1.65
Source: Gisser et al., 1985.
too long ago they still had rather high fertility (in the World Fertility
Survey in the late 197013, Portugal was considered part of the high-
fertility/developing country group). The low levels of stated ideal
family size in these countries also support the view that the present
low period fertility rates are not just a temporary phenomenon.
However, a stated ideal family size is not an actual family size,
especially if the ideal refers to an abstract average family rather than
one's own. An Austrian fertility survey conducted during the early
198013 asked five different questions related to family size to under-
stand better the personal biases involved. (Similar surveys have also
been conducted in other European countries.) Table 11.5 gives the
responses to questions on the societal ideal, the personal ideal, the
actual desired number of children, the realistically expected number
of children, and the children already born after five to eight years of
marriage. The survey shows an interesting result: the respondents'
support for the two-child family is much stronger at the societal
level than at the personal level.
Only 2 percent of the married women expressed that they prefer
to remain childless, but the data on actual fertility show that the
proportion childless is much higher. Because the Austrian data come
from a panel study, it was possible to determine how many women
have completed their stated plans over a three- to four-year period
(see Lutz, 198.5). More than half of the births that were planned
did not occur (pregnancies were also counted as births). On the
other hand, 13 percent of the women had more children than they
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planned. This resulted in a significant net deficit. It also implies that
if unplanned pregnancies could be avoided by better contraception,
the deficit may become even larger.
The most significant case of a personal deficit, that is, having
fewer children than originally intended, seems to be with the first
birth. The actual number of childless women tends to be much
higher than the number of women who say in their early adulthood
that they prefer to remain childless. It is quite difficult to calculate
the proportion of women remaining without children (and complete
family-size distributions) as implied by period fertility rates because
birth-order specific information is required. A recent survey article
by Feeney and Lutz (1991) describes alternative methods and shows
estimates of childlessness among all women by age 45 as implied by
period rates in the early 1980s: 27 percent of women remain childless
in the USA; 31 percent, in the Netherlands; and 28 percent, in
Austria.
More accurate but less up-to-date information on childlessness
is available on cohorts of women. A study of Austria, East Germany,
and West Germany shows that about 30 percent of cohorts above
age 70 were childless in the late 1980s (see Buttner and Lutz, 1990b).
Between 15 percent and 20 percent of cohorts aged 50-70 were child-
less. This decline in childlessness is evidence of the disappearance of
the traditional "European marriage pattern" under which high pro-
portions of women remained unmarried. Childlessness had always
been somewhat lower in East Germany than in Austria, but after
the 1940 cohort the trends of childlessness completely diverge, with
decreases in East Germany and increases in Austria. As discussed
later, the very low levels of childlessness in East Germany are partly
attributable to government policies. For West Germany the exist-
ing data for marriage cohorts after 1956 show a clear increase of
childlessness over time (after 11 to 15 years of marriage) to almost
20 percent for those married in the period between 1971 and 1975.
Taken together with the fact that the proportion of married women
has been declining and that fertility outside marriage is very low,
this implies very high levels of cohort childlessness in West Germany.
These family-size distributions, including childlessness, also
have direct implications on distributional and equity issues, such
as the concentration of childbearing and the division of labor for
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society's reproduction among women of one generation. The rather
even distribution and low childlessness in East Germany in the late
1980s implies that 3:3 percent of all women had half the children
born, whereas in Austria 23 percent of all women had half the chil-
dren (Lutz and Vaupel, 1987). In West Germany 29 percent of all
married women had half the children, but for all women together the
proportion should be lower than in Austria, i.e., the concentration
higher. The concentration of childbearing has many implications
which are discussed in Lutz (1989).
One relevant issue for future fertility levels is whether there will
be a trend toward some women specializing in childrearing while
the rest have few or no children. Such a pattern could result in
higher total fertility, but is very unlikely. All empirical information
shows that very few women have expressed that they want to have a
large number of children and that the overwhelming majority have
expressed the desire to have at least one child or two children. The
normative trend toward the two-child family, at least as a goal, seems
to be very strong, which implies that in the future childrearing is
unlikely to be concentrated in a certain group of women.
11.4 Arguments for Assuming Higher
Fertility
In several countries period fertility has been below so-called
repla.cement-Ievel fertility (i.e., a net reproduction rate of 1.0) for
more than two decades. Is this a stable and sustainable pattern of
reproduction in modern industrialized societies, or is it only a tran-
sitory state that will be followed by higher fertility? One can think
of several mechanisms that can potentially lead to higher average
fertility in these countries.
11.4.1 The homeostasis argument
The usual interpretation of the demographic transition theory is that
an initial equilibrium between high birth rates and high death rates
is disturbed by declining mortality which in turn triggers a fertility
decline that brings birth and death rates back to an equilibrium at
low levels. However, history has shown that fertility declines with all
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their irregularities and national particularities generally do not stop
at replacement level, but continue to decline further. The homeosta-
sis argument would stress that this is simply an overshooting that
will be reversed after some inevitable societal adjustments. Most
explicitly this has recently been expressed by Vishnevsky (1991)
who does not see fertility levels as the sum of individual behav-
ior, but rather sees it as one aspect in the evolution of a system
that determines behavior. He believes that the development of the
demographic system is directed by a proper, inherent goal. In the
process of self-organization the system aims at self-maintenance and
survival. For human beings at a certain stage of evolution, a new and
higher goal is assumed to appear that goes beyond pure population
survival - namely, that of maintaining homeostasis in the popula-
tion's reproduction, even in the face of considerable fluctuations in
external conditions (see Vishnevsky, 1991:265).
It is not yet possible to empirically test this hypothesis. Trends
such as the recent fertility increase in Sweden, which has been a
forerunner of many other social changes, may be taken as evidence
by supporters of this hypothesis. But the hypothesis is not specific
enough to be tested (e.g., it does not state by how much fertility
should increase over a period). Since studies have not addressed the
mechanisms and motivations that induce couples to have more chil-
dren, it remains largely a philosophical argument. Nevertheless, this
hypothesis seems worth considering at this general level, although it
is highly controversial. For example, authors such as Westoff (1991a)
criticize the assumption of a "magnetic force" toward replacement.
11.4.2 Assumption of fertility cycles
Several views summarized under this heading contend that the
present low level of period fertility is just the end of a cycle and that
the future will bring an upward trend. These views can be grouped
into arguments dealing with the timing of fertility within cohorts
and those dealing with intergenerational fertility fluctuations. The
first argument is based on the observation that in many countries
the recent declines in total fertility were accompanied by declines
in the fertility ra.tes of younger women. Hence, one could assume
that observed trends only reflect a. delay in childbearing (the timing
of fertility) and do not indicate a decline in the number of children
268 Wolfgang Lutz
a woman has over her life span (the quantum of fertility). As de-
scribed earlier it is evident in all countries that declines in cohort
fertility have been slower than declines in period fertility. But in
most European countries, meanwhile, cohort fertility is also below
2.0, and in several countries even below 1.6.
It is difficult to evaluate the argument that women will soon
begin having their delayed births, hence increasing period fertility.
The slight recovery in total fertility around 1990 in several European
countries may be partly attributable to this phenomenon. Studies
for Sweden have also shown that current high period fertility is
largely due to this timing phenomenon and was likely to decline soon
(Hoem, 1990). Indeed, the most recent data indicate such decline.
The timing phenomenon could only have a sizable impact on future
period fertility levels if one assumes that cohort fertility tends to
be substantially higher than present period rates. This may be the
case in Southern Europe, where period fertility recently declined
extremely fast, but generally there is no clear substantive reason
to assume that a significant catch-up phenomenon will occur. For
longer- term fertility trends (more than 10 years) such timing aspects
are irrelevant in any case.
The second argument focuses on longer-term cycles. It assumes
that the fertility level of the parents' generation is a determinant in
their children's reproductive behavior. Best known in this context
is Easterlin's relative income hypothesis (Easterlin, 1980). In short,
it assumes that fertility is determined by income relative to aspira-
tions, with cohort size determining income: generation one has low
relative income and low fertility; generation two grows up with low
aspirations for wealth but finds advantages in labor-market condi-
tions because of few competitors, hence it has high relative income
and high fertility; generation three is large and has high aspirations
resulting in low relative income and low fertility. Empirically, this
model fits nicely to the US baby boom in the 196013 and the subse-
quent fertility decline. But this is not a complete cycle. So far a new
baby boom has failed to materialize. For other countries the his-
torical long-term cycle argument is even less applicable. There are
also a number of conceptual problems such as the fact that within
a generation fertility is unevenly distributed among families - some
families have many children, others only one (see discussion in Lutz,
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1989) - and that women have children at different ages which soon
smoothes out any cycles based on intergenerational dynamics. But
even if this assumed mechanism is not a dominating factor for fer-
tility trends, it may play some role.
11.4.3 Pronatalistic policies
Governments in countries with very low fertility have reason to
worry about the long-term implications of subreplacement fertility
together with increasing life expectancy at higher ages on the pen-
sion system and other social-security systems such as health care.
Because the baby- boom generation is currently in its main produc-
tive ages, the economic dependency burden is still quite favorable.
But projections indicate that in Western Europe, the proportion of
the population above age 60 will increase significantly over the next
few decades. This situation poses an extremely serious threat to
present forms of pay-as-you-go pension schemes, where the active
people pay for the pensioners. For this and other reasons, several
European countries have tried to stimulate fertility through poli-
cies that make it slightly more profitable to have children. It must
be stressed, however, that most countries that provide extensive
child-care benefits do this for reasons of social policy rather than
population policy (Holm, 1991). But still such policies might be
relevant for individual reproductive decisions.
If couples react to reproductive incentives in the way that indi-
viduals react to other incentives, then changes in the incentive struc-
ture will have an impact on fertility. Monetary incentives for having
children are only one possible mechanism of government policies to
increase fertility. There is very little evidence that such monetary
policies actually work. For instance, Germany and Austria pro-
vide many direct and indirect child benefits while in the USA the
benefits are almost nonexistent; yet fertility is much lower in Ger-
many and Austria than it is in the USA. Also over time it is hard
to link changes in fertility rates to changes in government benefits
(Chesnais, 1985; Klinger, 198.5). One exception is the marked fer-
tility increase in East Germany between 1976 and 1977, which can
clearly be attributed to the introduction of a package of social-policy
measures (Biittner and Lutz, 1990a; Vining, 1984). But conditions
in East Germany were very specific: there was a severe housing
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shortage, and the birth of a child was an easy way to get access
to an apartment and other benefits. Since these benefits provided
for basic needs that otherwise could hardly be met, the motivation
for childbearing became very strong. But this already goes beyond
the usual understanding of incentives, because it is associated with
deprivations that are hardly acceptable in democratic, free-market
societies.
Beyond material incentives, social pressure and changing atti-
tudes as well as infrastructural arrangements for childrearing may
be very important. Because no monetary transfer can realistically
compensate the cost of children, including the opportunity costs
of women not working because of a child, nonmaterial motivations
for parenthood remain extremely important. These motivations can
also be influenced by government policies that try to remove institu-
tional and other obstacles so that women can combine motherhood
with a profession. In Sweden, the universal and low-cost provision
of public child-care starting at very young ages and the many oppor-
tunities for part-time work may be important factors in explaining
the high level of fertility.
11.4.4 National identity and ethnic rivalry
NationaJ identity may have an important influence on individual
reproductive behavior. Fears related to the ethnic composition of
the population and ingroup-outgroup feelings can be powerful emo-
tional forces that may directly influence fertility. Examples of this
may be found in Israel, Northern Ireland, and the Baltic states; in
these areas there is clear rivalry between two groups of the popula-
tion. This rivalry may be an important reason why fertility levels
are higher in these countries than in other countries under similar
socioeconomic conditions. One possible hypothesis is that through
international migration such rivalry may also affect other industrial-
ized countries. But there are strong counterexamples, such as fran-
cophone Canadians, non-Hispanic Californians, or Germans living
in cities with many Turks, where ethnic-linguistic rivalry is carried
out by means other than reproductive behavior.
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11.5 Arguments for Assuming Lower
Fertility
11.5.1 Trend toward individualism
According to the sociological theories of Durkheim (1902) and
Tonnies (1887) the process of "modernization" is characterized
by a transition from "community" (Gemeinschajt) to "society"
( Gesellschaft). While "community" refers to a living arrangement
that is lasting and complete under a relatively stable structure, "so-
ciety" means a mere proximity of persons who are independent of
one another living within relatively open structures. In this process
of transition, an increasing number of needs that were once met by
the family are taken over by anonymous institutions. This means
an increase in equality and personal freedom, but also an increase
of individualism and a weakening of interpersonal bonds.
With respect to the future of the family, Hoffmann-Nowotny
(1987) assumes that the trend of increa.sing differentiation as well as
multiple and partial integration will continue, especially for women.
From a sociological point of view, he concludes that there is little
reason to believe that the family as we know it can and will survive
as the mainstream model for future living patterns. This view is not
too different from the notion of a "second demographic transition"
put forward by Lestaeghe (1983) and van de Kaa (1987) to char-
acterize a new phase of demographic behavior that expresses itself
through lower marriage propensities, higher instability of unions,
increase in extramarital fertility, and lower total fertility.
Another psychological aspect of this supposed trend toward in-
dividualism is tha.t men and ,vomen are increasingly reluctant to
make decisions that have long-term consequences and clearly limit
the future freedom of choice. The decision to have a child prede-
termines many choices for the following two decades, and makes
second thoughts impossible once the child is born. If the trend to-
ward greater mobility in all aspects of life continues, this might well
mean fewer responsible men and women daring to become parents.
There is little empirical basis to evaluate the validity of these
hypotheses for the future, but they seem to be powerful arguments
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and plausible explanations of recent trends. In the future it might
well happen that, if this trend develops to an extreme, counterforces
will be mobilized to compensate some of the negative aspects of
this trend. But a return to traditional patterns of "community"
with their restrictions on individual freedom is very unlikely. Most
of the following arguments are related to this general "continued
modernization" argument.
11.5.2 Economic independence of women
One recent trend that has often been singled out as a dominating
feature of societal change is the increasing economic independence
of women. Female labor-force participation has been steadily in-
creasing in virtually all industrialized countries over recent decades.
The increase has been strongest in Scandinavia, where labor-force
participation is almost universal among adult women below age 50,
but female activity rates in North America are not much lower. In
Italy, female labor-force participation increased by more than one-
third in the 1980s. This fundamental change in economic activity
of women is obviously connected to changing reproductive patterns.
Increasing economic independence of women also tends to result in a
postponement of marriage, which typically is associated with lower
fertility.
One must be cautious, however, in pointing out female economic
activity as a major determinant of declining fertility. It may also
be that the lower desired number of children motivates women not
to stay at home but rather to enter the labor force, or there may
be another driving force behind both trends. This last possibility is
su pported by evidence from several countries that are experiencing
improvements in fertility rates, despite very high and still increas-
ing female labor-force participation. The key question in this mul-
tifaceted issue seems to be: How can women combine parenthood
with participation in the labor market (see, e.g., Kiernan, 1991)?
This may be a decisive question in determining future European
birth rates. Nevertheless, even with flexible regulations and good
child-care systems, working women, on average, will not have very
large families.
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11.5.3 Instability of partnership
As described above, marital stability has been declining in all indus-
trialized countries. Part of the reason for this phenomenon clearly
lies in the increasing economic independence of women. Women are
no longer economically forced to stay in an unsatisfactory union if
they earn an independent income. Other reasons may lie in the
general increase in mobility in modern industrialized societies and
in a decreasing threshold in the level of dissatisfaction necessary to
attempt to change conditions. \Vhatever the social and psycholog-
ical reasons may be, the chances of a young couple today staying
together for 20 years, the minimum time required to raise a child,
are slimmer than they were in the past.
Increasing evidence from empirical studies (Kiernan, 1992)
shows that the separation of parents actually does more harm to
children than had been assumed in the past. Such harm is measured
by studying a child's social behavior, intellectual performance, and
feeling of happiness and security. Thus, responsible prospective par-
ents may decide not to have children if they have doubts about the
stability of their partnership. This may be a very important factor
in the decisions of couples in consensual unions, which seem to have
much lower stability than marital unions (Prinz, 1995).
One possible counterargument would be that remarriage (or for-
mation of new nonmarital unions) may actually be an incentive to
have an additional child to strengthen the relationship with a new
partner. Empirical analysis on data cross-classified by marital sta-
tus and number of children for Finland (see Lutz, 1993a) shows that
a slight effect of this kind exists, but it does not have a significant
impact on total fert1lity.
11.5.4 Consumerism and use of time
Commentators often mention the increase in consumerism as a basic
underlying cause for the recent fertility decline. The argument is
that people would rather invest in pleasures for themselves than in
children; they would rather buy a new car than have another child;
they would rather spend their time watching TV than changing
diapers. Children are considered work and not fun. As pointed
out by Keyfitz (1991), in earlier times couples had to work harder
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and more hours to earn a living and still found the time to have
many children. The extra leisure time couples have today is not
being spent on having children. Having children is defined as work
and therefore one talks about its opportunity cost. In the words
of Keyfitz (1991:239): "No one complains about the opportunity
cost of having sex. Thus to talk about opportunity cost of children
indeed highlights the problem of non-childbearing." He suggests
thinking of a work-fun continuum and trying to move childbearing
toward the fun end of that continuum.
Whether childbearing and, especially, childrearing will become
favored leisure-time activities of men and women will depend on
the trade-offs between fun and burdell. Some European cities al-
ready have more dogs than children. Obviously in these areas the
work-fun balance is more favorable for pets, which require less of a
commitment and in the worst case can always be given away. This
argument clearly suggests that unless the burden of having children
is diminished or the rewards from children is enhanced, the balance
will continue to be negative for childbearing.
11.5.5 Improving contraception
The final argument in this series is less concerned with changing val-
ues but is at a more mechanical level. It is an empirical fact that, in
all industrialized societies, a significant number of pregnancies are
unplanned. Demographers often distinguish between timing failure
(early pregnancy) and quantum failure (unwanted pregnancy). Both
could be reduced by more efficient contraceptive use: for the latter
this would clearly imply lower fertility; for the former this would
theoretically have no effect on fertility. In practice one can assume
that a certain number of the births categorized as timing failures
may not be realized at a later point in time because of changing
living conditions, such as disruption of a union, a more demanding
job, or physiological reasons. With respect to unwanted pregnan-
cies, Westoff et at. (1987) estimate that for a number of low-fertility
countries, completely efficient contraception would bring down fer-
tility rates by somewhat less than 10 percent, as well as significantly
lower the number of abortions.
Currently, we are still far from a perfect contraceptive that re-
quires no effort to use and has no negative side effects. An increasing
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number of women report being tired of using the pill, yet sterilization
is not acceptable to all men and women (especially in continental
Europe) because of its irreversibility. New empirical data suggest
that the number of risk-takers or couples practicing less reliable nat-
ural methods may have increased because of higher awareness of the
side effects of the pill. A hypothetical perfect contraceptive without
any side effects, which is taken once and then requires some reverse
action for a woman to become pregnant, certainly would change the
situation; this hypothetica.l contraceptive would clearly inhibit un-
planned pregnancies which currently are still quite numerous. It will
make quite a difference for future fertility levels whether one must
go to the doctor to have a child or not to have a child; currently the
latter is the case.
11.6 Fertility Assumptions and Population
Heterogeneity
All the arguments given in Sections 11.4 and 11.5 for a tendency
toward either lower or higher future fertility levels have some degree
of justification. Each argument is based 011 assumed developments
that impact on future reproductive behavior in industrialized coun-
tries, but it is unclear what the possible balance, the synergism,
of these partly contradictory developments will be. For this reason
we cannot provide one estimate but can only suggest alternative
scenario assumptions.
A probable situation is that the synergism of these various
trends will not result in a uniform pattern of childbearing in all
countries and in all population groups within countries. Heterogene-
ity of reproductive behavior has been increasing since the postwar
baby boom, and there is no indication that this heterogeneity is
likely to diminish. Quite the contrary, the above-mentioned trend
toward a societal structure labeled "society" rather than "commu-
nity" implies lower normative pressure toward uniform behavioral
patterns. There may be many subgroups and subcultures in society
that have quite different reproductive behavior. On the other hand,
it is often argued that mass media exert a powerful force toward
standardization. But with respect to fertility the direction of this
standardization is not clear. Among TV "protagonists" you find
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singles, childless couples, and traditional families. It seems to be
the case that the plurality of lifestyles is in itself one of the key
messages from the media.
Heterogeneity of the population has important impacts on de-
mographic dynamics. In mortality, heterogeneity affects the over-
all dynamics of the system through selection processes resulting in
changing weights ofthe subgroups. As to differential fertility- aside
from individual biological differences - subgroups with higher fertil-
ity grow more rapidly and hence have more weight in the population
structure. Empirically this can be observed for certain high fertility
religious groups but also with respect to foreigners who have not
fully adapted to the host country's average fertility level. In Ger-
many, for instance, the slightly positive balance of births and deaths
around 1990 was attributable to the large birth surplus of foreigners
living in Germany. While only 1 in 12 inhabitants of Germany is
a foreigner, 1 in 8 children born has foreign citizenship. In other
words, without non-Germans the German fertility rate would be
even lower than it actually is.
Such considerations of heterogeneity also entered the final nu-
merical choice of fertility assumptions for the five industrialized re-
gions considered in this study. At least in the long run, fertility
levels should not be considered independent of migration Levels just
as they should not be seen as being completely independent of mor-
tality levels in developing countries. Some of these dependencies are
modeled in Chapters 1.5 and 16.
Figure 11.5 shows the fertility assumptions for Western Eu-
rope and North America together with recent trends in total fertil-
ity rates. The high, central, and low assumptions reflect different
combinations of the trends described above. The often-assumed
replacement-level fertility was not used as a benchmark because
there is little substantive reason for such a "magic" level. The un-
certainty range is assumed to widen quickly over the next decade.
By 2030-2035 the uncertainty range is assumed to increase even
further. The low value will reach 1.3 in Eastern Europe, Western
Europe, Pacific OECD, and the European part of the former Soviet
Union and 1.4 in North America. The assumed high values are 2.1
(which is somewhat above replacement under low-mortality condi-
tions) in Western Europe, Pacific 0 ECD, and Eastern Europe and
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Figure 11.5. Total fertility rates, 1965-1995, and assumptions
until 2030-203.5 in North America and Western Europe.
2.3 in North America. The assumed central values are always the
arithmetic means of the low and high values. They may be seen as
the values with the greatest probability. The range between the low
and the high assumptions is assumed to include roughly 90 percent
of all possible future trends.
A complete description of specific fertility assumptions made for
each region and a more detailed discussion of these issues are given
in Chapter 15.
Chapter 12
The Future of Mortality at
Older Ages in Developed
Countries
James W. Vaupel and Hans Lundstrom
Death in developed countries usually strikes at older ages. In most
developed countries the life table probability of survival to age 65 is
over 75 percent for men and over 85 percent for women. Median life
table life spans typically exceed 75 years for men and 80 years for
women. Populations are aging, but even given current age distribu-
tions, about one-third of male deaths and half of female deaths in
developed countries occur after age 80.
Not only is mortality concentrated at advanced ages in devel-
oped countries, but uncertainty about the future of mortality in
these countries largely stems from uncertainty about the future of
death rates among the elderly. There may be some surprises in
trends at younger ages, analogous perhaps to the unanticipated epi-
demic of AIDS, but it seems plausible that the death rates at most
ages under 65 will continue to fall at rates of perhaps 1 or 2 percent
per year. In some countries for some subpopulations and in some
age categories ~ e.g., males in their 20s - death rates may rise some-
what, at least in the short term. In the longer term, however, any
such rise in mortality will produce public health responses that will
probably lead to mortality improvements.
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Whether or not it will be possible to continue to reduce death
rates at older ages is, in contrast, an open and highly controver-
sial question. Many gerontologists and demographers believe that
death rates at advanced ages cannot be substantially reduced and
that life expectancy will not increase beyond 85 years (Fries, 1980;
Fries et ai., 1989; Olshansky et ai., 1990; Lohman et ai., 1992; Har-
man, 1991; Hayflick, 1977; Bourgeois-Pichat, 1978; Keyfitz, 1978;
Demeny, 1984). Most deaths after age 80 are taken to be natural,
senescent deaths due to intrinsic, intractable aging process. Little,
then, can be done about saving lives (i.e., substantially postpon-
ing deaths) among the oldest-old. Opinions differ about whether
this barrier to progress is due primarily to biological causes or to
practical impediments, but the canonical view is that death rates
at advanced ages in developed countries are close to limits that can
only be relaxed by fundamental and currently unforeseeable break-
throughs in slowing the process of aging itself. This assumption
underlies the long-term mortality forecasts published by the World
Bank, the United Nations, and many national statistical offices.
Other researchers are skeptical about the existence of an upper
limit to life expectancy, at least at an age as early as 85. They fore-
see continuing and perhaps even accelerating progress in reducing
mortality rates at all ages, including the most advanced ages (Man-
ton et ai., 1991). Some projections suggest that the life expectancy
of the current generation of children in the United States might be
100 years or more if progress in reducing mortality rates continues
over the next century (Vaupel and Gowan, 1986; Guralnik et ai.,
1988).
If progress can be made, growth of the oldest-old population will
quicken, with major economic and social consequences, including es-
calation of the cost of public health care and retirement programs.
Progress is most important at the ages when most deaths occur; it is
the weighted average of age-specific rates of mortality improvement,
with weights corresponding to the product of death counts and re-
maining life expectancy, that determines change in life expectancy.
As a rule of thumb, an average rate of improvement of 1 percent
would yield an increase of one year in life expectancy per decade;
an average progress rate of 2 percent would yield a two-year increase
per decade (Vaupel, 1986). At current mortality levels a newborn
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girl in most developed countries has a life expectancy of about 80
years. If progress in reducing mortality rates could be maintained
at an average of 1 percent per year, then her life expectancy would
be about 90 years. Sustained 2 percent progress would imply that
the typical newborn girl in developed countries will live to celebrate
her 100th birthday (Vaupel and Owen, 1986; Vaupel and Gowan,
1986).
Such an increase in female life expectancy and a corresponding
increase in male life expectancy would result in a radical increase in
the number of persons at advanced ages. For instance, according to
one projection for the United States that assumes 2 percent annual
progress (Ahlburg and Vaupel, 1990), the population above age 85
could increase from 3 million in 1990 to 72 million in 2080. This
figure may be contrasted with the estimate of 17 million persons in
the "middle projection" of the US Bureau of the Census (Spencer,
1989), which assumes much lower rates of mortality improvement,
especially after 2005.
The conjunction of these three considerations - most deaths in
developed countries occur at older ages, future trends in death rates
at older ages are particularly uncertain, and alternative trends have
very different demographic implications - suggests that studies of
the future of mortality in developed countries should pay particular
attention to the future of death rates at older ages. In this chap-
ter we therefore review the reasons for the uncertainty surrounding
the future of death rates at older ages and then present some new
evidence based on Swedish data.
12.1 85 or 100+?
A major biomedical uncertainty lies at the core of the disagreement
between those who foresee life expectancy leveling off at about 80 or
85 years and those who predict more radical increases to a century
or more. Does the force of mortality (i.e., the age-specific hazard
of death) sharply and inexorably rise for the typical individual to
extremely high levels around age 85 or increase after age 85 at about
the same rate or even at a slower rate than before age 85, with the
likelihood that the rate of progress being made in reducing the force
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of mortality among the very old will be of the same magnitude as
the rate of progress being made among the younger old?
The first perspective implies that life spans are limited. Indi-
viduals may differ somewhat in their maximum potential life spans,
with some individuals having a potential of 100 years and others a
potential of 75 years. On average, however, the typical individual's
longevity is unlikely to exceed the natural limit of 85 years or so that
has prevailed. Most of those who adhere to this perspective believe
that continued progress in reducing mortality rates up to age 75 or
so is likely to be made, so that death before age 75 will become
rare. Consequently, life expectancy will approach the length of the
typical maximum life span, i.e., about 85 years. Eventually, some
extraordinary breakthroughs may be made that permit humans to
live beyond their natural life spans, but when such breakthroughs
will occur, if ever, is uncertain.
This general point of view is often illustrated with diagrams
showing an increasing rectangularization of survivorship curves or
showing bell-shaped distributions, centered at age 85, of what Fries
(1983) describes as "natural death (due to senescent frailty)." Such
survivorship curves and distributions of deaths imply that little or
no progress can be made in reducing death rates after age 80.
The second perspective implies that the force of mortality rises
fairly smoothly to very advanced ages exceeding 100 years or more;
there is no sharp increase for the typical individual around age 85,
and there may even be some gradual lessening of the rate of increase
after age 90 (as implied by the power function or the logistic function
used instead of an exponential function in some models of mortality).
Furthermore, there is no discontinuity around age 85 in the rate of
progress that is likely to be made in reducing the force of mortality,
so that substantial reductions in mortality rates will probably be
achieved at all ages. Consequently, life expectancy will continue
to gradually but steadily increase and may rise to 90, 95, or even
longer by the year 2050. Major biomedical breakthroughs are likely
over the course of the next century, although the exact nature and
significance of these breakthroughs cannot now be foreseen: these
breakthroughs may result in some acceleration in the rate of progress
made in reducing the force of mortality, so that a life expectancy of
well over 100 years less than 100 years from now cannot be ruled
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out. In contrast to the limited life-span paradigm, this might be
called the mortality-reduction paradigm.
Given current knowledge, no judicious researcher can claim to
know for certain which of these two paradigms is more correct -
or whether some combination of them or some entirely different
perspective will eventually prove to be true. Furthermore, each
paradigm has numerous variants that have not yet been conclusively
shown to be inconsistent with reliable empirical evidence.
Broadly speaking, the limited life-span paradigm can be asso-
ciated with the stream of research done by Pearson (1897), Pearl
(1923), Clarke (1950), Bourgeois-Pichat (1952, 1978), Comfort
(1964), Ryder (1975), Hayfiick (1977, 1980), Sacher (1977), Key-
fitz (1978), Kohn (1982), and their colleagues. The most promi-
nent advocate and popularizer of this general perspective is Fries
(1980, 1983, 1984; Fries and Crapo, 1981; Fries et ai., 1989); use-
ful reviews are also provided by Rosenfeld (1976) and Gavrilov and
Gavrilova (1991). These researchers generally assume that there are
biological barriers to longer life expectancy; in contrast, Olshansky
et al. (1990) stress practical barriers that may effectively limit life
expectancy to values less than 85. Whether the barriers are prac-
tical or genetic is, however, rarely explicitly addressed: in much of
the gerontological literature it is simply accepted as a stylized fact
that natural or senescent death implies that mortality rates can-
not be substantially reduced at advanced ages. Harman (1991) and
Lohman et ai. (1992) provide two recent examples of the strength
and persistence of this point of view.
The possibility that the mortality-reduction paradigm may be
more correct is implied by most of the process models of mortality
developed from Gompertz (1825) onward. This viewpoint has been
cogently argued by Manton (1982; Manton and Soldo; 1985; Man-
ton and Woodbury, 1987; Myers and Manton, 1984; Manton et al.,
1991), and is supported either explicitly or implicitly by Schatzkin
(1980), Schneider and Brody (1983), Peto et al. (1986), Vaupel and
Owen (1986), Vaupel and Gowan (1986), Schneider and Guralnik
(1987), Poterba and Summers (1987), and Rowe and Kahn (1987).
The key reason that the controversy between the limited life-
span and mortality-reduction paradigms has not been resolved is
that there is relatively little reliable data on mortality rates over
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age, time, and sex among the oldest-old (i.e., after age 85). Indeed,
it is remarkable how little is known considering the rapidly increas-
ing population at advanced ages and the high life table probability,
approaching 50 percent for females in some countries, of survival
past age 85.
Very few published human life tables extend past age 85, and
the population and death counts that are available for the oldest-old
tend to be suspect. As reviewed by numerous demographers (includ-
ing Shryock and Siegel, 1976; Mazess and Forman, 1979; Rosen-
waike, 1981; Horiuchi and Coale, 1983; Spencer, 1986; Coale and
Kisker, 1986,1990; Kannisto, 1988), various kinds of gross errors are
common in reported age-specific deaths and population sizes above
age 85. These errors - such as age-heaping caused by rounding off
ages to the nearest age divisible by five or ten, the tendency of some
older people to falsify their age, the fact that relatively few errors in
misclassifying younger people as very old people can swamp actual
counts of very old people, or failures to remove the deceased from
population registers so that the dead appear to survive eternally -
may represent systematic biases across populations. Hence it may
be impossible to reduce these errors by the usual statistical expedi-
ent of examining many data sets and either formally or informally
averaging them. It is consequently essential that large, reliable data
bases on oldest-old human mortality be assembled and analyzed.
The most reliable data on mortality rates up to the most ad-
vanced ages over a long period of time pertain to Sweden. Excel-
lent data exist for Sweden since 1750; superlative data have been
archived since 189.5. The published Swedish data that are readily
available are highly accurate, but even these data have some defi-
ciencies at advanced ages. In particular, a large part ofthe published
data has been smoothed by actuarial methods after age 90 or so, and
the most widely available mortality rates are based on aggregated
data 011 several years of age and time rather than by single years of
age and time. Furthermore, the data, once published, have not been
revised as new information (from censuses or cohort death counts)
has become available.
Using unpublished information in the archives of Statistics Swe-
den, one of the authors (Hans Lundstrom) is in the process of metic-
ulously verifying, correcting, and computerizing the death counts
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Figure 12.1. Force of mortality for females, ages 85, 90, and 95,
Sweden: 1900-1990.
and population counts needed to estimate mortality rates at ad-
vanced ages in Sweden from 1750 to 1992. For this presentation, we
made use of a nearly completed version of the data base for 1895 to
1990. Minor changes may be made to a few of the death and popu-
lation counts in this data base, but the version used is undoubtedly
extremely close to the final version.
12.2 Force of Mortality at 85, 90, and 95
Figure 12.1 plots the force of mortality for Swedish females at ages
8.5,90, and 95 from 1900 through 1990. Other ages between 80 and
100 show similar patterns.
The force of mortality, also known as the hazard or intensity of
death, is a measure favored by demographers to capture the level of
mortality. It is defined, at age x and time y, by
j.1.(.T) = _ d8(:r, y)jd:r
8(.T,y) ,y=yo+·l:,
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Figure 12.2. Force of mortality for males, ages 85, 90, and 95,
Sweden: 1900-1990.
where s( x, y) is the proportion of the cohort born x years ago that
is surviving at time y and Yo is the time the cohort was born. The
Swedish data are available by single years of age and time, so a
discrete approximation must be used to estimate Jl. We used the
standard approximation
Jl(x,y) = -In[l- D(x,y)/N(x,y)] ,
where D(x, y) represents the number of deaths among the cohort of
people who were between exact ages x-I and x on January 1 of
year y and N (x, y) represents the number of people in this cohort
on January 1. It should be noted that the members of this cohort
attain exact age x (i.e., celebrate their xth birthday) over the course
of year y. Also in- and out-migration is ignored: net migration is
negligible in Sweden after age 80.
Population sizes are small, especially at age 95, so the trajec-
tories in Figure 12.1 show considerable random fluctuation. The
overall trends, however, are clear. There was little progress in re-
ducing the force of mortality at advanced ages before 1940 or 1950.
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Table 12.1. Average annual rates of progress in reducing mortality
rates in various age categories and over various time periods.
Age 1900-09 to 1920-29 to 1940-49 to 1960-69 to
Sex category 1920-29 1940-49 1960-69 1980-89
Males 60-69 0.50 0.44 0.28 0.62
70-79 0.37 0.20 0.19 0.62
80-89 0.36 0.13 0.36 0.53
90-99 0.27 0.11 0.36 0.56
100+ 1.76 -1.07 0.97 0.18
Females 60-69 0.24 0.61 1.88 1.63
70-79 0.18 0.22 1.25 2.08
80-89 0.19 0.10 0.78 1.64
90-99 0.13 0.03 0.60 0.94
100+ 0.23 0.41 0.80 0.49
Afterward, the force of mortality declined considerably, even at age
9.5. At age 85 the force of mortality declined from about 0.2 to
about 0.1. At age 90 the decline was from a level of about 0.3 to
about 0.2. An absolute decline on the order of magnitude of 0.1,
from about 0.4 to about 0.3, is also apparent at age 95.
As shown in Figu're 12.2, the trends for Swedish males are
roughly similar although less dramatic. It is clear that the force
of mortality for very old males in Sweden was substantially lower in
1990 than it was in 1900, although the reduction was less for males
than for females and the levels of mortality were higher for males
than for females. At each age, the absolute decline for males was on
the order of magnitude of 0.0.5 in contrast to the decline of roughly
0.1 for females.
12.3 A verage Annual Rates of Progress in
Reducing Mortality Rates
To summarize the overall pattern of reduction, Table 12.1 presents
average annual rates of progress in reducing the force of mortality
for Swedish females and males over successive 20-year time peri-
ods and for people in their 60s and 70s as well as octogenarians,
nonagenarians, and centenarians.
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For males and for females, the average level of the force of mor-
tality over a decade of time and age was calculated as follows:
Yo+9 x o+9L L N(x)p(.1:, y)
Y-Yo x=xo
iL(x o, Yo) = Yo+ 9xo+9
L LN(x)
Y=Yo :1'==X o
In this equation N is used to standardize the age composition
of the population. We calculated N from the population of Sweden
in the 1980s:
1989
N(:r) = L N(:/:, y)
y=1980
The values of J.1( x, y) were calculated as described above. If the
death count equaled the population count, then the standard ap-
proximation J.1 equals 2 was used. Occasionally, at ages greater than
100, it was impossible to estimate p for some specific years because
no one was alive at that age and year. In such cases, the J.1 term
was dropped from the numerator and a corresponding correction
was made in the denominator. The average annual rate of progress
in reducing the force of mortality was then calculated using
p( x 0' Yo) = _ { [P( x 0, Yo +20)] 0.0.5 _ I}
p(:z:o,Yo)
Table 12.1 indicates that progress has been made in Sweden in
reducing the force of mortality at all ages after 60 for both males
and females. Estimated rates of progress fluctuate erratically for
centenarian males, probably because there are so few observations
in this category, but even so the general trend is toward a reduction
in mortality rates. For females and for younger age categories, the
picture is dear: mortality rates among the elderly are declining
in Sweden and at a faster pace in recent decades than in the first
decades of the century.
For males in the most recent time period, the rate of progress is
roughly the same - about half a percent per year - for men in their
60s, 70s, 80s, and 90s. For females in the most recent time period,
the rate of progress is about 2 percent for women in their 70s and
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half as much for women in their 90s. However, the rate of progress
for women in their 80s is the same, 1.6 percent, as that for women
in their 60s.
If rates of progress in the first 20 years of the century are com-
pared with the most recent 20-year period, it is apparent that there
has been a considerable acceleration of rates of progress. The accel-
eration is greater for females than for males. The acceleration is also
greater in older age categories than in younger ones, at least in the
age categories below age 100, where there are substantial numbers
of observations.
The overall acceleration in rates of progress and the greater ac-
celeration at older ages may reflect actual changes at the individual
level: the elderly today may be healthier than in the past, and they
may be receiving better health care. A supplemental explanation
was suggested by Vaupel et at. (1979). Progress in reducing mortal-
ity rates at younger ages makes it more difficult to make progress
at subsequent ages if the persons whose lives are saved are frail and
vulnerable. In effect, progress in reducing cohort mortality rates at
younger ages masks the true rate of progress (controlling for com-
positional changes) at older ages. However, as mortality rates in an
age category decline, this effect diminishes in importance, resulting
in an apparent acceleration in rates of progress.
12.4 Lexis Maps of Force of Mortality
Another way to summarize data concerning a surface of demographic
rates over age and time is to present a Lexis map, i.e., a shaded con-
tour map of the surface (Vaupel et aL, 1987). Figure 12.3 displays
a Lexis map of the force of mortality for Swedish females at ages 80
to 111 and from 1900 through 1990. Figure 12.4 displays a corre-
sponding map for Swedish males.
The data available include death counts by year of birth as well
as by current age and year. Furthermore, the data include popula-
tion counts of those attaining a specific age in some year (e.g., the
number of those who celebrated their 85th birthday in 1970) as well
as counts of the number of people at a given age on January 1 of a
given year. Hence it is possible to estimate the force of mortality for
triangular categories of age and time. Let q = DIN be the ratio of
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1900-1990.
290 James W. Vaupel and Hans Lundstrom
the death count to the population at risk in one of these triangles.
To convert this to an annual probability of death, let
q*=I-(I-q)2.
Then, analogous to the formula used earlier, the force of mor-
tality can be estimated by
p = -In( 1 - q*) .
The four shades of gray in Figures 12.3 and 12.4 represent four
levels of this estimated force of mortality. The light gray tones along
diagonals above age 100, terminated by a black triangle, generally
represent cohorts with one remaining member: the force of mortality
is zero until this person dies.
Consider the age at which the force of mortality for females
crosses the level of 0.125, as shown in Figure 12.3. Until 1945 or
so, this age is around 81; by 1990 the age is up around 87. One
interpretation of this is that an 87-year-old Swedish female in 1990
was as healthy (at least in terms of probability of death) as an 81-
year-old Swedish female in the first four decades of the 20th century.
The age at which the force of mortality for females crosses the level of
0.2050 increases by about five years from a level fluctuating around 89
to a level of 94. Despite substantial statistical noise, a shift upward
is also apparent at the level of 0.05, and there is also a clear increase
in the maximum age attained. The record longevity is 111 years,
attained by the grandmother of an employee of Statistics Sweden.
For males, as shown in Figure 12.4, the surface of mortality
rates is higher than for fenules. Furthermore, the upward shift is less
substantial at the 0.1205, 0.205, and 0.05 levels and in the maximum age
attained. Nonetheless, it is clear that there has been a definite shift
on the order of three years. As noted above, this can be interpreted
as the result of a downward shift in mortality curves or, alternatively,
as a delay in the aging process: elderly Swedish males in 1990 can
be considered to be three years younger (in terms of their risk of
death) than Swedish males of the same age in the first part of this
century.
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Table 12.2. Age when remaining life expectancy is two years or
five years.
Two years left Five years left
Period Males Females Males Females
1900-1909 93.9 9.5.3 80.5 81.7
1910-1919 94.1 95.7 80.7 81.8
1920-1929 95.3 96.1 81.2 82.0
1930-1939 94.4 95.4 80.9 81.5
1940-1949 95.0 96.9 81.6 82.3
1950-1959 95.9 97.3 81.8 82.9
1960-1969 96.3 99.0 82.5 84.0
1970-1979 97.6 99.7 83.2 85.8
1980-1989 98.1 100.1 83.7 86.7
12.5 Remaining Life Expectancy
A final perspective on the decline in oldest-old mortality rates in
Sweden is presented in Table 12.2. For the various decades from
1900 until 1990, the table gives, for males and females, the age when
remaining life expectancy is two years and the age when remaining
life expectancy is five years.
The numbers given are based on decennial life tables. The age-
specific mortality rates, for single years of age, that form the basis
of these life tables were calculated using the following formula:
Yo+9L D(:r, y)
y=Yo
q(x,yo) = yo+9
L N(x, y)
y=Yo
where, unlike above, D(x, y) now represents the number of deaths
of people who attain exact age :r in year y and N (x, y) represents
the number of people who attain age x in year y.
It should be noted that in Table 12.2, for both males and females
and when remaining life expectancy is either two years or five years,
there was little net change between the decade from 1900 to 1909 and
the decade from 1930 to 1939. From the 1930s to the 1980s, however,
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the shifts were substantial. For males, the age when two years of
life expectancy are left increased by almost four years, from 94.4 to
98.1. For females, the corresponding shift was close to five years,
from 95.4 to 100.1. The age at which remaining life expectancy is
five years increased for males by almost three years, from 80.9 to
83.7. For females, the increase was five years, from 81.5 to 86.7.
As suggested earlier, one interpretation of these shifts is that
the process of aging has been slowed or delayed in Sweden such that
elderly Swedish men are effectively three or four years younger than
they used to be, and elderly Swedish females are five years younger.
Caution is required because these figures are based entirely on mor-
tality statistics, with no information about morbidity or disability.
Nonetheless, treated judiciously, this perspective suggests that cer-
tainly mortality, and perhaps health more generally, is plastic even
at the most advanced ages. It has been possible, at least ill Sweden,
to lower the force of mortality and to significantly postpone death
even among the oldest-old.
12.6 Discussion
Swedish life expectancy has been among the very longest in the
world for many decades. If progress can be made ill Sweden in low-
ering mortality rates at advanced ages, then the contention that
oldest-old mortality rates cannot be significantly reduced seems
questionable. Using highly reliable data, we presented four perspec-
tives on mortality changes in Sweden since 1900 among the elderly.
As shown in Figures 12.1 and 12.2, the force of mortality at ages
85,90, and 95 has substantially declined, especially since 1945, and
more for females than for males. As shown in Table 12.1, rates of
progress in reducing mortality rates among the elderly have acceler-
ated over the course of the century, and from the 1960s to the 1980s
ran at an average annual rate of 1 to 2 percent for females and half
a percent for males. As shown in Figures 12.3 and 12.4, the age at
which the force of mortality attains the levels of 0.125,0.25, and 0.5
has shifted upward substantially since 1945, by about five years for
females and three years for males. Finally, as shown in Table 12.2,
the age when remaining life expectancy reaches two years or five
years has also shifted upward, by about five years for females and
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three or four years for males. These four perspectives are consis-
tent with each other. They indicate that the theory that oldest-old
mortality rates cannot be significantly reduced is incorrect.
Other strands of evidence, reviewed by Manton et at. (1991),
point in the same direction. Most of this evidence pertains to small
special populations followed for short periods of time or is based on
the results of sophisticated mathematical modeling. The evidence
from Sweden is highly reliable, pertains to a sizable national popu-
lation followed since 1900, and is so straightforward that it does not
have to be filtered through a statistical model.
The available evidence, taken together, suggests that if histori-
cal rates of progress in reducing mortality rates continue to prevail
in the future, today's newborns can expect to live about 90 years on
average. If, as knowledge of health and biomedical research devel-
ops, progress accelerates so that age-specific mortality rates come
down at an a.verage rate of about 2 percent per year, then the typi-
cal newborn in developed countries will live to celebrate his or her
100th birthday.
If our children survive to become centenarians, what will their
health be like during their extra life span? Will the added years be
active, healthy years or years of decrepitude, disability, and misery?
The answer to this question is central to forecasting the impact of
population aging on health and social needs and costs, on retirement
decisions and policies, and on other questions in the economics of
aging, but very little is currently known about what the answer
might be.
12.7 Conclusion
Let us return now to the original question: What is the future of
mortality in developed countries? It has been argued that the an-
swer to this question hinges on a narrower question: What is the
future of mortality at older ages? This question in turn hinges on
the question: Is it possible to substantially reduce death rates after
age 80? The Swedish data, together with other data reviewed by
Manton et at. (1991), indica.te that it is possible. However, whether
progress in reducing mortality rates will continue at historical levels
or even accelerate is, of course, an open question.
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Biomedical research may fail to continue to produce the ad-
vances needed to reduce mortaIity rates. Social and economic con-
ditions may become unfavorable to further improvements. Environ-
mental conditions may substantially deteriorate. Nuclear war may
kill millions or even billions. New diseases, like AIDS, may decimate
populations.
On the other hand, the acceleration of mortality improvement at
older ages may continue, so that 1ll0rtaIity rates may fall not at 1 or 2
percent per year but at :3 or 4 percent per year over the course of the
21st century. Biological, medical, and gerontological breakthroughs
could lead to considerable extensions of the human life span. The
life sciences may be poised at roughly the point the physical sciences
were at a century ago, and biological innovations comparable to
electricity, automobiles, television, rockets, and computers may be
forthcoming. Fundamental advances could occur over the next few
decades in genetic engineering, in the prevention and treatment of
such diseases as arteriosclerosis, cancer, or diabetes, and perhaps
even in understanding and controlling human aging itself.
The future is not just uncertain: it is surprisingly uncertain.
As Ascher (1978), Keyfitz (1981), Stoto (1983), and others reviewed
by Ahlburg and Land (1992) have demonstrated, the actual course
of demographic events often leads to outcomes beyond the most
extreme projections. Consequently, forecasts ought to include wide
bands of uncertainty that spread outward at an accelerating pace
into the more and more distant future.
Recent research by Lee (1992), Lee and Carter (1992), and Tul-
japurkar (1992) provides a good starting point. Using time-series
methods, Lee and Carter project life expectancy in the United
States, with confidence bands. Their forecast is that life expectancy
at birth in the United States in 2065 will be around 86 years with
a 9.5 percent confidence interval of plus or minus 4 or 5 years. This
projection, however, is based entirely on analysis of historical trends
of US data. The future of developed countries may not be like the
past of the United States: that is an important source of addi-
tional uncertainty. The results presented above for Sweden plus the
research summarized by Manton et aZ. (1991) suggest that future
improvements in death rates at older ages may be more rapid than
in the past.
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Taking those two considerations into account and using meth-
ods of subjective probability assessment (as explained, e.g., in Behn
and Vaupel, 1982), a more judicious guesstimate might be that life
expectancy in the typical developed country in 2065 is not 86 plus
or minus 4 or 5 but perhaps the following. There is a 50/50 chance
that life expectancy will be above or below 92. There is a 50 per-
cent chance that life expectancy will be between 85 and 100 and a
50 percent chance it will be outside this range. There is a 5 percent
chance that life expectancy will be below its current level of about
75 and a 5 percent chance that it will exceed the current record
longevity of 120. This is speculation, as are all predictions, but it is
informed speculation that takes into account our vast ignorance of
what breakthroughs or catastrophes the future might bring.

Part V
The Future of
Intercontinental
Migration
Chapter 13 gives the most complete account of intercontinental mi-
gration that can be produced with existing data. Even without
considering illegal migration, data on official or legal migration are
fragmentary. In a discussion on the forces that will induce future
migration, Chapter 14 shows that the traditional pull and push fac-
tors of economic disparities are often submerged by the impact of
legal and logistical restrictions on international migration. Short-
term political changes as well as refugee movements spurred by war
or famine can significantly affect migration level. Given the expe-
rience of the past, international migration can be assumed to show
great volatility in the future.
How can one derive from this information assumptions about
the future? For our projections it seems reasonable to assume that
in the high-migration case the future annual level assumed over the
whole period will roughly equal the maximum that has been ob-
served in the past. There is little basis for making any assumptions
on possible future mass migration induced by global environmen-
tal change. Past environmental disasters, however, show that such
migration mostly occurs within regions.
At the low extreme a convenient assumption is that there will
be zero net-migration, namely, in-migrants will equal out-migrants.
Such a scenario reflects the possibility of xenophobic policies. The
central scenario then gives the average of these two extreme scenar-
ios; it is also considered the most likely case.

Chapter 13
Migration to and from
Developing Regions: A
Review of Past Trends
Rania Zlotnik
At least since the "discovery" of the Americas in 1492, interconti-
nental migration has been a key factor influencing the demographic
evolution of the developing world. During the first decades of this
century, the major international flows originated in Europe and were
directed mostly to the "New World," that is, to the overseas coun-
tries of permanent resettlement and certain Latin American coun-
tries. Despite the dampening effects of the two world wars and the
Depression, major intercontinental flows continued to be dominated
by Europeans until the early 1960s. Since then, migration from de-
veloping to developed countries has been growing and important
interregional flows within the developing world have also gained
prominence. This chapter provides a comprehensive view of the
main migration flows either originating in or directed toward seven
developing regions, namely, sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa and
West Asia, South Asia, China, the rest of developing Asia (called
East and Southeast Asia), Central America and the Caribbean, and
South America.[1]
The task of quantifying migration to and from the regions is
far from straightforward. A variety of data sources must be used to
The views and opllllOns expressed in this paper are those of the author and do
not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations.
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piece together the facets of the phenomenon. The lack of compara-
bility between data sources severely constrains the types of estimates
that can be derived, so that in most cases only rough indications of
the magnitude of flows can be presented. On the other hand, the
use of major regions as units of analysis precludes the need to con-
sider every flow between developing countries. Most flows occurring
between neighboring countries, which are often the main sources of
migrants in specific countries, are excluded from the analysis.
Given the state of international migration statistics, more infor-
mation is available on migration to and from developed regions than
on that between developing regions. Therefore, most of the quanti-
tative analysis presented in this chapter focuses on statistics derived
from developed countries. Problems arising from lack of quantitative
information on a given flow are pointed out as appropriate. Before
proceeding with the presentation of migration estimates from a com-
parative perspective, an overview of the main data sources used and
their limitations is provided.
13.1 The Statistics Used
13.1.1 The universe covered
There are basically two different sources of information on interna-
tional migration: those producing data on the stock of migrants at
a given time and those producing statistics on the flow of immi-
grants or emigrants over a given period. Clearly, the latter are the
most useful in tracking the evolution of migration through time and
thus providing the basis to project it. However, whereas adequate
estimates of migrant stocks can be obtained from censuses that
may be carried out at relatively lengthy intervals, the availability
of flow statistics depends on the existence of relatively sophisticated
data-collection systems that must function continuously. Only a few
countries have those systems in place, and both their existence and
adequacy are highly correlated with whether a country considers it-
self to be a recipient of immigrants or a sender of emigrants. Indeed,
most countries that gather information on migration on a continuous
basis do so for administrative purposes and, consequently, tend to
identify migrants on the basis of administrative or regulatory prin-
ciples rather than on demographic ones (Zlotnik, 1987). The USA,
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for instance, gathers information on immigrants defined as aliens
granted the right of permanent residence. Since that right may be
granted to aliens who are already present in the country under a
temporary permit, the number of immigrants admitted annually by
the USA is not equivalent to the number of new arrivals of aliens. In
contrast, the statistics gathered on aliens granted only temporary
permission to stay in the USA refer to their entries into the country.
Consequently, to the extent that some such persons enter the USA
several times during a year, the statistics available overestimate the
number of persons involved.
Aside from data on permanent immigration to the United
States, this chapter makes use of those available for the other coun-
tries of permanent resettlement, namely, Australia, Canada, and
New Zealand. Information on immigration to Israel is also used,
together with those available for European countries having flow
statistics, namely, Belgium, Germany (the data refer only to the
former West Germany), the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom. Selected data on immigration to France are also used.
The data for Canada resemble those available for the United
States, because they reflect only the number of foreigners who are
granted the right of permanent residence. Australian and New
Zealand statistics are gathered at the time of entry and conform
better to demographic concepts. The Australian data in this chap-
ter refer to the arrivals of persons admitted as permanent settlers
and to their permanent departures. For New Zealand, the data also
reflect the number of arrivals of permanent immigrants and their de-
partures when they intend to stay away permanently. In all cases,
the data are classified by place of birth. No emigration data are
available for either Canada or the USA.
In the case of Israel, the data used represent the number of immi-
grants and the so-called potential immigrants entering the country
and classified by place of birth. Although some statistics on depar-
tures are gathered by the Israeli government, they are not tabulated
by place of birth, thus precluding the estimation of net migration
by region of origin.
In France, 1'Office National d'Immigration (0NI), which became
in 1988 l'Office des Migrations Internationales (OMI), has been in
charge of gathering statistics on the number of migrant workers
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and their families being "introdueed" into the country. However,
since the data are gathered through control procedures from which
many migrants are exempt by law, they have generally been in-
complete. In particular, after Algeria became independent in 1962,
Algerians have been subject to a special immigration regime that
has precluded a statistical accounting of their inflow (Tribalat and
Munoz-Perez, 1989). Given that France is a major receiving coun-
try of citizens from the Maghreb countries (Algeria, Morocco, and
Tunisia) and Turkey, statistics on both workers and family members
from those countries are used as indicative of migration from North
Africa and West Asia to France. The data regarding Algerians have
been derived from estimates presented by Benamrane (1983) and
Tapinos (197.5). It must be noted that OMI statistics include both
new arrivals and persons regularizing their status after being present
in France for a time.
Several European countries gathering information on migration
flows do so as part of the normal operation of their population regis-
ters (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden). Therefore,
the definition of immigrant and emigrant is derived in each case
from the rules establishing who can be added to or deleted from the
register. In the Netherlands a person is removed from the register
when he or she intends to stay abroad for at least a year. However,
Dutch citizens who have been abroad are inscribed in the register
when they intend to sta.y in the Netherlands for at least one month
and aliens are inscribed if they intend to stay for at least six months
(Verhoef, 1986). Statistics on immigrants and emigrants are appar-
ently adjusted to take into account only persons who intend to stay
in the country or out of it for a year or more (Schoorl and Voets,
1990).
In Belgium, an emigrant is someone coming from abroad and
intending to establish permanent residence in the country, whereas
an emigrant is someone giving up permanent residence (UN, 1978).
Similarly, in Germany, an immigrant is a person coming into the
country to establish residence and an emigrant is a person departing
and intending to give up residence in the country (UN, 1978). In
both cases, "residence" is a legal concept that remains ill-defined
since it is not clear under what circumstances foreigners are allowed
to establish residence.
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In Sweden, incoming persons must register if they intend to
stay in the country for at least a year and those leaving must de-
register if they intend to stay abroad for a year or more. Different
definitions, however, are applied to immigrants and emigrants from
Nordic countries in order to harmonize registration practices among
them (Nilsson, 1990).
In the United Kingdom. information on immigration and emi-
gration is gathered via the International Passenger Survey (IPS), a
survey of travelers entering or leaving the United Kingdom by the
principal air and sea routes. The IPS has been operational since
1964 and, although it gathers information on both British and for-
eign travelers, persons moving between the United Kingdom and
Ireland are beyond its scope (Haskey et at., 1989). The IPS is based
on definitions of immigrant and emigrant consistent with United
Nations standards, using an intended stay of over a year and an
intended absence of over a year to identify each group, respectively.
It must be noted that both the systems based on population reg-
isters and the British IPS gather information on both immigration
and emigration. Furthermore. similar coverage is extended to citi-
zens and aliens. Consequently, there are major differences between
the data produced by such systems and those yielded by the admin-
istrative records used by Ca.nada, France, or the USA. Aside from
the fact that the latter records lack information on emigration, both
of nationals and foreigners. their statistics are only rough indicators
of true population flows. Indeed. in the USA, a major problem of in-
terpretation has arisen lately because normal immigration statistics
have been artificially swollen by t he regularization of undocumented
aliens carried out under the provisions of the Immigration Reform
and Control Act (!RCA) of 1986.
According to the IRCA, two groups of undocumented aliens
could legalize their status ( US Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice, 1991). The first and larger group consisted of persons who
could prove that they had been present in the USA since before
1 January 1982 and who began regularizing their status in 1989.
The second group consisted of "special agricultural workers" who
had to prove that they had worked in agriculture at least 90 days
during each of the three years preceding 1 May 1986 and who be-
came eligible to start adjusting their status to permanent resident
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on 1 December 1989. Therefore, although these two groups began
appearing in the immigration statistics only in 1989, the first entry
of the former group must have taken place before 1982 and that of
the latter group before 1984. Since other evidence suggests that il-
legal immigration to the United States grew significantly during the
1970s, the data presented here have been estimated assuming that
those persons regularizing their status during 1989-1992 as part of
the first group entered during 1972-1981. Their entries over that pe-
riod were distributed according to a linearly increasing trend. That
assumption is validated, to a certain extent, by the terms of the reg-
ularization drive itself. With regard to special agricultural workers,
however, assumptions about their entry and stay in the USA are
less straightforward, particularly because many fraudulent applica-
tions were reportedly filed. Thus the group of migrants regularized
under the special agricultural worker program is likely to include
an important number of undocumented migrants who arrived in the
USA after the 1 January 1982 cutoff date and even up to the time at
which the IRCA was passed. It was decided, therefore, to distribute
their numbers uniformly over the 1982-1986 period.
13.1.2 Problerns of data classification
Regarding the criteria used to identify region of origin, data clas-
sified by country of last or next residence would appear to be the
most useful for projection purposes, since they allow straightfor-
ward demographic accounting. However, aside from the misreport-
ing problems arising from the different possible interpretations of
the term "residence," data thus classified are often not available.
Consequently, consideration of data classified by place of birth or
citizenship becomes mandatory, though their use involves the tacit
assumption that persons born in a given country who leave another
are intending to return to their country of birth or that citizens of a
country who leave another are intending to return to their country
of citizenship (and the equivalent in terms of arrivals).
The data used in this paper as indicative of migration flows
are classified by place of birth for Australia, Canada, Israel, New
Zealand, and the USA; by citizenship for Belgium, France, and the
Netherlands; and by country of last and next residence for Germany,
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Sweden, and the United Kingdom. However, citizenship being a cri-
terion so intrinsically linked to the international migration process,
it often colors the manner in which other criteria are used. Thus, the
data for Australia, Canada, Israel, and the USA include only foreign-
ers. In addition, German data distinguish between foreigners and
German citizens, thus permitting the consideration of only foreign-
ers as originating in or leaving for developing regions. Similarly, the
United Kingdom publishes data that are classified first by citizenship
(Commonwealth citizens vs. other) and then by place of residence.
Only the data thus classified distinguish between Commonwealth
citizens originating in Central American and Caribbean countries
and non-Commonwealth citizens originating mostly in South Amer-
ica. British data classified only by place of last or next residence
make no distinction between the two regions of the Americas. Hence,
the two series have been used, as appropriate, in presenting the data
by regions (see Table 13.1).
Although the use of data classified by citizenship has been kept
to a minimum, the series for the Netherlands is based on that cri-
terion; consequently Dutch citizens from overseas Dutch territories
migrating to the Netherlands cannot be identified separately. In par-
ticular, the relatively large flow of Dutch Surinamese who migrated
to the Netherlands just before and after Surinam's independence in
197.5 shows up as an increased inflow of Dutch citizens during the
1970s. To take this group into account in interregional migration, an
annual net gain of 4,000 persons during 1970-1974 and 6,000 during
197.5-1979 has been added to the estimated number of migrants to
the Netherlands originating in South America (the net migration
gain of Dutch citizens during the 1970s was roughly of that mag-
nitude, whereas during earlier or later periods net gains of Dutch
citizens were negative or virtually nil).
A further caveat relates to the actual classification by country
of origin used by the various receiving countries in publishing flow
statistics. The practice of listing separately only the countries of
origin of sizable numbers of migrants and grouping the rest into a
single figure often precludes an adequate calculation of regional indi-
cators. Problems encountered fairly frequently include the practice
ofreporting together all persons originating in the People's Republic
of China and in Taiwan; the separate listing of only a few countries in
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Table 13.l. Average annual number of immigrants originating in
the different developing regions and average annual net migration
by country of destination and period: 1960-1991; panell.
Origin
Sub-Saharan
Africa 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-91
Emigmnts to
Canada 794 2,217 5,819 5,707 3,585 6,174
USA 1,106 1,888 4,276 10,110 13,921 14,768 16,191
Israel 318 465 670 807 2,803 1,330 4,329
Subtotal 2,218 4,570 10,765 16,624 20,309 22,272 20,520
Australia 1,604 2 1551 3,401 2,719 4,308 5,708 3,960
New Zealand 468 I -'j 4:31 404 146,-
Belgium 7,932 7,919 7.660 5,774 3,176 4,403
Germany 5,:355 3,829 8.695 7,644 11 ,672 16,106
Netherlands 444 1,196 1,602 5,008
Sweden 698 2,367
UK 2!5,940 :34.200 27,640 20,220 23,760
Subtotal 15,359 40.411 54,831 45,377 41,822 57,352 3,960
Net emigmtioll to
Australia 1,529 2,286 3,033 2,531 4,079 5,548 3,865
New Zealand :377 r::.) 367 322 670_
Belgium 6,565 5,174 4,736 2,929 541 824
Germany 3,145 1,262 3,872 1,589 2,056 5,297
Netherlands 139 761 1,032 4,282
Sweden 445 2,096
UK - -6,960 -1,320 2,060 -5,520 13,160
Subtotal 11,616 1,814 10.827 10,192 2,700 31,207 3,865
Total emigrants 17.577 44,981 65.596 62,001 62,131 79,624 24,480
Maximum net loss 13,834 6,384 21,592 26,816 23,009 53,479 24,385
a continent thus precluding the proper identification of persons orig-
inating in the different subregions; the practice of using idiosyncratic
regions (e.g., the British Commonwealth); and the use of different
classifications through time which lead to spurious variations in the
regional estimates. Though there is no ideal solution for any of these
problems, the data 011 China were accepted as given (if given) and
the "other Asia" category was assigned to the East and Southeast
Asia region, "other Africa." wa.s generally assigned to sub-Saharan
Africa, and no general rule was followed for "other America." Be-
cause of the ensuing ambiguities in the last case, a region comprising
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Table 13.1. Continued, panel 2.
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Origin
North Africa
& West Asia 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-91
Emigrants to
Canada 3,146 6,534 4,698 6,858 4,878 9,829
USA 5,348 9,652 14,620 19,180 22,105 21,653 26,521
Subtotal 8,494 16,185 19,319 26,038 26,983 31,482 26,521
Australia 2,133 4,777 9,027 7,461 2,625 6,217 5,701
New Zealand 38 J4 60
Belgium 5,402 3,084 3,45.5 7,043 6,089 4,231
France 40,869 48,24.5 79,1.59 32,474 43,841 22,623
Germany 38,721 85.143 201,123133,466 88,874 77,084
Netherlands 84:J 9,595 16,522 18,882 15,066 16,666
Sweden 113 569 686 1,393 1,135 1,411
UK 7,420 13,140 15,360
Subtotal 88,119 1.51,428 310,034208,139170,769 143,591 5,701
Net emigration to
Australia 2,090 4,673 8,841 7,281 2,455 6,039 5,621
New Zealand 29 4 45
Belgium 4,732 1,210 2,647 4,236 1,925 965
Germany 29,144 44,813 121,2.51 17,017 -26,939 25,304
Netherlands 746 6,599 13,132 14,563 8,244 10,770
Sweden 94 488 486 1,228 994 1,315
UK - -8,160 -9,700 260
Subtotal %,8:35 57,787 146,403 36,164 -23,021 44,652 5,621
Total emigrants 96,613 167,613 329,349234,177197,752 175,073 32,222
Maximum net loss 86,198 122,218 244,881 94,675 47,802 98,757 32,142
Israel
lmmigrants from
North Africa
& West Asia 30,779 8,562 4,840 2,359 1,627 716 612
Immigrants from
elsewhere 26,233 19,698 26.532 31,089 1.5,101 13,323 198,904
Total immigrants .57,012 28,260 31,373 33,448 16,727 14,039 199,516
Net loss for North
Africa & West Asia -59,965 -102,520 -218,348 -63,586 -32,701 -85,434 166,762
Discrepancies in totals and subtotals are due to rounding.
the whole of Central America, the Caribbean, and South America
(denominated Americas-developing) was also considered.
Problems of classification by country of origin prevented the use
of the flow statistics available for Switzerland, a fairly important
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Table 13.1. Continued, panel 3.
Origin
South Asia 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-9]
Emigrants to
Canada 1,365 5,815 11,713 10,450 11,361 16,990
USA 1,387 5,393 17,335 25,739 45,271 54,540 64,553
Israel 3,007 3,014 2,194 1,647 858 1,158 162
Subtotal 5,759 14,222 31,242 37,836 57,490 72,689 64,715
Australia 1,042 2,521 4,547 1,909 2,166 5,687 8,280
New Zealand 330 276 342 43
Germany 4,234 3,318 4,395 7,170 10,636 21,824
UK - 32,440 21,600 28,260 26,280 23,520
Subtotal 5,606 38,555 30,884 37,339 39,125 51,031 8,280
Net emigration to
Australia 980 2,408 4,388 1,793 2,075 5,607 8,235
New Zealand 226 150 285 0 31
Germany 2,528 586 1,536 2,999 3,165 12,486
UK - 23,880 12,560 22,520 20,800 17,020
Subtotal 3,734 27,024 18,769 27,312 26,071 35,113 8,235
Total emigrants 11,365 52,777 62,126 75,175 96,615 123,720 72,995
Maximum net loss 9,493 41,246 50,011 65,148 83,561 107,802 72,950
migrant-receiving country in Europe. Since most of the migrants
in Switzerland originate in other European countries, exclusion of
Swiss data is not likely to lead to important biases. Indeed, the data
available did not identify separately a single category of migrants
originating in the developing world, though a fair number of Turkish
citizens and at least some Vietnamese refugees are known to have
been admitted by Switzerland.
The data discussed so far have been used to derive the estimates
presented in Table 13.1, which shows for each major region of origin
the number of emigrants that have originated in that region and
that have been recorded as immigrants by each receiving country
discussed. In addition, whenever possible net emigration from the
region of origin being considered has been presented. In general,
the table makes a distinction between the receiving countries that
have immigration and emigration statistics and those that have only
immigration statistics by region of origin. The sum of all emigrants
originating in a certain region and recorded as immigrants by the
receiving countries listed in the table is presented under the label
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Table 13.1. Continued, panel 4.
Origin
East & South-
east Africa 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-91
Emigmnts to
Canada 692 7,237 15,602 21,064 27,850 34,871
USA 9,156 21,783 66,070 114,762 186,948 168,707 183,552
Israel 26 23 20 19 79 21 677
Subtotal 9,874 29,043 81,692 135,845 214,877 203,599 184,229
Australia 1,010 2,071 3,910 10,661 23,059 31,759 43,069
New Zealand 391 472 496 1,080 925
Belgium 752 1,298 2,219 2,932 3,206 3,675
Germany 3,449 3,988 10,097 19,140 26,439 41,502
Netherlands 2,213 2,258 3,214 5,981 6,329 8,679
Sweden 3,144 12,559
UK - 25,420 27,100 29,800 30,100 32,680
Subtotal 7,815 35,507 47,036 69,594 93,202 130,854 43,069
Net emigmtion to
Australia 888 1,880 3,689 10,450 22,710 31,285 42,739
New Zealand 287 222 357 798 679
Belgium 464 849 1,250 1,552 1,655 1,778
Germany 2,257 1,836 6,243 10,932 9,378 22,776
Netherlands 1,886 1,830 1,971 4,298 4,186 6,475
Sweden -796 -1,409 -2,634 -2,059 1,365 11,808
UK 6,860 5,000 4,140 6,200 6,960
Subtotal 4,986 12,068 15,876 30,111 46,173 81,082 42,739
Total emigrants 17,689 64.550 128,728 205,439 308,079 334,453 227,298
Maximum net loss 14,860 41,111 97,568 165,956 261,050 284,681 226,968
"Total emigrants." That number can be interpreted as representing
the gross emigration from the region of origin considered.
Since net emigration figures are available for certain receiving
countries, a second indicator of overall emigration is calculated by
adding the data for receiving countries without emigration statistics
to the net gains or losses recorded by the rest. This second indicator,
denominated "maximum net loss," represents an upper limit for the
number of emigrants originating in a given region or, equivalently,
the maximum net gain by the developed countries listed as receiving
countries of immigrants from the developing region considered.
All data are presented in terms of average annual number of em-
igrants or average annual net emigration for the periods indicated.
Average annual numbers were used not only to make comparisons
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Table 13.1. Continued, panel 5.
Origin
China 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-91
Emigmnts to
Canada 1,123 4,288 4,865 5,055 7,230 6,572
USA 4,116 13,142 16.434 21,390 26,642 26,492 30,223
Israel 10 8 6 5 9 7 29
Subtotal 5,249 17,438 21,305 26,450 33,881 33,071 30,252
Australia 694 393 376 883 1,452 4,150 4,690
New Zealand 110 103 70
Germany 108 27 53 308 1,245 2,733
Subtotal 912 523 499 1,191 2,697 6,883 4,690
Net emigmtion to
Australia 65,) 342 320 832 1,406 4,062 4,615
New Zealand 81 69 50
Germany 72 5 25 123 461 1,245
Subtotal 808 416 396 955 1,867 5,306 4,615
Total emigrants 6,160 17,961 21,804 27,641 36,578 39,954 34,942
Maximum net loss 6,057 17,854 21,701 27,405 35,748 38,377 34,867
easier and thus facilitate the derivation of projection assumptions
on the basis of such a measure, but also to obviate the problem of
missing information for selected years: 1961,1962, and 1989 in the
case of Belgium; 1960 in the case of Germany; 1988 and 1989 in the
case of British data for the Caribbean and South America only; and
1991 for Australia and Israel. The set of data available for the 1990s
is so incomplete that it is only presented for illustrative purposes.
13.1.3 Asylum seekers
A major development in the 1980s was the sharp increase in the
number of persons seeking asylum in developed countries, particu-
larly those of the European Community. Since a large proportion
of asylum seekers originates in developing countries, their numbers
must be considered in this overview. However, it is difficult to de-
cide how to use such numbers as indicators of migration since they
have several shortcomings.
First, statistics on asylum seekers represent applications filed
rather than persons and, at least during the 1980s, a person could
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Table 13.l. Continued, panel 6.
Origin
Central America
& Caribbean 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-91
Emigrants to
Canada 2,381 8,947 16,490 13,244 9,822 15,176
USA 76,977 123,664 165,308 304,958 372,592 276,725 178,201
Israel 121 p') 130 136 127 92 93
Subtotal 79,479 132,733 181,928 318,338 382,541 291,993 178,294
Australia 179 638 3,645 507 533 1,798 2,341
New Zealand 28 42 84 36 9
Belgium 147 283 169
Germany 1,245 1,591 2,120 2,217 2,912 4,730
Netherlands 442 6,451 6,570 5,323
Sweden 371 389 794 2,728 1,671 674
UK u 5,280 4,460 3,000 3,667
Subtotal 1,823 2,660 12,365 16,546 14,978 16,361 2,341
Net emigration to
Australia 165 588 :3,494 443 485 1,754 2,311
New Zealand 21 29 78 21 3
Belgium 4 9 30
Germany 707 .375 820 526 705 1,323
Netherlands 187 5,599 5,201 4,454
Sweden 91 85 406 2,271 1,173 366
UK a -2,000 1,280 -400 1,000
Subtotal 984 1,077 2,985 10,144 7,176 8,927 2,311
Total emigrants 81,302 135,393 194,293 334,884 397,519 308,354 180,635
Maximum net loss 80,463 133,810 184,913 328,482 389,717 300,920 180,605
aThe data for the UK are classified by both citizenship and place of previous residence.
lodge asylum applications in several countries simultaneously. Sec-
ond, asylum seekers are not necessarily new arrivals: some were
already legal, albeit temporary, residents of the country where they
filed an application. Third, it is not clear what is the overlap be-
tween asylum statistics and normal migration statistics. In countries
having population registers, for instance, at what point are asylum
seekers who are allowed to stay and work pending consideration of
their application inscribed in the register? Clearly, if such inscrip-
tion takes place at any time (which it must, at least in the case
of persons granted refugee status or who are otherwise allowed to
stay), asylum seekers will be counted twice. Table 13.2 presents the
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Table 13.1. Continued, panel 7.
Origin
Sout.h America 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-91
Emigrants to
Canada 1,031 2,555 7,139 8,773 5,452 7,492
USA 20,026 23,844 22,495 37,870 44,498 44,316 46,732
Israel 1,894 1,667 2,132 2,442 1,633 1,675 2,522
Subt.otal 22,951 28,066 31,766 49,085 51,583 53,483 49,254
Australia 809 3,300 1,164 2,399 1,604
New Zealand 9 7 39 102 15
Belgium 496 844 1,076 956 815 725
Germany 2,322 2,297 3,393 3,052 3,701 3,140
Net.herlands 4,000 6,000
Sweden 1,212 3,966
UK a 1,140 1,160 1,400 1,333
Subtotal 2,827 3,148 10,457 14,570 8,307 11,563 1,604
Net emigration to
Aust.ralia 797 3,167 1,002 2,265 1,529
New Zealand 5 36 90 3
Belgium 281 499 286 290 277 272
Germany ] ,249 882 1,459 813 704 1,027
Net.herlands 4,000 6,000
Sweden 896 3,416
UK a -240 -560 -200
Subt.otal l,.535 1,381 6,338 9,800 2,682 6,979 1,529
Tot.al emigrants 25,778 31,214 42,223 63,655 59,890 65,046 50,858
Maximum net loss 24,486 29,447 38,104 58,885 54,265 60,462 50,783
aThe data for the UK are classified by both citizenship and place of previous residence.
data on asylum applications lodged in European countries during
1983-1990 classified by region of citizenship of the persons involved.
13.2 Overview of the Main Interregional
Migration Flows
13.2.1 Sub-Saharan Africa
Information on migration flows affecting sub-Saharan Africa since
1960 is highly asymmetric: there is more information on migration
originating in the region than on that directed toward the region.
Although sub-Saharan Africa attracted considerable numbers of Eu-
ropean and Asian migrants before 1960, the decolonization process
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Table 13.1. Continued, panel 8.
Origin
Americas
(developing) 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-91
Emigrants to
Canada 3,413 11,502 23,629 22,017 15,274 22,668
USA 97,003 147,508 187,804 342,828 417,090 321,041 224,933
Israel 2,014 1,789 2,262 2,578 1,759 1,767 2,615
Subtotal 102,430 160,799 213,695 367,423 434,123 345,476 227,548
Australia 179 638 4,454 3,807 1,698 4,197 3,945
New Zealand 37 49 123 139 23
Belgium 496 844 1,076 1,102 1,098 894
Germany 3,567 3,888 5,513 5,269 6,613 7,870
Netherlands 4,442 12,451 6,570 5,323
Sweden 371 389 794 2,728 2,883 4,640
UK 16,080 8,980 8,520 6,780 6,760
Subtotal 4,650 21,888 25,382 34,016 25,666 29,684 3,945
Net emigration to
Australia 165 .588 4,291 3,610 1,487 4,019 3,840
New Zealand 26 29 114 111 6
Belgium 28] 499 286 294 286 302
Germany 1,956 1,257 2,278 1,340 1,409 2,349
Netherlands 4,187 11,599 5,201 4,454
Sweden 91 85 406 2,271 2,069 3,783
UK 5,080 -1,200 1,360 -180 420
Subtotal 2,519 7,538 10,363 20,585 10,278 15,327 3,840
Total emigrants 107,080 182,687 239,077 401,439 459,788 375,160 231,493
Maximum net loss 104,949 168,337 224,058 388,008 444,401 360,803 231,388
led to a reversal of the flow. Not only did the independence of cer-
tain countries trigger important repatriation flows directed mostly
to European countries, but there were also cases of outright expul-
sion (e.g., that of British Asians from Uganda ordered by President
Idi Amin in 1972).
As the first panel of Table 13.1 indicates, the total number of
immigrants originating in sub-Saharan Africa and recorded by the
selected set of receiving countries considered rose significantly be-
tween 1960-1964 and 1970-1974 and remained fairly stable until the
late 1980s when another increase was recorded. Although the evolu-
tion of net migration (i.e., net emigration from sub-Saharan Africa)
paralleled that of gross emigration as of 1970 (it changed relatively
little between 1970 and 198.5, to rise sharply thereafter), during
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the 1960s the trend in net emigration was the opposite of that in
gross emigration. The United Kingdom was mainly responsible for
such contrasting trends during the 1960s because, even though it re-
ceived nearly 26,000 immigrants annually from sub-Saharan Africa
between 1965 and 1969, it sent out an annual average of 33,000
during the period. However, British data include both British citi-
zens and foreigners, so that it is likely that a significant proportion
of those individuals leaving for or coming from sub-Saharan Africa
were British citizens.
The first panel of Table 13.1 also indicates that, since 1960,
there has been a steady rise in the number of persons from sub-
Saharan Africa admitted as immigrants by the main countries of
permanent resettlement. For Israel, in particular, the admission of
Ethiopian Jews led to the rise registered during the 1980s. Although
gross immigration from sub-Saharan Africa to European countries
has also, by and large, been growing, the changes registered during
the 1980s are the most significant: net emigration from the region to
Europe rose from 2,700 annually during 1980-1984 to over 31,000
annually during 1985-1989, with Germany, the Netherlands, and,
especially, the United Kingdom registering very substantial gains.
Not surprisingly, the number of citizens from sub-Saharan African
countries seeking asylum in Europe also rose dramatically: from
16,000 annually during 1983-1984 (an average that would be con-
siderably lower if the data for the full fi ve- year period were available)
to 39,000 in 1985-1989 (see Table 13.2). Furthermore, preliminary
data for 1990 already indicate that the number of Africans from
south of the Sahara filing asylum applications in Europe rose to
nearly 77,000.
In addition to the flows documented in Tables 13.1 and 1.1.2,
between 500,000 and 800,000 inhabitants of the Portuguese colonies
of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique returned to
Portugal during the 1970s when those countries gained independence
(Ferreira de Paiva, 1983). The majority of these returnees were
Portuguese citizens. However, African nationals have also emigrated
to Portugal. By 1990, over 45,000 citizens of African countries,
mainly from Cape Verde (over 28,000), Angola (5,000), and Guinea-
Bissau (3,500), were legal residents of that country (GECD, 1991,
1992).
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Table 13.2. Average annual number of asylum seekers in Europe
by region of citizenship: 1983-1990.
Region of citizenship 1983-1984
Sub-Saharan Africa 15,890
North Africa and West Asia 12,896
South Asia 26,375
East and Southeast Asia 6,071
China 0
Central America and Caribbean 1,097
South America 2,682
Total 88,024
1985-1989
38,991
60,266
58,029
3,971
869
1,318
5,629
240,876
1990a
76,660
97,671
65,867
13,671
1,946
867
3,544
412,889
UData for 1990 are preliminary and do not necessarily refer to the whole year.
Italy has also experienced important inflows of migrants from
sub-Saharan Africa, especially during the 1980s. By the end of 1990,
75,000 citizens of countries in the region were registered as legal res-
idents in Italy: 25,000 from Senegal, 12,000 from Ethiopia, 11,000
from Ghana, and 9,000 from Somalia. At least 17,000 of the to-
tal had been regularized in 1986 and 36,000 in 1990. However, the
increase in these figures cannot be interpreted as necessarily indi-
cating an increase in inflows, since much depends on the stringency
of the regularization drive.
In Spain, where regularization drives were carried out in 1985
and 1991, the number of citizens from sub-Saharan African countries
who were officially registered as residents increased from about 1,000
by the end of 1980 to nearly 9,000 by the end of 1990 (Spain, 1991).
Among the 43,800 persons filing for regularization in 1985, 3,600
were Senegalese and 2,700 were Gambian (OECD, 1990). Prelimi-
nary data regarding the 1991 regularization drive are only available
for selected nationalities of applicants (OECD, 1992).
Information on inflows of migrants from other regions to sub-
Saharan Africa is mostly lacking. Indirect indications can be ob-
tained from stock data derived from censuses, though very few coun-
tries have two censuses with comparable information. In Liberia, for
instance, the population born outside of Africa increased from 8,600
to 11,800 between 1962 and 1974, in Reunion it rose from 16,300 to
30,200 during 1974-1982, and in Swaziland it increased from 4,200 to
6,700 during 1976-1986. The population of non-African citizenship
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also rose from 5,500 in 1974 to 8,300 in 1984 in the Congo and from
7,600 to 8,800 between 1963 and 1974 in Sierra Leone. A very rough
estimation of net migration based on the figures spanning the 1975-
1980 period would suggest that at least 2,500 persons immigrated
annually to sub-Saharan Africa from other regions.
More recent data for the Republic of South Africa suggest
that this country alone may have recorded even higher net migra-
tion gains. Thus, its foreign-born population rose from 426,000 to
450,000 between 1980 and 1985. Making allowance for mortality
at the level of 8 per 1,000 (lower than the 11 per 1,000 estimated
by the United Nations for the total population of South Africa to
make some allowance for the selectivity of migration), the estimated
net inflow of migrants to South Africa during 1980-1985 would have
been of the order of 41,000 - that is, about 8,200 per year. However,
it is likely that at least some of those migrants have already been
accounted for by the emigration data of the United Kingdom.
Given the paucity of the information available, only guesses are
possible regarding the possible net inflow to sub-Saharan Africa of
persons originating in countries other than those listed in Table 13.1.
To conclude, it is worth noting that sub-Saharan Africa hosts
the second largest number of refugees in the world, amounting to
about 5.2 million in early 1991 (UN, 1994b). Most of the refugees,
however, have found asylum in neighboring countries and have there-
fore remained within the region as defined here. Their movements,
therefore, need not be taken into account in projecting the total
sub-Saharan population.
13.2.2 North Africa and West Asia
The region comprising the northern part of Africa and the western
part of Asia has been one of the most dynamic in terms of its par-
ticipation in interregional migration flows, both as a region of origin
and as one of destination. There have also been important intrare-
gional flows that need not be documented here. The main sources of
interregional emigration have been the Maghreb countries (Algeria,
Morocco, and Tunisia) and Turkey.
Because the region encompasses many of the oil-rich countries of
the developing world, particularly those having a limited work force
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both in general terms and, more importantly, in terms of needed
skills, it has been a major destination of migrant workers, partic-
ularly those originating in countries of South, East, and Southeast
Asia. The region also includes Israel, one of the few countries pur-
suing an active policy of permanent resettlement. Lastly, as a result
of both internal and international conflict, the region has been the
source of important outflows of population both to neighboring re-
gions (South Asia) and, to a lesser extent, to the rest of the world
(via, for instance, the emigration of Lebanese).
Turkey
The second panel of Table 18.1 shows that the region has been the
source of very sizable migrant outflows directed mainly to Euro-
pean countries, especially France and Germany. However, at least
in the case of Germany, gross inflows have been considerably larger
than net migration. The same may apply to France, although lack
of information on emigra.tion from that country prevents an ade-
quate assessment of net gains. Indirect evidence suggests that net
migration from the Maghreb countries to France was positive dur-
ing the late 1970s but very low or possibly negative during at least
part of the 1980s. Thus, the number of citizens of Algeria, Morocco,
Tunisia, and Turkey enumerated by the censuses of France increased
from 1,161,000 in 1975 to 1,560,000 in 1982 and only to 1,614,000 in
1990 (OECD, 1992). Whereas the number of Moroccans, Tunisians,
and Turks in France grew bptween 1982 and 1990, that of Alge-
rians declined sharply. passing from 805,000 in 1982 to 620,000 in
1990. Although some of that change may have been due to natu-
ralization or better reporting of citizenship by persons of Algerian
descent (many of whom have the right to French citizenship), return
migration is also likely to have contributed to the change observed.
In 1990, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Swe-
den were hosting a total of 2,196,000 Turks, 951,000 Moroccans,
631,000 Algerians, and 242,000 Tunisians (OECD, 1992). Sizable
Turkish populations were also present in other European countries.
Thus, between 1980 and 1990, the number of Turks in Norway and
Switzerland increased from 40,600 to 69,700, and the number of
Turkish workers in Austria rose from 28,300 to 50,500. At least
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part of the increase in the Turkish population in Europe was asso-
ciated with the very sizable inflows of Turkish asylum seekers. As
Table 13.1 shows, the number of asylum seekers from North Africa
and West Asia rose very markedly between the early and late 1980s,
and Turks accounted for much of that increase (figures not shown).
Among the other nationalities, about 2,200 Moroccans were re-
ported to be present in Norway in 1990 and they figured prominently
in the regularization drives carried out by Italy and Spain since 1985.
In Italy, for instance, 146,000 persons from North Africa and 12,000
from West Asia were present in 1990, of which 78,000 were Moroc-
can, 41,000 Tunisian, 20,000 Egyptian, and 6,000 each Lebanese and
Jordanian. Of the total 158,000 North Africans and West Asians
present in 1990, 39,000 had regularized their status as a result of
the 1990 drive and 18,400 during that held in 1986 (GECD, 1991).
In Spain, the register of foreigners indicates that the North
African and West Asian population declined slightly from 1975 to
1980 (from 7,500 to 6,800), rose to 9,200 in 1985, and then increased
sharply to reach 21,100 by the end of 1990 (Spain, 1991). This rise
was partly due to the 1985 regularization drive where at least 8,000
Moroccans lodged applications for regularization (GECD, 1990).
Preliminary results from the 1991 drive indicate that a further
40,000 Moroccans may be regularized (GECD, 1992).
Lastly, it must be noted that the changes taking place in the
former East bloc countries have made Turkey a migrant-receiving
country. Indeed, in 1989,314,000 Bulgarians of Turkish ethnic origin
moved into the country. By September of 1991 there were 358,000
Bulgarians in Turkey. Nearly two-thirds had settled permanently
and virtually all had acquired Turkish citizenship (GECD, 1992).
Israel
Panel 2 of Table 13.1 indicates that gross immigration to Israel,
most of which has originated outside the region in recent years, has
contributed significantly to red uce the net emigration balance of the
region (see the last line of the second panel). The high levels of im-
migration recorded by Israel during the 1970s and again during the
1990s are associated with the arrival of Soviet Jews whose emigra-
tion during the 1970s was permitted as part of "detente" and during
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the 1990s as a result of the liberalization of the Soviet and now the
Russian regime. In 1990 alone, 185,200 Soviet Jews immigrated to
Israel, and the figure for 1991 is 147,800 (Sabatello, 1992). The 1989
census of the USSR enumerated 1.45 million ethnic Jews. Taking
into account Jews registered under other "nationalities" and their
non-Jewish relatives, an estimated 1.8 to 2 million persons might
still be eligible for eventual admission to Israel (Sabatello, 1992).
Unfortunately, information on emigration from Israel by region
of origin or region of destination could not be obtained. Available
information on net migration indicates that during 1975-1979, it
amounted to only 12,200 persons annually (UN, 1985a), a level far
lower than the gross immigration figure of 33,400 shown in Table
13.1. In addition, data on the number of Israeli residents who left
in a given year and had not yet returned by May 1990 indicate that,
on average, 9,700 emigrated annually during 1976-1979, 12,100 did
so during 1980-1984, and 22,700 during 1984-1988 (Israel, 1990). Of
course, the last figure is likely to overestimate permanent emigration
somewhat because the time elapsed since departure is shorter. How-
ever, such figures indicate the approximate levels of emigration that
Israel has been experiencing, levels that would reduce considerably
the gross gains presented in Table 13.1.
Oil-rich Countries
It is well known that the oil-rich countries of North Africa and West
Asia have been major importers of foreign labor. Even before the
dramatic rises in the price of oil during the early 1970s, several
countries in the region had been resorting to foreign workers. The
most complete estimates on worker migration to the region indicate
that, between 1975 and 1980, the total number of foreign workers
employed in Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen increased from
1.8 to 2.8 million (Birks and Sinclair, cited in UN, 1985a). The
largest proportions (43 percent in 1975 and 36 percent in 1980)
were employed in Saudi Arabia. Libya with 19 percent in 1980, the
United Arab Emirates with 15, and Kuwait with 13 followed.
Until 1980, most foreign workers in the region also originated
in countries of North Africa and West Asia: 71 percent in 1975 and
63 percent in 1980. The rest were mostly citizens of India, Iran,
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and Pakistan (2,5 percent in 191,5 and 27 percent in 1980). Whereas
Indians and Pakistanis worked in almost every possible receiving
country, Iranians were mostly concentrated in Iraq and Kuwait.
During the late 197013 a new trend took hold. The main labor-
importing countries in the region turned to migrant workers from
East and Southeast Asia. Table 13.3 shows the average annual
number of persons granted permission to work abroad under tem-
porary contractual agreements by various sending countries in both
South Asia and East and Southeast Asia. The data, though proba-
bly fairly incomplete for earlier periods, indicate that by 1975-1979
an annual average of 330,000 persons were being granted permission
to work abroad. During the 198013, the equivalent figure remained
above 1 million. The distribution by region of origin has changed
substantially since 1975. Whereas during 1975-1979,52 percent of
all workers securing permits to go abroad originated in South Asia,
by 1980-1984 their share had dropped to 43 percent, and during
1985-1989 it decreased further to 30 percent.
Care must be taken in interpreting the figures presented in Table
13.3. They represent generally the number of exit permits granted
by government authorities to persons wishing to work abroad. Since
temporary engagements are possible, multiple work permits may be
issued to a single person during a given year. Furthermore, even
from year to year, figures cannot be interpreted as representing new
workers joining the expatriate labor force. The policy of worker
rotation adopted by many receiving countries implies that foreign
workers usually remain abroad for relatively short periods (one or
two years) and need to return home before having their contracts re-
newed. Unfortunately, figures on !let flows are not available. On the
other hand, since workers have been known to emigrate "illegally"
without obtaining the necessary permits, the figures presented may
be subject to a counterbalancing negative bias. Lastly, although
the oil-rich countries of vVest Asia have been a major destination of
migrants originating in most of the countries listed in Table 13.3,
it is by no means certain that they are the only destination. Data
classified crudely by region of destination indicate that, at least for
Indonesia, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand,
the proportion of workers intending to go to the Middle East has
varied substantially since 1975 (see Table 13.4).
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Table 13.3. Average annual number of migrant workers leaving
from selected countries of South Asia, East and Southeast Asia, and
China: 1970-1991.
Average annual number of work
Region and country permits issued (thousands)
of origin 1970-74 1975-791980-84 1985-89 1990-91
South Asia
Bangladesh 13.8 53.0 78.0 125.5
India 5;3,6 236.5 139.7 -
Nepal 0.2 0.3
Pakistan 7.:3 92.3 133.9 80.3 128.3
Sri Lanka 11.5 28.5 (12.7)a -
Sri Lanka (final approvals) - 15.3 53.8
Subtotal 7.:3 171.2 451.9 313.5 307.9
East and Southeast Asia
Indonesia 4.7 24.4 66.3 10.5 ..5
Korea, Republic of 2.9 72.3 171.1 77.0 -
Myanmar 1.6 9.8
Philippines 15.5 75.9 330.9 (460.3)a (650.3)"
Philippines (deployed) (70.2)" 426.0 530.6
Thailand 0.1 6.3 60.0 97.0 63.5
Vietnam 13.3 38.9 2.1
Subtotal 18.5 1.59.2 599.7 706.8 711.5
China 27.6 73.9
Total 25.8 330.4 1,0.51.6 1,047.9 1,093.3
aEntry has not been used in calculation.
Unfortunately, data relative to the countries of destination are
generally lacking. In particular. no reliable information is available
regarding the size and composition of the foreign population present
in the main labor-importing country of the region, Saudi Arabia.
Although it has been estimated that the number of foreign workers
in the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council - Bahrain,
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates
- increased from 2.1 to 5.1 million between 1980 and 1985 (Russell,
1990), the bases for such estimates remain obscure. Data on entries
to and departures from Saudi Arabia indicate that the country has
been gaining population from regions other than North Africa and
West Asia, particularly from South Asia and East and Southeast
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Table 13.4. Distribution of average annual number of migrant
workers originating in countries of East and Southeast Asia by des-
tination: 1975-1988.
Average annual number
Country of origin and of work permits issued
intended destination 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1988
Korea, Republic ofa
Total workers 97,500 171,800 96,200
Workers to Middle East 77,800 128,400 42,600
Percentage to Middle East 79.8% 74.7% 44.2%
Indonesia
Total workers 24,400 61,400
Workers to Middle East 15,800 48,100
Percentage to Middle East 64.8% 78.4%
Philippines
Total workers 75.900 330,900 433,500
Workers to Middle East 28,500 232,300 278,700
Percentage to Middle East :37.()% 70.2% 64.3%
Thailand
Total workers 6,:300 60,000 89,900
Workers to Middle East 5,100 56,400 75,600
Percentage to Middle East 81.2% 93.9% 84.1%
Total
Total workers 179,800 587,100 681,000
Workers to Middle East 111,500 432,900 445,000
Percentage to Middle East 62.0% 73.7% 65.3%
aData on Middle East destinations are available only since 1977.
Asia (see Table 13.5). However, the usual drawbacks of entry and
departure statistics make t hem less than ideal indicators of long-
term migration to the country.
A word must be said about the effects of the Gulf War on mi-
gration to and from West Asia. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq led
to the large outflow of expatriate workers. At least 700,000 were re-
ported to have fled to Jordan from where they were eventually repa-
triated to their countries of origin. Estimates by the ILO indicate
that of the 2.6 million foreigners present in Iraq and Kuwait before
the invasion, only 1.4 million remained two months later. Among
those departing, there were some 229,000 persons from South Asia,
49,000 from the Philippines and Thailand, and 68,000 from other
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Table 13.5. Average annual migration to Saudi Arabia by region
of citizenship: 1977-1984.
Region of citizenship
Southern Africa
North Africa and West Asia
South Asia
East and Southeast Asia
China
Rest of the world
Total
Total from outside North Africa
and West Asia
1977-1979
8,998
22,938
59,144
51,937
1,865
9,076
153,958
131,020
1980-1984
-5,281
4,208
102,894
37,663
-1,131
-84,530
53,823
49,615
Asian countries (1LO, 1990). There is as yet no information about
the resumption of labor migration after the war, but the task of re-
construction is likely to have attracted not only those who fled but
other workers as well. Reports about the decision of Kuwaiti au-
thorities to dispense with Palestinian workers suggest that workers
from other countries may have to be imported to take their place.
The war also caused major dislocations in Iraq. In particular,
1.4 million Kurdish and Shiite refugees from Iraq fled to Iran be-
tween February and May 1991. Their repatriation, however, was
swift. By early July, only 252,000 remained in Iran (De Almeida e
Silva, 1991). Yet, continued instability in Iraq may lead to further
outflows to neighboring countries.
13.2.3 South Asia
The major countries of South Asia, by virtue of having been under
British colonial rule, have traditionally had close migration ties with
the United Kingdom and other developed members of the British
Commonwealth. As panel 3 of Table 13.1 shows, since 1970 the
region has been an important source of immigrants for the USA
and Canada, and over the period considered net migration between
South Asia and the United Kingdom has been positive. Important
contingents of South Asians have also been recorded recently in
Germany, a development that is likely to be associated with the
movement of asylum seekers from the region to Europe. As Table
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13.2 shows, the number of asylum seekers from South Asia increased
from an annual average of 26,000 during 1983-1984 to .58,000 during
198.5-1989. The main sources of asylum seekers in the region have
been Iran and Sri Lanka.
As discussed in Section 13.2 ..5, South Asia has also been an im-
portant source of labor migration for the oil-rich countries of West
Asia. Data on the outflow of workers from the main sending coun-
tries in South Asia are presented in Table 13.3. It is worth noting
that, particularly for India and Sri Lanka, the number of work per-
mits issued to those intending to work abroad is thought to under-
estimate true outflows. Sri Lanka's worker migration has attracted
attention because of the high proportion of women it involves. Most
of them work as maids in West Asian countries. Although there is
no information on the country of destination of the South Asian
workers who have been granted exit permits, it is safe to assume
that most of them intend to work in West Asia.
Only lately have there been reports of an increasing number of
South Asian workers finding employment in other Asian countries,
such as Japan or Taiwan. However, most of them work illegally.
Japanese statistics show that during 198.5-1990, 11 ,600 citizens of
Bangladesh, 10,700 of Pakistan, LOOO of Sri Lanka, 700 of each Iran
and India, and 400 of Nepal were deported. For each nationality,
the number of deportations rose rapidly over the period considered.
South Asian workers are also finding their way to Europe. To-
ward the end of 1990, Italy recorded 34,100 citizens of Bangladesh,
India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka as legally residing in the country,
13,400 of whom had legalized their status during the 1990 regular-
ization drive and 12,100 during that held in 1986 (OEeD, 1990). In
Spain, the number of Sonth Asian nationals legally present by the
end of 1990 amounted to nearly 8,000, a substantial increase from
the 2,600 registered in 1980 (Spain, 1991).
Some of the largest population outflows have occurred within
the South Asian region itself. According to statistics on the foreign-
born, India was the second largest migrant-receiving country in the
world in 1980. Most of the migrants thus identified had moved to
India from Bangladesh or Pakistan, probably as a result of parti-
tion. In addition, the region hosts the largest refugee population
originating from a single conntry. Afghanistan. As of early 1991 an
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estimated 6.2 million Afghani refugees were present in Iran and Pak-
istan (UN, 1994b). Furthermore, by mid-1991 Iran was still hosting
252,000 Iraqi refugees.
13.2.4 East and Southeast Asia
The East and Southeast Asia region has been a major source of
migrants for both the developed countries and the labor-importing
countries of West Asia. As Table 13.1 indicates, immigrants from
the region have constituted the second largest contingent admitted
by the USA since 1970-1974. The close strategic, military, or even
colonial ties that link several countries in the region with the USA
have fostered such migration. Thus, the Philippines, the Repub-
lic of Korea, and Vietnam have been among the main sources of
immigrants to the USA for over a decade. Migration from Viet-
nam, Cambodia, and Laos has occurred mostly within the frame-
work of refugee resettlement. It is estimated that between 1975
and 1988 nearly 1.5 million Indo-Chinese refugees were resettled
abroad, the vast majority (1.15 million) in developed countries, in-
cluding 108,000 in France, 8,000 in Switzerland, and 6,000 each in
Norway and .Japan (LTN. 1992a). The Vietnamese resettled in other
developed countries are already reflected in the statistics presented
in Table 13.1. In addition, during the 1980s China admitted 284,000
ethnic Chinese from Vietnam for resettlement.
Emigration from Vietnam has also occurred in the context of
labor migration. Newly available statistics from the former Ger-
man Democratic Republic indicate that by the end of 1989 there
were over 60,000 Vietnamese in that country, a number that had
declined to :3.5,000 by the eud of 1990 (GECD, 1992). In the former
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic :34,000 Vietnamese workers were
present in 1990, but their number had declined to barely 10,000 by
1991 (GECD, 1992). Vietnamese workers are also known to have
migrated to the former Soviet Union, but no information on their
numbers is available. Table 1.1.3, however, indicates that during the
1980s a growing number of Vietnamese received clearance to work
abroad.
At least part of the growth of the number of East and Southeast
Asian immigrants recorded by the countries listed in panel 4 of Ta-
ble 18.1 is attributable to the intake of Indo-Chinese refugees after
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the fall of Saigon in 197.5. However, especially during the 1980s,
the numbers of migrants originating in countries like the Philip-
pines, Hong Kong, or Malaysia have also been growing. Indeed,
the planned devolution of Hong Kong to the People's Republic of
China has fueled emigration from the Crown Colony. Countries like
Australia, Canada, and the United States have established special
immigration categories aimed, at least in part, at attracting affluent
Hong Kong residents. AltllOugh emigration from Hong Kong has
been increasing, net migration to the Colony may still be positive.
Estimates of net migration for earlier periods indicate that Hong
Kong gained an annual average of 11,500 persons during 1961-1971,
20,400 during 1971-1976, and 80,000 during 1976-1981 (Skeldon,
1986). The sharp rise registered in the late 1970s was due to the
increased inflow of illegal migrants from China lured by the possi-
bility of regularizing their status in Hong Kong if they managed to
reach the urban areas of the Colony. The rise in illegal migration
prompted British authorities to remove that possibility in 1980. The
effects of such a change aTe noticeable in the evolution of the Hong
Kong population born in China. Whereas the 1976 census of Hong
Kong showed that 1.66 million Hong Kong residents were born in
China and the 1981 census put that figure at 1.97 million, the 1986
census showed that the population born in China increased only to
2 million (Hong Kong, 1988). The figures imply that net Chinese
migration would have amounted to an annual average of 79,000 dur-
ing 1976-1981 (assuming a mortality of 10 per 1,000) and of some
25,000 during 1981-1986 under unchanging mortality conditions.
The growing variety of sources of emigration from East and
Southeast Asia has been paraUeled by an increasing diversification
of possible destinations. During the 1980s, not only did increas-
ing numbers of East and Southeast Asian workers secure permits to
work in West Asian countries, but the proportion obtaining permits
to work elsewhere rose in the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, and
Thailand (see Table 13.4). Although many of those workers found
employment in other countries of the region, such as Brunei, Hong
Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, or Taiwan, others went further afield.
Rising numbers of Filipinos, in particular, have been recorded in
Japan (49,000 were registered aliens in 1990 compared with only
5,500 in 1980), Italy (;34,000 in 1990), and Spain (where 2,500
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applied for regularization in 1991). In addition, during 1985-1990,
;31 ,400 Filipinos were deported from Japan, 72 percent of whom
were women. The same proportion of women was found among the
7,100 Thai migrants deported from Japan during 1985-1990. In con-
trast, among the G,600 Malaysians deported during the same period,
women accounted for only 12 percent (Japan, 1990).
In conclusion, the number of citizens from East and Southeast
Asia seeking asylum in Europe has remained relatively small (see
Table 1:J. 2). The generous resettlement opportunities granted to
Indo-Chinese refugees during most of the 1980s are probably re-
sponsible for these trends. However, as conflict in Indochina su b-
sides and a growing number of would- be refugees are denied asylum
in the region, they may start seeking it elsewhere.
13.2.5 China
The fact that in 1980 over 2G million Chinese or descendants of Chi-
nese were estimated to be living in countries other than mainland
China or Taiwan (Poston and Yu, 1990) proves that Chinese emi-
gration has been significant in modern times. However, during the
first three decades of the People's Republic of China (from the late
1940s to the late 1970s), Chinese emigration from the mainland was
severely restricted and only a small number of people left legally
during the period. More recently, as Chinese authorities have in-
creasingly opened the country to foreigners, emigration levels have
risen somewhat (see panel 5 of Table 1:J.1) but, in general, Chinese
emigration remains highly restricted.
As panel 5 of Table 1:J.1 indicates, the main receivers of Chinese
emigrants have been the USA and Canada. Only during the 1980s
did Chinese immigration to Australia or Germany surpass the 1,000
mark. However, as already noted, Chinese emigration to neighbor-
ing countries, particularly Hong Kong, has been considerably larger.
In addition, the number of Chinese registered as resident aliens in
Japan has been rising in recent years, passing from 49,000 in 1975
to 75,000 in 1985 and reaching 150,000 in 1990 (Japan, 1990). It is
not clear, however, whether the data refer only to mainland Chinese
or also to those of Hong Kong or Taiwanese origin.
As Table 1:J.2 indicates, the number of Chinese asylum seekers
in Europe, though small, has been increasing. Chinese became more
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likely to obtain asylum after the events of Tiananmen Square in
1989. The USA passed at the time a Deferred Enforced Departure
Act that allowed virtually every Chinese student in the country and
his or her dependents to stay. By August 1992, a bill that would
grant permanent residence to an estimated 80,000 Chinese students
and dependents in the USA had been passed (FAIR, 1992).
Chinese are securing entry to developed countries not only via
asylum procedures but also as needed workers. In Italy 18,700 Chi-
nese were resident aliens by the end of 1990, 4,500 of whom had
regularized their status in 1986 and a further 9,700 in 1990. A high
proportion of them were registered as own-account workers. In ad-
dition, Chinese authorities themselves are promoting the export of
labor. As Table 13.3 indicates, the number of Chinese workers ob-
taining permits to work abroad increased markedly from an annual
average of 27,600 during 198.5-1989 to nearly 74,000 during 1990-
1991. Given the increasing misgivings that West Asian countries
are having about hiring ~Muslilll workers from other Asian countries
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 1990). resorting to Chinese labor may
be a desirable option during the 1990s.
13.2.6 Central America and the Caribbean
According to the data presented in Table 13.1, the region identified
here as Central America and the Caribbean, which includes Mexico,
has been the main source of emigrants during 1960-1984. Only for
the period 19805-1989 did the gross number of emigrants originat-
ing in East and Southeast Asia surpass those coming from Central
America and the Caribbean. However, the data in panel 6 of Table
13.1 include the over 2 million legalizations from Central America
and the Caribbean that were registered during 1989-1992 and that
have been redistributed over the period 1972-1986. As a result of
such redistribution, the average annual number of admissions of per-
manent immigrants from Central America and the Caribbean by the
USA increased from 13;3,000 to 165,000 in 1970-1974, from 158,000
to 305,000 in 197.5-1979, from 162,000 to 373,000 in 1980-1984, and
from 198,000 to 277,000 in 198.5-1989. Since most of the legal-
izations correspond to Mexican citizens, Mexico became the main
source of migrants to the USA during the late 1970s.
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In fact, any attempt at incorporating undocumented migration
into overall migration estimates would make Mexico a major country
of emigration. Indeed, because the regularization established by the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 imposed time limits
on those who could have their status legalized, it did not eliminate
entirely the undocumented population present in the USA. It has
been estimated that, even taking into account the regularization re-
sults, by June 1988 nearly 1.9 million undocumented migrants were
still in the country, 1.1 million of whom were Mexican and another
half a million were from the rest of North America (Woodrow and
Passel, 1990). Furthermore, some 70,000 were estimated to have
entered the country during 1987-1988. However, that number of
entries was not statistically significant (Woodrow and Passel, 1990).
Not only do the figures on immigration to the USA presented in
panel 6 of Ta.ble 13.1 exclude estimates of undocumented migration,
they also exclude the inflow of persons from Caribbean Islands whose
inhabitants are US citizens. Puerto Rico is probably the main source
of such migrants. According to census figures, the number of net
migrants from Puerto Rico amounted to an average annual intake
by the United States of 1/,700 during 1955-1960, 19,200 during
196.5-1970, and 20,000 during 1975-1980 (Ortiz, 1986).
It is noteworthy that relatively few migrants from the region
have found their way to overseas countries. Although migration
from the English-speaking Caribbean to the United Kingdom was
significant during the late 19.50s and early 1960s, as the data in
Ta.ble 13.1 show, the net migration of Commonwealth citizens from
the Caribbean and Belize to the United Kingdom has been relatively
small or even negative since 1970. However, several Caribbean coun-
tries have been the source of emigrants to other regions. Cuba, for
instance, sent both troops and workers to Angola, and it was also
a source of workers for certain East bloc countries. There were, for
instance, 8,000 Cubans in the former German Democratic Republic
in 1989, only 3,000 of whom remained by 1990 (OECD, 1992). In
the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, 1,100 Cuban workers were
present in 1990, but by 1991 only 100 remained.
Citizens from the Dominican Republic have also migrated in
search of work to both regional and overseas destinations. Thus,
the 1980-1981 regularization drive of Venezuela recorded 4,300
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Dominicans and 1,900 persons from other countries of Central Amer-
ica and the Caribbean (Torrealba, 1985). In addition, by the end of
1990,4,400 citizens from the Dominican Republic were registered as
legal resident aliens in Italy, and 5,000 more applied for regulariza-
tion in Spain in 1991 (OECD, 1992). Interestingly, the foreign pop-
ulation of Central American and Caribbean origin residing legally
in Spain changed relatively little, declining from 13,700 to 10,800
between 1975 and 198.5 and then rising to 14,000 by 1990 (Spain,
1991 ).
Although during the 1980s several countries of Central America
were important sources of refugees, relatively few persons from the
region have applied for asylum in Europe (see Table 13.2). Again in
this instance, the USA and Canada have been the preferred desti-
nations of asylum seekers from Central America and the Caribbean.
During 1984-1990, US authorities adjudicated 102,000 applications
for asylum filed by citizens of just t.hree Central American coun-
tries, namely, £1 Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. Those ap-
plications constituted 64 percent of all the asylum cases adjudicated
in the USA during the period, and the vast majority (88,000) were
denied. Since most applicants remained in the USA even after their
asylum request was turned down, they became undocumented aliens
and were probably adequately reflected by the statistics on undocu-
mented alien stocks reported above. However, as a result of a lawsuit
by human rights advocates, US authorities granted all Salvadorans
present in the country as of 19 September 1990 and all Guatemalans
present on 1 October 1990 the right to new hearings on their asylum
claims and the possibility of staying in the country and working un-
til 30 June 1992 (UN, 1994b). Approximately 185,000 Salvadorans
have benefited from the temporary protected status thus granted
(Weintraub and Diaz-Briquets, 1992).
13.2.7 South America
Until the late 19505, South America was a region of immigration,
since countries like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay attracted
an important number of immigrants from European countries after
the end of \Vorld War II. The main sources of European migration
to the Americas were Italy, Spain, Portugal, and several East Eu-
ropean countries. By the 1960s, however, the inflow of Europeans
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had largely run its course. Only Venezuela was successful in at-
tracting overseas migrants well into the 1970s. Entry and departure
statistics for Venezuela indicate that during 1974-1979 the country
registered, on an annual basis, a net inflow of some 10,000 European
immigrants and another 1,000 from other regions (Torrealba, 1982).
During 1980-1981, however, the net flow became negative and is
likely to have remained so during the rest of the decade.
Census data from two of the main receiving countries in the
region, Argentina and Brazil, suggest that during the 1970s net
migration became negative. In Argentina the population born in
Europe declined from 1.47 million in 1970 to 1.08 million in 1980, a
reduction that cannot be a.ccounted for by mortality alone. In Brazil
the population of European nationality declined from 803,000 in
1970 to 638,000 in 1980. Although such a change could be the result
of naturalization, return migration is likely to have also contributed
to it.
As panel 7 of Ta.ble 13.1 shows, South America has been a rel-
atively important source of immigrants to the USA. A fair number
of them remained in that country illegally because, although the
numbers legalizing under IRCA were small in comparison to those
of undocumented aliens from Central America and the Caribbean,
the trend since 1970 has been affected by the redistribution of those
legalizing during 1989-1992. In particular, without the IRCA legal-
izations, the average annual number of admissions of South Amer-
icans by the USA would have amounted to only 31,000 instead of
38,000 in 1975-1979, to 37,000 instead of 45,000 in 1980-1984, and
to 42,000 instead of 44,000 in 198.5-1989.
Emigration from South America is likely to have grown signifi-
cantly during the 1980s. Part of it, however, is difficult to measure,
since it involves the emigration of second- and third-generation mi-
grants (i.e., the children and grandchildren of the original immi-
grants) who have been granted citizenship rights by the countries of
origin of their forebears. Thus, Italy and Spain have been receiving
the inflow of Italian or Spanish citizens born overseas who do not
appear on statistics relative to foreigners. According to statistics
on the foreign stock, there were 47,000 South American citizens in
Italy at the end of 1990 (14,000 of whom were Brazilian and 13,000
Argentine citizens). and the number of South American citizens in
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Spain nearly doubled, passing from 24,000 in 1975 to 30,000 in 1985
and then to 49,000 in 1990 (Spain, 1991). In addition, about 7,000
nationals of Argentina and 5,000 of Peru lodged applications for
regularization during the 1991 drive carried out in Spain.
Perhaps one of the most interesting cases of return migration
among the descendants of former immigrants is the migration of
Brazilians and Peruvians of Japanese descent to Japan. Between
1985 and 1990, the population of South American origin in Japan
increased dramatically, rising from 3,600 to 71,500. Underlying such
a change was the decision of Japanese authorities to permit the
establishment in Japan of persons of Japanese descent. Both Brazil
and Peru host relatively sizable Sllbpopulations of Japanese ethnic
origin that may decide to go back to their roots.
The number of South American asylum seekers in Europe has
remained modest. Until the 1990 change of government in Chile,
citizens of that country were likely to obtain asylum in Europe,
particularly in the Nordic countries. The new Chilean government
is planning to facilitate the repatriation of those wishing to return.
13.3 Conclusion
This overview of migration trends to and from the main developing
regions, though fairly comprehensive, is still a weak basis on which
to estimate current interregional migration or derive assumptions
regarding future trends. Although data on migration flows are not
entirely lacking, those available are often incomplete (they do not
refer to all possible long-term movements), and they are not easily
comparable from one country to another. In addition, when the
main countries of destination are located in the developing world,
data on migration flows are often entirely lacking or cannot be read-
ily obtained. The political sensitivity of the migration phenomenon
is such that existing information is often treated as highly classi-
fied material that must be protected. Countries are often guilty of
benign neglect, preferring to ignore the magnitude of flows than to
measure them adequately. Despite efforts to improve the quality and
availability of international migration statistics, little progress has
been made. In the meantime, migration continues to increase and
its complexity rises. Part of that complexity stems from the barriers
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that potential countries of destination are using to control or stop
migration. When legal migration is highly restricted or not desired
under any circumstances, different varieties of illegal or undesirable
flows will arise. Such a situation makes the job of the forecaster even
more difficult, since policy aims are at odds with likely outcomes.
On the other hand, consideration of any time series on migration
is a sobering experience. As Table 13.1 indicates, relatively drastic
changes in trends can and have occurred over the course of the past
30 years in many developing regions. Events like the Gulf War can
trigger large interregional flows over relatively short periods. Given
the difficulties in forecasting such events and their likely effects on
migration, population projections are often based on relatively sim-
plistic assumptions regarding future migration trends. Perhaps the
most common assumption is that migration will, in the long run,
have little effect on population dynamics, so that it can be assumed
to be zero. Otherwise, migration assumptions are generally made in
terms of net numbers of migrants gained or lost during each of the
projection quinquennia (see, for instance, Arnold, 1989). When the
latter approach is taken, nonzero assumptions are typically made for
a few projection periods (11Sually one to four, thus covering at most a
span of 20 years) and from then on migration is assumed to taper off
to zero or to remain constant at the last assumed level. Although un-
doubtedly simplistic, such practices have much to recommend them,
particularly when one is dealing with large and complex regions such
as the ones considered in this paper. Given the relatively large pop-
ulation bases of most regions, estimated net migration levels of the
magnitude presented in Table 13.1 are likely to have relatively small
effects on the overall evolution of the population.
At the level of individual countries or smaller regions, however,
the situation may be different. Ivligration is also likely to be an im-
portant component of population change when fertility has reached
very low levels, especially if it remains below replacement for a cer-
tain period (see, for instance, OEeD, 1991). Yet, even in countries
facing such fertility prospects, projections continue to be made us-
ing the type of migration assumptions described above: total net
numbers of migrants that vary minimally over time. Although the
construction of more complex assumptions is technically possible,
policy considerations usually dissuade technicians, who are mostly
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at the service of governments, from using more realistic scenarios,
especially if these scenarios are likely to run counter to major policy
stances. Whether the use of such scenarios would help or hinder the
debate 011 migration, its desirability, or the degree to which it must
be tolerated is a matter that needs to be considered carefully.
Note
[1] Definitions of developing regions used.
Sub-Saharan Africa. East Africa: British Indian Ocean Territory,
Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mauritius, Mozambique, Reunion, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia,
Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe; Central Africa: Angola,
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial
Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tome & Principe, Zaire; Southern Africa:
Bot.swana, Lesotho, Namibia. South Africa, Swaziland; West Africa:
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria,
St.. Helena, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo.
North Africa and ~lIfst ASia. North Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Libya,
Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, West Sahara; West Asia: Bahrain, Cyprus,
Gaza Strip (Palestine), Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman,
Qat.ar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen.
South Asia. Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran, Maldives,
Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka.
East and Southeast Asia. East Asia: Hong Kong, Korea (Democratic
People's Republic), Korea (Republic), Macau, Mongolia; Southeast
Asia: Brunei Darussa.lam, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Lao Peo-
pie's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singa-
pore, Thailand, Vietnam.
China.
CcntT'al America and the Carib/lean, Central America: Belize, Costa
Rica, 81 Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama;
Caribbean: Anguilla, Antigua & Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barba-
dos, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cuba, Dominica, Do-
minican Republic, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Haiti, Jamaica, Martinique,
rVlontserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Puerto Rico, St. Kitts & Nevis,
St. Lucia, St, Vincent. & the Grenadines, Trinidad & Tobago, Turks &
Caicos Islands, US Virgin Islands.
South America. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,
Falkland Islands (Malvinas), French Guiana, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru,
Surinam, Uruguay, Venezuela.
Chapter 14
Spatial and Economic Factors
in Future South-North
Migration
Sture Oberg
The objective of this chapter is to estimate future migration flows
between less developed countries and more developed countries.
This could be an easy task, where earlier flows are used as a ba-
sis for trend projections, or an aim far too complex for the scope of
this chapter.
The solution here is close to the first idea. The estimated figures
are based on three factors that determine the probabilities of future
migration. The first is present trends as they are measured by the
UN (see Chapter 13). The second is an estimate of public attitudes
toward immigrants. The assumption is that these attitudes do not
change easily over time. Attitudes are also reflected in contempo-
rary flows, so these two factors are interrelated. The third factor
examines the proximity of push and pull regions, present contacts
between people living in rich and poor regions, and the welfare gap
between regions. This last factor is, of course, also interrelated with
the other two.
There is no official prognosis on future international migration, a
fact which has to do with political politeness. For a sending country
it is not easy to accept in hard figures that it will not be able to
organize its labor market or food production in the near future via
emigration. For a receiving country, it is not easy to reveal, for
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example, that it will deny citizenship to refugees in the future or
that it will continue to accept mostly well-educated immigrants from
poor countries. Prognoses of this kind therefore have to be personal
guesses made by individuals not working for UN agencies or any
other official authority.
Another reason for the lack of migration prognoses is the fairly
low interest in migration figures among demographers and others
working with forecasts. Migration figures are small compared with
other demographic changes. Every day there are 250,000 more in-
habitants on the globe (UN, 1992a). Every day 25,000 children
and adults die of starvation and diseases related to lack of nutrition
(Durning, 1989). Compared with this, the number of net migrants
from the South to the North during one day is a small number, about
5,000 each day. Per year, fewer than 1 inhabitant out of 2,000 in
developing countries migrate North. This could partly explain the
lack of prognoses on international migration.
The numbers are small, but the resulting political tension in
both sending and receiving countries is significant. Even small
streams are visible and create positive and negative changes in the
industrialized world. In the long run, say after one generation,
small numbers add up to large numbers and to more impressive
demographic-ethnic changes. But of course, at a very aggregated
level, the size of the numbers is still smaller than the numbers in-
fluenced by future changes in fertility and mortality patterns.
Before the prognosis in this chapter is presented let us define
some concepts and then determine how theories from different sci-
entific disciplines could be used to contribute to an understanding
of historical and current flows which in turn would make it easier
to speculate about future flows. This discussion is based on Oberg
and Wils (1992).
14.1 Definitions
The North is synonymous with the industrialized countries where
the income, on average, is roughly six times higher than in the de-
veloping countries, the South. The North consists of Europe, North
America, Japan, and Oceania.
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Figure 14.1. The world regions used in this book. See text and
Appendix Table 1 for definition of world regions.
Europe is sometimes divided into Western Europe, which is part
of the North, with around 400 million inhabitants and a high per
capita income, and the rest of Europe, the former communist coun-
tries, with more than 300 million inhabitants and a much lower per
capita income, thus statistically part of the South. North America
consists ofthe USA and Canada. Oceania is dominated by Australia
and New Zealand.
The regions used in this chapter are consistent with the regions
defined for the projections in this book. Thus, there are 13 groups of
nations forming the regions: I North Africa; II sub-Saharan Africa;
III China and Centrally Planned Asia; IV Pacific Asia; V Pacific
OECD; VI Central Asia; VII Middle East; VIII South Asia; IX East-
ern Europe; X Europea.n part of the former Soviet Union; XI West-
ern Europe; XII Latin America; XIII North America. The regions
are presented in Figure 1>t.l.
NIigmtion usually means '"relatively permanent" changes of res-
idence. Since we define regions as continents or groups of nations,
interregional migration refers to movements across the boundaries
of these regions. Permanence stands for several years, preferably a
lifetime.
Of the large number of persons who enter or leave a country,
only a small portion are defined as migrants. Tourists, business
Factors in Future South-North Migration 339
executives, temporary workers, and asylum seekers trying to find a
new home (Rogge, 1992) are usually not defined as migrants. This
definition makes it easier to make a prognosis because the accepted
flows are statistically better known than the illegal and temporal
ones. Most of the discussion in this chapter uses a wider definition
of migrants, but the prognosis at the end of the chapter is only
concerned with migrants receiving permission to stay permanently,
including those who later become citizens of the new country.
Citizenship is an individual's formal membership of a state.
This is a purely legal definition that serves as the basis for a number
of rights and duties. The most important here is the legal right for
a person to stay in the country where he or she is a citizen. There
are also other aspects, like political and psychological ones, but they
are not considered here (see Reinans and Hammar, 1993).
14.2 Theories on International Migration
Today, migration is understood as a process of complexity and het-
erogeneity. It can be analyzed from several perspectives and within
different conceptual frameworks or paradigms. Migration studies
can concentrate on individuals or structures, on micro or macro fac-
tors. These studies consider a wide range of historical processes and
contemporary situations.
Migration concerns individuals, and thus it is a result of unique
responses to an actual, potential, or perceived understanding of
many processes. It is partly a voluntary and partly a forced action
controlled not only by the migrant but also by others, including reg-
ulating governments. With this complexity in mind, researchers still
try to find regularities which could be used for theories or prognoses.
Different scientific disciplines have specialized in different aspects on
regularities or prevailing ideas behind migration processes.
The basic idea in the scientific literature on migration between
less developed and more developed countries, South-North migra-
tion, is that people should migrate North. This will equalize the cap-
ital per worker ratio and thus increase efficiency and hence incomes
and welfare. A majority of the population in the North will gain
from migration (Simon, 1993). Industrialists are happy to employ
less-expensive labor. An increased snpply of labor would decrease
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the wage level. Rich and well-educated people would also be bet-
ter off if they could afford to employ housemaids and gardeners for
Low wages. People in possession of real estate will earn money on
increased demand for housing.
Many people in the South would also gain. Migrants would
be better off in their new countries. They could help new migrants
settle in the North. They would probably send money home to their
relatives in less developed countries. At present the remittances are
about $75 billion annually, substantially more than development aid.
The first ideas on international migration that were developed
into a theoretical framework are more than two centuries old. In a
study by Kryger (1764), a Swedish social scientist, causes of inter-
national migration were discussed as well as how authorities could
influence the size of the flows. His idea was that migration cannot
be explained in simple words. Individual households could have sev-
eral reasons for migrating, and the gross migration flows could have
several causes. At that time the academic disciplines were broader
and fewer than today, but Kryger's study could be labeled "applied
economics." As Sweden at that time was a poor country, he concen-
trated his analysis on push factors, such as low wages in some sec-
tors, unfair taxation, badly organized social-security systems, and
lack of a well-functioning food distribution system. Several of these
factors are still push factors in today's poor countries.
A little more than a century later, several researchers like Raven-
stein (1885) in England and Rauchberg (1893) in Austria formu-
lated theories on interregional migration that could be extended
to international migration. A French researcher (Lavasseur, 1885)
discussed, as we often do today, "the increased facilities for commu-
nication, and the multiplicity of the relations existing between the
countries of emigration and immigration" as two of the main factors
behind migration.
An example of a summary of present knowledge on regularities
can be found in Lee (1966). He deals with a prevailing set offactors
both in the sending and in the potential receiving regions. These
factors could be positive, neutral, or negative. Added to them are
potential barriers to migration, "intervening obstacles," such as spa-
tial and cultural distances between regions, costs of migration, or
Factors in Future South-North Migration 341
government restrictions. Bohning (1981) provides a more general
overview. A recent survey of macro determinants of international
migration is given by Greenwood and McDowell (1992).
Today, economic theory is less applied than during Kryger's
time and thus further from actual socioeconomic processes. It is
a scientific discipline with a hard and coherent theory, based on a
number of simplified assumptions about people and society. How-
ever, several economists are struggling to develop theories that can
be applied to real world situations, like international migration (e.g.,
Lucas, 1981; MacPhee and Hassan, 1990; Blanchard et ai., 1991).
According to economic theory we could expect not only labor to
move North but also capital to move South. These activities would
increase the total production of goods and services. In a hypothet-
ical future with only economic considerations, no restrictions on
international migration, and no ethnic tension or social problems,
the greatest economic efficiency would be attained by a very large
redistribution of the population.
In reality, economic theory cannot be used in this simplified way.
Rather than calculating the flows necessary to achieve a theoretically
efficient equilibrium, economic theory should be used to indicate the
direction of the flows - not only migrants but also capital and trade
commodities - and the marginal returns of these flows.
In geography, a more applied discipline, researchers on migra-
tion have been concerned mainly with intranational migration, in-
cluding urbanization. Strong theories, like the gravitation approach
from the 1940s, could then be applied to make probable prognoses
on migration flows. However, South-North migration is not only
dependent on factors such as distances, information flows, the size
of populations, or the number of employment opportunities in dif-
ferent regions. Legal restrictions in the rich countries prevent many
foreigners from entering. \Vith present trends, less than 1 percent
of the population in the South will probably migrate to the North
before 2010.
The well-known mobility transition theory (Zelinsky, 1971),
which sometimes is treated as a deterministic theory, tells us that
there are historical phases, for exampIe, the demographic transi-
tion, when movement is related to general processes of urbanization,
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industrialization, and modernization. It is, however, not self-evident
how these ideas could be applied to South-North migration.
Political science can teach us about public institutions and pub-
lic decision systems concerning, for example, the formation of im-
migration policies (Kelley and Schmidt, 1979). Law can explain the
background and practice of immigration rules. However, neither
discipline has a theory on international migration flows.
The geopolitical future of the world, studied by geographers
and political scientists, is important, but there are no good theo-
ries which could help us make forecasts. We know that the lack
of congruence between ethnic settlements and political borders will
continue to be a problem - it is a problem in several regions. The
present situation in Africa is shown in Figure 14.2. In Europe, a
strong ethnic chauvinism not only created more than a dozen new
nations in past years, but also caused "ethnic cleansing." Unwanted
minorities have been either expelled from their settlements or killed
in a systematic way. This type of geopolitics is currently taking
place in the former Yugoslavia.
Sociology can explain some of the flows. According to one the-
ory (Hoffman-Nowotny, 1981), some flows have to do with the distri-
bution of power and prestige in a social system. A typical migrant
would first live in a poor country with a specific status among friends
and neighbors, then migrate to a rich country where he or she would
work hard, accumulate savings, and finally move back to the poor
country with the savings and with a higher status than before. The
attractive aspect of this theory is that it fits many movements be-
tween South and North.
Demographers speculate less than other researchers. They want
clear assumptions and established methods. A typical study would,
for instance, assume that 20,000 migrants with a specific ethnic
belonging and age and sex distribution settle permanently in Aus-
tralia every year. The study would then make calculations on how
this flow would change the demographic structure of the Australian
population over time. Lutz and Prinz (1992), in their study on hy-
pothetical migration flows from Eastern Europe to Western Europe,
show that assimilation processes would soon reduce the number of
"foreigners" in the West to very small numbers.
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Figure 14.2. Ethnic territories and national boundaries in Africa.
Present boundaries were drawn with very little consideration of eth-
nicity and long-lasting peaceful coexistence within and between na-
tions. Source: Peoples and Bailey, 1991.
The dependency burden is one of the central concepts in demog-
raphy, and an international gap in this burden would lead to migra-
tion flows. The discrepancy of an elderly (and wealthy) population
in the more developed countries and a young (and poor) population
in the less developed is repeatedly pointed out by demographers.
This creates a "demographic potential" for migration.
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Demographers are also concerned with feedback and return
flows, as are scientists in other fields, such as geography and so-
ciology. It is a well-known fact that small, pioneer flows of a new
group of migrants into a region later generate larger flows. First
a small group of new migrants is established in a new region. If
the members in this group are better off there than others are at
home, they can receive friends or relatives and give them a base to
start from; these friends can in turn receive others, and so on. A
further example of feedback effects is that a migration flow grows
as agencies (formal and informal) are set up in the sending country
to help potential migrants by providing them with information and
practical assistance.
Another well- known fact is that migration flows in one direction
will later cause counterflows. An early reference with both ideas and
empirical evidence on this statement regarding international migra-
tion flows is Ravenstein (1885). For example, a large proportion of
the immigrants, legal and illegal, to the USA from Mexico returns
home after a work season or a few years.
History is, of course, not only an academic discipline; it is also
the empirical source of all applied social science. We understand the
world by observing it. By knowing more about past and present mi-
gration flows it is hoped that we will be better prepared for expected
future flows. There have been many mass migration flows over long
distances. In the last century, Europeans migrated to North Amer-
ica, South America, and Australia; Russians colonized parts of Asia;
Chinese went South. The British, Ottoman, and, more recently, the
Russian empires fell, resulting in large numbers of British, Turkish,
and Russian settlers belonging to the ruling class migrating from
conquered territories. In recent decades, the Rio Grande and the
Mediterranean have become symbols of borders that are crossed by
large numbers of migrants. Today, the need for foreign labor in the
USA, Europe, and the oil-producing countries is resulting in large
flows of labor migrants, staying for shorter or longer periods, some
of them becoming citizens in their new countries.
Can these and other earlier movements tell us anything about
the future? Yes, they can teach us that a few thousand net migrants
per year add up to many millions over several decades. During the
1970s and 1980s about 4 percent (net) of the Mexican population
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migrated to the USA. History also tell us that economic booms in
the North result in large labor flows in the future. Less comforting
is that history also tells us that several flows were not regarded as
probable before they became a fact. History, however, cannot tell
us about future details; it can only provide probable patterns.
The main factors influencing historic and contemporary interna-
tional migration are well known, and will continue to be important.
There are many ways to label them. Economic factors include wage
differences, different access to economic wealth, and material stan-
dard of living. Social factors comprise proximity to relatives and
friends. Cultural factors, such as lifestyles and ethnicity, include so-
cial organizations, religion, and values. Geopolitical factors concern
tension or conflict, political instability, and threats to life. Environ-
mental factors, such as the carrying capacity of land for inhabitants
with limited resources, cause large migration flows, especially when
they are combined with geopolitical instability.
The causal links between these factors and the flows are gen-
erally clear. For example, if everything else is equal, most people
prefer higher wages, nearness to family, and religious freedom.
Migrants from the South usually go directly to the North, but
sometimes they first migrate to another developing country before
continuing to an industrialized country. For example, ethnic Turks
from the Balkan states often migrate to Turkey in a first move and
then to Western Europe. A study of such indirect international
migration to the United States was carried out by Greenwood and
Trabka (1991).
14.3 Push Factors
The welfare gap between countries in the South and North, which
includes factors such as a structural income gap or physical prox-
imity, does not change easily over time. The income gap between
Eastern Europe and Western Europe or between North America and
South America will not disappear before the year 2020 (Oberg and
Boubnova, 1993). Also even with unrealistically large investments
in the South (for example, 50 percent), it may still take a long time
to reduce this gap. If present policies continue, the gap could even
be larger in the future than it is today. There are more dollars
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Figure 14.3. Hard and soft push factors of migration.
invested per person in the North today than the total income per
person in the South.
As indicated earlier, causes of migration are sometimes divided
into two groups - push factors and pull factors. The ways these fac-
tors influence South-North migration have been discussed by sev-
eral authors (e.g., Golini et al., 1991; Heyden, 1991). Push factors
can be structural, such as the rapid global population growth with
its effects on competition for food and other resources. Population
growth is most severe in poor countries that are already struggling
with major food problems. Another structural cause is the welfare
gap between the North and the South. There are several other struc-
tural forces, but they are aU somewhat internally interrelated in a
causal structure.
Push factors can also be related to individual motives as shown
in Figure 14.8. There are no indications that these factors will
become less important in the future. Vlithout being pessimistic, it
is easy to believe the opposite for several reasons.
Wars between or within nation-states are usually caused by a
combination of long-lasting ethnic tensions and economic inequali-
ties. They can create large migration flows. For example, in the past
migration flows occurred in many former African colonies such as
Algeria, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Namibia, and Zim-
babwe (Rogge, 1992). Today these migration flows are taking place
in former Yugoslavia, Sudan, and Sri Lanka. Usually people try
to move to neighboring countries. In some cases, they may move
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to distant places if relatives and friends are already located there.
Indonesians migrated to the Netherlands, Armenians to the USA,
and Croats to Sweden. War between nations usually occurs where it
has occurred before, where ethnic hate exists, and where the social
systems are under too loose control (anarchy) or too strict control
(dictatorship) .
In some parts of Africa, the Balkan area, and Southeast Asia,
the risk of war in the coming decades is high. Countries like South
Africa and Israel have more tension in relations to their neighbors
than Switzerland or Canada, and thus the risk for future war is
higher in the former countries. However, higher risks do not forecast
future outcome. Peace can come unexpectedly in some areas; and
tension can rise fast in peaceful regions.
Persecution exists in many parts of the world, such as in Sudan,
Myanmar, former Yugoslavia, and El Salvador. Ethnic tension leads
to murder in war times and persecution in peace times. It will
continue to be a problem in most parts of the world in the coming
decade. Africa may see more of this problem than other parts of the
world in the near future.
Starvation with high mortality is already prevalent in many
countries (Dreze and Sen, 1989). In most African countries the
consumption of calories has decreased in the last decade: 35 out of
47 countries were worse off in 1989 than in 1980, according to FAG
statistics. The worst decline was in sub-Saharan countries like An-
gola, Botswana, Gabon, Mozambique, and Rwanda. Starvation in
the future is more probable in poor countries with a small domestic
food production or in nondemocratic nations, since "no democratic
country with a relatively free press has ever experienced a major
famine" (Sen, 1993). Starvation is also more probable in countries
with ethnic/political tension since it is a weapon that can be used
to hurt enemies, for example, in the Ukraine in the 1930s, Biafra
in the 1960s, and southern Sudan in the 1990s. Areas with current
low income, high debts, and low food consumption are shown in
Figure 14.4.
Poverty is probably the largest single factor behind current and
future migration flows. According to one estimation from the UN
(1993b), 100 million migrants have left their home countries be-
cause of poverty. It is of course hard to define poverty gaps, but
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Figure 14.4. Potential emigration areas. The map shows countries
with low income per capita, large debts in relation to income, and
low food consumption. A quarter of a billion people live in these
countries. Low income is defined as less than $1,500 per person in
1990; high debts mean more than one year's GNP; and at present
low food consumption implies that the supply of food is lower than
2,300 calories per person per day. Source: UNEP and UNDP, 1992.
they certainly constitute a contemporary and a future main force
behind international migration. The search for a good living stan-
dard can be combined with all the push factors mentioned earlier,
such as parenthood or ethnicity. Poverty has indirect effects on mi-
gration flows in the sense that we do not find the poorest part of
the population among the migrants. Large numbers of very poor in
a, country will increase competition for resources, add to crime and
violence, and thus decrease the living standard for others, including
the lower and upper middle classes. It is in these latter groups that
we find most migrants.
Environmental catastrophes are often discussed as a common fu-
ture cause behind large migration flows. Nuclear power stations or
factories producing atomic, biological, or chemical (ABC) weapons
could pollute large areas, such as Chernobyl did in the Ukraine in
1986. A rise in sea level or more hurricanes, which are phenom-
ena discussed as a possible scenario if global warming becomes a
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reality, will create floods in lowlands in many countries. With less
ozone protection in the atmosphere, large areas will be uninhabit-
able. For the moment there are no good prognoses of where future
environmental catastrophes are likely to occur. Most environmental
catastrophes have occurred in developing countries. Drought, floods,
soil erosion, and desertification are widespread, recurrent problems.
According to a 1992 report by the International Organization for
Migration, environmental migration will be caused by the follow-
ing disruptions: elemental, biological, slow-onset accidents; devel-
opment factors; and finally, environmental warfare. Each category
covers a spectrum of disruptions ranging from mild to catastrophic.
For an excellent overview of the literature on links between environ-
mental degradation and migration see Suhrke (1993).
Social loneliness is a problem of much less general importance
than others mentioned here. Furthermore, it will be a problem only
for a very small minority in the South, such as some parents with
children in the North. However, this small group can be a sub-
stantial proportion of the migrants going North, since they are usu-
ally allowed to move to their close relatives (Jasso and Rosenzweig,
1986).
Summarizing the short discussion of push factors is easy. They
are overwhelming and will probably change the world in many ways.
We may be facing an unrecognizable world in the year 2020 with
migration flows of the sa.me magnitude as during the last century
when Europeans flooded other parts of the world.
The North will be affected in a.n unforeseeable way, especially
if the future flows are determined by the supply of emigrants in the
South instead of, as today, by the demand for immigrants in the
North. However, a large part of these international flows will con-
tinue to be between neighboring countries in the South. A large part
will also be refugees who will not be allowed to stay permanently
or temporary workers; neither group is defined as migrants in this
chapter.
The basic assumption in this chapter is that changes are not very
spectacular. Restrictions placed by countries in the North will regu-
late future immigration. Future changes in restrictions are assumed
to be mainly influenced by present attitudes toward strangers, atti-
tudes that will not change during one generation.
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Figure 14.5. The gap between demand for cheap labor in the
North and the South is so large that minor changes in the demand
only influence migration flows indirectly through policy formation.
14.4 Pull Factors
The distinction between push and pull factors is usually unclear
from a scientific point of view. Wealth can be a pull factor in the
North, attracting migrants from less wealthy countries, but this phe-
nomenon could also be described as a push factor, lack of wealth,
in the South. With this in mind. caution must be taken when push
and pull concepts are under study.
From a technical point of view, it is difficult to distinguish be-
tween the importance of push and pull factors in relation to South-
North migration. The gap between indicators such as salary, secu-
rity, and demand for cheap labor is usually so large between the
Sou th and the North that changes in either the push or pull factor
only marginally affect it.
Also, theoretically a distinction is combined with severe prob-
lems. A larger flow of migrants during a period of low demand in
poor countries could be dependent either on the low demand during
the period, in which case it is a push factor, or on a delayed response
to an earlier situation with a high demand in the rich countries, in
which case it is a pull factor (see Figure 14.5). Thus, not only
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can data be selected in different ways, but the same information
can also be interpreted in many ways. Concerning, for example,
the early migration flows between Sweden and the United States,
Wilkinson (1967) states that they were mainly determined by labor
demand in the USA, while Thomas (1941) reports that the economic
conditions in Sweden were more important. Quigley (1972) shows
that conditions in both the sending country and the receiving coun-
try were important. An overview of these and other empirically
based studies on patterns and dynamics of push and pull factors
can be found in Greenwood and McDowell (1992). The most suc-
cessful studies of international migration are theoretically weak but
empirically strong.
Models of rnigration are specific to the relative importance of
push or pull factors. Depending on which theory a researcher uses,
he or she is restricted to specific mathematical tools. Each modeling
technique emphasizes either push or pull factors. For example, a
Markov model "pushes" migrants between time steps in the future
depending on earlier trends. An overview on how different methods
rely on push or pull ideas can be found in the geographic literature
(Alonso, 1974).
In the literature, pull factors are expressed in terms of gaps.
A high demand for labor with a corresponding high salary level
is related to the wage gap between countries. Pull factors of this
kind are difficult to trace in em pirical figures because the gap is
so enormous that it is not theoretically sound to relate marginal
changes directly to migration flows.
It would be better to relate pull factors indirectly to migra-
tion flows through the formation and implementation of immigra-
tion policies in the North. According to this idea, there is always
a long-lasting, large structural welfare gap between the North and
the South. The average income on one side of a geographical border
can be more than 2000 percent higher than on the other side - for
example, along the northern ~vIexican border or along the eastern
Finnish border. An increase in the wage level of a few percent-
ages on either side of the border does not change the gap as such.
However, in some situations, pull factors in the North, such as a
shortage of labor, could make it easier for the people in the North
to accept immigrants. Policies could change and migration flows
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could increase. This view makes the distinction between push and
pull factors instrumental in studies of South-North migration.
Related to this idea is the concept of migration pressure. This
commonly used expression roughly means unrealized migration de-
sires. The migration pressure from the South thus increases either
if fewer people are allowed to migrate through a more restrictive
policy or if a larger proportion of the population in the South would
like to move North.
Pull factors that could change migration policies are related
to economic and humanitarian ideas. Economic considerations are
stronger than humanitarian factors. If influential actors in the North
could earn money on immigration, this would probably be the most
important pull factor. A few can always gain - farmers in California
or fishermen in Sicily - but they must be supported by other groups,
usually more than half of the population in democracies.
Looking ahead, there are different opinions on the future de-
mand of labor in the North. One extreme argument is that there
will not be a future need for more immigrants. The demand for
labor has changed structurally in recent decades. In the future few
laborers will be employed in modern agriculture in the North, yet
this sector will produce more food than ever. Furthermore, there
will not be a future need for industrial workers in the North. This
is not only because of the increasing competition from the newly
industrializing countries but also because of new technologies in the
production system. More investments in industry and its produc-
tivity will only decrease demand for employees. Robots and com-
puters will run machines in some rich countries. For example, in the
Netherlands, only three workers out of ten in the labor market are
in farming or in industry.
A further argument for why there is no need for immigration is
that even with a future demand for labor in a booming economy,
many millions of homemakers in the North can enter the labor mar-
ket. Today, the low labor-market participation in southern Europe,
for example, functions as a reserve supply of labor.
The opposite argument is that the demand for labor in the North
will increase as a function of income, not as a function of demand for
labor in agriculture and industry. Service employment must also be
included in the analysis. For example, many rich old people in the
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North will need help in the future, but a shortage of people willing
to care for them has been projected. The shortage is due partly to a
new demographic situation, with a decrease in working-age groups,
and partly to the fact that it is difficult to recruit people living in
the North for jobs with a low status.
The humanitarian rationale for accepting refugees as immi-
grants has been quite strong, and will probably maintain its strength
in the future. A tendency to decrease its influence on migration is
the argument that more refugees could get help for the same amount
of money if they did not have to migrate to the North. Temporary
refugee camps in the South will probably be more common in the
future. Another tendency is that attitudes toward immigration are
changing slowly. Right-wing political parties tend to try to promote
policies that result in fewer migrants (Vandermotten and Vanlaer,
1993; Fielding, 1993). It is hard to see how the humanitarian pull
factor can change policies so that more migrants will be accepted in
the future. Yet, if a change in attitudes occurs, it could influence
immigration much more than changes in the labor market.
14.5 Policies
In this chapter, the most important factor for future permanent im-
migration flows to the developed countries is assumed to be attitudes
toward foreigners within the receiving countries. These attitudes
determine regulation policies in the North. Ethnicity in a broad
sense plays an important part in this context. Feelings of superior-
ity among rich majority groups in the North or of hate or fear of
potential immigrant groups belonging to other ethnic groups cause
decreases in future flows. Native ethnic Estonians are afraid of large
flows from Russia. Ethnicity also plays an important role when in-
ternal flows in the South are determined. Muslims in Pakistan are
not interested in large flows of Hindus from India.
Since there is no comparative study of this sensitive issue on
feelings on ethnicity and attitudes toward other ethnic groups, the
current international discussion among researchers is based on a
combination of nonsystematic interviews with colleagues from dif-
ferent countries, official policies, and statistics on actual permissions
for foreigners to obtain citizenship. According to this soft approach,
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Japan, the oil-rich Muslim countries, and Australia will be hesitant
to accept immigrants from other cultures; North America will wel-
come large streams; and Western Europe will hold a position in
between these two.
Within Western Europe, current practice varies: Sweden ac-
cepted one non-European asylum seeker for every 80 inhabitants
during the 1980s; Finland accepted almost no non-European immi-
grants. On average, there are large migration flows within Europe
but very limited immigration from other parts of the world.
However, small labor flows from neighboring regions continue.
For example, in Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands, the Turk-
ish population increased from 1.6 million to 1.8 million between 1985
and 1988. During the same period, the number of Algerians, Mo-
roccans, and Tunisians living in those countries rose from 330,000
to 370,000 (UN, 1992a:179). The majority of the labor migrants
are legal. Most of the illega.! migrants are now in Italy. There are
several estimates on the number of illegal migrants, but most give
estimates of about 1 million (Montanari and Cortese, 1993).
In the past the immigration policy in Western Europe varied
from country to country, but a more coherent policy is now emerg-
ing (Widgren, 1992). Five countries (Germany, France, the Nether-
lands, Belgium, and Luxembourg) have signed an agreement to har-
monize immigration. This group of countries, the Schengen group,
will directly or indirectly influence other countries to adjust their
policies in the same direction. Europeans are very restrictive to
non-European immigrants. On average, around 1 percent of the
population are non-Europeans. France, the UK, Germany, Sweden,
and Belgium have higher figures.
Within the former USSR, which comprises a European part (the
Baltic states, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova) and an Asian
part (including Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan),
there are now flows from Asia to Europe. Ethnic Russians migrate
to Europe from territories where they used to belong to a ruling mi-
nority, or where they were working for high salaries as compensation
for poor working conditions. The same is true for ethnic Ukrainians
and Belarussians (Oberg and Boubnova, 1993).
The two countries in the North American region are of spe-
cial interest in this chapter since they have traditionally accepted
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Table 14.1. Principal countriesa of resettlement of refugees and
asylum seekers.
Resettlement
country
Sweden
Canada
Australia
USA
France
Germanyb
1975-1990
121,000
325,000
183,000
1,478,000
200,000
91,000
Ratio
refugees/population
1/71
1/82
1/96
1/171
1/238
1/869
aSome countries with very small populations - Denmark, Norway, and New
Zealand - have high ratios, as high as those in the USA or France.
bExcludes ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe. If this group is included, Ger-
many has the same ratio as France.
Source: USeR, World Refugee Survey, 1992, cited in Rogge, 1992.
immigrants with different ethnic backgrounds. The United States
accepts more immigrants than any other country in the world. The
·USA and Canada belong to the principal countries of resettlement of
refugees and asylum seekers (see Table 14.1). Canada accepts fewer
immigrants in absolute numbers but more than the USA in rela-
tive terms. The USA granted permanent resident status to nearly
6 million people and Canada to 1 million during the 1980s.
The US immigration policy legalized the stay of another 0.5 mil-
lion people in 1989. For more than a decade, immigration has been
increasing. About one-third of the immigrants today are admitted
because they are adult children or siblings of US citizens, another
third are spouses, children, and parents, and the last third are hu-
manitarian or economic immigrants without close relatives living in
the USA.
The Canadian immigration policy has always been based on hu-
manitarian ideas and economic considerations (Green, 1976). Fam-
ily reunions and protection of refugees belong to the former category;
labor-market needs, to the latter. Approximately one-third of the
immigrants belong to the latter group. They have desired skills or
occupations or business intentions, or they are members of a family
having this labor-market advantage. In recent years, labor-market
needs have become more important, and there are discussions on
increasing this group of immigrants still further.
356 Sture Oberg
The majority of the population in Oceania lives in Australia and
New Zealand. Australia admitted about 0.8 million immigrants from
countries outside Oceania during the 1980s. New Zealand, a country
with net emigration, admitted less than half in relative terms, which
is approximately one-tenth in absolute numbers. Roughly every fifth
person moving to Australia was skilled and defined as a "business
migrant." Every tenth (between 1986 and 1989) was a refugee or a
person admitted under the Special Humanitarian Program.
Japan is a rich country with a demand for foreign labor. It
is by tradition a closed society. However, its strong and successful
economy has increased the demand for labor within the country to
a degree where legal and illegal imports become a factor. The le-
gal workers are mainly women entertaining Japanese men, 71,000 in
1988 (UN, 1992a). The unregistered, illegal workers are increasing
in numbers but are still less than 1 percent of the labor force (Shah,
1992). Thus there are some foreigners working in Japan, but they
seldom get permission to settle in the country. A reasonable guess is
that present attitudes toward non-Japanese will not change within
one generation. The result could then be a large number of tempo-
rary guests or guest workers employed in Japan but not allowed to
be citizens.
The rich oil-producing countries, especially in West Asia, will
probably use the same strategy; they will continue their policy to
allow workers to stay in the country on temporary jobs but will
not allow foreigners to become citizens. Today, they accept large
numbers (perhaps 2 or 3 million) of foreign workers: people of Arab
origin (e.g., Egyptians, Palestinians, and Jordanians), people from
countries in South Asia (e.g., India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh),
and people from Southeast Asia (e.g., the Philippines, Republic of
Korea, and Thailand). By 1985, it was estimated that 63 percent of
all workers in the six Gulf States (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) were from South or
Southeast Asia (Shah, 1992). Since these workers are not allowed to
be citizens in West Asian countries, they are all temporary visitors
and are not treated as (permanent) immigrants in this chapter. The
assumption is that even in the coming decades, very few people will
be allowed to become permanent immigrants to this rich part of the
world.
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Hong Kong, which is a part of China in this book (and will
formally be a part of China as of July 1997), has an unpredictable
future. Many inhabitants have already moved to other countries.
The UK says that it will no longer accept the inhabitants as privi-
leged members of the Commonwealth, except for 50,000 people with
their families. China will, according to a probable scenario, become
more integrated with the economy of the rest of the world in the
coming decades. This event could result in larger migration flows
to North America where there is a positive attitude toward immi-
grants from Asia. Also, Australia could be affected demographically
by more intense economic cooperation with China.
The attitudes toward immigration in the rich countries are gen-
erally in favor of strong regulations and limitations on the numbers
allowed to enter. The attitudes vary from a more generous North
America to a restrictive Japan. Australia is similar to North Amer-
ica, but has clear ethnic priorities. Europe is, on average, closer to
Japan, but some individual countries are exceptions.
The discussion of attitudes is mainly based on knowledge from
historic and current situations. Attitudes toward future immigrants
are based 011 attitudes toward immigrants today. These attitudes
are already known indirectly through the size of contemporary mi-
gration flows. Previous migration flows between South and North,
to a large extent, determine future flows. There are at least three
reasons for this. First, an existing flow tells us that the receiving rich
country accepts immigrants. Second, earlier immigrants, now living
in the North, with social contacts to people in the South, make it
easier for potential migrants to realize their wishes and thus become
new immigrants. Large proportions of present immigrants are re-
lated to earlier immigrants. For example, more than one-third of
the immigrant flow to the USA consists of close relatives of US citi-
zens (spouses, children, and parents). Third, if many immigrants of
one ethnic background move to a country with a democratic society,
they become a political force because they have many votes, have
economic power, and can organize lobbies. The Hispanic part of the
US population is a good example of an immigrant group reaching
the point of being able to exercise political power.
More detailed figures on assumed future migration streams be-
tween the world regions are discussed in Chapters 15 and 16.

Part VI
Projections
This concluding section translates the substantive considerations
given in Parts II through V into alternative population projections.
This exercise is done for 13 world regions over the 1995-2100 period.
The central scenario describes the most likely future population
path under our assumptions. This scenario results in a world popu-
lation of 7.88 billion in 2020, 9.87 billion in 2050, and 10.35 billion
in 2100. These findings a,re remarkably close to the medium variant
projections of the United Nations.
The systematic combinations of the three values (low, central,
and high) for all three demographic components (fertility, mortality,
and migration) result in 27 scenarios. These scenarios provide a
broad range of possible future population trends. However, three
findings hold across all scenarios:
• The world population will grow substantially.
• The world population will become older.
• The proportion ofthe population in today's developing countries
will continue to increase.
The fully probabilistic projections contribute additional infor-
mation. For example, given our assumptions there is a 64 percent
chance (i.e., roughly two-thirds) that the current world population
will never again double in the future - that is, it will not reach the
11.5 billion mark (which is twice the present level of 5.75 billion).

Chapter 15
"World Population Scenarios
for the 21st Century
Wolfgang Lutz) Warren Sanderson, Sergei Scherbov,
Anne Coujon
The previous chapters provide expert views on fertility, mortality,
and migration. This chapter presents a synthesis of the expert views
and, based on this synthesis, two sets of alternative scenario projec-
tions: one set in which the fertility, mortality, and migration compo-
nents are assumed to be deterministic, independent of one another,
and not subjected to any feedbacks; and another set in which cer-
tain consistent "stories" are defined and the components interact
and react to certain outcomes of the projections such as population
growth and aging. These two sets correspond to the two different
meanings of "scenario" used in population projections (as discussed
in Section 2.6). In Section 15.2 all possible combinations of the high,
central, and low assumptions in fertility, mortality, and migration
are presented. Section 15.3 provides three examples of interaction
scenanos.
15.1 Synthesis of Expert Views on Future
Fertility, Mortality, and Migration
A complex process led to our specifications of low, central, and high
values for the three components in each of the 13 regions defined
in this book. A basic outline of the process is given in Chapter 2,
and more details can be found in Lutz (1995a). One feature of
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this exercise is that the experts only agreed to define alternative
trends up to the period 2030-203.5. For every world region and for
each component they assumed three values: high, central, and low
values. To limit the possible number of choices the central value was
determined to be the mean of the high and low extremes; roughly
90 percent of all possible future cases were to be included in the
range between these two extremes. Extensions of the assumptions
beyond 2030-2035, as well as the specification of the exact path
between the current level and the level to be reached by 2030-2035,
are defined in Section 15.2. In this section we present a synthesis of
the reasoning that led to the low, central, and high values assumed
for 2030-2035 and listed in Tables 15.1 to 15.3.
15.1.1 Future fertility
Assumptions about the future course offertility may be derived from
several sources of information. First, past trends may be analyzed
to assess the status of individual countries and regions in the process
of demographic transition. Chapter 3 presents an assessment of this
type on today's developing countries. This assessment was a major
guideline in making specific assumptions for individual regions under
the basic premise that the fertility transition that has started almost
everywhere will essentially continue. While low values assume a
rapid pace in the continuation of the fertility transition, the high
values assume a much slower pace, in some cases even a stagnation,
of the declining trend. In parts of Asia this even implies increasing
fertility.
For the near future the intentions expressed by women in repre-
sentative surveys can be taken as an additional important piece of
evidence. Chapter 4 analyzes this information for a number of coun-
tries. Sub-Saharan Africa has, by far, the highest fertility levels and
the lowest levels of contraceptive prevalence, but in all countries in
this region the desired fertility rates, which have been derived from
surveys, are clearly lower than actual levels - for example, in Kenya
by almost two children. This fact, together with indications of in-
creasing contraceptive prevalence, leads to the expectation of signifi-
cant fertility declines in the next decade, even in sub-Saharan Africa
which until recently has shown constant high fertility. In North
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Africa the fertility transition is already much further advanced, and
more than one-third of the female population uses contraceptives.
Desired fertility rates in this region indicate that further significant
fertility declines are to be expected unless dramatic events, such as
a rise in pronatalist fundamentalism, change the pattern.
The three Asian countries considered in Chapter 4, Indonesia,
Sri Lanka, and Thailand, already have total fertility levels below 3.0
with further declines expected. Latin America has an intermediate
position comparable with that in North Africa. A noteworthy fea-
ture of this region is that over recent decades fertility was rather
stagnant at this intermediate level, but the most recent evidence
indicates further decline.
In the long run, without doubt, the general socioeconomic and
cultural changes will determine fertility levels. But these trends are
by no means easier to forecast than the path offertility change itself.
One more specific aspect in this context is the role of government
policies and family-planning programs. As pointed out in Chap-
ter 5, experience with such programs has shown that, over several
decades, they can have an important effect if they are well integrated
into other government policies and particularly if the socioeconomic
development of the population has reached a point at which limi-
tation of family size is considered advantageous and a real option
by sizable segments of the population. Since many countries have
been adopting such programs, they may well accelerate the fertility
decline.
In terms of specific numerical assumptions, the high value in
2030-2035 was assumed to be lower than the current fertility level
for all developing regions except East and Central Asia. This is due
to the overwhelming evidence of a continuation of the demographic
transition process in parts of the world that still have high fertil-
ity. For this reason no constant fertility scenario was specified (as
done by the UN, 1994b). However, the high values do not assume
a smooth fertility transition but rather an interruption or at least
retardation of the process. This could be due to setbacks in so-
cioeconomic development, cultural or religious movements such as a
rise of fundamentalism, or strong heterogeneity with pre- and post-
transitional populations living together in one region. The low val-
ues indicate a very rapid fertility decline that does not stop at 2.1 but
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Table 15.!. Alternative fertility assumptions used in projections.
TFR TFR 2030-2035
Region 1995 Low Central High
Africa
North Africa 4.35 2.00 3.00 4.00
Sub-Saharan Africa 6.18 2.00 3.00 4.00
Asia-East
China & CPAa 2.00 1.50 2.25 3.00
Pacific Asia 2.88 1.70 2.35 3.00
Pacific OECD 1.53 1.30 1.70 2.10
Asia-West
Central Asia 3.35 2.00 3.00 4.00
Middle East 5.47 2.00 3.00 4.00
South Asia 3.77 1.70 2.35 3.00
Europe
Eastern Europe U;6 1.30 1.70 2.10
European FSUb 1.50 1.30 1.70 2.10
Western Europe 1.67 1.30 1.70 2.10
Latin America 3.10 1.70 2.35 3.00
North America 1.97 1.40 1.85 2.30
aCentrally Planned Asia.
bEuropean part of the former Soviet Union.
continues to sub replacement fertility as it did in most industrialized
countries. The resulting central values (the mean of the high and
low values) lie somewhat above replacement level in most develop-
ing regions and significantly above in Africa, Central Asia, and the
Middle East. The fertility assumptions for China are based on the
discussion in Chapter 6, and are set at a low value of 1.5 and a high
value of 3.0 in 2030-2035.[1]
The process of making assumptions for today's industrialized
countries is in one way more difficult and in another way easier
than for today's high-fertility countries. It is more difficult because
the direction of change is unclear: Will fertility increase or decrease?
It is easier because the margin of uncertainty may be assumed to
be smaller. For a modern urban society with increasing female eco-
nomic activity, it is unlikely that fertility will be significantly above
replacement level in the future. But it seems equally unlikely that
fertility will remain permanently below a very low level such as
about half of replacement because, at an individual level, the desire
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for children seems to be deeply rooted in women and men and, at a
societal level, very rapid population aging results in serious problems
(see deliberations in Chapter 11).
Until a few years ago, the United Nations and other institu-
tions preparing population forecasts assumed that fertility would
increase to replacement level and that subreplacement fertility was
only a transitory phenomenon. This assumption is supported by the
argument of homeostasis as discussed in Chapter 11. In this view,
fertility levels are not seen as the sum of individual behavior, but as
one aspect of the evolution of a system in which individual behavior
is a function of the status of the system (see Vishnevsky, 1991). Un-
der such a systems approach the assumption of replacement fertility
in the long run seems a defendable possibility. Therefore, we as-
sumed a TFR between 2.1 and 2.3 in 2030-2035 as the high-fertility
assumption in the five industrialized regions.
It is difficult, however, to find many researchers who support
this view. Too much evidence points toward low fertility. The return
to replacement fertility has been criticized as an assumed magnetic
force without empirical support (Westoff, 1991). Many significant
arguments support an assumption of further declining fertility lev-
els. They range from the weakening of the family in terms of both
declining marriage rates and high divorce rates, to the increasing in-
dependence and career orientation of women, and to a value change
toward materialism and consumerism.
These factors, together with increasing demands and personal
expectations for attention, time, and also money to be given to
children, are likely to result in fewer couples having more than one
or two children and an increasing number of childless women. Also,
the proportion of unplanned pregnancies is still high, and future
improvements in contraceptive methods are possible.
In conclusion one can say that the bulk of evidence suggests
that fertility will remain low or further decline in today's industri-
alized societies. How far it will decline is not clear at this time. The
expert group decided to settle for a TFR of 1.3 as the low value to
be reached by 2030-2035. This value is below the low-fertility as-
sumptions in some other projections, but it is far from being impos-
sible. Actually several populations have already experienced such
levels for extended periods. Taking into account the different ethnic
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composition in North America, the fertility range in this region was
chosen to be slightly higher (104 to 2.3) than in Europe and Japan.
15.1.2 Future mortality
Mortality conditions at one point in time can be conveniently sum-
marized by period life expectancy at birth, an indicator that results
from a life table based on all age-specific mortality rates observed at
that time. In this section, this indicator is used to define martali ty
assumptions.[2]
The uncertainties about future improvements or possible de-
clines in life expectancy in today's high-mortality countries differ
from those in low-mortality countries. With the exception of East-
ern Europe, the latter countries have seen impressive increases in
life expectancy and segments of their populations are approaching
ages that were once considered a biological upper limit to the human
life span. Hence assumptions about future improvements crucially
depend on whether such a limit exists and will soon be reached (see
Chapter 12; Manton, 1991). In regions that still have very low life
expectancy, this question is irrelevant, and future mortality condi-
tions will be determined by the efficiency of local health services,
the spread of traditional (e.g., malaria) and new (AIDS) diseases,
and the general level of subsistence.
Currently, life expectancy at a national level is highest in Japan:
82.5 years for women and 76.3 years for men. Only 30 years ago in
1960-1964, female life expectancy was 71. 7 and male life expectancy
was 66.6, implying an average increase of more than 3.5 years per
decade for women. Eastern Europe, on the other hand, had the
same life expectancy as Japan during the early 1960s but has had
almost no improvement since then, bringing it to only 67.3 for men
and 75 for women at present. During the 1980s the Soviet Union
even experienced a decline in male life expectancy, and current esti-
mates for Russia are as low as 59 years. Western Europe and North
America took an intermediate position; life expectancy increased
steadily by about two to three years per decade. The recent trend
clearly points toward further improvements, and the analysis of age-
and cause-specific mortality trends does not give any indications of
improvements leveling off (Valkonen, 1991). Also studies of occu-
pational mortality differentials in the Nordic countries - which are
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Table 15.2. Alternative mortality assumptions to 2030-203.5.
Life expectancy Assumed change in years of
1995 life expectancy per decade
Region Men 'Women Low Cent.ral High
Africa
Nort.h Africa 62.7 65.3 0.5 2.3 4.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 50.6 53.9 -2.0 1.0 4.0
Asia-East
China & CPA 66.4 70.1 Men 1.0 1.5 2.0
Women 1.0 2.0 3.0
Pacific Asia 63.1 67.4 0.0 2.0 4.0
Pacific OECD 76.1 82.2 1.0 2.0 3.0
Asia-West.
Cent.ral Asia 65.1 72.5 1.0 2.0 3.0
Middle East 65.6 68.0 0.5 2.3 4.0
South Asia 59.7 59.7 Men 0.0 1.5 3.0
Women 0.0 2.0 4.0
Europe
East.ern Europe 67.3 75.0 1.0 2.0 3.0
European FSU 61.1 72.8 Men 0.0 2.0 4.0
Women 1.0 2.0 3.0
West.ern Europe 72.1 78.1 1.0 2.0 3.0
Latin America 66.3 71.5 1.0 2.0 3.0
North America 72.:3 79.1 1.0 2.0 3.0
more homogeneous than countries in many other regions - still show
significant inequalities by social class (Andersen, 1991), which may
be taken as an indication of the possibility of further improvements
if the higher-mortality groups change their lifestyles. Vaupel and
Lundstrom (in Chapter 12) show in the case of Sweden that at very
high ages mortality also continues to decline.
These considerations in the low-mortality countries prompted
us to assume future improvements that are more significant than
those assumed by most other national and international population
projections. As a high variant life expectancy is assumed to increase
by three years per decade to 2030-2035. It is clearly not impossible
since it is still below recently observed improvements in Japan and
parts of Western Europe. The resulting central variant of a two-year
improvement per decade also seems plausible, as supported by Mesle
(1993). A broader margin was chosen for men in the European part
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of the former USSR because of greater uncertainties: assuming a
continuation of bad conditions, the low value was set at zero years;
the upper value was fixed at 4.0 because of the potential that life
expectancy will greatly improve if the lifestyles in the region become
similar to the Western patterns.
Health conditions in the developing regions have generally ex-
perienced very impressive improvements since World War II. Life
expectancy in all developing countries has increased by more than 20
years since 1950-19.55, when it was estimated to be about 40 years
for both men and women. Some regions, such as East and West Asia,
have experienced especially rapid increases. Latin America, which
already had higher life expectancies during the 1950s, has achieved
lower mortality levels than Africa and Asia. In the Caribbean, the
mortality decline is particularly impressive.
These rapid improvements in mortality have led institutions
that produce population projections to regularly change their as-
sumptions. The UN raised the life expectancy limit for men from
72.6 years, assumed in 1973, in steps to 82.5 years, assumed in 1988.
Similar adjustments were made for women (see Chapter 7).
Africa has the greatest mortality uncertainties of all regions. In
Chapter 8, Garenne concludes his survey of African mortality by
pointing out that past trends in Africa have been induced by tech-
nology transfers from the West, which affected virtually all coun-
tries in a short period of time. Public health, nutrition, economic
development, and modern education were the key determinants of
mortality decline. There are reasons for assuming that this declining
trend of the past 30 years will not continue in Africa, and that dif-
ferences between countries will prevail or even increase: one reason
is that infectious diseases, especially the HIV virus, may spread fur-
ther; another is that problems of basic subsistence and food supply
may continue (see Chapter 10). In Chapter 9, Bongaarts presents a
new calculation of the possible impact of AIDS on mortality. Trans-
lated into life expectancies and projected further into the future,
his calculations result in a considerable range of uncertainties. For
sub-Saharan Africa, the values for the scenario assumptions include
uncertainties about AIDS as well as other uncertainties, such as pos-
sible wars and food shortages. The most optimistic case assumes fur-
ther increases of four years per decade during a catching-up process
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with the rest of the world. The low scenario assumes declines in life
expectance of two years per decade. Consequently, the central value
shows only very modest improvements of one year per decade.
In the other developing regions, a general increase in life ex-
pectancy of between one and three years per decade has been as-
sumed. In South Asia and Pacific Asia, which are also seriously
affected by AIDS, the range was chosen to be greater assuming no
improvements in the low case and four years per decade in the high
case. In South Asia and China, where the sex differential in mor-
tality is still unusually low because of differential treatment of girls
and boys, life expectancy is assumed to increase somewhat more
rapidly for women over the coming decades. For the Islamic regions
of North Africa and the Middle East, a minimum increase of 0.5
years and a maximum increase of 4 years was chosen reflecting the
somewhat greater potential for improvements in these regions.[3]
15.1.3 Future interregional migration
Of the three components of population change, international migra-
tion is the most difficult to examine for two reasons: less reliable and
representative statistical information is available for assessing past
and present migration levels; and migration patterns tend to show
much less continuity. Recent immigration trends in Western Eu-
rope clearly demonstrate the volatility of migration trends. During
the early 1970s West Germany had an annual net migration gain of
more than 300,000; five years later this number had declined to only
6,000 and 3,000 during the early 1980s. During 1985-1989, however,
the annual net gain increased sharply to 378,000, 100 times that of
the previous period. Few other countries have these extreme fluc-
tuations, but the traditional immigration countries - USA, Canada,
and Australia - show remarkable ups and downs. Annual net mi-
gration to Australia declined from 112,000 in the early 1970s to
54,000 in the late 1970s. During the 1980s it increased again to over
100,000. For the United States and Canada, only immigration fig-
ures are available, which for the USA shows a steady increase from
around 280,000 per year during the early 1960s to around 800,000
during the early 1980s. In 1990-1991 the figures have declined to
under 700,000.
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Table 15.3. Matrix of assumed high values of annual net migration
flows (in thousands).
To
North Western Pacific Middle
From America Europe OECD East Total
Africa
North Africa 90 250 20 15 375
Sub-Saharan Africa 115 150 40 5 310
Asia-East
China & CPA 270 50 50 370
Pacific Asia 400 50 100 10 560
Asia-West
Central Asia 10 30 40
Middle East 15 30 10 55
South Asia :300 100 80 15 495
Europe
Eastern Europe 50 100 150
European FSU 50 150 25 225
Latin America 700 90 25 5 820
Total 2,000 1,000 350 50 3,400
Aside from the migration streams into Western Europe, North
America, and Australia/New Zealand, labor migration within Asia
has been remarkable over recent decades (see Chapter 13 by Zlot-
nik). For instance, during the late 1980s more than 430,000 workers
left the Philippines annually, with some 280,000 of them going to the
Middle East. South Korea lost an average of 170,000 workers per
year during the early 1980s, India lost 240,000, and Pakistan lost
130,000 during the same period. The largest proportion of these
workers went to the oil-rich countries in the Middle East. During
the late 1980s these migratory streams within Asia have shown sig-
nificant declines.
Because of the volatility of these trends and the great role that
short- term political changes play in both the receiving and send-
ing countries, it is more difficult to speculate about the future of
migratory streams than about future fertility or mortality trends.
Furthermore, net migration always results from the combination of
two partly independent migration streams, namely, that entering
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and that leaving a certain region for whatever reasons. These rea-
sons are sometimes grouped into political (asylum seekers), eco-
nomic (expected differentials in standard of living), and recently
environmental factors. This last category remains rather vague be-
cause worsening environmental conditions often result in worsening
economic conditions. As pointed out in Chapter 14, for all categories
the potential for further increases in interregional migration is great
because of better communications between the regions, cheap mass
transport facilities, and the persistent gap between the North, which
is not only richer but also rapidly aging and most likely in need of
young labor, and the South, which has many young people with only
limited opportunities in their home countries.
The actual extent of future South-North migration streams de-
pends not only on the pull and push factors, but also on the immi-
gration policies in the receiving countries. If the European Union,
for instance, decides to enforce a policy of virtually closed borders
to the outside because of popular demand within the EU, this may
well result in a situation of almost no net migration. Hence in the
projections, zero net migration was chosen for the low variant. This
does not mean that borders are entirely closed to migrants; it only
assumes that the number of in-migrants approximately equals the
number of out-migrants.
For the high-migration scenarios, annual net migration gains of
2 million in North America, 1 million in Western Europe, 350,000 in
the Pacific OECD region, and 50,000 in the Middle East have been
assumed. The distribution of migrants from the assumed sending re-
gions to the recei ving regions and migration patterns among the less
developed regions are based mostly on current migratory streams as
described in Chapter 13. Table J5.3 gives the migration matrix
assumed in the high-migration case. In the low-migration case, all
cells are zero; in the central scenario, values are half of those given in
Table 15.3. The high scenario assumes an annual net migration loss
of 375,000 in North Africa, 310,000 in sub-Saharan Africa, 370,000
in China and other Centrally Planned Asia, 560,000 in Pacific Asia,
495,000 in South Asia, 150,000 in Eastern Europe, and 225,000 in
the European part of the former Soviet Union. Model migration
schedules by Rogers and Castro (1981) were used to determine the
age patterns of migrants.
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It is almost certain that actual migration streams will not be
constant over time. But assuming that the short-term fluctuations
average around certain levels of constant annual net migration is the
most practicable way to deal with this volatility.
15.2 Scenarios with Independent Fertility,
Mortality, and Migration Trends
15.2.1 Specific model assumptions
In addition to the general assumptions described above, every pro-
jection must make several specific choices concerning the age pat-
terns of fertility, mortality, and migration as well as the specific
patterns of change over time and many other more technical details.
The most important choices are summarized in this section.
The projections were generated using DIALOG, a software pro-
gram developed by Sergei Scherbov; DIALOG is specifically de-
signed for multistate population analysis and projection. The pro-
jections were done in five-year intervals for five-year age groups.
These projections differ from most other projection models because
we define separate age groups up to age 120; extending the age
categories beyond the usual 80+ category helps to avoid serious bi-
ases that occur when significant proportions of the population in
low-mortality regions come into the highest age group.
As described in previous chapters all countries were grouped into
thirteen world regions that can be regrouped into six continents as
well as into two groups ofless developed and more developed regions.
The population data for the starting year, 1995, were taken from the
Population Reference Bureau (PRB) World Population Data Sheet
1995, which gives the most recent estimates for total population size
as well as fertility and mortality levels in aU countries. Since this
source does not provide the full age distribution of the population,
age distributions were taken from the United Nations 1994 assess-
ment by proportionally adjusting the age groups to match the PRB
total population figures in the case of discrepancies between the two
sources. Age patterns of fertility and mortality in the starting year
were derived using the same procedure.
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As to the assumptions offertility, mortality, and migration, the
1995 values and the alternative values chosen for 2030-2035 have
been described above. A more detailed table giving the specific
time path of the values and their extensions to 2100 is given in
the Appendix. The values for 1995-2000 and 2000-2005 reflect the
assumption of a quick opening up of the uncertainty range over the
first five years followed by linear interpolation ("sausage model").
This particular decision was based on the observation that, under
strictly linear interpolation, the range of uncertainty given for the
first interval is far too small; therefore, between 1990 and 1995,
many countries showed empirical trends that were outside the range
assumed by the projections based on 1990 data.
Fertility assumptions for the second half of the 21st century are
usually considered to be more art than science. Typically long-range
projections assume some kind of a convergence toward the so-called
replacement level. This is done for two reasons: first, it is conve-
nient; second, no plausible alternatives seem to exist. But there
is no good theory to explain how some magic hand should raise
fertility to a level slightly above two children per woman after com-
pletion of the demographic transition. Only a vague and unproven
homeostasis hypothesis would suggest such a pattern.
In this analysis we suggest another rationale. Ultimate fertility
is assumed to be a function of region-specific population densities
within a predefined range of ultimate TFRs. After the completion
of the demographic transition, low population densities are assumed
to be associated with higher fertility, and vice versa. [4] Fertility is
assumed to reach a level between 1.7 and 2.1 children per woman
depending on density (for the central scenario) by the year 2080.
The projected density for 2030 (central scenario) is taken as a cri-
terion. The least densely populated region - South America with
28 persons per km2 projected for 2030 - is given the highest TFR
(2.1), while beyond 300 persons per km2 (only South Asia, with a
density of 478 persons per km2 by 2030) a TFR of 1.7 is assumed.
For densities between 28 and 300, intermediate fertility levels are
obtained through linear interpolation. The low-fertility (and high-
fertility) assumptions are set at 0.5 children below (and above) the
value obtained for the central scenario. Appendix Table 1 gives
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assumed fertility and mortality levels for the period 2080-2085 for
each of the three scenarios. Beyond 2080-2085, levels are assumed
to remain constant. Between the periods 2030-2035 and 2080-2085,
levels are derived from linear interpolation.
Future age-specific fertility rates have been obtained by propor-
tionally changing the age-specific rates of the starting year in accor-
dance with the TFR level chosen. Extensive analysis of changing
age profiles of fertility under different fertility levels has indicated
that this is a reasonable approximation.
With respect to mortality, the United Nations (in the bi-annual
assessments as well as in long-range projections) presents only one
fixed path for each region without any uncertainty variants. Maxi-
mum life expectancy at birth is assumed to be 87.5 years for women
and 82.5 years for men, and improvements in life expectancy end
once the maximum figure is reached (between 2075 and 2150, de-
pending on the region). For countries that already have very low
mortality this implies very little prospects for further improvements
in the future. In sharp contrast, our mortality assumptions span a
very broad range in the long term, reflecting the great uncertainty
about possible maximum 1ll0rta1ity levels (see discussion in Section
1.5.1.2). In the low-mortality case, mortality rates continue to de-
cline with a speed that corresponds to the past experience of the
more successful countries. The high-mortality case even assumes
some worsening in certain regions (see Appendix Table 1). Life-
expectancy increases after 2030-2035 are generally smaller than be-
fore 2030, with constant mortality under the high-mortality assump-
tion, a one-year increase per decade under the central-mortality
assumption, and a two-year increase per decade under the low-
mortality assumption. In regions with small mortality differentials
by sex, future increase of the differentials has been assumed, as de-
scribed in Appendix Table 1.
A Brass- type relationallogits model was used to produce a new
set of age-specific mortality rates at a given level of mortality. For
sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia special life tables have been ap-
plied; these tables include the specific age pattern of AIDS mortality
which has been used by Bongaarts (Chapter 9). For age-specific mi-
gration, the model migration schedules by Rogers and Castro (1981)
have been applied.
World Population Scenarios for the 21st Century 37.5
The following sections give a summary of the most important
results. The Appendix Tables provide more information on each
region. A complete set of results is available from the authors and
accessible on the internet (http://www.iiasa.ac.at); in this set the
results are arranged by five-year age groups (age 0-120) in five-year
time intervals (1995-2100) for all 13 regions and all 27 scenarios
that result from the combination of the three fertility, mortality,
and migration assumptions.
15.2.2 Population size by region
World Population
Table 15.4 lists the total population sizes for the six continental
divisions, the two economic divisions, and the world total in 1995
and population projections for 2020, 2050, and 2100. The table com-
prises nine cells that present the results for all possible combinations
of assumptions of low, centraL and high fertility and mortality un-
der central-migration assumptions. The Appendix provides detailed
tables on the 13 regions, at additional points in time, and also un-
der the low- and high-migration assumptions in the regions most
significantly affected by migration.
Table 15.4 is different from the usual presentation of popula-
tion projection results in two important ways: first, the user can
freely choose any combination of the three fertility and mortality
assumptions; second, the user may combine different scenarios in
different continents. Hence, the user can derive the total world
population resulting from high fertility and low mortality in Africa
but low fertility and low mortality in Europe. Traditionally, uncer-
tainty variants, such as the low variant in UN projections or the
low-fertility flow-mortality scenario given in the 1994 edition of this
book, present figures assuming lower than expected fertility in all
parts of the world. This strong assumption of a perfect correlation
between the regions results in the most extreme low figures for total
world population. In the more likely case of no strict conformity of
trends in different parts of the world, results tend be close to the
central scenario because, for example, higher than expected fertility
in Africa may be compensated by lower than expected fertility in
East Asia. The figures given for the world in Table 15.4 thus refer
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Figure 15.1. Alternative projected paths of world population size
(nine scenarios, central migration).
only to the very unlikely case that all regions follow the same trends.
The figures given for the two economic divisions, also assume that
the same trends occur in each division.
Given the possible combinations of scenarios for different parts
of the world, it is difficult to summarize the information con-
tained in the table in a few sentences. If every region followed the
central-fertility, central-mortality, and central-migration assump-
tions - which are assumed to be the most likely ones as seen today
- world population would increase from 5.7 billion in 1995 to 7.9
billion in 2020, 9.9 billion in 2050, and 10.4 billion in 2100. This
time path is plotted in Fig'ure 15.1 which shows that this set of
assumptions implies a clear leveling off of world population growth
toward the end of the 21st century. Before 2050 world population
still increases by another 4 billion people. It surpasses the 10 bil-
lion mark in 20,50-20,55, then reaches an all-time high of 10.6 billion
around 2080, and starts to decline somewhat to 10.35 billion by the
end of the 21st century. In other words, the world population under
the central scenario falls short of doubling from its present size of
5.7,5 billion (end 1995).
The most extreme case of high population growth results from
the combination of high-fertility assumptions in each region with
low-mortality assumptions in each region. In this highly unlikely
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case, the world population would double before the middle of the
next century and reach an incredible 22.7 billion by the year 2100.
High fertility combined with high mortality - which is a more prob-
able combination - would only result in 15.1 billion people. Hence,
given a high-fertility case, alternative mortality assumptions can
make a difference in total population size that is larger than today's
world population.
On the low-fertility side, the combination of low fertility with
high mortality yields the lowest path of world population growth. If
these rather unlikely assumptions were strictly applied to all world
regions, world population would still increase by another 30 percent
until 2030 and thereafter would enter a population decline that gains
momentum during the second half of the century and might bring
world population down to a low 3.9 billion by 2100. This would
be significantly below today's total population size. It would equal
the population in 1973-1974. Because of the significant population
aging implied by this scenario, an inverse momentum of population
growth (shrinking momentum) suggests further population decline
during the 22nd century because smaller and smaller cohorts would
enter the main reproductive ages. But aside from the incredible
population aging implied by this, this scenario cannot be called de-
sirable because it is associated with the highest mortality and thus
a great deal of human suffering. In many parts of the world this
scenario assumes very little or no future progress in mortality re-
duction; in sub-Saharan Africa it even assumes declining trends in
life expectancy. The most desirable, under the criteria of a high
quality of life and low population growth, is the low-fertility /low-
mortality scenario, which results in a further increase of population
size to 8.5 billion by 2050 followed by a more moderate decline to
6.5 billion by 2100.
Table 15.4, together with Figu.re 15.1, can be used to evaluate
the relative impacts of the difference in the assumed mortality and
fertility alternatives. The nine cells in the table and the nine lines
in the figure show a clear ranking of the demographic variables,
with fertility being the dominating variable but mortality still being
highly significant. The impact of alternative mortality assumptions
on total population size is more significant in the low-fertility case
than in the high-fertility case. In the high-fertility case by 2100
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the low-mortality assumptions yield a population size that is 50
percent higher than that of the high-mortality assumption; in the
low-fertility case the differential is 6.5 percent. This differential is
clearly big enough to justify the analysis of alternative mortality
assumptions in addition to alternative fertility assumptions.
As stated above, Figure j 5.1 only gives the scenarios in which
fertility and mortality trends in all regions follow the same pattern.
Combining different assumptions in different regions results in sev-
eral additional lines that all lie between the extremes given. Most
are close to the central scenario; the positions of the lines depend on
the degree to which trends in one region compensate for those in an-
other. A more systematic analysis of these aspects is provided in the
context of the probabilistic population projections in Chapter 16.
Regional Population Distribution
The global population growth described above results from a great
diversity of different regional patterns. Under the assumptions of
central fertility, mortality, and migration the population on the
African continent grows the most rapidly. Its population almost
triples in size over the next five decades from 720 million in 1995 to
more than 2 billion in 20,50. Accordingly, the share of the world pop-
ulation that lives in Africa increases from 13 percent to 21 percent
(see Table 15.5). In the high-fertilityjlow-mortality case Africa's
population more than quadruples by 2050, whereas under the low-
fertility jhigh-mortality scenario, it does not even double. By 2100
the pessimistic mortality assumptions of this scenario lead to a pop-
ulation size that is smaller than today's.
The population of East Asia, which is currently home to one-
third of the world's population, increases by 41 percent under the
central assumptions until the year 20.50. Because this growth lies
well below the world average of 7:3 percent, the proportion of the
world population living in this region declines by six percentage
points to 28 percent. West Asia, on the other hand, gains five per-
centage points and holds 30 percent of the world population; by 2050
the population in this region more than doubles under the central
assumptions. The reason for this difference lies predominantly in the
fact that the fertility transition is already much further advanced in
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Table 15.5. Distribution of world population (in %) by continent,
according to three scenarios and under central migration: 1995 and
2050.
Three scenarios in 2050
Low fert.. Central fert. High fert.
1995 High mort. Central mort. Low mort.
Africa 13 18 21 22
Asia.-East 34 28 28 28
Asia.- West 25 31 30 30
Europe 14 8 8 7
Latin America 8 10 9 9
North America 5 5 4 4
Le88 developed 78 85 87 88
More developed ,~,~ 15 13 12,,~
World 100 100 100 100
East Asia. Latin America currently has 8 percent of the world's pop-
ulation; it is likely to maintain this proportion because its growth
is expected to be close to that of the world average.
Europe and North America both grow below the world average
under all three scenarios. The fraction of the world population liv-
ing in Europe falls from the current 14 percent to 7-8 percent by
2050. Looking at economic divisions, today's more developed re-
gions decline from 22 percent to only 12-15 percent depending on
the scenario, while the less developed regions grow from 78 percent
to 85-88 percent (Table 15.5).
Alternative migration assumptions show sizable impacts on to-
tal population size only in the low-fertility industrialized regions of
Western Europe and North America. Figure 15.2 illustrates the im-
pacts of high- and low-migration scenarios in North America over
the 21st century. As indicated above the high-immigration scenario
for North America assumes average annual net migration gains of
2 million, whereas the low-migration assumption sets net migration
at zero. The central scenario assumes a net migration of 1 million
per year. Fertility assumptions in North America (for 2030-2035)
vary from a TFR of 1.4 (low) to one of 2.3 (high). All the scenarios
plotted in Figure 15.2 are based on central-mortality assumptions
and alternative fertility and migration assumptions.
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Figure 15.2. Alternative projected paths of population SIze In
North America.
The figure shows that under all scenarios the total population
size of North America increases from the present 300 million, at
least for the next 30 years. After that time the combination of low
fertility and low migration results in a significant decline of total
population size, reaching about 160 million by the end of the 21st
century. Combining the low-fertility assumption with high migra-
tion, however, results in a stable total population size of some 400
million. This difference of 240 million is due to alternative migra-
tion assumptions. Combined with high-fertility assumptions, the
impact of high- and low-migration assumptions is greater in abso-
lute terms (because the immigrants also have higher fertility) but
smaller in relative terms. The combination of high fertility with low
mortality is very close to the central scenario until the middle of
the 21st century but then results in higher population growth later
in the century. The unlikely combination of high fertility and high
immigration results in significant exponential population growth in
North America, coming close to 1 billion by the end of the 21st cen-
tury. Government policies have more influence on immigration than
on either fertility or mortality; therefore, immigration is clearly the
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key policy variable for influencing the extent of population growth
in North America over the next century.
15.2.3 Population aging
Universal population aging (as measured by the mean age of the
population or the proportion of the population above age 60) is the
most consistent and dominant population trend of the next century.
In all regions, the scenario projections show an aging population.
Population aging has long been recognized as a cause of concern in
the industrialized countries, but projections clearly show that over
the coming decades it is likely to hit less developed countries even
harder than it has industrialized countries because of more rapid
fertility declines.
Table 15.6 has the same structure as Table 15.4 but gives the
proportions above age 60 instead of total population. Currently only
9..5 percent of the world population is above age 60. Since the early
1950s this percentage has slowly increased from 8.1 percent in 1950
to 8.4 percent in 1970 and 8.8 percent in 1985. Over the coming
decades this percentage is projected to increase much more rapidly
under all possible scenarios. Under the three central assumptions
it increases to 1:3.2 percent in 2020, 19.6 percent in 2050, and 26.8
percent in 2100. These projected increases are much higher than
any increases that have been experienced today in industrialized
countries. Currently, Western Europe, the region with the oldest
population, has 18.6 percent of the population above age 60.
Even under the extreme high-fertility and low-mortality sce-
nario, which results in more than 22 billion people in 2100, the
percentage of elderly increases to above 17 percent. Under the low-
fertility flow-mortality assumptions the aging figures become truly
daunting. By the end of the the 21st century, this scenario shows
that 42.5 percent of the population is above age 60. In industrial-
ized countries half of the population is projected to be above age
60 under these assumptions, which are often called most desirable
by ecologists and the media because they result in the lowest total
population size. If mortality is high, fewer people survive to an old
age, lowering the old-age dependency ratio. But even in this case of
undesirably high mortality one- third of the population will be above
age 60 by the end of the 21st century.
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Figure 15.3. World population (in millions) under high-fertility
and high-mortality scenario in all regions: 1995 and 2050.
Given the dynamics of the population age structure one can
safely say that in the foreseeable future the proportion of the popu-
lation above age 60 will not return to today's low level. Only major
disasters affecting the elderly could bring about such a situation,
and then only for a limited period. Continued exponential growth
at very high rates (which would be necessary to produce a younger
age structure through fertility) can be ruled out for several obvious
reasons.
Figures 15.3 and 15.4 depict age pyramids for 2050 of the two
extreme scenarios in terms of the resulting age structure - namely,
that of high fertility combined with high mortality (Figure 15.3)
and that of low fertility combined with low mortality in all regions
(Figure 15.4). The shaded area gives the 1995 age pyramid for com-
parison. The high-fertility/low-mortality scenario (Figure 15.3) re-
sults in an age distribution that closely resembles the shape of the
1995 pyramid but at 2.3 times its population size (13.3 billion). Al-
though it may not be directly visible from the graph, the population
in the 2050 pyramid is clearly older than that in the 1995 pyramid
both in terms of mean age and the proportion above age 60.
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Figure 15.4. World population (in millions) under low-fertility
and low-mortality scenario in all regions: 1995 and 2050.
Under the low-fertility and low-mortality assumptions (Figure
15.4), the 2050 age distribution no longer has a pyramid shape but
resembles that of a bottle; this shape is already visible today in the
age pyramid of some very low-fertility countries. Figure 15.4 shows
that, although the population in the 2050 age pyramid is 50 percent
larger than the population in the 1995 pyramid, it is made up of
fewer children. The proportion above age 60 consequently increases
from 9.5 percent to 26.6 percent under this scenario. The pyramids
graphically depict this dramatic aging within only 55 years.
Among the developing regions, China (together with Centrally
Planned Asia) is certain to experience the most rapid aging because
fertility has already declined dramatically. Figure 15.5 shows the
increase in the proportion of the population above age 60 under
five different scenarios for this region. Currently, only 9.2 percent
of the population is above age 60. This percentage is much lower
in China than in aU industrialized regions. But a steep increase
in this proportion is already preprogrammed in the age structure
of China. Over the next 15 years a moderate increase in the age
structure occurs followed by a steep increase; these increases show
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Figure 15.5. Alternative projected trends in the proportion of
population above age 60 in China and CPA.
up under all alternative fertility and mortality assumptions. Only
after 203.5, when the large cohorts born before 197.5 are over age 60,
does this proportion stabilize under certain scenarios. Within less
than four decades China's old-age dependency burden will be higher
than North America's and about the same as that in Western Eu-
rope today. Western Europe's old-age dependency burden has built
up over more than a century, so the region has been able to de-
velop social-security schemes for the elderly. Nevertheless, Western
Europe is confronted with serious problems in the pension system
today and will have to deal with more problems in the future.
To avoid some of these problems China must take immediate
and intensive actions. China's authorities are well aware of this issue
and are considering not pushing programs to lower fertility further
in order to avoid the large imbalances in the future age structure.
15.2.4 Population growth versus population aging
When comparing the information on projected aging to that on
projected population growth, one very important feature becomes
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apparent. The scenarios that result in the highest population growth
show only moderate population aging, while those showing a leveling
off in population size imply very rapid population aging. Generally,
very rapid population growth and very rapid aging are considered
undesirable, but the scenarios described above clearly show that
one cannot avoid both. An intermediate path, such as that given
by the central scenario, avoids extremes but still combines substan-
tial population growth with substantial aging at the global level.
Since the problems caused by rapid growth and rapid aging are felt
more at the regional level rather than at the global level, solutions
to the problems must work at the former level. This issue must be
discussed within a more regional context. The epilogue to this vol-
ume takes up some of the policy issues related to the aging versus
population growth dilemma.
15.3 Special Interaction Scenarios for
Selected Regions
So far in this chapter the fertility, mortality, and migration compo-
nents have been considered independent determinants of population
size and structure. When different scenario assumptions are com-
bined to produce alternative scenarios, all combinations are given
equal weight. However, certain combinations of indicators, such as
very high fertility with very high mortality, are very unlikely and
implausible given the analysis of past trends.
Why, then, do we present such systematic permutations of sce-
nario assumptions without explicitly specifying likely interactions?
There are three reasons for first presenting the scenarios as if the
three components were independent:
1. In the short to medium term it is unclear whether any connec-
tion between, for example, fertility and mortality or fertility and
migration exists. If such an interaction exists, it may be specific
to certain regions.
2. There are an infinite number of possible types and intensities of
dependence in different parts of the world; no set of interaction
scenarios can be exhaustive.
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3. The scenarios presented in Section 15.2 provide details on the
extreme cases. Any assumed interaction that keeps each com-
ponent within the bounds defined by the high and low extremes
- for example, a positive correlation between fertility and mor-
tality - results in more moderate population trends than those
presented in the extreme scenarios. In this sense users are on the
safe side when they look at the range of uncertainty as described
by the scenarios that assume the components are independent
of one another.
But dearly not all of the possible interactions can be derived
from the scenario results provided above, especially if the objective
is to focus on paths that change over time. To illustrate what types
of scenarios may be defined, the following three sections provide
a. small sample of possible future "stories" in selected parts of the
world.
15.3.1 Can migrants to Western Europe and
North America stop the aging process?
This question is often directed to demographers when the issue of im-
migration into industrialized countries is under discussion. Clearly,
a one-time wave of young migrants can improve the old-age depen-
dency ratio temporarily because the working-age population is in-
creased while that above age 60 remains unchanged. But over time
these immigrants age, and ultimately increase the dependency ratio
when they pass age 60. If retiring immigrants are replaced by the
same number of young immigrants there will be no additional deteri-
oration in the dependency ratio but also no long- term improvement
(assuming that the migrant population has the same fertility as the
native population). Only if the absolute number of immigrants con-
tinuously increases, can the otherwise increasing dependency ratio
be kept down in a sustainable way.
To determine the growth rate of the immigrating population to
Western Europe and North America necessary to reduce the propor-
tion of the population above age 60 - or more precisely, to have it
increase more slowly - we have defined a number of specific scenar-
ios with different growth rates. The annual net migration under the
central scenario was taken as the basis for comparison. This means
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a constant annual net inflow of 500,000 to Western Europe and 1
million to North America. Each number was assumed to increase by
0.5 percent, 1 percent, or 2 percent per year until 2080-2085 under
three additional scenarios.
In summary, the results show that, even with a 2 percent an-
nual increase, immigration has a very low impact on the proportion
elderly. Under constant net migration (central scenario) the propor-
tion age 60+ in Western Europe increases from today's 18.6 percent
to 35 percent in 2050. This percentage is only 1.9 percentage points
lower (33.1 percent) under the assumption of a 2 percent annual
increase. Until 2100 further improvements are even more moderate.
But this scenario also results in a total population that is 7 percent
higher in 2050 and even 39 percent higher by 2100 than today's.
The pattern for North America is not much different from Western
Europe's, although at somewhat lower levels of old-age dependency.
By 2100 under a 2 percent annual increase the proportion above age
60 is only 27 percent instead of 31 percent but the total population
is higher by 66 percent; in other words, the population of North
America is about 775 million with the migration factor instead of
467 million as shown in the central scenario.
From this exercise we conclude that even immigration rates that
significantly increase the total population size have only a minuscule
effect in counteracting long-term increases in the proportion above
age 60 if fertility remains low.
15.3.2 Overshooting carrying capacity in
sub-Saharan Africa
The popular literature, as well as parts of the scientific literature
in ecology, frequently mentions the scenario of overshooting carry-
ing capacity - namely, the possibility of a collapse resulting from a
population size so large that it hits the growth ceiling beyond which
adequate food supplies cannot be secured. Usually nothing spe-
cific is said about the type of collapse. To illustrate a demographic
scenario that reflects this situation, we simply assumed that the
collapse shows itself in the form of an increase in mortality. But
mortality can increase in many different ways and, in turn, can re-
sult in very different demographic consequences. In the following
we briefly look at alternative ways such a collapse might happen.
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Figure 15.6. Projected population size (in millions) in sub-
Saharan Africa, with and without feedbacks on mortality.
Sub-Saharan Africa is chosen for this example because it is the
region most likely to experience the fastest population growth in
coming decades. It is also a region that might surpass the critical
point of population size that was derived from ajoint FAOjUNFPAj
IIASA (1984) land-carrying capacity study. In this study, an agricul-
tural carrying capacity of 4 billion people was given for sub-Saharan
Africa, assuming medium agricultural inputs. The low-input sce-
nario resulted in sufficient agricultural production for less than 1
billion people.[.5] For this study we look at a hypothetical interme-
diate case in which the carrying capacity is fixed at 2..5 billion.
Figure 15.6 gives future population sizes in sub-Saharan Africa
projected until 2100, including feedback and disaster scenarios. The
solid line gives the evolution derived from the central scenario, with
a gradual increase in population size over the next 80 years and a
stabilization at some 1.8 billion people over the extended long term.
All other lines reflect disastrous developments. Both the dotted
line and the short dashed line assume gradually increasing mortality
(high-mortality or 'Unspectacular disaster scenarios) as defined under
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the high-mortality assumptions for the region. Life expectancy de-
creases by two years per decade until 2030-20305 and then remains
const ant. This situation reflects the possibility of a slowly spreading
mortality crisis which could Iw due to AIDS, deteriorating health
systems, local famines, and regional conflicts. Fertility rates in both
scenarios reflect the high- and low-fertility assumptions. Both cases
have undesirably high mortality. Combined with high fertility, the
trend is very close to the central scenario and almost reaches the 2
billion mark. Combined with low fertility, population increases to
sllghtly over I billion and then declines.
The remaining scenario projects initially more fortunate devel-
opments in mortality: life expectancy increases four years per decade
until 2030-20305, when it reaches a level of 66 years for men and 69
years for women, and continues to grow more slowly thereafter (low-
mortality scenario). Fertility, on the other hand, does not decline as
rapidly. The TFR declines as in the high-fertility scenario reaching
a level of 4.0 in 2030-203.5 and 2.4 by 2080-20805. By 200505 this sce-
nario passes the assumed critical level of 2.05 billion. At this point,
something must happen along the lines of a Malthusian "positive
check." LJ nder this assumed collapse, 20 percent of the population
(more children than adults) die from war, starvation, disease, or
some other cause. Because fertility is not assumed to change, only
10-105 years later, however, the magic 2.05 billion threshold is again
exceeded (dashed line in Figure 15.6). Assuming that no further
improvements are made in agricultural production and fertility and
mortality remain unchanged (except for years of collapse), catastro-
phes occur in 10- to IS-year cycles.
The purpose of this highly speculative exercise of defining a col-
lapse through an overshooting carrying capacity has been twofold:
first, to show that the complaint of some ecologists that population
projections simply do not consider the possibility of such feedbacks
is not justified; second, to illustrate that the high-fertility jhigh-
mortality scenario (labeled the unspectacular disaster scenario), un-
der which the population size stays below the limits of carrying
capacity, is not really more desirable than the high-fertility jlow-
mortality path checked by 20 percent collapses. In both cases there
are large numbers of premature deaths. The exercise also shows
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that ecologists must provide more details about the kinds of col-
lapse they have in mind if demographers should incorporate them
into their projections.
15.3.3 Fertility responses to rapid aging in China &
CPA and the Pacific GECD regions
Unprecedented aging of populations might also cause reactions. If
the mean age of the population or the proportion of elderly ex-
ceeds a certain threshold, a feedback to the migration or fertility
components seems possible. Extremely high levels of aging could
be disadvantageous for economic and/or social reasons. Economic
handicaps might result in increased immigration, which would only
have minor long-term impacts on the proportions above age 60 as
demonstrated earlier. It is conceivable that reproductive behavior
in such societies changes through a combination of individual reori-
entation and strong public incentives. In the following discussion
it is assumed that such a response occurs. China (and CPA) and
the Pacific GECD region are used as examples because they are
particularly interesting as far as the speed of the fertility transition
(China) and the level of life expectancy already reached (Japan)
are concerned. The central scenario has been modified for these
calculations.
The underlying assumption is simple: when a certain level of
aging is reached, the TFR is assumed to increase by 0.3. When the
aging level exceeds a somewhat higher threshold, fertility is assumed
to increase further by another 0.:3 - a total of 0.6 children per woman.
The aging levels at which fertility responses are simulated are 20 and
25 percent above age 60 in China and CPA (reached in 2025-2030
and 2045-2050 under the central scenario) and 25 and 33 percent in
the Pacific GECD (reached in 2005-2010 and 2030-2035). Results of
such fertility feedbacks are given in Table 15.7, which contrasts total
population sizes and proportions of elderly under three scenarios:
the central scenario without responses, the central scenario with
only the one response, and the central scenario with two responses.
The effects of the first response become visible by 2050. By
2100, the proportion of elderly in China and CPA is lowered by 4
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Table 15.7. Proportion above age 60 (in %) and population
size (in millions) in China and CPA and Pacific OECD under the
population-aging/fertility- feedback scenarios.
China & CPA Pacific OECD
------------
No One Two No One Two
Year response
Proportion elderly
1995 9.2
2050 26.7
2100 28.7
Population size
1995 1,362
2050 1,837
2100 1,796
response
25.5
24.3
1,946
2,339
responses
25.3
21.0
1,964
2,711
response
19.4
38.4
38.2
147
148
125
response
34.7
33.0
164
177
responses
33.6
28.5
169
214
and 8 percentage points, depending on whether one or two fertility
responses are assumed. The respective figures for the Pacific OECD
region are 5 and 10 percentage points. Effects on population size,
however, are even more pronounced. In the China and CPA region
two fertility responses increase the population by 900 million (or 50
percent) to 2.7 billion by 2100. In the Pacific OECD countries two
fertility responses increase the total population size by 90 million or
70 percent.
This example shows that impacts of feedbacks on fertility be-
come effective only very slowly. But in the long run the effect on
the proportion above age 60 is clearly more significant than that
of increasing migration discussed above. The scenario assuming 2
percent annual growth of net migration in the USA results in a 66
percent larger population and a four percentage point decline in the
proportion above age 60. The two fertility increases in the Pacific
OECD region result in a decline of 10 percentage points with a 70
percent increase in the population.
There is no reduction in population aging without a substantial
increase in population size. Only the undesirable case of higher mor-
tality could bring down both. In this sense the laws of population
dynamics are merciless.
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Comparison with Other World
Population Projections
In Chapter 2 we argue that there is a need for additional world pop-
ulation projections that supplement those prepared by the United
Nations, World Bank, and others. Because the differences in results
often lie in the approach taken by the organization - such as how
to deal with uncertainty, whether to vary mortality assumptions in
addition to fertility assumptions, whether to consider dependencies
between the regions and between the components - it is difficult
to directly compare our results with those of the other agencies.
But an sets of projections have one common feature: they include
one projection that is presented as the most likely one, called the
medium variant by the UN and the central scenario by us. Table
15.8 summarizes the most likely projections of the UN, the World
Bank, the US Bureau of the Census, and IIASA.
However, even when a comparison is restricted to the most likely
case, it is impeded by the fact that different projections have differ-
ent time horizons and different forms of spatial aggregation. For this
reason the information presented in Table 15.8 refers only to two
points in time (2025 and 2100) and to the total world population.
While the degree of increase between the two points in time gives
a fair representation of the total path resulting from the assump-
tions made by each agency, the global aggregation clearly hides some
important regional differences. For example, the UN 1994 medium
variant and the IIASA 1996 central scenario yield almost exactly the
same total world population size for 2025 but have different popula-
tion figures for specific world regions and different proportions above
age 60. One reason for this is that the UN assumes lower mortality
improvements in industrialized countries and higher improvement
in Africa than we do.
Naturally the differences between the projections are larger in
2100 than in 202.5. The UN long-range projections produce the
highest population size and the lowest proportion above age 60.
This is mostly due to higher fertility assumptions and, to a certain
extent, to lower life-expectancy assumptions. But these projections
already date back to 1992 when most agencies were still assuming
higher fertility. In fact, the recent projections of population size
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Table 15.8. Most likely projections produced by the United Na-
tions, the US Bureau of the Census, the World Bank, and nASA.
Total population size
(in million)
Proportion
above age 60
28%
27%
UN 1992 (long range)
UN 1994
US Bureau of the Census
World Bank 1994
IIASA 1996
2025
8,504
8,2790
7,944
8,121
8,276
2100
11,186
10,958
10,350
2025 2100
13%b 26W
14%0
15%
14%
15%
a Mean of values given for 2020 and 2030.
bEstimated from information for age groups 65-79 and 80+.
of all the agencies are lower than their previous forecasts. This
reflects the fact that over the past five years fertility has declined
in all world regions and AIDS and other infectious diseases have
cast serious doubts on further mortality improvements in several
developing regions.
As to the treatment of uncertainty, the World Bank 1994 pub-
lished only one projection to the year 2150 without any uncertainty
variants. The UN 1994 assessment published three variants (high,
medium, and low) up to the year 2050, which are only distinguished
by different fertility assumptions - mortality and migration assump-
tions remain constant. The UN 1992 long-range projections provide
five fertility variants up to the year 2150. UN 1994 and UN 1992
both present an additional "Constant-Fertility Scenario," which can
only be intended for illustrative purposes because the resulting pop-
ulation size of more than 100 billion by the end of next century
belongs in the category of "impossible scenarios." Aside from this
outlier, the UN 1992 uncertainty variants for 2100 range between 6
and 19 billion. The nASA 1996 scenarios presented in this chap-
ter show population sizes ranging between 4 and 23 billion. This
broader range is entirely due to the fact that our scenarios consider
mortality uncertainty in addition to the fertility uncertainty. When
limited to the scenarios assuming central mortality, the nASA range
is very close to the UN range.
For all projections discussed above it remains somewhat unclear
what is meant by uncertainty variants or alternative scenarios: Do
they mark the bounds within which population sizes may grow or
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are they just randomly chosen sample paths? However, even in the
latter case, they may serve a useful purpose by providing extreme
sample paths to be used for sensitivity analysis. A more rigorous
treatment ofthe uncertainty issue in population projection, however,
requires that specific probabilities of alternative paths be defined.
These definitions are provided in Chapter 16.
Notes
[1] In all regions, 1990 age patterns of fertility were kept unchanged and
scaled down (or up) according to the specification of the total fertility
rate.
[2] UN model life tables (UN, 1982) corresponding to the respective region
were used as input for 1995 to obtain age-specific mortality rates for
today's developing regions. For the remaining regions, observed mor-
tality rates were used. For regions with assumed high AIDS mortality
special sets of age-specific mortality were used.
[3] Future age-specific mortality patterns were derived from model life
tables (UN, 1982; Coale and Guo, 1989). Coale-Guo "west tables" were
extended up to life expectancies of 100 to provide mortality schedules
for very high life expectancies.
[4] Some very preliminary cross-sectional analyses suggest that such a re-
lationship may indeed exist among societies that have fully passed
through the demographic transition. It would also correspond to an
ecological approach which typically thinks in terms of "carrying capac-
ity" and "crowdedness." But clearly much more research is needed on
this issue. Here the rationale is assumed simply to present an alterna-
tive to the ubiquitous replacement-level assumption which also lacks
sound scientific foundations.
[5] This study has frequently been criticized for overestimating the agri-
cultural potential of rain forests. Hence, without improvements in agri-
cultural production and with no massive imports of food it is feasible
to assume a limit of 4 billion people for this region.
Chapter 16
Probabilistic Population
Projections Based on Expert
Opinion
Wozfgang Lutz, WaTTen SandeTson, SeTgei ScheTbov
One thing that we know with certainty about the future population
sizes is that they are uncertain. The nature of this uncertainty and
ways to deal with it are highly controversial and still scientifically
unresolved issues. Can we speak meaningfully about a distribution
of possible future population sizes? Can mean, median, and modal
future population sizes be determined? Can confidence intervals for
future population sizes be derived? The literature on projections
contains three views, none of which we find completely satisfactory
(se.e discussion in Chapter 2). In this chapter, we provide a fourth
pel'Spective.
Most national and international agencies that produce popula-
tion projections avoid addressing the issue of uncertainty explicitly.
Typically they provide one main variant that is generally consid-
ered the most likely case. Sometimes high, low, and other variants
are added, but these are virtually never given a probabilistic in-
terpretation. If anything is said explicitly, it is that the high and
low variants should not be considered to define confidence intervals.
Supplementing variants with presentations of extreme case scenar-
ios can be useful for sensitivity analysis, but it does not help in
quantifying the extent of uncertainty.
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In contrast, many methods of producing fully probabilistic pop-
ulation projections have been proposed and implemented, although
so far only at the national level (see, for example, Alho, 1990; Carter
and Lee, 1986; Lee and Tuljapurkar, 1994; McNown et al., 1995; and
Pflaumer, 1992). These approaches, which are almost exclusively
based on time-series models, produce distributions of future popu-
lation sizes and, thus, seem to be able to tell us, quite precisely, how
much uncertainty there is in the results of population projections. A
third possibility of forecasting the uncertainty of future population
sizes is to make an assessment of the likely error in future projec-
tions; this is done by evaluating the errors made in past projections.
This tack has been suggested in Keyfitz (1981) and Stoto (1983).
In this chapter. we propose and implement a new method for
dealing with the uncertainty of future population sizes. We call our
projections "probabilistic population projections based on expert
opinion." Our method is distinguished from other methods by its
use of expert opinion both on the future courses of fertility, mortal-
ity, and migration, and on the extent of their uncertainty. To our
knowledge, this is the first time that probabilistic population pro-
jections have been made in this manner (aside from discussions in
Muhsam, 1956, and Keyfitz. 1977), and the first time that a proba-
bilistic model has been applied to all world regions. Therefore, our
results should be treated with caution because these new ideas have
not yet been thoroughly tested. More systematic sensitivity analy-
sis of the Delphi method in this context is needed. Nathan Keyfi tz
(personal communication) points out that there is the danger of
a downward bias in the range of uncertainty assumed by experts.
Nevertheless, we think that the use of expert opinion could have
significant advantages over the use of time-series models or past
projection performance.
In Section 16.1, we briefly discuss our motivation for developing
this approach to probabilistic population projections. Section 16.2
provides a discussion of the interpretation of confidence intervals in
the present context. Section 16.3 contains a description of how we
combined the opinions of the experts presented in the first 14 chap-
ters of this book to produce the assumptions for our probabilistic
population projections. In Section 16.4, we present the information
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we have obtained on population size and age structure for the 13
world regions. In Section 16 ..5, we present similar data for the world
as a whole. We conclude in Section 16.6 with a discussion of the im-
plications of the expert- based probabilistic projections for the inter-
pretation of the projections in Chapter 15, as well as for projections
produced by others.
16.1 The Motivation for New Probabilistic
Population Projections
The usefulness of a population projection is enhanced by knowing its
range of uncertainty. Indeed, the uncertainty, as well as the mean of
a projection, could influence the actions of policy makers. Currently,
there are two methods of quantitatively assessing the likely error of a
population projection: time-series analysis and ex post error analy-
sis. In time-series analysis, parameters are estimated from past data
on certain demographic variables. These parameters, along with es-
timates of their uncertainty, are used to produce the information
needed for population projections. In ex post error analysis, data
are collected on the errors in past projections. On the assumption
that similar errors may occur again in future projections, we can
tell policy makers and others the expected range of errors.
Time-series analysis is an approach, not a specific recipe. Differ-
ent researchers using time-series analysis on the same data have pro-
duced different projections along with different error estimates.[I]
Most of the assumptions in the time-series approach are statistical
in nature. Thus, in the evaluation of a set of different time-series-
based projections, we must consider concepts such as stationarity,
linearity, transformations of variables, orders of autoregressive and
moving-average processes, autocorrelation, error-term correlations,
as well as other elements that have no easy translation into the birth
rates, death rates, and migration rates that we need to produce a
population projection. It is easy to use statistical assumptions that,
although individua.lly seem plausible, produce implications for fu-
ture demographic changes that would be regarded as highly unlikely
by experts in the field. The problem may not be with any partic-
ular assumption, but rather may be with a complex interaction of
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assumptions that is difficult to diagnose. In addition, time-series
analysis typically derives only short- term information from a histor-
ical data set. Demographic variables are often only related to their
own values over the previous few years. This application is appropri-
ate for making relatively short-run projections. However, long-run
projections require a procedure that focuses on the determinants of
longer-term changes. Because of the indirect connection between
assumptions and implications, it is difficult for policy makers and
others untrained in statistics to assess the error bounds produced
by time-series analysis.
Ex post error analysis is more comprehensive than time-series
analysis, but it also has a problem when used in multiple projec-
tions of the same population over the same period. Suppose one
projection estimates the population at some future date at 10 mil-
lion people and another estimates it at 20 million. If the mean error
of past projections were plus or minus 15 percent, we would tell pol-
icy makers that the population would be 10 million plus or minus 15
percent or 20 million plus or minus 15 percent. Thus it is possible
that the average of past errors is small compared to the variation
in the projections. In such cases, policy makers may ignore the av-
erage past errors and use the range of population projections as an
indicator of uncertainty. Also the application of ex post errors to
future projections involves the important assumption that today's
forecasters make the same mistakes or neglect the same structural
discontinuities as did the forecasters of the past.
All population projections are based on judgment. In our judg-
ment, the best way to produce projections is to base them explicitly
on the synthesized opinions of a group of experts.[2] We have al-
ready discussed some of the advantages of using expert opinion as a
foundation for making population projections in Chapters 2 and 105.
In the case of probabilistic projections, we obtain information from
the experts not only on fertility, mortality, and migration trends, but
also on the uncertainty of the trends. This information is provided
in a clear and easy-to-assess form. By bringing together informa-
tion from experts who are specialists in different fields, we believe
that we can capture the best information currently available. This
is reflected in the subtitle of this volume, "What can we assume
today?"
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16.2 The Concept of Confidence Intervals
for Population Projections
In making a projection, we must focus on only a few elements from
an extremely complex reality. There are an infinite number of ways
of making these abstractions, and it is natural that different pro-
jections would embody different assumptions. At any future date,
differences in assumptions generally imply different distributions of
population sizes, in particular, different mean populations and dif-
ferent 95 percent confidence intervals.
Table 16.1 contains data on probabilistic projections of the pop-
ulation of the United States around 2065; most of these projections
were made in the early 1990s. The figures in the table are adapted
from Lee and Tuljapurkar (1994) and are ordered according to the
lower bound of the 95 percent confidence interval. The first column
identifies the forecaster. The second column lists the mean popu-
lation size and the third and fourth columns show the lower and
upper bounds, respectively, of the 95 percent confidence interval.
In the table, the mean population of the USA around 2065 ranges
from 296 million to 680 million. The lower bound of the 95 percent
confidence interval ranges from 207 million to 551 million people.
The upper bound ranges between 349 million and 836 million.
The inconsistencies in this table are clear. Pflaumer (1992), us-
ing a time-series approach with the logarithm of population as the
variable to be explained, is 95 percent confident that the US popula-
tion around 2065 would lie between 551 and 836 million people. The
US Bureau of the Census (1989) is 95 percent confident that the US
population at that time would lie between 207 and 456 million peo-
ple. Clearly, both cannot be correct at the same time. For example,
we cannot simultaneously believe that the probability of the popu-
lation being 551 million or less is 2.5 percent and the probability of
the population being 456 million or less is 97.5 percent.
The nine projections in Table 16.1 all produce different confi-
dence intervals. How should we interpret this? First, it is vital to re-
alize that there is no "correct" 95 percent confidence interval in that
table. Given that there are a large number of ways to forecast a fu-
ture that will be clearly different from our current understanding of
the world today, it is to be expected that different projections would
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Table 16.1. Forecasts and 95 percent confidence intervals (CI) for
the population (in million) of the USA around 2065.
611
389
435
Upper
bound of
95% CI
456
349
609
599
270
272
291
207
253
259
268
Lower
bound of
95% CI
Population
around
2065
296
301
398
413
443
:324
:351
Forecaster
us Bureau of the Census, 1989
Ptlaumer, 1988
Lee and Tuljapurkar, 1994
US Census Bureau, 1992
Ptlaumer, 1992
(ARIMA with dep.var.POP)
Social security, 1989
Social security, 1991
Ptlaumer, 1992
[ARIMA with dep.var.log(POP)] 680 551 836
Logarithmic estimate 620 552 701
Estimates are ordered in ascending order of the lower bound of the 95 percent
confidence interval.
Source: Adapted from Lee and Tuljapurkar, 1994 :Table 1, which includes de-
tailed explanatory notes that a.re not reproduced here.
embody different assumptions and produce different confidence in-
tervals. Thus, it is never correct to say that the future population
will certainly lie within a particular 95 percent confidence interval.
These confidence intervals are dependent on the assumptions made
in the projections and, as can be seen from Table 16.1, can vary
dramatically from one projection to another.
Second, the problem of multiple inconsistent confidence inter-
vals is not just a problem with the projections in Table 16.1. It is a
generic phenomenon that afflicts all probabilistic population projec-
tions regardless of the methodology used. Time-series analysis and
the projections based on the expert opinion presented in this book
produce different confidence intervals whenever their underlying as-
sumptions change.
Thus, it is just as impossible to tell policy makers and others
what the future confidence interval for a population would be, as
it is to tell them what the future population size would be. vVe
can produce projections of population distributions with associated
means, medians, and confidence intervals, but all these statistics
depend on the assumptions that are used. Our procedure uses clear
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assumptions, but no procedure can free us from our assumptions and
provide us with true future population distributions. We can provide
policy makers and others with possible mean future population sizes
and confidence intervals, given the set of assumptions that we use.
The assumptions we use are the best assessments that we can make
about future trends and their uncertainties. Tomorrow, however,
we may be able to make even better assessments, which, in turn,
will result in more accurate projected mean population sizes and
confidence intervals.
16.3 The Methodology
In Chapter 1.5, we discuss how the opinions of the experts were
translated into the high and low values that constituted 90 percent
confidence intervals for total fertility rate, life expectancy, and mi-
gration level in the period 2030-203.5 and extended to 2100. These
assumptions, however, are not sufficient to produce the probabilistic
projections. To complete them, we must first explore the additional
assumptions that are needed.
16.3.1 Fertility
Our fertility assumptions are based on the data in Table 15.1 and
the Appendix Tables. Table 15.1 gives four numbers for each region:
the 199.5 total fertility rate (TFR) and low, central, and high values
for the interval 2030-203.5. The Appendix Tables define in more
detail the three paths from 199.5 to 2100. Clearly, there are many
ways to use these data to generate random TFR paths into the
future. We have chosen a simple procedure of random lines (or
piecewise linear paths).[3] Normal distributions are used to specify
random lines that conform to the 90 percent confidence intervals in
the Appendix Tables.
In the procedure, we use only one random draw from the normal
distribution to determine the full fertility path from 199.5 to 2100.
We do not think that all paths of the total fertility rate will be
random lines. An alternative view would be that the TFRs would
behave like a random walk within predefined bounds. Each bounded
random walk would produce a population total (see Goldstein et al.,
1994, for a discussion of this sort of model) and in the aggregate a
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population distribution would be generated for each projection pe-
riod. These bounded random walks produce distributions of popu-
lation sizes that are concentrated on a central value, and which are
similar to those obtained using the assumptions described above.
The prime advantage of this combination of assuming normal-
ity and linear trends over time (random lines instead of random
walks) is that it provides a simple and reasonably robust way of
generating population distributions. Its main disadvantage is that
it is inappropriate for predicting short-term population dynamics.
Those dynamics can be much more volatile than would be predicted
using the combination of the normality and linearity assumptions.
16.3.2 Mortality
The procedure selected to produce mortality paths is analogous to
that described for fertility. Because the mortality scenarios had
been defined in terms of improvements over 10-year periods, the
low, central, and high values must be converted into values of life
expectancy. This conversion provides us with three points of the
2030-2035 life-expectancy distribution, which are the exact analog
of the three points of the 2030-2035 TFR distribution given by the
experts. As in the case of fertility, random points are determined
for life expectancies in 2030-2035 and 2080-2085.
Next, the time path of the life expectancy is linearly interpo-
lated from the 1995 level to the randomly but jointly chosen 2030-
2035 and 2080-2085 levels. After 2080-2085, all life expectancies
are assumed to remain constant. After the path of change in life ex-
pectancy at birth is selected, age-specific mortality rates are derived
using the model life tables as described in Chapter 15.
16.3.3 Migration
Expert opinion guided the production of a table of interregional mi-
gration flows (see Table 15.3 for the annual levels of net migration).
These flows are assumed to remain constant over time. The data
in Table 15.3 represent the high values of those flows. The central
value is assumed to be half of the high value, and the low value is
assumed to be zero.[4] Again a normal distribution is assumed with
90 percent of all cases falling between the high and low values.[5]
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We apply the same age-specific interregional migration rates that
were used in Chapter 15. These rates are derived from age-specific
schedules in Rogers and Castro (1981).
16.3.4 Interrelationships between the components
Population projections typically do not assume that the trends in the
three components of population change are related to one another.
In this chapter, we consider migration to be independent of the other
two components and of the age structure and size of the population,
but we also consider the possibility of a correlation between fertility
and mortality. In Sections 16.4 and 16.5, we provide population
projections of perfectly (positively) correlated fertility and mortality
and of uncorrelated fertility and mortality.
16.3.5 Interrelationships between regions
Most international population projections assume that all countries
and regions simultaneously have higher than expected fertility in
their high variants and lower than expected fertility in their low
variant. However, fertility and mortality may not follow parallel
trends across regions. The interdependencies between the two de-
mographic variables can be quite complex. For example, across the
regions in which the majority of inhabitants are Muslim fertility may
be correlated, but the fertility level may be uncorrelated in Europe
and Latin America.
In dealing with interrelations between regions, we considered the
situations in which fertility and mortality are either perfectly corre-
lated across regions or uncorrelated. Fertility and mortality levels
may be correlated across regions, but within regions, fertility and
mortality may still be either correlated or uncorrelated with each
other. Similarly, fertility and mortality may be uncorrelated with
fertility and mortality, respectively, across regions, but correlated
with one another within each specific region.
In the case of both interrelationships between components and
interrelationships between regions, we are dealing with long-term
dependencies. To address the relationships in both cases we use
procedures that link the entire time paths of fertility and mortality
together within regions and across regions.
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16.4 Regional Results
16.4.1 Regional population sizes
Table 16.2 shows the populations of the 13 world regions in 1995.
In addition, it gives the mean and median projected populations in
2020, 2050, and 2100, as well as the upper and lower bounds of the
95 percent confidence interval for each year. These numbers were
produced on the assumption that there is no long-run correlation
between fertility and mortality within regions. In Section 16.4.3,
we provide an example of the impact that such a correlation could
have.
The table contains two indicators of asymmetric population size
distributions: the difference between the mean and median popu-
lations, and the difference between the average of lower and upper
bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval and the median. When
the mean is greater than the median and the difference between
the average and the bounds is positive, then the distribution of the
population size is asymmetric and points in the direction of higher
population sizes.
Consider first, the data for China and Centrally Planned Asia
(CPA). In 1995, the region had a population of 1.36 billion people.
Look at what happens to the lower bounds of the 95 percent con-
fidence interval. By 2020 according to our population distribution,
there is a 2.5 percent chance that the population will be below 1.53
billion. Thirty years later. there is a 2..5 percent chance that the
population will be below L~5 billion, and by the end of the 21st
century there is a 2.5 percent chance that the population will be
below 0.71 billion. The table tells us that between 2050 and 2100,
China's population may decline by almost half. At the high end of
the spectrum, the table shows that in 2100 China has a 2.5 percent
chance of having a population above 4.43 billion. The population
distribution for China in 2100 is very skewed, with relatively high
probabilities of relatively high population sizes. The future popula-
tion distributions of China behave in this way because we assume
that the lower end of its TFR range is below replacement level, while
its upper end is above replacement.
The time paths of the populations of North America and the
European part of the former Soviet Union (predominantly Russia)
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Figure 16.1. Future population size in the European part of the
former Soviet Union, uncorrelated random variations in fertility and
mortality paths. The figures on the right-hand side refer to the
probability that population size will lie below the line indicated.
are interesting to compare. The population of the European part of
the former Soviet Union was 238 million in 1995 (this total includes
the Russian Federation with a population of 147 million). Figure
16.1 shows the region's population distribution changes from 1995
to 2100 under the assumption that the random variations in fertility,
mortality, and migration are uncorrelated with one another. Each
line is labeled with the probability that the population size would lie
below it. According to the assumptions, there is a 2.5 percent chance
that the population will be below the bottom line and a 2.5 percent
chance that it will lie above the top line. Thus, the interval between
the bottom and top lines gives the 95 percent confidence interval.
There is a 20 percent chance that the population will lie between
the two middle lines and a 60 percent change that the population
will lie between the second and fifth lines.
Over the course of the 21st century, population change in the
region is likely to be negative. By 2020, the mean population falls
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Figure 16.2. Future population size in North America, uncorre-
lated random variations in fertility and mortality paths. The figures
on the right-hand side refer to the probability that population size
will lie below the line indicated.
from 238 million in 1995 to 224 million. By 2050, the mean popula-
tion falls to 189 million and by 2100 to 147 million. At the midpoint
of the century, there is a 2.5 percent chance that the population will
be below 144 million and a 2.5 percent chance that it will be above
241 million. This means that, according to the assumptions used
here, there is slightly over a 2.5 percent chance that the population
of the region will not decline between 1995 and 2050.
The causes of the decline in the population of the European part
of the FSU are below replacement fertility, relatively high mortality,
especially for males, and net out-migration. After 2030, there is a
possibility of above replacement fertility and significantly improved
mortality rates. This accounts for the possible population growth
in the second half of the century that we see from the top two lines
in Figure 16.1.
Figur'e 16.2 shows population distribution changes in North
America under the assumption that random variations in fertility
and mortality paths are uncorrelated. The population of North
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America in 1995 was 297 million. The mean population distribution
increases to 356 million in 2020, 405 million in 2050, and 482 mil-
lion in 2100. There is a possibility that the population of North
America will be smaller in 2100 than it was in 1995 but, given the
assumptions used here, the chances of this are less than 20 per-
cent. The continued growth of the US population is largely fueled
by continuing migration. The population will shrink only if migra-
tion is greatly restricted and the USA had a long period of below
replacement fertility.
It is interesting to compare our 95 percent confidence intervals
for North America in 2065 with those for the USA shown in Ta-
ble 16.1. The lower bound of our 9.5 percent confidence interval
for North America is around 280 million and our upper bound is
around 610 million (Figure 16.2). Taking into consideration the
larger population of North America (which includes Canada, Mex-
ico, and the USA), our 9.5 percent confidence intervals are roughly
similar to those in Lee and Tuljapurkar (1994) and the US Bureau of
the Census (1992) and only slightly lower than the PHaumer (1992)
time-series model with the population size as the dependent variable.
16.4.2 Regional age structures
Tables 16.3 and 16.4 are arranged like Table 16.2 except that they
refer to the percentage of the population in the 0~14 age group
and the percentage in the 60 and above age group, respectively. It
is interesting to note that while the percentage of children 14 and
under will likely decrease during the 21st century in all regions, the
percentage 60 and above will grow. For example, in North Africa,
38.8 percent of the population were age 14 and below in 1995. In
2050, given the assumptions used here, the mean percentage falls to
27.0 percent, with the 95 percent confidence interval lying between
18.6 and 34.2 percent. By 2100, the mean is 18.7 percent and the 95
percent confidence interval lies between 1L5 and 25.1 percent. On
the other hand, the proportion of the North African population age
60 and above was 5.9 percent in 1995. In 2100, the mean percentage
is 24.0 percent, with the 95 percent confidence interval between 15.2
and 37.4 percent. The phenomenon of population aging will occur
on a worldwide scale during the 21st century. In our next examples,
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we look again at the case of China and CPA and at the comparison
between the European part of the FSU and North America.
In China and CPA, 27.3 percent of the population in 1995 were
between ages 0 and 14. By 2020, given the assumptions used here,
the mean percentage falls to 21.2, with a 95 percent confidence in-
terval stretching from 16.5 to 25.6 percent. This means that the
probability of a fall in the percentage of the 0-14 age group is over
97.5 percent. The decrease in the percentage of this group contin-
ues over the century, with the mean at 17.1 percent in 2100 and a
95 percent confidence interval between 9.8 and 24.1 percent. It is
interesting to note that the skewness in the distribution of popula-
tion sizes that emerges in the region between 2050 and 2100 is not
mirrored in the distribution of the percentage of younger people,
which remains quite symmetric. Indeed, the percentage distribu-
tion of younger people in the population remains quite symmetric
throughout the 21st century for all regions in Table 16.3.
With this decrease in the percentage of the 0-14 age group in the
China and CPA region there is an increase in the percentage of the
population age 60 and above (Table 16.4). In 1995,9.2 percent of
the population was 60 and above; by 2050 the mean is 25.3 percent,
and by 2100 it increases to 28.3 percent. Most of the increase in
the older population takes place in the first half of the 21st century.
We are quite confident of this, because the 95 percent confidence
interval for 2050 lies between 17.8 and 34.1 percent. Even at the
lower bound, the percentage of the population 60 and above almost
doubles between 1995 and 2050.
The comparison between the age structure changes in the Eu-
ropean part of the former Soviet Union and those in North America
is especially interesting in view of the differences in their population
growth trends. Figures 16.3([ and 16.3b show the comparisons ofthe
0-14 populations and Figures 16.4([ and 16.4b provide a compari-
son of the 60 and above populations. In the European part of the
FSU and in North America, the percentages of the 0-14 populations
were almost identical in 1995,21.6 and 22.0 percent, respectively. In
2100, the mean percentages are even closer, 17.6 and 17.5 percent,
respecti vely.
There is slightly more uncertainty about the percentage of this
age group in the European pa.rt of the FSU than in North America
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Figure 16.3. Percentage of the population in the 0-14 age group;
random variations in fertility and mortality paths: (a) North Amer-
ica and (b) European FSU. The figures on the right-hand side show
the proportion of cases in which the percentages fall below the line
indicated.
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ica and (b) European FSU. The figures on the right-hand side show
the proportion of cases in which the percentages fall below the line
indicated.
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in 2100. The 95 percent confidence interval for the European part of
the FSU is between 9.5 and 24.7 percent, while for North America
it is between 11.6 percent and 23.3 percent. Most of the difference
between the 95 percent confidence intervals is in the lower bounds.
The large gap between the two bottom lines in Figure 16.3b for the
European part of the FSU indicates that the distribution is slightly
skewed in the direction of the smaller percentages. We can see the
same trend in Table 16.3 because the mean percentage of the 0-
14 population is less than the median percentage. Indeed, in all
regions it is generally the case that the mean percentage of the 0-14
age group is less than the median.
The percentages of the 60 and above population were very close
in the two regions in 1995. In the European part of the FSU it was
16.9 percent and in North America it was 16.4 percent. According
to the assumptions, by 2050 the two mean percentages are 34.5 and
30.5 percent, respectively. The four percentage point difference is
small compared with the 95 percent confidence intervals. In the case
of the European part of the FSU we are 95 percent confident that
the percentage would lie somewhere between 26.3 and 44.5 percent
in 2050. For North America, the 95 percent confidence interval is
bounded by 24.0 and 38.6 percent in 2050. Clearly, we cannot be
sure in which region the percentage will rise more rapidly. In both
cases, the percentage for the 0-14 age group and the percentage for
the 60 and over age group, the differences between the two regions
are relatively minor. This is the case even though the trends in
population growth are very different.
16.4.3 An example of correlated fertility and
mortality
The regional data presented above were computed on the assump-
tion that there would be no future long-run relationship between the
random variations in the time paths of fertility and mortality. To
see the effect of such a correlation, Table 16.5 compares two cases
in sub-Saharan Africa in 2100: in one case the time paths of fertility
and mortality are independent (uncorrelated) over time and in the
other they are perfectly correlated.[6] Sub-Saharan Africa currently
has a high fertility rate, but we assume that it will experience its
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demographic transition during the period of our projection. Given
the knowledge that we have on the experience of other countries that
have passed through fertility transitions, it is reasonable to assume
that the speeds of mortality and fertility decline will be positively
correlated over time. Correlated fertility and mortality means that
if, in the future, sub-Saharan Africa has a relatively fast decline in
mortality, it would also have a relatively rapid decline in fertility,
but if the decline in mortality were slow, the fall in fertility would
also be slow.[7]
Table 16.2 shows that sub-Saharan Africa is the region of the
world with the greatest uncertainty about future population size. In
1995, the population in the region was 558 million people. By 2100,
the mean population size is estimated at 1.909 billion; the median
is 1.738 billion; and the 95 percent confidence interval encompasses
almost 4 billion people, with a lower bound of 578 million and an
upper bound of 4.345 billion. This gigantic confidence interval is
the result of unusually large uncertainty about both fertility and
mortality in the region, and the assumption that the speeds of the
decline in fertility and mortality are unrelated to each other.
Table 16.5 shows that under correlated and uncorrelated as-
sumptions, the median population size is about the same: 1.738
billion when the paths of fertility and mortality are independent
and 1.728 billion when they are perfectly correlated. However, the
population size distributions vary considerably. If fertility and mor-
tality trends are considered unrelated, then the mean population
size will be 1.909 billion in 2100; if the trends are assumed to be
correlated, the mean will be 1.663 billion. The greatest difference
is in the extent of uncertainty. In the case of uncorrelatedtrends
the 95 percent confidence interval lies between 578 million and 4.345
billion people; in the case of perfectly correlated trends the 95 per-
cent confidence interval lies between 1.174 and 1.859 billion people.
Thus, in the future the mean population size and especially the
95 percent confidence intervals of Sub-Saharan Africa depend, to a
great extent, on whether or not future fertility and mortality trends
are assumed to be correlated.
Although uncertainty about population size shrinks dramati-
cally when future trends in fertility and mortality are perfectly cor-
related, uncertainty about age structure does not necessarily lessen.
T
ab
le
16
.5
.
M
ea
n,
m
e
di
an
,
a
n
d
95
pe
rc
en
t
c
o
n
fid
en
ce
in
te
rv
al
s
fo
r
su
b-
Sa
ha
ra
n
A
fr
ic
a:
21
00
.
97
.5
%
In
de
pe
nd
en
t
ra
n
do
m
m
o
rt
al
ity
C
or
re
la
te
d
ra
n
do
m
m
o
rt
al
ity
a
n
d
fe
rti
lit
y
pa
th
s
a
n
d
fe
rti
lit
y
pa
th
s
-
-
-
-
-
"
-
-
-
-
'
'
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
19
95
M
ea
n
M
ed
ia
n
2.
5%
97
.5
%
M
ea
n
M
ed
ia
n
2.
.
5%
T
ab
le
16
.6
.
Su
m
m
ar
y
o
fw
o
rld
po
pu
la
tio
n
pr
oje
cti
on
s(
in
m
ill
io
ns
)
w
ith
di
ff
er
en
t
a
ss
u
m
pt
io
ns
o
f
th
e
co
rr
e-
la
tio
n
be
tw
ee
n
fe
rt
ili
ty
a
n
d
m
o
rt
al
ity
bo
th
w
ith
in
a
n
d
be
tw
ee
n
re
gi
on
s:
20
20
,2
05
0,
21
00
.
a
B
et
w
ee
n
fe
rt
ili
ty
a
n
d
m
o
rt
al
it
y
w
ith
in
re
gi
on
s.
bC
ol
um
ns
la
be
le
d
2.
5%
a
n
d
97
.5
%
pr
ov
id
e
da
ta
o
n
th
e
lo
w
er
a
n
d
u
pp
er
bo
un
ds
,
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y,
o
f
th
e
95
pe
rc
en
t
c
o
n
fi
de
nc
e
in
te
rv
al
.
E
ac
h
o
f
th
e
fo
ur
ro
w
s
is
ba
se
d
o
n
1,
00
0
pr
oj
ec
tio
ns
to
th
e
ye
ar
21
00
.
E
ac
h
is
ba
se
d
o
n
13
re
gi
on
al
pr
oj
ec
tio
ns
.
T
he
m
e
rg
ed
c
a
se
c
o
m
bi
ne
s
th
os
e
si
m
ul
at
io
ns
a
n
d
th
er
ef
or
e
is
ba
se
d
o
n
4,
00
0
o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
.
C
or
re
la
tio
n
B
et
w
ee
n
B
et
w
ee
n
f&
m
a
20
20
20
50
21
00
re
gl
O
ns
w
ith
in
re
gi
on
s
19
95
M
ea
n
M
ed
.
2.5
%
b
97
.5%
b
M
ea
n
M
ed
.
2.5
%
b
97
.5%
b
M
ea
n
M
ed
.
2.5
%
b
97
.5%
b
0
0
5,
70
2
7,
90
2
7,
90
0
7,
67
1
8,
14
4
10
,0
47
10
,0
40
8,
96
5
11
,2
60
11
,2
59
11
,1
90
8,
20
0
15
,4
90
1
0
5,
70
2
7,
90
0
7,
90
2
7,
31
5
8,
46
4
10
,0
35
10
,0
00
7,
36
1
12
,9
50
11
,2
12
10
,6
00
4,
37
4
21
,3
70
0
1
5,
70
2
7,
89
0
7,
89
3
7,
73
6
8,
04
5
9,
94
8
9,
94
7
9,
34
3
10
,5
90
10
,6
44
10
,6
20
8,
86
9
12
,6
40
1
1
5,
70
2
7,
88
0
7,
88
1
7,
48
8
8,
23
9
9,
90
6
9,
89
1
8,
28
5
11
,4
90
10
,5
21
10
,3
30
5,
94
5
15
,7
10
M
er
ge
d
5,
70
2
7,
89
3
7,
89
5
7,
47
4
8,
29
0
9,
98
4
9,
96
3
8,
10
8
11
,9
50
10
,9
09
10
,7
10
5,
71
5
17
,3
30
1,
85
9.
0
22
.9
40
.0
1,
17
4.
0
10
.2
14
.7
Po
pu
la
tio
n
(in
m
ill
io
ns
)
·
55
8.0
1,
90
9.
4
1,
73
8.
0
57
8.
4
4,
34
5.
0
1,
66
2.
7
1,
72
8.
0
0-
14
ag
e
gr
ou
p
(in
%
)
45
.4
18
.1
18
.3
11
.0
24
.5
17
.8
18
.4
60
+
ag
e
gr
ou
p
(in
%
)
4.
7
22
.
.5
21
.7
15
.0
34
.3
23
.1
21
.4
E
ac
h
di
st
ri
bu
ti
on
is
ba
se
d
o
n
1,
00
0
si
m
ul
at
io
ns
.
Probabilistic Population Projections 419
The 95 percent confidence interval for the percentage of the popu-
lation in the 0-14 age group is slightly smaller when we assume a
perfect correlation, but the confidence interval for the percentage of
the population age 60 and above is larger.
16.5 World Projections
In this section, we project world population sizes by combining the
regional projections presented in Section 16.4. The process of ag-
gregation adds one more complication, because we cannot simply
add the regional figures together. We must also take into account
the possibility that fertility and mortality paths could be correlated
across regions.
Table 16.6 shows five world population projections. In the first,
fertility and mortality paths are uncorrelated both across regions
and within regions. These data are derived by aggregating the re-
gional data presented in Section 16.3. In Table 16.6, the mean pop-
ulation size of the world at a future date can be derived by adding
together the means for each region. The median and particularly
the bounds on the 95 percent confidence interval, however, are not
derived from addition. They must be simulated. In the second
projection, fertility and mortality paths are each correlated across
regions, but not within regions (i.e., high fertility in one region goes
along with high fertility in all other regions). In theory, the mean
populations in this projection are the same as those in the first case.
In practice, they are slightly different from each other because the
random samples are different.
To illustrate the difference between these two assumptions, Fig-
ures 16.50. and 16.5b show the resulting distributions of total popu-
lation size for all world regions together in the case of perfect correla-
tion between regions (Figure 16.50.) and in the case of independence
(Figure 16. 5b). The X axis is given on a relative scale with 1.0 cor-
responding to the mean. One thousand simulations were conducted
for each distribution. It is clearly visible that, in the case of indepen-
dence, the distribution is more concentrated. This is because under
the independence assumption regions may compensate for one an-
other; for example, an unusually low fertility level in one region may
partly be offset by high fertility in another region. In the case of
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Figure 16.5. Probability distribution of world population, (a) regions
dependent and (b) regions independent; fertility and mortality indepen-
dent: 2100. Each graph is based on 1,000 projections. The mean popula-
tion is 11.212 billion. The results are plotted to that mean. For example,
a population of 12 billion in 2100 would be plotted as 1.07 (12 divided by
11.212) on the horizontal axis. Each figure represents the right endpoint of
an interval of width 0.1. For example. the tick mark labeled 1.0 is the right
endpoint of the interval 0.9 to 1.0. The height of each bar indicates the
percentage of the 1,000 populations in 2100 that fall within each interval.
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perfect correlation such compensations are not possible, thus many
more extreme cases result.
The third and fourth projections in Table 16.6 are based on
the assumption that fertility and mortality are perfectly correlated
within regions. This situation is most plausible in regions that are
still undergoing demographic transitions. The third projection as-
sumes no correlation of fertility and mortality across regions, while
the fourth assumes a perfect positive correlation across regions.
Again, in theory the mean populations should be identical, but are
not because of random sampling.
We call the fifth projection the "merged" case because it is com-
puted by merging the outcomes of the other four. Each of the first
four projections is based on a sample size of 1,000 observations. The
merged projection is based on 4,000 observations. The experts were
not asked about correlations of fertility and mortality within and
between regions; nevertheless, to produce world population projec-
tions, information on these correlations is required. In particular,
we must know both the correlations themselves and the uncertainty
associated with each one. In the absence of expert opinion, we in-
troduce uncertainties into the correlations by giving equal weight
to, or merging, the four extreme case projections.[8]
The range of the 95 percent confidence intervals depends on
which projection is chosen. On the one hand, if we were certain that
future time paths of fertility and mortality were uncorrelated within
and across regions, then according to the assumptions, the mean
population of the world in 2050 would be 10.0 billion people, with
the range of the 95 percent confidence interval between 9.0 and 11.3
billion. On the other hand, if we were certain that future fertility and
mortality trends were perfectly correlated across regions, but not
within regions, the mean population of the world in 2050 would also
be 10.0 billion, but the range of the 95 percent confidence interval
would be wider, between 7.4 and 13.0 billion.
It is useless to try to determine which 95 percent confidence
interval is the "correct" one. There is no "correct" 95 percent con-
fidence interval. Each projection embodies different assumptions
about the correlations and their uncertainties and, therefore, pro-
duces different confidence intervals. We prefer the merged projection
because it is the only one of the five that incorporates uncertainty
422 Wolfgang Lutz, Warren Sanderson, Sergei Scherbov
0.975
0.025
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
2085 21002040 2055 2070
Year
~:::::::::::::;.:-:";.;.;.:.....
......:.-.:...:
f---------------------------------,""r.-;." " " " "
18
16
Vi 14
c
~ 12
e.
c 100
.~
:J 8
0..
0
0.. 6
"0
~
~ 4
2
0
1995 2010 2025
Figure 16.6. Merged distribution of the size of the world's popu-
lation (in billions): 199.5-2100.
about the correlations in addition to fertility and mortality uncer-
tainties. For this reason, in the remainder of this section we focus
on the merged projection.
Figure 16.6 shows the distributions of future population sizes
derived from the merged projection at five-year intervals to the year
2100. The top and bottom lines bound the 9.5 percent confidence
interval. The top line indicates that there is an unlikely possibility
of almost linear population growth between 199.5 and 2100. The
bottom line shows that there is an equally unlikely possibility that
population would peak in the mid-21st century and fall thereafter to
below 6 billion by 2100. The range covering 60 percent of all cases
(between the 0.2 and 0.8 fractiles) is remarkably small. By 2050
this uncertainty range is less than 1.5 billion people and by 2100 it
doubles to about 3 billion people.
The figure also shows that in more than 60 percent of all cases
the growth of the world population would level off during the second
half of next century or even start to decline. Given that the world
population in early 1996 was estimated at 5.7.5 billion, we can de-
termine the probability of when or if it will double - that is, hit the
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Figure 16.7. Merged distribution of the population of the world in
the 0-14 age group (in percent). The figures on the right-hand side
refer to the proportion of cases, out of 4,000 projections, in which
the percentage of the 0-14 age group falls below the line indicated.
11.5 billion mark - in the next century. Roughly two-thirds of our
simulated cases do not reach 11.5 billion during the 21st century;
the remaining one-third surpasses that mark. Because those paths
that do not reach 1L5 billion level off by the end of the century, we
project that they will also not surpass that level during the 22nd
century. From this we conclude that, given the assumptions used
here, there is a 66 percent probability that the population of the
world will never again double.
Figure 16.7 shows the dist.ribution of the percentage of the pop-
ulat.ion in the 0-14 age group. In 1995, 31.4 percent of the popu-
lat.ion was in this group. The percentage will clearly fall over time,
t.he only question is how fast. In 2100, its 95 percent confidence
interval lies between 10.6 and 22.7 percent. It is interesting to note
that the uncertainty about the percentage of younger people in the
population does not. considerably increase in the second half of the
next. century, even though there is a substantial increase in the un-
certainty about population size.
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Figure 16.8. Merged distribution of the population of the world
in the 60+ age group (in percent).
The percentage of the population at age 60 and above is shown
111 Figure 16.8. All the lines ascend, indicating that we are quite
confident that the percentage of older people in the population will
increase over time. In 2050, the mean percentage is 19.7 compared
with 9.5 in 1995; the 95 percent confidence interval for 2050 is be-
tween 15.1 and 25.7 percent. By 2100, the mean increases to 27.1
percent, with a 95 percent confidence interval between 18.6 and 40.6
percent. Hence, given the assumptions used here, there is a 97.5
percent chance that the proportion of elderly will at least double by
2100; in the most likely case it will almost triple; and it may even
more than quadruple. The uncertainty with respect to the percent-
age above age 60 grows significantly during the second half of the
21st century; this clearly contrasts with the uncertainty surrounding
the percentage of the population age 14 and below. The uncertainty
in the older age group increases particularly at the upper end due to
the uncertainty about future old-age mortality when combined with
low fertility. According to the assumptions used here, by 2100 there
is a 20 percent chance that 30 percent or more of the population of
the world will be age 60 or above.
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16.6 Discussion
To generate population projections, we must make assumptions
about an unknown future. There are many ways of making these as-
sumptions and, in general, different assumptions will result in differ-
ent future population sizes and different confidence intervals. There
is no way around this problem. One tempting shortcut is to as-
sume that the processes which generated fertility, mortality, and
migration in the past will continue unchanged in the future. Unfor-
tunately, this assumption does not get us very far, because there are
a large number structures that could have generated the same past
data (see Sanderson, 1995). We must first specify the equations for
past processes before we estimate their parameters. Therefore, in
making projections, and in particular probabilistic ones, there is no
substitute for judgment. The main question is, What is the best
way to incorporate judgment into projections?
In this chapter we have proposed a methodology for using judg-
ment in making probabilistic projections. We suggest that experts
be asked about: (1) the time paths of fertility, mortality, and mi-
gration; (2) the perceived uncertainty of these time paths; (3) the
correlations between the time paths both within and between re-
gions; and (4) the assessment of the uncertainty ofthose correlations.
We have also implemented the methodology by using information
obtained from experts on future fertility, mortality, and migration
paths and on their uncertainty about those paths. In contrast to the
conventional Delphi model we were concerned with the synthesized
judgment of a group of experts on the extent of uncertainty in fer-
tility and mortality rather than in deriving probability distributions
from what the experts thought to be the most likely occurrences.
This is an important aspect for the choice of the normal distribution
because in usual Delphi studies where experts give just one value
the symmetry assumption is problematic because of the dependence
of experts. As to the shape of these intuitive (subjective) uncer-
tainty distributions in the mind of the expert, the normal distribu-
tion seems to be a natural choice. The calculations have also been
made assuming a uniform distribution resulting in a somewhat wider
uncertainty range of future populations. Since the uniform distri-
bution is less appealing in that it gives equal weight to the central
value and to the high and low values and does not allow any cases
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to be outside the range of the high and low values, the presentation
in this chapter is based on the normal distribution. In our case, the
experts were not asked about correlations and so we assumed that
there was a wide range of uncertainty.
Asking experts about future trends and uncertainties is one way
to obtain the information needed to make population projections.
Another is to use statistical analyses of various sorts to determine
the parameters that are assumed to characterize the past. These pa-
rameters and the estimated randomness of past time-series data can
be used to make projections of the future. We use expert opinion
because it makes the inputs into the projections very clear. Sta-
tistical assumptions, such as whether to use some transformation
of the dependent variable or the untransformed variable, can have
important implications for the outcome of a projection, but their
exact meaning is often unclear. Since our proposal on how to use
expert opinion to make probabilistic projections is a new one in the
field of population projections, it will take time to assess whether
it has significant advantages over the alternative ways of making
probabilistic projections.
The variation in the confidence intervals based on different as-
sumptions about correlations is not just of theoretical interest. The
United Nations regularly publishes its population projections with
low, medium, and high variants for each country. Low, medium,
and high variants for the world are derived by adding together the
respective variants for each country. By doing so the UN implic-
itly assumes that fertility trends in all countries of the world are
perfectly correlated. In the more likely case that trends are diver-
gent, the uncertainty range for the population of the world becomes
smaller because diverging country trends partly compensate for one
another.
Finally, it is important to stress, even at the risk of being repet-
itive, that the confidence intervals that we produced are not true
confidence intervals in the sense that we definitely know that the
future population, at a specific future date, has a 95 percent prob-
ability of being within some interval. Our probabilistic projections
are our best estimates of expected future population sizes at future
dates combined with our best estimates of the associated confidence
intervals. The population sizes and confidence intervals are based
Probabilistic Population Projections 427
on expert opinion on both the components of population growth
and the uncertainty about those components. Expert opinion can
be wrong and often is wrong. But there is no better alternative.
Expert opinion - especially when derived from an interactive group
process - incorporates the relevant knowledge that has been accu-
mulated over years of experience and study into a wide range of
disciplines. It also accommodates human intuition and nonquan-
titative judgment and is therefore more comprehensive than any
specific formal model. It is far from perfect, but until we develop a
true model that generates future fertility, mortality, and migration
trends, expert opinion is the best guide that we have.
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Notes
[1] This can be seen in Table 16.1 below. Sanderson (1995) also shows
this phenomenon using a simulation approach.
[2] The procedure that we used to elicit the expert opinion required that
the experts reach a consensus and thus synthesize their opinions. Those
who have studied a particular issue in detail can influence the opinions
of those who have not. We believe that synthesized opinions provide a
better measure of the extent of uncertainty than the individual opin-
ions of the experts. (More details about the process from which the
assumptions were derived can be found in Lutz, 1995.)
[3] Let Xi be the ith draw from a standard normal distribution. We use Xi
to choose three TFRs: one for 2000, one for the period 2030-2035, and
the third for the interval 2080-2085. We denote these TFRs by TFRi,j,
where j = 1,2, or 3 depending on the date of the TFR. To complete
our notation, we call the central value at time j, /-lj, and the difference
between the high and low value at time j, fl j . We can express the ith
random TFR at time j as
fl
TFRi,j = {lj + J:i . 3.~9
where 3.29 is the difference between the upper and lower bounds of the
90 percent confidence interval for the standard normal distribution.
The same ;Ei term appears in the expression for each TFR date. This
means that we are assuming persistence in fertility patterns. If fertility
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starts out lower than the average in 2000, it will be lower than average
in 2100. TFRs at other dates are computed from linear interpolation
between two adjacent dates. TFRs after 2080-2085 are assumed to
remain at their 2080-2085 values.
[4] Let Mi,",j be the migration flow in the ith random draw for cell r in
Table 15.3, at time j. We can write:
D.,.
M· '-1/ +X"-
',",J - r" '3.29'
where J-Lr is the central migration level for region r, Xi is the value
of the ith random draw from a standard normal distribution, D.,. is
the difference between the high and low values for region r, and the
constant 3.29 is the difference between the upper and lower bounds of
the 90 percent confidence interval of the standard normal distribution.
The subscript j does not appear on the right-hand side of the equation,
indicating that the migration flow is constant over time.
[5] If a random migration flow is less than zero, the migration flow in the
projection is assumed to be zero.
[6] A different scenario which can be derived from the data given in Chap-
ter 15 would be to assume that increasing mortality caused by AIDS is
associated with a rapid fertility decline due to the increase of condom
use and a higher awareness of reproductive health.
[7] In the future, experts should address these correlations.
[8] An alternative is to introduce the two correlations that are uniformly
distributed over a unit square. This procedure would have been con-
sistent with our emphasis on distributions, but it would have been
computationally more burdensome.
Chapter 17
Epilogue: Dilemmas in
Population Stabilization
Wolfgang Lutz
There is no doubt that population growth will come to an end at
some point in the future. Infinite physical growth on a finite planet
is impossible. Even if technological progress makes advances that
are unimaginable today, there is a limit to growth in the number of
people. Current understanding of our natural, social, and economic
environs indicates that the sooner population growth stabilizes the
better-off humankind will be. Hence population stabilization has
become a major goal of international politics. This goal was re-
cently emphasized at the 1994 International Population Conference
in Cairo. In this epilogue I take a look at some of the trade-offs en-
countered in efforts to stabilize population growth that result from
the nature of population dynamics as described in this book.
17.1 Possible, Likely, and Desirable
Population Trends
This book tries to give the best possible answer we can give today
to the question, What will be the size, regional distribution, and
age and sex structure of the fut ure world population? It also tries
to answer a related question, What is the range of uncertainty of
this population projection? The book describes possibilities and
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likelihoods. But to ask which of the projected alternatives is desir-
able is an altogether different question. This question intentionally
was not discussed before because the book does not take a normative
approach. This latter issue is, however, addressed in this epilogue
because discussions of future world population growth often mix
together these different questions, and the end result tends to be
confusion.
One area where the combination of these questions tends to lead
to confusion is in the disc ussion of the world's carrying capacity.
Chapter 10 reviewed a large number of alternative estimates of how
many people can live and be fed on earth; these estimates range
from less than 1 billion to 1 trillion. In recent years a number of
estimates have been published that give figures which are below or
only slightly above the present world population (e.g., Ehrlich et at.,
1993; Resources for the Future, 1984). These estimates are clearly
wrong because evidently the earth can support a larger population
(at least for the present and most likely also in the future). To infer
from such estimates that the quality of life will deteriorate after
a certain threshold, transcends the original ecological meaning of
carrying capacity (How many people can be alive?) and introduces
living standards that are clearly part of the second question, namely,
What is the desirable quality oflife? This question is far beyond the
scope of this book. In fact, it may never be possible to answer this
question. Great inequalities exist among people and are not likely
to disappear soon. Therefore, it is impossible to apply a universal
standard for quality of life, let alone define such a standard in the
face of differing views on what is good.
In this context one must be cautious. Ecologists may demand,
in the name of sustainable development, a drastic reduction in pop-
ulation size that can only be reached through increased mortality.
The projections described in Chapters 1.5 and 16 clearly show that
even with the most rapid fertility decline that can reasonably be as-
sumed the world population will increase to more than 7 billion by
the middle of the 21st century. Lower growth means higher mortal-
ity which is associated with immense human suffering. This must
be taken into account when considering the benefits of a smaller
population size.
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17.2 The Low-Mortality /
Rapid-Stabilization Dilemma
Future population growth cannot simply be switched off through
population policies for two reasons: the reproductive behavior of
large populations does not change radically overnight and due to
past high fertility ever-increasing numbers of young women are en-
tering the reproductive ages (i.e., the so-called momentum of pop-
ulation growth). These two basic facts are slowly being recognized
outside the demographic community. Of course, catastrophically
high mortality levels or declines in birth rates to less than one-third
of today's level could always stop population growth, but these sit-
uations are extremely unlikely. In sub-Saharan Africa, for example,
simulations show that fertility would have to decline to less than one
child per woman overnight to prevent further population growth;
this is an absurd scenario. This book gives estimates of what is pos-
sible in the real world based on our current understanding of human
behavior.
Within the limits of what is possible, alternatives exist. These
alternatives have been numerically demonstrated in Chapters 15 and
16. One can interpret the minimum population growth resulting
from the low-fertility scenarios as realistically unavoidable further
population growth, which is due to the combination of the age-
structural momentum and the inertia of fertility rates. Figure 17.1
gives this unavoidable population growth until 2050 as the shaded
area in the context of the five scenarios (disregarding migration)
defined in Chapter 15. The figure shows that this realistically un-
avoidable growth adds 2.4 to 3.8 billion people (depending on the
choice of mortality assumptions) to the world population.[l]
Figure 17.1 also shows that low fertility combined with high
mortality would result in the lowest population growth (only 7.1
billion by 2050). Although this scenario is possible, it is by no means
desirable because the higher mortality would be associated with
tremendous human suffering (for example, under this scenario male
life expectancy in sub-Saharan Africa declines from today's 52 years
to only 44 years in 2030-203.5). Hence, it can be assumed that any
policy intending to increase the quality of life by averting avoidable
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population growth also aims at decreasing mortality. For this reason
the scenario in Figur'e 17.1 that combines low fertility with low
mortality is chosen as the borderline between possibly avoidable
and unavoidable growth.[2]
This clearly illustrates the dilemma that arises in the context
of population stabilization: lower mortality results in slower popu-
lation stabilization and higher mortality results in faster stabiliza-
tion. The international community (WHO, UNFPA, UNICEF, etc.)
wants to achieve both rapidly declining mortality and rapid stabi-
lization simultaneously and the documents produced do not always
seem to take into account the merciless laws of population dynamics
that make these two goals contradictory. Put simply: lower mortal-
ity means more people on earth.
This low-mortality Irapid-stabilization dilemma became appar-
ent during discussions on the preamble to the Programme of Action
at the 1994 Cairo Conference (see Lutz, 1995b). At the conference
proposals were made that the low variant of the UN population
projections should be considered a likely trend if the Programme
of Action were to be successfully implemented. The UN, however,
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uses identical mortality assumptions for all three variants, whereas
an important and widely praised aspect of the Cairo Programme of
Action was to embed family planning into reproductive health ef-
forts, maternal mortality, child mortality, and health improvements
in general. Hence, successful implementation of the Programme
would result in not only lower fertility, but also lower mortality -
that is, more survivors - which contradicts the unchanged mortality
assumptions of the UN low variant. Therefore, when producing fu-
ture population projections, variants that combine low fertility with
low mortality must be taken into account if the Cairo Programme
of Action is to be given serious consideration; this, however, will
inevitably result in higher population growth.
17.3 The Population-Growth/
Population-Aging Dilemma
Growth of total population size - which receives a great deal of at-
tention in the discussion of future world population trends - is only
one side of the coin. The other side is population aging. If pop-
ulation growth follows the central scenario, the percentage of the
world population above age 60 increases from 9.5 percent currently
to 13.2 percent in 2020, 19.6 percent in 2050, and 26.8 percent in
2100. The low-fertilityflow-mortality scenario would bring the pro-
portion above age 60 to an incredible 42.5 percent in 2100. For
comparison, in the region with the oldest population today, West-
ern Europe, less than 20 percent of the population is above age 60.
And today's developing countries are hardly prepared to cope with
the social challenges of massive aging.
The figures on projected population aging under different sce-
narios clearly show that when discussing possible and desired future
population trends both sides of the coin - population growth and
population aging - must be taken into consideration. The issue of
population aging is sometimes consciously disregarded with the ar-
gument that, for an eventual stable situation of low fertility and
low mortality, the laws of population dynamics imply that at some
point a certain high mean age of the population would be reached in
any case whereas the ultimate population size would depend on the
speed of fertility decline. This is certainly true in the very long run;
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however, in the coming decades the speed of aging will have a big
impact. A mean age of 36 years, which under a high-growth scenario
will only be reached in :2100, will already be reached around 2030
under the low-growth scenario. Hence the low-growth scenario will
certainly put more stress on society to adapt to rapid and massive
aging and develop support networks for the aged that can no longer
count on traditional family support.
Mentioning the aging associated with a rapid curbing of popu-
lation growth is not to say that the problems associated with aging
cancel the benefits of rapid stabilization. A science-based weighting
of the socioeconomic and environmental consequences of both pop-
ulation aging and rapid decrease in population growth is beyond the
focus of this book and requires very different considerations. With-
out in-depth analyses I would guess that the benefits of rapidly
declining fertility, such as a lower child dependency ratio, less stress
on infrastructure and life support systems, better educational op-
portunities for women, and a likely boost to productivity, would
more than compensate the problems of aging, if sufficient attention
is given to timely social policies.[:3]
17.4 Conclusion
This book attempts to assemble the most relevant knowledge about
past and future trends in fertility, mortality, and migration in dif-
ferent parts of the world, translate this knowledge into alternative
population projections, and give a quantitative assessment about
the degree of uncertainty involved. In doing so it also tries to in-
clude in the uncertainty assumptions the possible impacts of future
environmental, economic, political, and cultural changes as far as
they can be foreseen today as (even low-probability) possibilities of
the future.
All of the chapters have made contributions to answer the ques-
tion in the subtitle of this book: What can we assume today? As
trends evolve and more knowledge is acquired about the interact-
ing processes that shape our future, tomorrow's assumptions will
probably look different from today's.
Epilogue: Dilemmas in Population Stabilization
Notes
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[1] This decomposition into avoidable and unavoidable growth follows a
somewhat different logic than the analysis by Bongaarts (1994) which
estimates that, of the likely 5.7 billion additional people in the develop-
ing world by 2100 (based on the World Bank projections), 2.8 billion
are due to population momentum, 1.0 billion to high desired family
size, and 1.9 billion to unwanted pregnancies. Aside from the issue of
wanted and unwanted pregnancies, which is part of the assumptions of
our scenarios but not a defining criterion, Bongaarts' decomposition is
different from ours in that it takes stable replacement-level fertility - a
convenient but problematic concept as discussed in previous chapters -
as the point of reference. All births below replacement fertility are con-
sidered momentum, all births above that level are considered avoidable
through reductions in unwanted pregnancies and reductions in demand
for large families. Alternative mortality trends are not considered in
these calculations.
[2] Alternatively the low-fertility/high-mortality scenario may be chosen
as a reference if one prefers to consider high mortality as part of a
strategy to avoid growth.
[3] This was found to be the case in a recent in-depth study on Mauritius
(see Lutz, 1994).
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Appendix Table 1. Definition of World Regions
Thirteen World Regions
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I. North Africa
Algeria
Egypt
Libya
II. Sub-Saharan Africa
Angola
Benin
Botswana
British Indian Ocean Territory
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Congo
Cote d'Ivoire
Djibouti
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
III. China fj CPA
Cambodia
China
Hong Kong
Laos
Morocco
Sudan
Tunisia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Reunion
Rwanda
St. Helena
Sao Tome and Principe
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Seychelles
Somalia
South Africa
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zaire
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Mongolia
North Korea
Taiwan
Vietnam
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Thirteen World Regions Continued
Appendix
IV. Pacific Asia
American Samoa
Brunei
East Timor
Fiji
French Polynesia
Indonesia
Kiribati (Gilbert Islands)
Malaysia
Myanmar
New Caledonia
V. Pacific 0 ECD
Australia
Japan
VI. Central ASia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Vll. :'vfiddle East
Bahrain
Iran
Iraq
Israel
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
VIll. South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
IX. Eastern Europe
Albania
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech Republic
Hungary
X. European FS U
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Estonia
Georgia
Papua New Guinea
Philippines
Singapore
Solomon Islands
South Korea
Thailand
Tonga
Vanuatu
Western Samoa
New Zealand
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Syria
United Arab Emirates
Yemen
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Macedonia
Poland
Romania
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Yugoslavia
Latvia
Lithuania
Moldova
Russian Federation
Ukraine
Appendix
Thirteen World Regions Continued
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XI. Westem Europe
Andorra
Austria
Azores
Belgium
Canary Islands
Channel Islands
Cyprus
Denmark
Faeroe Islands
Finland
France
Germany
Gibraltar
Greece
Greenland
Iceland
XII. Latin America
Antigua & Barbuda
Argentina
Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
Bermuda
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
EI Salvador
French Guiana
Grenada
Guadeloupe
XIII. North America
Canada
Guam
Puerto Rico
Ireland
Isle of Man
Italy
Liechtenstein
Luxembourg
Madeira
Malta
Monaco
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United Kingdom
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Martinique
Mexico
Netherlands Antilles
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
St. Kitts & Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent
Surinam
Trinidad & Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela
Virgin Islands
USA
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Six Aggregated World Regions
Africa
North Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Asia-East
China & CPA
Pacific Asia
Pacific GECD
Asia-West
Central Asia
Middle East
South Asia
Europe
Eastern Europe
European FSU
Western Europe
Latin America
North America
Two Economic Regions
Industrialized region
North America
Western Europe
Eastern Europe
European FSU
Pacific GECD
Developing region
Latin America
Central Asia
Middle East
North Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
China & CPA
South Asia
Pacific Asia
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Appendix Table 2. Alternative Assumptions for
Life Expectancy at Birth in 13 World Regions:
1995, 2000, 2030-2035, 2080-2085
:woo 2030-2035 2080-2085
Region 1995 L C H L C H L C H
Male
North Africa 62.7 63.0 63.8 64.7 64.6 71.1 77.7 64.6 74.9 85.2
Sub-Saharan Africa 50.6 49.6 51.1 52.6 43.1 54.4 65.6 43.1 58.1 73.1
China & CPA 66.4 66.9 67.2 67.4 70.2 72.0 73.9 70.2 75.8 81.4
Pacific Asia 63.1 63.1 64.1 65.1 63.1 70.6 78.1 63.1 74.4 85.6
Pacific GECD 76.1 76.6 77.1 77.6 79.9 83.6 87.4 79.9 87.4 94.9
Central Asia 65.1 65.6 66.1 66.6 68.9 72.6 76.4 68.9 76.4 83.9
Middle East 65.6 65.9 66.7 67.6 67.5 74.0 80.6 67.5 77.8 88.1
South Asia 59.7 59.7 60.5 61.2 59.7 65.3 71.0 59.7 69.1 78.5
Eastern Europe 67.3 67.8 68.3 68.8 71.1 74.8 78.6 71.1 78.6 86.1
European FSU 61.1 61.1 62.1 63.1 61.1 68.6 76.1 61.1 72.4 83.6
Western Europe 72.1 72.6 73.1 73.6 75.9 79.6 83.4 75.9 83.4 90.9
Latin America 66.3 66.8 67.3 67.8 70.1 73.8 77.6 70.1 77.6 85.1
North America 72.3 72.8 73.3 73.8 76.1 79.8 83.6 76.1 83.6 91.1
Female
North Africa 65.3 65.6 66.4 67.3 67.2 73.7 80.3 67.2 78.7 90.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 53.9 52.9 54.4 55.9 46.4 57.7 68.9 46.4 62.7 78.9
China & CPA 70.1 70.6 71.1 71.6 73.9 77.6 81.4 73.9 82.6 91.4
Pacific Asia 67.4 67.4 68.4 69.4 67.4 74.9 82.4 67.4 79.9 92.4
Pacific GECD 82.2 82.7 83.2 83.7 86.0 89.7 93.5 86.0 94.7 103.5
Central Asia 72.5 73.0 73.5 74.0 76.3 80.0 83.8 76.3 85.0 93.8
Middle East 68.0 68.3 69.1 70.0 69.9 76.4 83.0 69.9 81.4 93.0
South Asia 59.7 59.7 60.7 61.7 59.7 67.2 74.7 59.7 72.2 84.7
East.ern Europe 75.0 7.1.5 76.0 76.5 78.8 82.5 86.3 78.8 87.5 96.3
European FSU 72.8 73.3 73.8 74.3 76.6 80.3 84.1 76.6 85.3 94.1
Western Europe 78.6 79.1 79.6 80.1 82.4 86.1 89.9 82.4 91.1 99.9
Latin America 71.5 72.0 72.5 73.0 75.3 79.0 82.8 75.3 84.0 92.8
North America 79.1 79.6 80.1 80.6 82.9 86.6 90.4 82.9 91.6 100.4
L = low, C = central, H = high.
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Appendix Table 3. Alternative Assumptions for
Total Fertility Rates in 13 World Regions:
1995, 2000, 2030-2035, 2080-2085
2000 2030-2035 2080-2085
Region 1995 L C H L C H L C H
North Africa 4.35 3.92 4.13 4.35 2.00 3.00 4.00 1.54 2.04 2..54
Sub-Saharan Africa 6.18 5.56 5.87 6.18 2.00 3.00 4.00 1.44 1.94 2.44
China & CPA 2.00 1.60 2.00 2.40 1.50 2.25 3.00 1.37 1.87 2.37
Pacific Asia 2.88 2.30 2.65 3.00 1. 70 2.35 3.00 1.29 1.79 2.29
Pacific OECD 1.53 1.22 1.53 1.84 1.30 1.70 2.10 1.24 1.74 2.24
Central Asia 3.35 2.68 3.34 4.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 1.45 1.95 2.45
Middle East 5.47 4.92 5.20 5.47 2.00 3.00 4.00 1.45 1.95 2.45
South Asia 3.77 3.39 3,58 3.77 1.70 2.35 3.00 1.20 1.70 2.20
Eastern Europe 1.66 1.33 166 2.00 1.30 170 2.10 1.39 189 2.39
European FSU 1.50 1.20 150 1.80 1.30 1.70 2.10 1.55 2.05 2.55
Western Europe 1.67 1.34 1.67 2.00 1.30 1.70 2.10 1.39 1.89 2.39
Latin America 3.10 2.48 2.79 3.10 1.70 2.35 3.00 1.60 2.10 2.60
North America 1.97 1.58 1.94 2.30 1.40 1.85 2.30 1.59 2.09 2.59
L = low, C = ceutral, H = high.
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Appendix Table 4. Summary Results to 2100.
North Africa
Fertility C L C
Mortality C H H
Migration C C C
H
H
C
L
C
C
H
C
C
L
L
C
C
L
C
H
L
C
4.35
4.22
4.11
3.42
2.54
24.6
25.5
26.5
29.4
36.9
38.8
38.4
36.9
33.0
23.6
5.9
6.3
7.8
11.8
20.4
162
235
299
593
1288
5,688
7,656
9,207
15,120
21,880
]62
229
282
468
716
4.24
3.70
3.35
2.62
2.04
24.6
26.0
27.6
33.0
42.2
5.9
6.4
8.2
15.0
27.6
38.8
36.8
34.1
26.9
18.2
5,544
6,704
7,321
8,929
8,704
162
223
266
362
357
24.6
26.6
28.8
37.8
49.8
5.9
6.6
8.7
19.4
39.2
38.8
35.2
30.9
19.7
12.1
5,407
5,764
5,530
4,512
2,615
5.9
6.2
7.4
] 0.4
16.8
24.6
25.5
26.3
28.6
34.9
38.8
38.3
36.9
33.3
24.6
162
233
294
558
1117
5,687
7,631
9,116
14,500
19,890
5.9
6 ".U
162
222
26]
337
290
8.4
17.2
32.3
24.6
26.5
28.6
36.7
46.0
38.8
35.2
30.9
20.1
13.4
162
232
288
519
912
24.6
25.4
26.2
28.1
33.7
Total populatIOn size (in millions)
1995 162 162 162
2010 228 220 226
2020 277 256 272
2050 439 311 407
2100 607 227 489
Mean age (in years)
1995 24.6 24.6 24.6
2010 26.0 26.5 25.9
2020 27.4 28.4 27.3
2050 32.1 35.9 31.5
2100 39.5 43.5 37.7
Percentage of population aged 60+
1995 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9
2010 6.3 6.4 6.2 6.0
2020 7.9 8.0 7.5 7.1
2050 13.2 15.3 11.7 9.2
2100 22.7 27.2 19.1 14.1
Percentage of population aged 0-14 yem's
1995 38.8 38.8 38.8 38.8
2010 36.8 35.] 36.7 38.3
2020 34.1 30.9 34.0 36.9
2050 27.3 20.3 27.5 3:q
2100 19.4 ]4.2 20.0 25.0
Annual number of births (in thousands)
1995-2000 5,543 5,405 5,542 5,686 5,406
2010-2015 6,681 5,724 6,657 7.603 5,745
2020-2025 7,250 5,416 7,169 9,014 5,476
2050-2055 8,566 4,095 8,095 13,700 4,330
2095-2100 7,907 1,997 6,674 16,790 2,372
Assumed total fertility mtes
1995-2000 4.24 4.]4 4.24 4.35 4.14 4.35 4.14
2010-2015 3.70 3.18 3.70 4.22 3.18 4.22 3.18
2020-2025 3.35 2.59 3.:35 4.11 2.59 4.11 2.59
2050-2055 2.62 1.82 2.62 3.42 1.82 3.42 1.82
2095-2100 2.04 1.54 2.04 2.54 1.54 2.54 1.54
Assumed life expectancies fOl' both sexes combined (in years)
]995-2000 64.8 64.4 64.4 64.4 64.8 64.8 65.2 65.2 65.2
2010-2015 67.9 64.9 64.9 64.9 67.9 67.9 71.0 71.0 71.0
2020-2025 70.2 65.4 65.4 65.4 70.2 70.2 75.0 75.0 75.0
2050-2055 74.] 65.9 65.9 65.9 74.1 74.] 82.5 82.5 82.5
2095-2100 76.8 65.9 65.9 65.9 76.8 76.8 87.7 87.7 87.7
The nine scenarios combine low (L), central (C), and high (H) fertility and
mortality assumptions with central migration assumptions (and low and high
migration in the cases of Western Europe and North America).
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Sub-Saharan Africa
Fert.ilit.y C L (-:; H L H L C H
Mort.alit.y C H H H C C L L L
Migration C C C C C C C C C
Total population size (in millions)
1995 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558
2010 842 805 827 849 819 865 833 856 880
2020 1,055 945 1,006 1,067 991 1,120 1,032 1,099 1,168
2050 1,601 1,001 1,303 1,654 1,225 2,041 1,437 1,876 2,390
2100 1,759 479 996 1,827 849 3,232 1,305 2,632 4,770
Mean age (in year's)
1995 22.1 22,1 22,1 22.1 22,1 22.1 22.1 22,1 22,1
2010 22,7 23.2 22,8 22,3 23.2 22.2 23.2 22.7 22.2
2020 23,8 24.9 23.9 23.0 24.9 22.9 24.9 23.8 22.9
2050 30.0 :34.3 30.2 27.1 34.1 26.8 34.5 30.3 27.0
2100 39.0 45.0 39,0 34.7 45.2 34.5 47.6 40.7 35.8
Pel'centage of population aged 60+
1995 4.7 4.7 4.7 4,7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7
2010 5.2 5,3 5.1 5,0 5.3 5.0 5.4 5.2 5.1
2020 5.4 5.7 5.4 5.1 5.8 5.1 6.0 5,6 5.3
2050 9.1 11.6 8.9 7.0 11.9 7.2 13.1 10,0 7.8
2100 21.1 29.2 20.5 15.1 30.2 15.5 34,9 24.5 18.0
Pel'centage of population aged 0-14 years
1995 45.4 45.4 45.4 45.4 45.4 45.4 45.4 45.4 45.4
2010 43.3 41.3 42,9 44.4 41.7 44.8 42.0 43.6 45.1
2020 39,7 36.1 39,0 41.6 36.8 42.3 37.2 40.1 42.7
2050 28,3 20,1 27.2 32.9 21.1 34.2 21.3 28.6 34.6
2100 188 12.3 17.8 22,8 12,9 23.9 12,3 18.3 23.7
Annual number of births (in thousands)
1995-2000 26,010 25,330 25,990 26,660 25,340 26,680 25,350 26,020 26,690
2010-2015 32,500 28,170 32,120 36,090 28,500 36,510 28,810 32,840 36,900
2020-2025 34,540 25,780 33,310 41,230 26,720 42,760 27,560 35,630 44,120
2050-2055 33,590 14,150 27,690 46,550 17,130 56,580 19,680 38,620 65,110
2095-2100 22,630 3,885 12,950 32,780 6,786 57,390 9,607 32,020 81,240
A ssumed total fertility mtes
1995-2000 6.03 5,87 6.03 6.18 5.87 6.18 5.87 6.03 6.18
2010-2015 4.77 4.19 4.77 5.34 4.19 5.34 4.19 4.77 5,34
2020-2025 3.88 3.10 3.88 4.67 3.10 4.67 3.10 3.88 4.67
2050-2055 2,58 1.78 2.58 3.38 1.78 3.38 1.78 2.58 3.38
2095-2100 1.94 1.44 1.94 2.44 1.44 2.44 1.44 1.94 2.44
Assumed life elpectancies for both sexes combined (in years)
1995-2000 52.7 51.9 51.9 51.9 52.7 52.7 53.4 53.4 53.4
2010-2015 54.0 48.7 48.7 48.7 54,0 54.0 59.2 59.2 59.2
2020-2025 55.0 46.7 46.7 46.7 55.0 55.0 63.2 63.2 63.2
2050-2055 57.7 44.7 44.7 44.7 57,7 57.7 70.7 70.7 70.7
2095-2100 60.3 44,7 44.7 44,7 60.3 60.3 75.9 75,9 75.9
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China & CPA
Fertility C L C H L H L C H
Mortality C H H H C C L L L
Migration C C C C C C C C C
Total population siZf (in millions)
1995 1,362 1,362 1,362 1,362 1,362 ] ,362 ],362 1,362 1,362
2010 1,554 1,487 1,549 1,612 1,492 1,617 1,497 1,559 1,622
2020 1.665 1.524 1,650 1.778 1.538 1,793 1,551 1,679 1.808
2050 1,837 1,311 1,759 2,321 1,378 2,412 1,449 1,916 2,503
2100 1,796 640 1,587 3,331 745 3,715 862 2,000 4,055
Mean age (in years)
1995 29.7 29.7 29.7 29.7 29.7 29.7 29.7 29.7 29.7
2010 34.0 35.1 33.9 32.9 35.1 32.9 35.2 34.0 33.0
2020 ,16 ..3 .38 ..3 36.1 H ..3 38.4 .34.4 .38.6 .36.4 34.6
2050 40.2 45.8 39.4 :34.5 46.7 .35.2 47.8 41.2 .36.0
2100 42.8 48 ..3 41.1 35.9 50.7 .37.1 5.3.9 45.1 .38.8
Per'centage of population aged 60+
1995 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2
2010 11.7 12.1 11.6 11.1 12.2 11.2 12..3 11.8 11..3
2020 15.5 16.4 15.1 14.1 16.7 14..3 17.1 15.8 14.6
2050 25 ..3 31.7 2.3.7 17.9 ,H.7 19.2 .35.8 27.1 20.7
2100 28.1 .35.7 24.7 17.9 40 ..3 20 ..3 45.8 .32.1 2.3.2
Percentage of population aged 0-14 ye01'S
1995 27.3 27.3 27.3 27 ..3 27 . .3 27 ..3 27.3 27 ..3 27 ..3
2010 22.1 18.9 22.1 25.1 18.8 25.1 18.8 22.1 25.1
2020 21.1 16.9 21.1 24.8 16.8 24.8 16.8 21.0 24.7
2050 19.6 12.7 1\1.9 26.3 12.4 26.0 12.1 19.2 25.6
2100 16.8 11.0 17.4 2.3.1 10.3 22.7 9.4 15.9 21.9
Annual number' of births (in thousands)
1995-2000 24,710 22,230 24,710 27,180 22,240 27,180 22,240 24,710 27,180
2010-2015 24,560 18,240 24,520 30,840 18,260 30,880 18,280 24,590 30,920
2020-2025 24,480 15,670 24,370 34,330 15,730 34,490 15,800 24,580 34,640
2050-2055 24,080 9,71.3 23,510 45,820 9,946 46,950 10,130 24,550 47,860
2095-2]00 19,550 4,105 18,010 54,980 4.454 59,680 4,677 20,520 62,680
Assumed total fertility rates
1995-2000 2.00 1.80 2.00 2.20 1.80 2.20 1.80 2,00 2.20
2010-2015 2.10 1.56 2.10 2.63 1.56 2.63 1.56 2.10 2.63
2020-2025 2.17 1.53 2.17 2.82 1.53 2.82 1.53 2.17 2.82
2050-2055 2.10 1.45 2.10 2.75 1.45 2.75 1.45 2.10 2.75
2095-2100 1.87 1.37 1.87 2.37 1.37 2..37 1.37 1.87 2.37
Assumed life expectancies for both scres combined (in years)
1995-2000 69.0 68.8 68.8 68.8 69.0 69.0 69.2 69.2 69.2
2010-2015 71.2 69.9 69.9 69.9 71.2 71.2 72.5 72.5 72.5
2020-2025 73.0 70.9 70.9 70.9 73.0 73.0 75.0 75.0 75.0
2050-2055 76.4 71.9 71.9 71.9 76.4 76.4 81.0 81.0 81.0
2095-2100 79.1 71.9 71.9 71.9 79.1 79,1 86.3 86.3 86.3
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Pacific Asia
Fertility C L C H L H L C H
Mortality C H H H C C L L L
Migration C C c: c: c c c c C
Total population size (in milliolls)
199.5 447 447 447 447 447 447 447 447 447
2010 554 530 550 ,569 535 574 539 559 579
2020 623 568 609 650 581 665 594 636 679
2050 776 550 703 884 611 970 673 845 1049
2100 783 289 609 1136 385 1433 492 951 1688
Mean age (in years)
1995 26.7 26.7 26.7 26.7 26.7 26.7 26.7 26.7 26.7
2010 30.0 30.8 29.9 29.1 30.9 29.2 31.0 30.1 29.3
2020 32. J 33.4 31.8 30.5 33.7 30.7 34.0 32.4 31.0
2050 37.2 40.5 36.0 32.5 41.9 33.5 43.7 38.9 34.9
2100 42.7 46.5 ,10.4 35.8 49.6 37.7 54.4 46.5 40.6
Pn'centage of population aged 60+
1995 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8
2010 8.7 8.8 8.5 8 'J 9.0 8.4 9.2 8.9 8.6
2020 11.3 11.5 10.7 10.0 12.1 10.6 12.7 11.9 ILl
2050 19.8 22.2 17.:3 13.8 25.2 15.9 28.9 23.0 18.5
2100 27.6 31.7 22.7 J 7.0 :38.1 20.7 46.5 34.2 25.8
Pel'centage of population aged 0-14 yeaTS
1995 33.2 33.2 33.2 .13.2 33.2 33,2 33.2 33.2 33.2
2010 28.2 25.6 28.2 30.6 25.6 30.7 25.6 28.3 30.7
2020 26.2 22.7 26.2 29.:3 22.7 29.3 22.6 26.1 29.2
2050 21.5 16.0 21.9 27.1 15.6 26.8 14.9 20.8 26.1
2100 16.3 11.3 1- .) 22.4 10.4 21.7 9.0 14.9 20.41._
Annual numbel' of births (in thousands)
1995-2000 10,930 10,240 10,930 11,620 10,240 11,620 10,240 10,930 11,620
2010-2015 11,500 9,324 11,450 13,590 9,359 13,640 9,390 11,530 13,690
2020-2025 11 ,590 8,402 11,460 14,780 8,499 14,950 8,580 11,710 15,100
2050-2055 11 ,200 5.393 10,540 17.890 5.728 19,020 5,968 11,680 19,830
2095-2100 8,214 1,906 6,853 18,200 2,294 21,810 2,521 9,010 23,910
A ssumed total fatility rates
1995-2000 2,77 2.59 2.77 2.94 2.59 2.94 2.59 2.77 2.94
2010-2015 2.54 2.(H 2.54 3.00 2.07 3.00 2.07 2.54 3.00
2020-2025 2.44 1.89 2.44 3.00 1.89 3.00 1.89 2.44 3.00
2050-2055 2.13 1.54 2.13 2.72 1.54 2.72 1.54 2.13 2.72
2095-2100 1.79 1.29 1. 79 2.29 1.29 2.29 1.29 1.79 2.29
Assumed life eTpectancies for both sexes combined (in years)
1995-2000 66.0 65.5 65.5 65.5 66.0 66.0 66.5 66.5 66.5
2010-2015 68.8 65.2 65.2 65.2 68.8 68.8 72.3 72.3 72.3
2020-2025 70.7 65.2 65.2 65.2 70.7 70.7 76.2 76.2 76.2
2050-2055 74.4 65.2 65.2 65.2 74.4 74.4 83.7 83.7 83.7
2095-2100 77.1 65.2 65.2 65.2 77.1 77.1 88.9 88.9 88.9
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Pacific OECD
Fertility C L C H L H L C H
Mortality C H H H C C L L L
Migration C C C C C C C C C
Total population SiZE (in millions)
1995 ]47 ]47 147 147 147 ]47 147 147 147
2010 155 150 154 158 151 159 ]52 156 160
2020 156 146 154 16] 149 163 151 159 166
2050 148 118 139 164 126 172 135 157 181
'2100 125 65 112 183 75 200 87 139 217
Mean agE (in years)
1995 38.6 38.6 :18.6 38.6 38.6 38.6 38.6 38.6 38.6
2010 42.9 43.7 42.7 41.8 43.9 42.0 44.1 43.1 42.2
2020 45.3 c16.4 44.8 43.:1 46.9 43.8 47.4 45.8 44.3
2050 49.2 51.6 47.:1 43.5 53.5 45.3 55.7 51.2 47.2
2100 49.6 51.T 45.9 41.0 55.9 44.0 60.7 53.7 47.4
Pf.TccntagE of population aged 60+
199,5 19.4 19.4 19.4 19.4 19.4 19.4 19.4 19.4 19.4
2010 27.6 27.9 21.2 26.5 28.3 26.9 28.7 27.9 27.2
2020 31.1 31.6 3U.l 28.8 :32.6 29.7 33.5 32.0 30.6
2U50 38.9 42.1 3,5.7 30.4 45.5 33.4 48.8 42.] 36.4
2100 39.1 41.7 33.:3 26.5 48.,5 31.4 54.9 44.8 36.1
Percentage of populatioll aged 0-14 years
1995 17. ] 17.1 17.1 17.1 17.] 17.1 17.1 17.1 17.1
2010 15.5 13.3 15.6 17.7 13.2 17.7 13.1 ]5.4 17.6
2020 14.1 11.8 14.3 16.6 11.6 16.4 !l.5 13.9 16.2
2U50 13.2 9.9 13.9 17.8 9.3 17.1 8.8 ]2.5 16.3
2100 13.6 9.9 14.9 19.9 8.7 18.6 7.7 12.3 17.3
Annual Tlumber of birth8 (in tholJ8and.s)
1995-2000 1,608 1,445 1.608 1.T71 1,445 1,771 1,446 1,608 1,771
2010-2015 l,449 1.134 1,448 1,763 1,135 1,763 1,135 1,449 1,763
2020-2025 1,356 998 1,355 1,742 999 1,743 1,000 1,357 1,744
2050-2055 1,229 671 I -I')') 1.985 674 1,995 677 1,233 2,002, .... _-
2095-2]00 1,073 371 1.057 2,.504 376 2,544 378 1,080 2,562
A s8umed total fel,tility mtf'8
]995-2000 1.53 1.38 1.53 1.69 U8 1.69 1.38 1.53 1.69
2010-2015 1.60 1.25 1.60 1.94 1.25 1.94 1.25 1.60 1.94
2020-202,5 1.65 1.28 1.65 2.02 1.28 2.02 1.28 1.65 2.02
20.10-2055 1.72 1.28 1 -'I 2.16 1.28 2.16 1.28 1.72 2.16., -
2095-2100 I. 74 l.24 1. 74 2.24 1.24 2.24 1.24 1,74 2.24
AS8'umed life expectancies for both se.l'e.s combinEd (in years)
199.5-2000 79.7 79.5 79 ..1 79.,5 79.7 79.7 80.0 80.0 80.0
20]0-2015 82.6 80.9 8U.9 80.9 82.6 82.6 84.4 84.4 84.4
2020-2025 84.7 81.9 81.9 81.9 84.7 84.7 87.4 87.4 87.4
2050-2055 88.3 82.8 82.8 82.8 88.3 88.3 93.9 93.9 93.9
2095-2]00 91.0 82.8 82.8 82.8 91.0 91.0 99.0 99.0 99.0
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Central Asia
Fertility C L C H L H L C H
Mortality C H H H C C L L L
Migration C C C C C C C C C
Total population size (in millions)
1995 54 54 54 ,54 54 54 54 54 54
2010 73 68 73 77 69 77 69 73 78
2020 88 78 87 97 78 98 79 89 98
2050 138 92 133 184 96 191 101 143 197
2100 195 70 173 361 81 402 93 216 435
Mean age (in years)
1995 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3
2010 28.0 29.3 27.9 26.7 29.4 26.7 29.4 28.0 26.8
2020 29.2 31.4 29.0 27.1 31.5 27.3 31.7 29.4 27.4
2050 33.1 38.2 32.4 28.2 39.1 28.8 40.1 33.9 29.4
2100 40.5 45.1 38.6 34.1 47.7 35.4 51.0 42.8 37.1
Percentage of population aged 60+
1995 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8
2010 7.6 7.9 7.5 7.0 8.1 7.2 8.2 7.7 7.3
2020 9.6 10.5 9.3 8.4 10.8 8.7 11.2 10.0 9.0
2050 15.3 20.1 13.9 10.0 21.9 11.1 23.9 16.8 12.2
2100 24.2 29.8 20.6 15.0 35.0 17.6 40.7 28.2 20.5
Percentage of population aged 0-14 years
1995 36.3 36.3 36.3 36.3 36.3 36.3 36.3 36.3 36.3
2010 33.0 28.7 33.0 36.8 28.7 36.8 28.7 33.0 36.8
2020 31.9 26.7 31.9 36.3 26.6 36.2 26.5 31.8 36.1
2050 26.9 19.1 27.2 33.8 18.7 33.6 18.3 26.5 33.2
2100 18.5 13.0 19.2 24.6 12.2 24.1 11.1 17.6 23.3
Annual numbel' of bil,ths (in thousands)
1995-2000 1,51.5 1,365 1,515 1,664 1,366 1,664 1,366 1,515 1,664
2010-2015 1,947 1,463 1,946 2,432 1,464 2,434 1,465 1,949 2,435
2020-2025 2,100 1,366 2,092 2,917 1,371 2,928 1,376 2,107 2,939
2050-2055 2,622 1,094 2,566 4,897 1,117 5,007 1,136 2,668 5,095
2095-2100 2,369 541 2,199 6,375 583 6,875 609 2,475 7,184
A ssumed total fertility rates
1995-2000 3.35 3.02 3.35 3.68 3.02 3.68 3.02 3.35 3.68
2010-2015 3.21 2.42 3.21 4.00 2.42 4.00 2.42 3.21 4.00
2020-2025 3.11 2.21 3.11 4.00 2.21 4.00 2.21 3.11 4.00
2050-2055 2.58 1.78 2.58 3.38 1.78 3.38 1.78 2.58 3.38
2095-2100 1.95 1.45 1.95 2.45 1.45 2.45 1.45 1.95 2.45
Assumed life expectancies for both sexes combined (in years)
1995-2000 69.7 69.5 69.5 69.5 69.7 69.7 69.9 69.9 69.9
2010-2015 72.4 70.5 70.5 70.5 72.4 72.4 74.1 74.1 74.1
2020-2025 74.4 71.6 71.6 71.6 74.4 74.4 77.2 77.2 77.2
20.50-2055 78.0 72.5 72.5 72.5 78.0 78.0 83.6 83.6 83.6
2095-2100 80.5 72.5 72 ..5 72.5 80.5 80.5 88.6 88.6 88.6
Appendix 449
Middle East
Fertility C L C H L H L C H
Mortality C H H H C C L L L
Migration C C C C C C C C C
Total population size (in millions)
1995 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151
2010 234 226 232 238 228 240 229 235 241
2020 301 278 296 313 283 318 287 305 323
2050 517 375 484 610 402 651 426 546 685
2100 738 299 606 l,088 373 1,309 453 859 1,491
Mean age (in yea/'s)
1995 23.1 23.1 23.1 23.1 23.l 23.1 23.1 23.1 23.1
2010 24.3 24.8 24.3 23.8 24.8 23.8 24.8 24.3 23.8
2020 25.7 26.8 25.7 24.7 26.8 24.8 27.0 25.9 24.9
2050 31.8 35.6 31.4 28.1 36.2 28.5 37.1 32.6 29.1
2100 41.0 45.1 39.3 35.1 47.7 36.3 51.6 43.9 38.3
Percentage oj population aged 60+
1995 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4
2010 5.6 5.6 5.5 5.3 5.7 5.4 5.8 5.7 5.5
2020 6.8 6.9 6.5 6.1 7.2 6.4 7.5 7.1 6.7
2050 12.4 14.4 11.2 8.9 16.0 9.9 17.8 13.9 11.1
2100 25.0 29.7 21.3 16.0 34.9 18.7 41.7 29.9 22.2
Percentage oj population aged 0-14 years
1995 42.8 42.8 42.8 42.8 42.8 42.8 42.8 42.8 42.8
2010 40.3 38.6 40.2 41.7 38.7 41.8 38.8 40.4 41.9
2020 37.0 33.9 36.9 39.5 34.1 39.7 34.2 37.1 39.8
2050 27.3 20.3 27.3 33.1 20.3 33.2 20.0 27.1 33.0
2100 18.1 12.9 18.5 23.4 12.3 23.2 11.1 l7.0 22.4
Annual number oj births (in thousands)
1995-2000 6,035 5,877 6,035 6,188 5,877 6,188 5,878 6,036 6,189
2010-2015 7,885 6,850 7,867 8,875 6,866 8,895 6,880 7,901 8,914
2020-2025 8,657 6,604 8,584 10,640 6,659 lO,730 6,710 8,724 10,810
2050-2055 10,090 4,984 9,610 15,940 5,228 16,760 5,415 10,460 17,380
2095-2100 8,886 2,386 7,639 18,740 2,768 21,850 3,002 9,651 23,750
Assumed total jel,tility rates
1995-2000 5.34 5.20 5.34 5.47 5.20 5.47 5.20 5.34 5.47
2010-2015 4.35 3.80 4.35 4.91 3.80 4.91 3.80 4.35 4.91
2020-2025 3.68 2.90 3.68 4.45 2.90 4.45 2.90 3.68 4.45
2050-2055 2.58 1.78 2.58 3.38 1.78 3.38 1.78 2.58 3.38
2095-2100 1.95 1.45 1.95 2.45 1.45 2.45 1.45 1.95 2.45
Assumed lije expectancies jor both se:z:es combined (in years)
1995-2000 67.7 67.2 67.2 67.2 67.7 67.7 68.1 68.1 68.1
2010-2015 70.7 67.7 67.7 67.7 70.7 70.7 73.8 73.8 73.8
2020-2025 72.9 68.2 68.2 68.2 72.9 72.9 77.7 77.7 77.7
2050-2055 77.0 68.7 68.7 68.7 77.0 77.0 85.3 85.3 85.3
2095-2100 79.6 68.7 68.7 68.7 79.6 79.6 90.5 90.5 90.5
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South Asia
Fertility C L C H L H L C H
Mortality C H H H C C L L L
Migration C C C C C C C C C
Total population size (in millions)
1995 1,240 1,240 1,240 1,240 1,240 1,240 1,240 1,240 1,240
2010 1,604 1,559 1,590 1,622 1,572 1,636 1,584 1,617 1,649
2020 1,839 1,717 1,798 1,880 1,756 1,922 1,792 1,876 1,962
2050 2,340 1,74:3 2.124 '2.558 1,9'23 2,817 2,098 2,545 3,056
2100 2,20'2 872 1,65:3 '2,872 1,180 3,797 1,528 2,772 4,701
Mean age (in yea1's)
1995 25.8 25.8 25.8 25.8 25.8 25.8 25.8 25.8 25.8
2010 28.1 28.5 28.1 27.6 28.6 27.7 28.6 28.1 27.7
2020 29.7 30.7 29.7 28.8 30.7 28.8 30.9 29.9 28.9
2050 35.6 39.0 35.2 32.1 39.4 32.4 40.1 36.2 32.9
2100 43.3 48.8 42.3 37.4 50.2 38.1 52.8 45.3 39.7
Percentage of population aged 60+
1995 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7
2010 8.6 8.7 8.5 8.3 8.8 8.4 8.8 8.7 8.5
2020 10.1 10.4 9.9 9.5 10.6 9.7 10.8 10.3 9.9
2050 16.8 19.3 15.9 13.2 20.4 14.0 21.9 18.1 15.1
2100 28.2 35.9 26.0 19.5 38.7 21.1 43.6 31.9 24.0
Pel'centage of populatzon aged 0-14 years
1995 36.6 36.6 36.6 :36.6 36.6 36.6 36.6 36.6 36.6
2010 32.5 31.0 32.4 33.7 31.1 :33.8 31.2 32.6 33.9
2020 29.9 27.3 29.8 32.0 27.5 32.2 27.6 30.0 32.3
2050 22.3 16.6 22.1 27.1 16.7 27.3 16.6 22.2 27.2
2100 15.4 9.8 15.5 20.8 9.6 20.9 9.0 14.8 20.4
Annual number of birth.s (in thousands)
1995-2000 36,870 35,910 36,860 37,810 35,920 37,830 35,930 36,880 37,840
2010-2015 40,300 35,280 40,060 44,860 35.490 45,130 35,690 40,520 45,370
2020-2025 ,39,820 31,010 39.120 47,590 31,570 48,450 32,070 40,450 49,230
2050-2055 ,35,170 17,630 32,150 51,770 19,270 56,650 20,650 37,690 60,710
2095-2100 21,690 4,900 16,610 42,420 6,409 55,420 7,642 25,850 66,010
Assumed totalfel·tz/ity mtes
1995-2000 ,3.68 3.58 3.68 3.77 3.58 3.77 3.58 ,3.68 3.77
2010-2015 ,3.11 274 3.11 3.47 2.74 3.47 2.74 ,3.ll 3.47
2020-2025 2.73 2.22 2.73 3.24 2.22 3.24 2.22 2.73 3.24
2050-2055 2.09 1.50 '2.09 2.68 1.50 2.68 1.50 2.09 2.68
2095-2100 1.70 1.20 1.70 2.20 1.20 2.20 1.20 1.70 2.20
Assum.ed life expectancies f07' both seus com.bined (in years)
1995-2000 60.5 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.5 60.5 60.9 60.9 60.9
2010-2015 62.8 59.7 59.7 59.7 62.8 62.8 65.8 65.8 65.8
2020-2025 64.5 59.7 59.7 59.7 64.5 64.5 69.,3 69.3 69.3
2050-2055 68.0 59.7 59.7 59.7 68.0 68.0 76.2 76.2 76.2
2095-2100 70.6 59.7 59.7 59.7 70.6 70.6 81.5 81.5 81.5
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Eastern Europe
Fertility C L C H L H L C H
Mortality C H H H C C L L L
Migration C C C' C C C C C C
Total population sIze (in milliolls)
1995 122 1')') p') 1')') l'n 122 122 122 122
2010 1'24 120 124 127 121 128 121 125 129
2020 123 115 121 128 116 130 118 125 132
2050 109 84 10:3 12.5 90 133 97 116 140
2100 77 30 66 128 37 144 45 88 160
Mean age (in yeal's)
1995 :35.6 35.G 3.5.6 :35.G 35.6 35.6 35.6 35.6 35.6
2010 39.0 39.9 38.9 :37.9 40.0 38.0 40.1 39.1 38.2
2020 41.1 42.5 40.8 39.2 42.8 39.5 43.2 41.5 39.9
2050 46.2 49.5 44.7 40.6 51.1 41.9 52.8 47.9 43.5
2100 46.5 .51.2 43.5 38.0 54.9 40.4 59.7 50.5 43.5
Percentage of population aged 60+
1995 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7
2010 19.6 19.9 19.:3 18.8 20.2 19.0 20 ..5 19.9 19.3
2020 24.1 24.7 2:3.:3 22.1 25.5 22.8 26.3 24.9 23.5
2050 34.5 38.8 3Ui 25.9 41.9 28.5 45.2 37.6 31.3
2100 34.9 4l..3 29.4 21.8 48.] 26.] 55.4 41.1 31.0
Percentage of popu.lation aged 0-14 yeCll's
]995 21.3 21.3 21.:3 ::n.3 21.3 21.3 21.3 21.3 21.3
20]0 ]7.5 15.0 17.6 20.0 ]5.0 20.0 ]4.9 ] 7.5 19.9
2020 16.4 ]3.6 16.,5 19.3 ]3.5 ] 9.] 13.3 16.2 19.0
2050 ] 4.] ]0.0 14.6 ] 9.2 9.5 ]8.6 9.0 13.4 17.9
2]00 ]5.0 9.8 ]6.2 22.0 8.7 20.9 7.5 13.6 ]9.6
A nllllal number of births (in thollwlUls)
]995-2000 ] ,499 ] ,350 ],499 ],6.52 ],350 1,652 ],350 1,499 1,6,52
20]0-2015 1,394 ] ,09] 1,393 1.703 1,092 J.704 1,092 1,395 1,705
2020-2025 1,208 846 ],204 ] ,6] 9 849 1,625 852 ] ,212 ] ,630
2050-2055 97] 4~') 953 1,679 48] 1,711 488 985 1,736,-
2095-2100 74] 169 694 ],994 182 2,]27 189 768 2,203
A ssumed total fel,tilitymtes
1995-2000 1.66 1.50 1.66 1.83 1.50 1.83 1.50 1.66 1.83
20]0-20]5 1.68 1.32 Ui8 2.04 1.32 2.04 1.32 1.68 2.04
2020-2025 1.69 1.31 1.G9 2.07 1.3] 2.07 1.3] 1.69 2.07
2050-2055 1.78 1.34 1.78 2.22 1.34 2.22 1.34 1.78 2.22
2095-2]00 1.89 1.39 1.89 2.39 1.39 2.39 1.39 1.89 2.39
Assumed life expectancies for both sexes combined (in years)
]995-2000 72.0 71.8 71.8 71.8 72.0 72.0 72.3 72.3 72.3
2010-2015 74.7 72.9 72.9 72.9 74.7 74.7 76.5 76.5 76.5
2020-2025 76.7 7:3.9 73.9 73.9 7G.7 76.7 79.5 79.5 79.5
2050-2055 80.3 74.8 74.8 74.8 80.3 80.3 85.9 85.9 85.9
2095-2]00 82.8 74.8 74.8 74.8 82.8 82.8 91.0 91.0 91.0
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European FSU
Fertility C L C H L H L C H
Mortality C H H H C C L L L
Migration C C C C C C C C C
Total population size (in millions)
1995 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 238
2010 231 223 229 235 225 238 227 233 240
2020 224 207 219 230 212 236 217 229 241
2050 187 139 171 209 154 227 171 206 246
2100 135 51 112 217 64 254 79 158 289
Mean age (in years)
1995 36.0 36.0 36.0 36.0 36.0 36.0 36.0 36.0 36.0
2010 39.4 40.2 39.2 38.3 40.3 38.5 40.5 39.6 38.7
2020 41.2 42.5 40.8 39.3 42.9 39.7 43.4 41.7 40.2
2050 45.5 48.6 43.8 39.8 50.3 41.3 52.5 47.7 43.4
2100 43.4 47.3 40.4 35.4 51.1 37.8 56.2 47.6 41.2
Percentage of population aged 60+
1995 16.9 16.9 16.9 16.9 16.9 16.9 16.9 16.9 16.9
2010 19.1 19.3 18.7 18.2 19.6 18.6 20.0 19.4 18.9
2020 23.6 24.0 22.7 21.6 24.9 22.4 25.9 24.6 23.3
2050 34.0 37.7 30.6 25.0 41.3 28.0 45.6 38.0 31.7
2100 30.0 34.7 24.5 18.1 41.7 22.4 50.2 37.1 27.9
Percentage of population aged 0-14 years
1995 21.6 21.6 21.6 21.6 21.6 21.6 21.6 21.6 21.6
2010 16.1 13.7 16.1 18.4 13.7 18.4 13.6 16.0 18.3
2020 16.0 13.3 16.2 18.9 13.1 18.7 12.9 15.8 18.5
2050 14.6 10.6 15.4 19.9 10.0 19.1 9.2 13.6 18.0
2100 17.4 12 ..5 18.9 24.6 11.1 23.2 9.4 15.6 21.5
Annual number of births (in thousands)
1995-2000 2,529 2,276 2,529 2,782 2,276 2,782 2,276 2,529 2,782
2010-2015 2,549 1,992 2,547 3,106 1,994 3,109 1,995 2,551 3,111
2020-2025 2,084 1,460 2,076 2,778 1,465 2,789 1,470 2,091 2,800
2050-2055 1,748 854 1,709 2,982 874 3,052 890 1,780 3,108
2095-2100 1,568 385 1,445 3,972 420 4,304 441 1,643 4,506
Assumed total fe,·tility mtes
1995-2000 1.50 1.35 1.50 1.65 1.35 1.65 1.35 1.50 1.65
2010-2015 1.58 1.24 1.58 1.92 1.24 1.92 1.24 1.58 1.92
2020-2025 1.64 1.27 1.64 2.01 1.27 2.01 1.27 1.64 2.01
2050-2055 1.84 1.40 1.84 2.28 1.40 2.28 1.40 1.84 2.28
2095-2100 2.05 1.55 2.05 2.55 1.55 2.55 1.55 2.05 2.55
Assumed life expectancies for both sexes combined (in years)
1995-2000 67.8 67.3 67.3 67.3 67.8 67.8 68.2 68.2 68.2
2010-2015 70.5 67.6 67.6 67.6 70.5 70.5 73.2 73.2 73.2
2020-2025 72.5 68.0 68.0 68.0 72.5 72.5 76.9 76.9 76.9
2050-2055 76.1 68.6 68.6 68.6 76.1 76.1 83.7 83.7 83.7
2095-2100 78.7 68.6 68.6 68.6 78.7 78.7 88.6 88.6 88.6
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Western Europe (High Migration)
Fertility C L C H L H L C H
Mortality C H H H C C L L L
Migration H H H H H H H H H
Total population size (in millions)
1995 447 447 447 447 447 447 447 447 447
2010 478 462 476 489 465 492 467 481 494
2020 492 461 486 510 468 517 474 499 524
2050 505 402 4~~ 564 429 592 457 534 622, I
2100 484 260 434 702 297 769 338 536 834
Mean age (in years)
1995 37.0 37.0 37.0 37.0 37.0 37.0 37.0 37.0 37.0
2010 40.1 40.9 40.0 39.0 41.1 39.2 ·U.2 40.3 39.3
2020 42.0 43.2 41.6 40.1 43.6 40.5 44.0 42.4 40.9
2050 46.3 48.8 44.7 41.1 50.5 42.6 52.4 48.1 44.3
2100 46.2 48.1 43.1 38.7 51.8 41.3 56.1 49.9 44.3
Pel'centage of population aged 60+
1995 18.6 18.6 18.6 18.6 18.6 18.6 18.6 18.6 18.6
2010 21.6 22.0 21.3 20.8 22.3 21.0 22.6 21.9 21.3
2020 24.7 25.2 24.0 22.8 26.0 23.5 26.8 25.5 24.3
2050 34.0 36.8 31.0 26.3 40.0 28.9 43.2 37.0 31.7
2100 34.1 35.8 28.8 23.0 42.1 27.3 48.3 39.5 31.8
Pel'centage of population aged 0-14 years
1995 19.9 19.9 19.9 19.9 19.9 19.9 19.9 19.9 19.9
2010 17.1 14.8 17.1 19.4 14.7 19.4 14.6 17.0 19.3
2020 16.0 13.4 16.2 18.7 13.3 18.5 13.1 15.8 18.3
2050 14.6 11.1 15.2 19.2 10.5 18.5 9.9 13.9 17.8
2100 15.6 11.9 16.8 21.7 10.8 20.5 9.6 14.3 19.2
Annual number of births (in thousands)
1995-2000 5,599 5,045 5.599 6,152 5,045 6,152 5,046 5,599 6,152
2010-2015 5,203 4,087 5,201 6,320 4,089 6,323 4,091 5,206 6,326
2020-2025 5,075 3,710 5,067 6,552 3,716 6,563 3,722 5,083 6,573
2050-2055 4,796 2,656 4,7.54 7,653 2,679 7,723 2,694 4,826 7,772
2095-2100 4,974 1,872 4,845 10,910 1,915 11,230 1,935 5,036 11 ,380
Assumed total fertility mtes
1995-2000 1.67 1.51 I.G7 1.84 1.51 1.84 1.51 1.67 1.84
2010-2015 1.68 1.33 1.68 2.04 1.33 2.04 1.33 1.68 2.04
2020-2025 1.69 1.31 1.69 2.07 1.31 2.07 1.31 1.69 2.07
2050-2055 1.78 1.:34 1.78 2.22 1.34 2.22 1.34 1.78 2.22
2095-2100 1.89 1.39 1.89 2.:39 1.39 2.39 1.39 1.89 2.39
Assumed life expectancies fOl' both se:res combined (in years)
1995-2000 75.8 75.6 7.5.6 75.G 75.8 75.8 76.1 76.1 76.1
2010-2015 78.8 77.0 77.0 77.0 78.8 78.8 80.6 80.6 80.6
2020-2025 80.8 78.0 78.0 78.0 80.8 80.8 83.6 83.6 83.6
2050-2055 84.5 79.0 79.0 79.0 84.5 84.5 90.0 90.0 90.0
2095-2100 87.1 79.0 79.0 79.0 87.1 87.1 95.2 95.2 95.2
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Western Europe (Low Migration)
Fertility C L C H L H L C H
Mortality C H H H C C L L L
Migration L L L L L L L L L
Total population size (in millions)
1995 447 447 447 447 447 447 447 447 447
2010 462 446 459 472 449 475 451 464 477
2020 463 433 457 480 440 487 446 470 494
2050 4:3:3 340 408 487 364 513 391 460 541
2100 341 159 302 530 186 585 217 383 639
Afean age (in years)
199,5 :37.0 :l7.0 :37,0 :37.0 37.0 37.0 37.0 37.0 37,0
2010 40.4 41.:3 40,3 :EI.4 41.4 39 ..5 41.6 40,6 39.7
2020 42.6 43.8 42.2 ,10.6 44.2 41.0 44.6 43.0 41.4
2050 47.5 50.4 45.8 41.9 52.1 43.5 54.1 49.4 45.3
2100 47.6 50.8 44.3 39.2 54.8 41.9 59.6 51.6 45.1
Pel'centage of population aged 60+
1995 18.6 18.6 18.6 18.6 18.6 18.6 18.6 18.6 18.6
2010 22,1 22.4 21.8 21.2 22.7 21.5 23.1 22.4 21.8
2020 25.7 26.3 24.9 23.7 27.1 24.4 27.9 26.5 25.2
2050 36.1 39.7 33.0 27.7 43.0 30.5 46.3 39.3 33.4
2100 36.5 40.7 :311.9 23.9 ,11.5 28.4 54.2 42.3 33.2
PfTcentage of population u!}ed 0-14 ye(/r.~
199,5 19.9 19.9 EUI 19.9 19.9 19.9 19.9 19.9 19.9
2010 16.8 14.5 16.9 19.1 14.4 19.1 14.4 16.8 19.0
2020 15.6 LUI 15.8 liU 12.9 18.1 12.7 15.4 17.9
2050 13.9 10.2 14.6 18.1 9.7 18.0 9.1 13.2 17.3
2100 14.8 10.6 16.1 2lA 9.4 20.1 8.2 13.5 18.8
Annual number of births (m thousands)
1995-2000 5.544 4.996 5.544 6.1J92 4,997 6,092 4,997 5,544 6,092
2010-2015 4,888 3,839 4,885 5,937 3,841 5,940 3,842 4,890 5,943
2020-2025 4,613 3,357 4.606 !i,979 3,363 5,990 3,368 4,621 6,000
2050-2055 3,880 2.048 3,843 6,381 2,068 6,443 2,082 3,907 6,488
2095-2100 3,293 986 :3,191 8.(J56 1,017 8,316 1,033 3,343 8,444
A ssumed total fel·tility mte"
1995-201J0 1.67 1.51 1.67 1.84 1.51 1.84 1.51 1.67 1.84
2010-2015 1.68 1.33 1.68 2.04 1.33 2.04 1.33 1.68 2.04
2020-202,5 1.6~) 1.:31 1.69 2.07 1.31 2.07 1.31 1.69 2.07
2050-2055 1. 18 1.34 1.78 2.·:t2 1.34 2.22 1.34 1.78 2.22
2095-2100 1.89 1.39 1.89 2.39 1.39 2.39 1.39 1.89 2.39
Assumed life e.r:pectancies f01' both sen's combined (in yean)
1995-2000 75.8 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.8 75.8 76.1 76.1 76.1
2010-2015 78.8 77.1 77.1 77.1 78.8 78.8 80.6 80.6 80.6
2020-2025 80.8 78.0 78.0 78.0 80.8 80.8 83.6 83.6 83.6
2050-2055 84.5 79.0 79.0 79.0 84.5 84.5 90.1 90.1 90.1
2095-2l00 87.1 79.0 79.0 79.0 87.1 87.1 95.2 95.2 95.2
Appendix 455
Western Europe (Central Migration)
Fertility C L c: H L H L C H
Mortality C H H H C C L L L
Migration C C C C C C C C C
Total population size (in millions)
1995 447 447 441 447 447 44/ 447 447 447
2010 410 454 461 480 457 483 459 473 486
2020 478 HI 4/1 495 454 502 460 485 509
2050 469 311 442 525 397 553 424 497 582
2100 41.3 209 368 616 241 677 278 459 736
Mean (lge (in years)
1995 37.0 31.0 37.0 :no 37.0 37.0 31.0 37.0 37.0
2010 40.3 41.1 40.1 39.2 41.2 39.4 41.4 40.4 39.5
2020 42.3 43.5 41.9 40.4 43.9 40.8 44.3 42.7 41.2
2050 46.9 49.5 45.2 41.5 51.3 43.0 53.2 48.7 44.8
2100 46.8 49.2 43.6 38.9 52.9 41.5 57.4 50.6 44.1
PeTcentage of population aged 60+
1995 18.6 18.6 18.6 18.6 18.6 18.6 18.6 18.6 18.6
2010 21.9 22.2 21.6 21.0 22.5 21.3 22.8 22.2 21.6
2020 25.2 25.7 24.4 23.2 26.5 24.0 27.3 26.0 24.7
2050 35.0 38.1 32.0 26.9 41.3 29.7 44.6 38.1 32.5
2100 35.1 31.7 29.6 2:3.4 44.1 27.8 50.6 40.7 32.4
Percentage of population aged 0-14 yeal'S
1995 19.9 19.9 19.9 19.9 19.9 19.9 19.9 19.9 19.9
2010 17.0 14.6 11.0 19.3 14.6 19.2 14.5 16.9 19.2
2020 15.8 13.2 16.0 18.5 13.1 18.3 12.9 15.6 18.1
2050 14.3 ID.7 14.9 19.0 10.1 18.3 9.6 13.6 17.6
2100 15.3 11.4 16.5 21.6 10.2 20.3 9.0 13.9 19.0
Annual 1111mber' of bir'ths (in thousands)
1995-2000 5,571 5,021 5,571 6,122 5,021 6,122 5,021 5,572 6,122
2010-2015 5,046 3.963 5.043 6,128 3,965 6,131 3,967 5,048 6,134
2020-2025 4,844 3,534 4,836 6.266 3,539 6 .)~~ 3,545 4,852 6,286, ... ( (
2050-2055 4,338 2.352 4,298 7.017 2.373 7.083 2,388 4,366 7,130
2095-2100 4,134 1,429 4,018 9,484 1,466 9,771 1,484 4,189 9,910
Assumed total fer'tility mtes
1995-2000 1.67 1.51 1.61 1.84 1.51 1.84 1.51 1.67 1.84
2010-2015 1.68 1.33 1.68 2.04 1.33 2.04 1.33 1.68 2.04
2020-2025 1.69 1.31 Ui9 2.07 1.31 2.07 1.31 1.69 2.07
2050-2055 1.78 1.34 1.78 2.22 1.34 2.22 1.34 1.78 2.22
2095-2100 1.89 1.:39 1.89 2.39 1.39 2.39 1.39 1.89 2.39
Assumed life e:z;pectancies for both ,e:res combined (in years)
1995-2000 75.8 75.6 15.6 75.6 75.8 75.8 76.1 76.1 76.1
2010-2015 78.8 77.1 77.1 17.1 78.8 78.8 80.6 80.6 80.6
2020-2025 80.8 18.0 78.0 78.0 80.8 80.8 83.6 83.6 83.6
2050-2055 84.5 79.0 79.0 79.0 84.5 84.5 90.0 90.0 90.0
2095-2100 87.1 79.0 79.0 79.0 87.1 87.1 952 95.2 9.5.2
4.56 Appendix
Latin America
Fertility C L C II L II L C II
Mortality C II II II C C L L L
Migration (J C C C C C C C C
Total population size (in millions)
1995 477 477 477 477 477 477 477 477 477
2010 607 586 605 624 588 627 590 610 629
2020 693 644 686 729 650 737 656 700 743
2050 906 687 867 1,080 722 1,125 756 945 1,169
2100 1,056 454 927 1,700 530 1,910 612 1,180 2,096
Mean age (zn yea!'!!)
1995 26.9 26.9 26.9 26.9 26.9 26.9 26.9 26.9 26.9
2010 29.9 :30.7 29.9 29.2 30.7 29.2 30.8 30.0 29.2
2020 32.0 :3:3.4 :31.9 30.6 :n.5 30.7 33.6 32.2 30.8
2050 37.5 41.4 36.8 :3:3.1 42.2 33.7 43.1 38.3 34.4
2100 41.7 46.3 40.0 35.3 48.7 36.6 51.9 44.1 38.4
Pe"centage of populatIOn aged 60+
1995 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6
2010 9.4 9.6 9.3 9.0 9.7 9.1 9.8 9.5 9.2
2020 11.9 12.4 11.6 10.9 I·J - 11.2 13.0 12.2 11.5_.1
2050 20.7 24.4 19.4 15.5 26.0 16.7 27.8 22.3 18.0
2100 27.1 33.1 23.8 17.8 37.5 20.3 42.8 31.1 23.2
Pe'rcentage of population aged 0-14 years
1995 33.7 33.7 33.7 33.7 33.7 33.7 33.7 33.7 33.7
2010 29.3 27.0 29.3 31.4 27.0 31.4 27.0 29.3 31.5
2020 26.8 2:3.6 26.9 29.8 23.6 29.8 23.5 26.8 29.8
2050 21.9 16.2 22.1 27.5 15.9 27.2 15.6 21.5 26.9
2100 18.6 13.3 19.3 24.6 12.6 24.1 11.6 17.7 23.2
Annual number of bi,·ths (in thousands)
1995-2000 12,370 11,720 12,370 13,020 11,720 13,020 11,720 12,370 13,020
2010-2015 13,050 10,800 13,030 15,280 10,810 15,300 10,820 13,060 15,320
2020-2025 13,290 9,792 13,230 16,960 9,835 17,040 9,875 13,340 17,110
2050-2055 13,730 6,990 13,400 22,530 7,158 23,090 7,295 13,990 23,540
2095-2100 13,350 3,765 12,280 31,030 4,097 33,720 4,314 14,040 35,460
Assumed total fertility mtes
1995-2000 2.95 2.79 2.95 :3.10 2.79 3.10 2.79 2.95 3.10
20 10~-20 15 2.62 2.18 2.62 3.06 2.18 3.06 2.18 2.62 3.06
2020-2025 2.49 1.94 2.49 3.03 1.94 3.03 1.94 2.49 3.03
2050-2055 2.25 1.66 2.25 2.84 1.66 2.84 1.66 2.25 2.84
2095-2100 2.10 1.60 2.10 2.60 1.60 2.60 1.60 2.10 2.60
Assumed life expectancies for both SLrC8 combined (in yem's)
1995-2000 69.8 69.6 69.6 69.6 69.8 69.8 70.1 70.1 70.1
2010-2015 72.4 70.6 70.6 70.6 72.4 72.4 74.1 74.1 74.1
2020-2025 74.4 71.6 71.6 71.6 74.4 74.4 77.1 77.1 77.1
2050-2055 78.1 72.6 72.6 72.6 78.1 78.1 83.6 83.6 83.6
2095-2100 80.7 72.6 72.6 72.6 80.7 80.7 88.8 88.8 88.8
Appendix 457
North America (High Migration)
Fertility C L C H L H L C H
Mortality C H H H C C L L L
Migration H H H H H H H H H
Total population size (in millions)
1995 297 297 297 297 297 297 297 297 297
2010 351 340 3.50 360 :341 362 343 353 363
2020 388 363 384 404 368 409 372 393 414
2050 480 386 4,58 543 407 566 429 503 589
2100 623 360 568 890 402 964 447 678 1,031
Mean age (in yean)
1995 35.6 35.6 35.6 35.6 35.6 35.6 35.6 35.6 35.6
2010 38.1 39.0 38.0 37.1 39.1 37.2 39.2 38.3 37.4
2020 39.7 41.0 39.4 37.9 41.3 38.2 41.7 40.0 38.5
2050 43.2 45.6 41.7 38.3 47.1 39.6 48.8 44.7 41.1
2100 43.6 45.3 40.8 36.7 48.6 38.9 52.3 46.7 41.5
Pel'centage of population aged 60+
1995 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4
2010 18.5 18.8 18.3 17.8 19.1 18.0 19.4 18.8 18.3
2020 22.7 23.3 21.0 20.9 24.0 21.5 24.6 23.4 22.2
2050 28.6 30.9 26.0 22.0 33.7 24.2 36.6 31.2 26.6
2100 30.1 31.3 25.4 20.3 36.9 24.] 42.5 34.8 27.9
Percentage of popu.lation aged 0-14 years
1995 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22,0 22.0 22.0
2010 ]9.2 16.9 ]9.3 21.6 ]6.8 21.5 ]6.8 ]9.2 21.5
2020 18.5 1.5.7 ]8.6 21.4 ]5.5 21.2 ]5.4 ]8.4 21.1
2050 17.0 ]3.2 ] 7.6 :22.0 12.6 21.3 12.1 ]6.4 20.7
2100 17.9 ]4.2 19. ] 24.0 1:3.0 22.9 11.9 ]6.7 21.7
Annu.al numbel' of births (in thousands)
]995-2000 4,283 3,888 4,283 ·1,677 3,888 4,677 3,888 4,283 4,677
20]0-20]5 4,624 3,644 4,621 5,610 3,645 5,6]3 3,647 4,626 5,6]5
2020-2025 4,8]8 3.487 4,811 6,275 3,492 6,286 3,497 4,825 6,295
2050-2055 5,546 3, ]41 .5,503 8,774 3,164 8,847 3,180 5,577 8,899
2095-2100 7,671 3,235 7,493 ]5,890 3,298 ]6,320 3,326 7,752 ]6,.5]0
Assu.med total fel·tility mtes
1Y95-2000 1.96 1.78 1.96 2.14 1.78 2.]4 1.78 1.96 2.]4
2010-2015 1.9] 1.51 1.9] 2.30 1.5] 2.30 1.5] 1.91 2.30
2020-2025 1.88 1.46 1.88 2.30 ] .46 2.30 1.46 1.88 2.30
2050-2055 1.95 ].48 UJ,5 2.42 1.48 2.42 ].48 1.95 2.42
2095-2100 2.09 1.59 2.09 2.59 1.59 2.59 1.59 2.09 2.59
Assumed life expectancies fOI' both secus combined (in years)
]995-2000 76.2 76.0 76.0 76.0 76.2 76.2 76.5 76.5 76.5
20]0-20]5 79.2 77.4 77.4 77.4 79.2 79.2 81.0 81.0 81.0
2020-2025 81.2 78.4 78.4 78.4 81.2 81.2 84.0 84.0 84.0
2050-2055 84.8 79.4 79.4 79.4 84.8 84.8 90.4 90.4 90.4
2095-2100 87.5 79.4 79.4 79.4 87.5 87.5 95.5 95.5 95.5
458 Appendix
North America (Low Migration)
Fertility C L C H L H L C H
Mortality C H H H C C L L L
Migration L L L L L L L L L
Total population size (in millions)
1995 297 297 297 297 297 297 297 297 297
2010 318 307 316 326 309 327 310 320 329
2020 329 307 325 343 311 348 315 333 352
2050 332 25'1 314 :382 274 401 292 351 421
2100 311 141 278 503 164 550 189 344 594
Mean age (in yeal's)
1995 35.6 3,5.6 35.6 35.6 35,6 35.6 35.6 35.6 35.6
2010 38,9 39.8 38.8 37.9 39.9 38.0 40.1 39.1 38.1
2020 41.0 42.4 40.6 39.0 42.7 39.4 43.1 41.3 39.7
2050 45.3 48.4 43.6 :39.5 50.2 41.0 52.1 47.1 42.7
2100 45.4 48.9 42.3 3~ ') 52.7 39.7 57.4 49.1 42.5,,_
Percentage of population aged 60+
1995 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4
2010 19.6 19.9 19,3 18.8 20.2 19.0 20.5 19.9 19,3
2020 25.1 25.9 24.4 2:3.1 26.6 23.8 27.3 25.8 24.5
2050 32.2 35.9 29,3 24.1 39.1 26.7 42.4 35.3 29.4
2100 33.3 37.8 28.1 21.3 44.3 25.4 50.9 38.7 29.6
Pel'centage of population aged 0-14 years
1995 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 no 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0
2010 18.6 16.1 18,6 20.9 16.1 20.9 16.0 18.5 20.8
2020 17.6 14.7 17.8 20.5 14,6 20.4 14.4 17.4 20.2
2050 1.5.9 11,6 16.5 n.2 11.1 20.5 10.5 15.1 19.8
2100 16.9 12.3 18.2 23,7 11.0 22.5 9.7 15.5 21.2
Annual number of births (in thousands)
1995-2000 4,162 3,779 4,162 4,545 3,779 4,545 3,779 4,162 4,545
2010-2015 3,940 3,102 3,938 4,785 3,104 4,787 3,105 3,942 4,789
2020-2025 3,806 2,720 3,799 5,009 2,724 5,019 2,728 3,812 5,027
2050-2055 3,485 1,796 3,452 5.860 1,813 5,916 1,825 3,509 5,957
2095-2100 3,544 1,070 3.437 8,758 1,103 9,036 1,119 3,596 9,169
Assumed total fel·tility mtes
1995-2000 1.96 1.78 1.96 2.14 1.78 2.14 1.78 1.96 2.14
2010-2015 1.91 1.51 1.91 2,30 1.51 2.30 1.51 1.91 2.30
2020-2025 1.88 1.46 1.88 2.30 1.46 2.30 1.46 1.88 2.30
2050-2055 1.95 1.48 1.95 2.42 1.48 2.42 1.48 1.95 2.42
2095-2100 2.09 1.59 2.09 2.,59 1.59 2.59 1.59 2.09 2.59
Assumed life expectancies fOl' both sexes combined (in years)
1995-2000 76.2 76.0 76.0 76,0 76.2 76.2 76.5 76.5 76.5
2010-2015 79,2 77.4 77.4 17.4 79.2 79.2 81.0 81.0 81.0
2020-2025 81.2 78.4 78.4 78.4 81.2 81.2 84.0 84.0 84.0
2050-2055 84.9 79.4 '19.4 79.4 84.9 84.9 90.4 90.4 90.4
2095-2100 87.5 '19.4 79.4 79.4 87.5 87.5 95.5 95.5 95.5
Appendix 459
North America (Central Migration)
Fertility C L C H L H L C H
Mortality C H H H C C L L L
Migration C C C C C C C C C
Total population size (in millions)
1995 297 297 297 297 297 297 297 297 297
2010 335 323 333 343 325 345 327 336 346
2020 359 33,'} 354 374 :l39 378 344 363 383
2050 406 321 386 463 340 483 360 427 505
2100 467 2,'}1 42:l 697 283 757 318 511 812
Mean age (in yem"s)
1995 3,'}.6 :l5.6 35.6 35.6 35.6 35.6 35.6 35.6 35.6
2010 38.5 39.3 :38.4 37.5 39.5 37.6 39.6 38.6 37.7
2020 40.3 41.6 39.9 38.4 42.0 38.7 42.3 40.6 39.1
2050 44.0 46.7 42.5 38.8 48.4 40.2 50.2 45.7 41.8
2100 44.2 46.3 41.3 36.9 49.8 39.2 53.8 47.5 41.9
Pe/Tentage of population aged 60+
1995 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4
2010 19.0 19.4 18.8 18.2 19.6 18.5 19.9 19.3 18.8
2020 23.8 24.5 23.1 21.9 25.2 22.6 25.9 24.5 23.2
2050 30.0 32.9 27.4 22.8 35.9 25.2 38.9 32.9 27.8
2100 31.2 33.2 26.3 20.6 39.1 24.6 45.0 36.1 28.5
Pel"Centage of population aged 0-14 years
1995 22.0 22.0 22.0 no 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0
2010 18.9 16.5 19.0 21.3 16.5 21.2 16.4 18.9 21.2
2020 18.1 1" '} 18.2 21.0 15.1 20.8 15.0 17.9 20.70._
2050 16.6 12.5 j- 'J 21.7 12.0 21.0 11.4 15.9 20.31._
2100 17.6 13.7 U3.8 23.9 12.5 22.7 11.2 16.3 21.5
A nnual number of births (in thollsands)
1995-2000 4 '''')'J 3,833 4,222 4,611 3,834 4,611 3,834 4,222 4,6111"'~'"
2010-2015 4,282 3,373 4,280 5,197 3,375 5,200 3,376 4,284 5,202
2020-2025 4,312 3,103 4,305 5,642 3,108 5,652 3,113 4,319 5,661
2050-2055 4,516 2,468 4,477 7,317 2,488 7,382 2,502 4,543 7,428
2095-2100 5,608 2,152 5,465 12,330 2,201 12,680 2,223 5,674 12,840
Assumed total /atility mtes
199,'}-2000 1.96 1.78 1.96 2.14 1.78 2.14 1.78 1.96 2.14
2010-2015 Ull 1.51 1.91 2.30 LSI 2.30 1.51 1.91 2.30
2020-2025 1.88 1.46 1.88 2.30 1.46 2.30 1.46 1.88 2.30
2050-2055 1.95 1.48 1.95 2.42 1.48 2.42 1.48 1.95 2.42
2095-2100 2.09 1.59 2.09 2.59 1.59 2.59 1.59 2.09 2.59
Assumed life expectancies /07" both sexes combined (in years)
199.5-2000 76.2 76.0 76.0 76.0 76.2 76.2 76.5 76.5 76.5
2010-2015 79.2 77.4 77.4 77.4 79.2 79.2 81.0 81.0 81.0
2020-2025 81.2 78.4 78.4 78.4 81.2 81.2 84.0 84.0 84.0
2050-2055 84.8 79.4 79.4 79.4 84.8 84.8 90.4 90.4 90.4
2095-2100 87.5 79.4 79.4 79.4 87.5 87.5 95.5 95.5 95.5
460 Appendix
Industrialized Region
Fertility C L C H L H L C H
Mortality C H H H C C L L L
Migration C C C C C C C C C
Total population size (in mil/tOns)
1995 1,251 1,:251 1,25] 1,251 1,25] 1,251 ],251 1,251 1,251
2010 1,3]5 1,270 ],307 ],344 1,278 ] ,353 ] ,286 1,323 1,361
2020 1,340 ],250 1,~n9 ] ,388 1,270 ],410 1,291 1,360 1,43]
2050 1,3] 9 1,032 1,241 1,486 1,107 1,568 1,188 1,402 1,654
2100 1,216 607 1,08] 1,84] 700 2,033 806 ],355 2,214
Mean age (in years)
1995 36.5 36.5 36.5 36.5 36.5 36.5 36.5 36.5 36.5
2010 39.9 40.7 39.7 38.8 40.8 38.9 41.0 40.0 39.1
2020 41.8 43.] 41.4 39.9 43.5 40.3 43.9 42.2 40.7
2050 46.0 48.8 44.4 40.5 50.5 42.1 52.4 47.9 43.8
2100 45.7 48.2 42.6 37.9 51.9 40.4 56.4 49.4 43.4
Percentage of population aged 60+
1995 17.7 17.7 17.7 17.7 17.7 17.7 17.7 17.7 17.7
2010 21.1 21.4 20.8 20.2 21.7 20.5 22.0 21.4 20.8
2020 25.1 25.7 24.4 23.1 26.5 23.9 27.3 25.9 24.7
2050 33.7 36.9 30.7 25.7 40.2 28.4 43.6 36.9 31.3
2100 33.4 36.2 28.1 21.9 42.5 26.1 49.1 39.0 30.7
Pel'centage of population aged 0-14 years
1995 20.5 20.5 20.5 20.5 20.5 20.5 20.5 20.5 20.5
2010 17.2 14.8 ] 7.2 ]9.5 14.8 19.5 14.7 17.1 19.4
2020 16.3 13.6 16.5 19. ] 13.5 18.9 13.3 16.] 18.7
2050 14.9 ] 1.1 15.5 19.8 10.5 19. ] 9.9 14.2 ]8.3
2100 16.2 12.2 17.5 22.7 11.0 21.5 9.7 14.8 20.]
Annual number of bil·ths (in thousands)
1995-2000 15,429 13.925 15.429 16.938 13,926 16,938 13,927 ]5,430 16,938
2010-2015 14,720 11,553 14,711 17,897 11,561 17,907 11,565 14,727 17,915
2020-2025 13,804 9,941 13,776 18,047 9,960 18,086 9,979 13,831 18,121
2050-2055 12,802 6,817 12.659 20,980 6,890 21,223 6,944 12,907 21,404
2095-2100 13,124 4,506 12,679 30,284 4,644 31,426 4,716 13,354. 32,02]
Assumed total fel·tility mtes
1995-2000 1.69 1.52 1.69 1.85 1.52 1.85 1.52 1.69 1.85
2010-2015 1.71 1.35 1. 7] 2.07 1.35 2.07 1.35 1.71 2.07
2020-2025 1.73 L14 1.73 2.12 1.34 2.12 1.34 1.73 2.11
2050-2055 1.83 138 1.83 2.28 1.38 2.28 1.38 1.83 2.28
2095-2100 1.97 1.47 1.97 2.47 1.47 2.47 1.47 1.97 2.47
Assumed life expectancies for both sexes combined (in years)
1995-2000 74.5 74.2 74..2 74.2 74.5 74.5 74.8 74.8 74..8
2010-2015 77.5 75.6 75.5 75.5 77.5 77.5 79.5 79.5 79.5
2020-2025 79.6 76.5 76.5 76.5 79.6 79.6 82.7 82.6 82.6
2050-2055 83.5 77.8 77.8 77.7 83.5 83.5 89.3 89.3 89.3
2095-2100 86.5 78.5 78.2 78.0 86.7 86.3 94.8 94.7 94.5
Appendix 461
Developing Region
Fertility C L C
Mortality C H H
Migration C C C
H
H
C
L
C
C
H
C
C
L
L
C
C
L
C
H
L
C
Total population size (in mil/ions)
1995 4,451 4,451 4,451
2010 5,696 5,482 5,652
2020 6,541 6,011 6,404
2050 8,554 6,071 7,780
2100 9,137 3,330 7,040
Mean age (in years)
1995 26.6 26.6 26.6
2010 29.0 29.7 29.0
2020 30.6 32.0 30.6
2050 35.4 39.7 35.1
2100 41.6 46.8 40.4
Percentage of population aged 60+
1995 7.2 7.2 7.2
2010 8.8 9.0 8.7
2020 10.8 11.2 10.5
2050 17.4 21.1 16.4
2100 25.9 32.9 23.3
4,451
5,823
6,802
9,810
13,228
26.6
28.3
29.3
31.4
35.7
7.2
8.5
9.9
13.0
17.3
4,451
5,524
6,138
6,694
4,433
26.6
29.8
32.0
40.1
48.5
7.2
9.1
11.5
22.2
36.4
4,451
5,869
6,946
10,765
16,915
26.6
28.4
29.4
31.7
36.6
7.2
8.5
10.1
13.8
19.2
4,451
5,564
6,257
7,301
5,701
26.6
29.8
32.1
40.9
51.5
7.2
9.2
11.7
23.8
41.6
4,451
5,738
6,665
9,285
11,325
26.6
29.1
30.7
36.1
43.8
7.2
8.9
11.0
18.8
29.8
4,451
5,912
7,080
11,643
20,524
26.6
28.4
29.5
32.2
38.2
7.2
8.6
10.4
15.0
22.1
64.6
68.8
72.0
78.5
83.7
64.6
68.8
71.9
78.5
83.6
64.6
68.8
71.9
78.5
83.6
Percentage of population aged 0-14 years
1995 34.5 34.5 34.5 34.5 34.5 34.5 34.5 34.5 34.5
2010 31.0 28.7 30.9 32.9 28.8 33.0 28.9 31.1 33.1
2020 29.1 25.7 28.9 31.7 25.9 32.0 26.0 29.2 32.1
2050 23.3 16.7 23.1 28.7 16.8 29.0 16.7 23.3 29.0
2100 17.3 11.6 17.5 22.9 11.3 22.8 10.5 16.5 22.1
Annual number of birth.s (in thousands)
1995-2000 123,983 118,077 123,952 129,828118,109 129,869 118,131 124,005 129,891
2010-2015 138,423115,851 137,650 159,570 116,494 160,420 1l7,099 139,094 161,205
2020-2025141,727104,040139,335177.461105,860 180,464 107,501143,862 183,156
2050-2055 139,048 64,049 127,561 219,097 69,907 238,557 74,786 148,587 254,645
2095-2100 104,596 23,485 83,215 221,315 29,763 276,635 34,987 122,270 322,114
Assumed total fertility rates
1995-2000 3.36 3.21 3.36 3.51 3.21 3.51 3.21 3.36 3.51
2010-2015 3.04 2.57 3.04 3.52 2.57 3.52 2.57 3.05 3.53
2020-2025 2.80 2.17 2.79 3.41 2.17 3.42 2.18 2.80 3.42
2050-2055 2.27 1..59 2.26 2.93 1.60 2.94 1.60 2.27 2.95
2095-2100 1.88 1.38 1.88 2.39 1.38 2.38 1.38 1.88 2.38
Assumed life e:L'pectancies for both. sexes combined (in years)
1995-2000 64.2 63.8 63.8 63.8 64.2 64.2
2010-2015 66.0 63.2 63.3 63.3 66.0 66.1
2020-2025 67.5 63.1 63.1 63.2 67.5 67.6
2050-2055 70.5 62.9 63.0 63.1 70.5 70.6
2095-2100 73.3 63.6 64.0 64.3 73.2 73.5
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World
Fertility C L C H L H L C H
Mortality C H H H C C L L L
Migration C C C C C C C C C
Total popula.t;on size (in millions)
1995 5,702 5,702 .5,702 5,702 5,702 5,702 5,702 5,702 5,702
2010 7,012 6,752 6,960 7,168 6,802 7,221 6,850 7,061 7,272
2020 7,879 7,261 7,723 8,191 7,408 8,356 7,547 8,026 8,510
2050 9,874 7,103 9,021 11,300 7,802 12,330 8,488 10,690 13,300
2100 10,350 3,937 8,120 15,070 5,134 18,950 6,507 12,680 22,740
Mean age (in yea.7·s)
1995 28.8 28.8 28.8 28.8 28.8 28.8 28.8 28.8 28.8
2010 31.1 31.8 31.0 30.3 31.8 30.3 31.9 31.1 30.4
2020 32.5 33.9 32.4 31.1 34.0 31.2 34.1 32.7 31.3
2050 36.9 41.0 36.4 32.6 41.6 33.0 42.5 37.6 33.7
2100 42.1 47.1 40.7 36.0 49.0 37.0 52.1 44.4 38.7
Penentage of populo.tion aged 60+
1995 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.05 9.05 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5
2010 11.1 11.3 11.0 10.7 11.5 10.8 11.6 11.2 10.9
2020 13.2 13.7 12.9 12.2 14.0 12.5 14.4 13.6 12.8
2050 19.6 23.4 18.4 14.7 24.8 15.7 26.6 21.1 17.0
2100 26.8 33.4 24.0 17.8 37.2 19.9 42.5 30.8 22.9
Pe7'centage of popu.la.tion o.ged 0-14 yea7'S
199.5 31.4 31.4 31.4 31.4 31.4 31.4 31.4 31.4 31.4
2010 28.4 26.1 28.3 30.4 26.2 30.5 26.3 28.5 30.6
2020 26.9 23.6 26.8 29.6 23.8 29.8 23.9 27.0 29.9
2050 22.2 15.9 22.1 27.6 16.0 27.8 15.8 22.1 27.7
2100 17.2 11.7 17.05 22.9 11.3 22.6 10.4 16.4 22.0
Annual numbe7' of bi7'ths (in thousa.nds)
1995-2000 139,400 132,000 139,400 146,800 132,000 146,800 132,000 139,400 146,800
2010-2015153,100127,400152,400177,500128,100 178,300128,700153,800179,100
2020-2025155,500 114,000 153,100 19.5,500 115,800 198,500 117,500 157,700 201,300
2050-2055 151,900 70,860 140,200 240,100 76,800 259,800 81,730161,500276,100
2095-2100117,700 27,990 95,910 251,600 34,410308,000 39,700 135,6003054,100
Assumed tota.1 fertility rates
1995-2000 2.96 2.81 2.96 3.12 2.81 3.12 2.81 2.96 3.12
2010-2015 2.81 2.36 2.81 3.26 2.36 3.27 2.36 2.82 3.27
2020-2025 2.65 2.07 2.64 3.22 2.07 3.23 2.08 2.66 3.23
2050-2055 2.23 1.58 2.22 2.86 1.58 2.87 1.59 2.23 2.88
2095-2100 1.90 1.40 1.90 2.40 1.40 2.40 1.39 1.89 2.39
Assumed life e2'pectancies for both se.res combined (in yea.7·s)
1995-2000 65.0 64.5 64.6 64.6 65.0 65.0 65.4 65.4 65.5
2010-2015 67.3 64.0 64.2 64.4 67.1 67.4 70.1 70.3 70.4
2020-2025 68.7 63.05 63.7 63.9 68.5 68.8 73.3 73.4 73.5
2050-20055 71.4 62.8 63.1 63.4 71.2 71.6 79.7 79.8 79.9
2095-2100 74.0 64.7 64.8 64.9 74.0 74.2 84.3 84.4 84.5
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